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Abstract 
This dissertation is a theoretical investigation of the kinds of knowledge and ways of 
knowing that are valued within mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics.  
Central to this research is a theoretical framework based upon the Traditional Western 
Worldview and an Indigenous Worldview.  This research is based upon a collage of three 
methodologies: auto/ethnography, Gadamerian hermeneutics, and grounded theory.  The initial 
data source within this dissertation is a personal one, namely the story of how I, the author, have 
related to mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics from my earliest memory 
up to the moment of genesis for the theoretical worldview used within my research.  Analysis of 
this data gives rise to the collection and analysis of further data, until a theory can be, and is, 
proposed.  In doing this research, I, the author, am most interested in the points of conflict and 
tension that exist within the different arenas of mathematics and the teaching and learning of 
mathematics, how these trouble spots relate to the valuing of different kinds of mathematical 
knowledge and ways of knowing, and ultimately theorizes about how to rectify these problems.  
In addition to proposing a new theory of mathematics and the teaching and learning of 
mathematics, this dissertation also proposes a new philosophy of mathematics in support of that 
theory. 
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Introduction 
Mathematics and I have had a long and, for the most part, positive relationship.  As in all 
relationships, there have been times when I questioned whether I really knew mathematics.  At 
other times I thought I knew it better than anything else.  Over the years however, I came to feel 
that although I loved the math I knew, there was more to it than I had ever been shown.  Even as 
some of the reality of mathematics that I had never known or appreciated started to inch forward 
into my range of vision, I did not recognize it for what it was or could be – it was just ghost blips 
on my mathematical radar.  It was only when I allowed my thinking about mathematics to 
interact with my new understandings of two worldviews that I started to realize that the ghost 
blips were actually parts of mathematics that, for me, had been forced to hide in dark corners, far 
removed from the mathematics that I knew and loved.  This is my exploration of those corners, 
of turning on the floodlights to expose, consider, and analyze other mathematical possibilities 
and why they were left behind.  This is also a theoretical exploration of the consequences of 
coming to know and value these other mathematical possibilities not only for myself, but also for 
students, teachers, society, and even mathematics itself.  And so I begin my dissertation where it 
all began for me, with my story.  It is a story of personal experience and academic learnings, it is 
a story of worldview awareness and mathematical questioning. It is the story of Mathematics and 
Me. 
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Preface: Speaking from Place 
Before beginning the telling of my story, I first need to clarify a 
few words that I know hold distinctive meanings for different people.  
Foundational to my work are the terms First Nations, Métis, Inuit, 
Aboriginal, and Indigenous, as well as Native (American), and Indian.  
Like Herman Michell (2005), “I use the term ‘Aboriginal’ to refer to First 
Nations, Métis, and Inuit who are recognized under section 35 of the 
Canadian Constitution (1982)” (p. 33); while at times I am more liberal in 
my usage, and use Aboriginal to refer to the First Nations, Métis, and 
Inuit of a specific region of Canada, such as the Aboriginal people of 
Saskatchewan.  This use comes from years of working in the 
Saskatchewan provincial government, where at least for a time, it was the 
standard to use Aboriginal to refer to the First Nations and Métis (and 
Inuit) of Saskatchewan.  In this particular case, Inuit is in brackets 
because Saskatchewan has also held two different positions in this 
definition of Aboriginal – sometimes included and sometimes not.  This 
“flip-flopping” between definitions is a result of how “membership” in 
Saskatchewan for Indigenous peoples has been considered.  Historically, 
it is commonly held that Saskatchewan was not home to any Inuit, but 
over time, more and more Inuit have come to take permanent residence 
in Saskatchewan, both on and off reserves, so they have come to at times 
be included in the term Aboriginal in Saskatchewan.   
“I use ‘First Nations’ when referring to the first peoples of 
whatever region is being discussed” (Herman, 2005, p. 33) – the First 
Nations of Saskatchewan, the First Nations of Northern Manitoba, the 
First  Nations  of  Canada.   Formally,  First  Nations  is  the  term used  in  
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reference to “the diverse Indigenous peoples in Canada who are 
connected to ‘treaties’ and ‘reserves’ under the Indian Act” (p. 33), and as 
a result, I typically refrain from using this term when speaking beyond 
the Canadian border.    
Technically, “Métis are persons of mixed blood - 
European/Aboriginal blood (Indian ancestry); Someone who is distinct 
from Indian and Inuit, someone who has genealogical ties to Aboriginal 
ancestry.  Note: There is no specified blood quantum” (Canadian Métis 
Council, n.d.).   However, I tend to be less exacting in my use, allowing 
for Métis to include any people who are part Aboriginal in their heritage 
and ancestry, regardless of the rest of their ancestral origins.    
Most frequently, you will find that I use the term ‘Indigenous’ to 
refer to those people who “have a long-term connection, relationship and  
occupancy of  a  particular geographical  land base” (Herman, 2005,  
p. 33) – they are the First Peoples of every land.  Thus, there are 
Indigenous people around the world, on every continent, in every region, 
in every country, in every state, province, and territory. 
At this point, a side note is likely required, and that is why I 
capitalize Aboriginal and Indigenous, when not everyone does.  I do this 
because I see these terms as proper nouns in the English language.  They 
name a specific group (or groups) of people, and as such, as the name of 
these people, I believe they should be capitalized, as should 
Saskatoonians, British Columbians, Canadians, Europeans, and Africans.  
I do so as a sign of respect first and language consistency second.  
Returning to the definitions of terms I may use, at times 
throughout the short  history of this country  the  Aboriginal  people  of  
Canada  have  been  referred  to  (in  literature and  in  public and private 
ii 
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spaces) as Savages, Indians, and Natives.  Each term has carried 
significant demeaning connotations as well as, at least in the cases of 
Indian and Native, been reclaimed as tools of empowerment and 
decolonization by some (the exploration of which would, in itself, be at 
least another dissertation).  They may appear in my writing as parts of 
the academic documentation and evidence presented; however, they are, 
for me, terms that I have not come to understand or value and as such 
they are not terms that I will choose to use of my own accord.  
As in the Canadian context, other geographical and political 
regions in the world have their own terminology used in reference to 
Indigenous peoples. For example, in the United States, ‘Native 
Americans’ and ‘Eskimos’ are frequently used terms.  Any such terms 
used in this dissertation will include documentation of the geographical 
region of the people being discussed. 
Finally, specific cultural names rather than broad sweeping (and 
sometimes contentious) categories such as First Nations, Métis, Inuit, 
Aboriginal, and Indigenous will be used, whether it is the Maori or the 
Plains Cree.  Just as one would specify Hungarian rather than European 
if the discussion was specific to Hungarian people – I do this out of 
respect and to honour the place of the knowledge being shared or story 
being told. 
And now, I believe, the story can begin.  It is a story with many 
branches and many cycles. It is the story of mathematics and me. 
iii 
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Long before I ever entered school, I knew that there were some 
times when story was valued and others when it was not.  For instance, 
when talking to my mom about my friends, story was important, but 
when I was using numbers, the numbers themselves were all important.  
It is probably my early awareness of this assumed lack of relationship 
between story (or context) and mathematics that allowed me to be 
intrigued by both.  In valuing story and mathematics, I did so separately 
– understanding that the two were like separate islands within a large 
ocean of knowledge, a Venn diagram with no overlap.  The story I now 
share is the start of how I have come to a new understanding of story and 
mathematics, an understanding which is aware of a common base on 
which the two islands of story and mathematics sit, a hidden overlap in 
that Venn diagram, if you will.  This is my story of coming to re-
understand and question what mathematics is and what it could be.  
And, in the way that many stories are told, I go now to the beginning. 
  
 
My first mathematical memory is that of playing Kingo Bingo 
(Sawaka, 1970) with my mother.  Kingo Bingo was a bingo game held 
once a week on a  local TV station serving as a fundraiser for the local 
Kinsmen Club.  
Every week, my parents and grandparents would buy Kingo Bingo 
cards from the grocery store and give them to me.  On the day of the 
broadcast, Mom and I would move the piano bench in front of the TV 
and arrange the cards on it with a jar of pennies for markers beside them. 
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Because of these experiences, by the age of four, I was able to 
count from 1 to 75 and was able to divide 75 into groups of 15, knowing 
that there were 5 groups of fifteen in 75.  I also learned different shapes – 
horizontal, vertical, diagonal lines, Xs, Ls, Us, and squares.  If asked 
which column 64 would be in I could answer immediately “under the 
O”.  This knowledge of numbers transferred easily to other tasks, such as 
counting cups of flour when Mom made bread – twenty four.  But that 
soon became too boring – I wanted there to be more than just 24 since I 
could count higher.  I also recall becoming annoyed when my 
grandfather “miscounted” when we played Sorry – after all the most he 
had to do was to count to 6?!  Like Amanda Bean in Amanda Bean’s 
Amazing Dream (Woodruff, 1998), I counted “Anything and everything!”  
From this vantage point, Sesame Street (Connell, 1970) really 
irritated me as a child.  Here it was supposed to be such a great learning 
show – teaching us letters and numbers, but the most they ever counted 
was to 20, and that was a rarity.  What the Count was counting did not 
matter – the story was not important to me – we were counting, and we 
were counting too little for my tastes.  I just wanted to learn more 
numbers!  
On the other hand, shows such as Mr. Dressup and The Friendly 
Giant held great allure for me – they were all about story and 
relationships.  Numbers were rarely present, and if they did happen to 
be, they weren’t being counted or computed with – they were just part of 
the story, just like saying that a character was wearing a blue shirt.  As a 
result, I loved these two shows because of their story and the 
relationships.  As an adult, I now realize that Sesame Street also had story 
and relationships,  but  because of  the (my?)  emphasis  on numbers I did 
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not take note of those other parts, since the stories weren’t as important 
as the mathematics – after all, that was what we were supposed to be 
learning.  Soon, however, Kingo Bingo, Sesame Street, Mr. Dressup, and The 
Friendly Giant were replaced by something I had been impatiently 
waiting for – school. 
  
When I started school I loved every class I took – everything was 
compartmentalized, just as I knew it should be – stories were part of 
English class and numbers were in mathematics class.  To the best of my 
recollection, there were no stories and no relationships in mathematics 
classes and there were no numbers (unless mathematically 
inconsequential) in English – and that made sense to me.   
Early on, I also learned there was one right way of doing 
mathematics – a fact that was made unquestioningly clear to me when, in 
grade one, I attempted to help the girl behind me do some math.  
Although, or perhaps because, I was puzzled as to why she did really 
well in English, but struggled so much in mathematics, I tried explaining 
to her what we were doing in my own way.  Our first grade teacher 
overheard my explanation and declared that I was not to help anyone – if 
they needed help, the teacher would help them … the right way.  Lesson 
learned: there is one right way and other wrong ways to do mathematics. 
Later that year or the next, as we were working on our addition 
facts up to 9 + 9, this prior message of doing mathematics the right way 
came  to  haunt  me.   For  what  seemed  like  forever,  my  Mom  would 
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practice addition facts with me using a set of flash cards, and I was great 
at them … except for 8 + 5.  I never could remember that one. Then on 
one of our practice runs, my mom first showed the 8 + 4 card: “12!”.  And 
then, Mom showed the 8 + 5 card.  I was crushed.  I had been doing so 
well and now I did not know the answer – again!  After Mom told me the 
answer was 13, we were done for that practice run and I reflected on this 
answer and the previous one.  I recall thinking how strange it was that 8 
+ 5 was only one more than 8 + 4, and that 5 was only one more than 4.  
Now, I knew that this was not the right way of getting the answer to 8 + 
5 because our teacher had not taught it to us, but I was desperate to have 
a way to know the answer – even if I couldn’t tell anyone else how I got 
it.   I would have to lie and say I just knew it if asked.  As I continued to 
get the right answer whenever I thought about these relationships, I 
started feeling less and less guilty.  However, I did continue to feel some 
level of guilt as it would be more than 20 years before I would share with 
anyone what I had done to know that 8 + 5 = 13.  
Similarly, in grade three, I was acing my multiplication facts – 
except 8 x 7.  No one had told me the mnemonic of 8 x 7 = 56 and 5678, 
although I probably would have mixed it up and thought 8765 so 8 x 7 = 
65.  The cure for my inability happened in the same way for this case as it 
had for the addition – by consecutive flash cards.   
First I was shown the card 8 x 6 … “48!”, then 8 x 7  was shown 
and I was crushed.  After being told, again, that the answer was 56, I 
thought, “strange, 8 x 6 is 48, and if you add 8 to 48 you get 56 which is 8 
x 7.”  Thus, just as with 8 + 5, I had an “illegal” trick to use for 8 x 7.  
From  then  on,  I  thought of  8 x 7  as 8 more than 8 x 6 and I  always got 
the correct answer,  even though  I was  clearly not doing it right.  Again, 
4 
 
  
 11 
 
in shame, I hid my secret from my teacher and classmates, with only my 
success in multiplication overall as giving some relief from my internal 
humiliation. 
By grade four, or perhaps it was grade five, we were on to new 
and bigger mathematics, such as adding and subtracting decimals, and 
adding columns of two and three digit numbers.  As long as I avoided 
the “cardinal sin” (as our teacher regularly told us) of not putting the 
decimal down first before adding or subtracting, I was flying through 
mathematics. Although I attended church regularly with my parents (the 
United Church), the notion of a “cardinal” sin was foreign to me; 
however, I did understand what sin is, so I was very careful to follow this 
commandment. 
 Sinning aside, I knew I was doing the best I possibly could, 
because in mathematics the best is getting 100%, and that is what I was 
getting.  Everything was correct.  Then, one evening my father saw me 
doing some homework involving adding columns of two digit numbers 
and I explained to him how I was working down the ones column first, 
adding one’s digit r to the sum until I reached the bottom of the list.  My 
dad, interjected and said “the way to add columns of numbers was to 
build to tens: add the six to the four and the three, five and two together 
to get 20 with 8 more, that’s twenty eight…” I was stymied.  What Dad 
was saying seemed to get the right answer, and it made sense.  After all, 
we had learned that horizontal addition was “commutative”, but this 
was vertical addition and Dad wasn’t commuting the entire number, he 
was not showing his work – he had to be wrong.  However, he had 
piqued  my  curiousity,  so  from  then  on,  whenever  I  had  the  time,  I 
would check my columns of addition using his method in my head or on 
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a scrap of paper, after using the teacher’s method on the paper.  Of 
course, I made sure that any evidence of my using the “wrong” method 
was erased or thrown out – in a different classroom.  I was puzzled and 
intrigued how very often when the answers did not agree, the answer I 
had found “the teacher’s way” was later marked wrong (and the answer 
found Dad’s way was right).  Still, I reminded myself to always do the 
calculations the teacher’s way – the right way.  
From late elementary school through to high school, specific 
memories of mathematics elude me.  Perhaps there was nothing to stand 
out, or perhaps it was because there were too many other things going 
on: making friends, quarrelling with friends, thinking you are being 
treated like a kid ….  What I do recall is that during this time is that I 
loved my English classes and their journeys into stories and 
relationships, and I continued to take delight in mathematics.   
In high school, I continued to diligently do my mathematics the 
right way – the way the teacher taught us.  Of course, there were times 
when I did it the right way, but I made “silly mistakes”, like forgetting to 
put the +/- sign when solving a quadratic equation written as a perfect 
square: 
Teacher: Remember, when you take the square root you 
have to put in the +/- sign.  If the square root sign is 
already there, just use the sign already given. 
Me: Oh right (accompanied with a bump of the heel of 
my hand to my forehead) – how could I have forgotten 
to do that! 
In general,  throughout  all  12  grades,  I  was  perplexed  by  the 
number of students that struggled, and often not succeeding, to get 50%, 
6 
 
  
 13 
 
let alone 100%.  I would often over hear them saying to the teacher or 
friends (including me): “I don’t get math,”  “I don’t know what’s going 
on,” “I don’t know why we are doing this.”  For me, I had no such 
dilemma.  I got math – just do what you are told to do.  All you need to 
know is what kind of question you are being asked, and you do it 
because that’s how we were told to do it – it’s the right way!  It all 
seemed so straightforward and simple.  However, the time was coming 
that I would start to understand their dilemma. 
  
As it came time to apply for university (as everyone who had a 
say in the matter believed  I would naturally do) I had a tough choice to 
make: major in English or major in Mathematics.  The hardest part of this 
decision was that I was going to have to make a commitment to one and 
leave the other (more or less) behind.  In the end, and for reasons I don’t 
even really know, English won out … for the first year. Despite doing 
equally well in both my first year English and first year mathematics 
classes, something (again unknown to me) compelled me to change paths 
and I became a mathematics major.  
As second year got under way, the change of majors seemed to 
pay off in many of my math classes.  The probability theory class was 
really different, but also seemed straightforward, and in linear algebra I 
was regularly getting that 100% that I so cherished in mathematics.  
However, the same was not true with the vector calculus class I 
was taking.   I was not getting 100%, or anything near it.   I found myself 
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echoing so many of my classmates and friends from years gone by: “I 
don’t get what to do,” “I don’t understand this,” and “what is this all 
about.”  This struggle also happened once in my linear algebra class, but 
after demonstrating that I could get the right answer a number of 
different ways, but not in a linear algebra way, my professor conceded 
and told me what to do (so I could do it the right way).  
This resolved my linear algebra problem, and I went back to my 
frequent marks of 100%; however, I did not find a similar “silver bullet” 
for my vector calculus course.  By the final exam, I was almost 
completely dejected, believing that I had hit the end of my mathematical 
road, just as I had seen so many before me do.  
On the final, there was a question that involved the intersection of 
two functions.  I recognized the functions by their form – one was the 
equation of a plane and one of a cylinder.  I solved the question 
completely; however, when I checked my work, I realized that the 
answer had to be wrong because instead of the circular intersection that I 
knew it had to be, I had gotten a function that I recognized as being in 
the form of an ellipse.  So, I erased my work and started over – yet again I 
got an ellipse. I erased and tried again – still an ellipse.  I was getting 
panicked, so I tried a method from another class (I knew I was breaking 
the right way rule, but I was desperate) – I still got an ellipse.  This was 
how I spent more than an hour of my time for the final exam: erasing, 
trying again, and erasing again ….   For the first time in my life, I had no 
way (right or wrong) to get what I believed was the right answer, and I 
was erasing my work, not to hide my cheating, but to hide my failure.  In 
the end  I did two things that  I had never  done before and never  
thought I  would  do:  gave  no answer to a  big  question and  erased  my 
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work so much that there was a tear that stretched across half the page.  I 
left the exam defeated – I knew I had failed. 
The following day, despite my predictable removal from being in 
the   honours program,  and  likely  from  being   a  mathematics  major, 
perhaps even from being a student at the university, I decided I would 
check to see if any marks were posted for my other classes.  As I made 
my way into the Department of Mathematics and Statistics from the 
outside rain to check for postings on my professors’ doors, my walk took 
me past the door of my professor for that vector calculus class.  I was 
relieved to see it was closed, but no sooner had I passed by, when I heard 
my name coming from behind me.   
As I turned, there stood my vector calculus professor, beckoning 
me to come and talk to her.  Walking into her office, my professor took 
my wet coat and hung it up, and then offered me a cup of tea from a pot 
of freshly steeped Earl Grey.  Sheepishly, I accepted and then we both sat 
down at her desk.  She reached into a file folder and pulled out my final 
exam and said she wanted to talk to me about it.  If I could have turned 
and run away, I would of, but sitting in the chair, full cup of tea in hand, 
jacket hanging in a closed closet, and a door that seemed to be miles 
away, I agreed.  She opened my test paper to the ripped page and asked 
me to explain what had happened there.  
I explained that I knew that the one function was a cylinder.   She 
agreed.  And the other was a plane.  She agreed.  I then explained, 
demonstrating with my pencil and student card that the intersection of 
the two functions would be a circle, but that I kept getting an ellipse.  I 
just could not get the right answer, so I kept erasing and trying again.   In 
the end, I told her the page was torn and I gave up. 
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I can still recall the “tsk tsk” sound that my professor made as she 
slightly pushed the heel of my hand upwards and I saw my student card 
about to theoretically slice the pencil on a non-right angle.  As I 
visualized my student card slicing through the pencil at that angle my 
circle disappeared and was replaced by an ellipse.  In fact, it was 
replaced by many ellipses, only one of which was actually a circle.  All I 
could say was “You’ve got to be kidding!”  My professor replied, “No, 
but now I need to know what you are going to do about it.” 
As I contemplated and grappled with what this revelation had 
shown me – that I could regurgitate mathematics, but that there was at 
least some (possibly a great deal or all) of mathematics that I could 
regurgitate but didn’t really understand – I gradually formulated a reply 
to her prompt.  I explained to my professor that I appeared to have two 
obvious options: to quit as a mathematics major and go back to being an 
English major where I was sure I understood things (I was wrong about 
that too), or else I was going to have to challenge myself and go back to 
figure out what I really didn’t know about the mathematics I thought I 
knew.  I recall thinking, at the time, that it wasn’t really a good reply; 
however, my professor thanked me and said, “that’s all I needed to 
know.”  
I quickly finished my tea, she brought me my jacket, and without 
bothering to check if my other marks were posted – it wouldn’t matter as 
I was sure I had failed my vector calculus (I had no doubt then that 
everything else I did on the exam was wrong as well) – I went back out 
into the rain. To my surprise, when I received my marks for the term I 
had not only passed vector calculus, but I had been given the minimum 
mark in that class that would keep me in the honours program.  
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 I returned shortly after receiving my marks to see my professor 
again to thank her, at which point she said: “just remember what you 
said your options were.”  I have never forgotten them, that in ultimately 
choosing to stay as a mathematics major I was committing myself to 
relearning mathematics, to understanding and not just mimicking 
mathematics.  I have never forgotten how on that rainy day that 
professor, who made me a cup of tea and tilted my hand, started me on a 
journey of learning to re-think mathematics. 
I remained committed to the promise I had made to my vector 
calculus professor, and I struggled to gain the mathematical 
understandings I hadn’t learned before.  Often it was a difficult struggle, 
with understanding coming months after I had first sought it, or with my 
receiving of praise (in terms of high marks and recommendations by 
professors to do a Masters in mathematics) for my outstanding 
knowledge, knowledge that I guiltily knew, and frequently admitted, 
was not as spectacular or meaningful as the credit I was being given 
seemed to indicate.  Although I was open and honest about what I felt 
my deficiencies were, both my professors and fellow students really 
didn’t seem to understand what I was getting at. 
Probably the best example of my struggles and of others not 
understanding them comes from the day that a student, who I had now 
known for two and a half years and who was in all the same mathematics 
classes that I was in, came into a classroom of ours to find me clearly in 
torment over something.  Upon his inquiry, I replied that I was finding it 
very difficult to “wrap my head around” the mathematics we were 
learning  in  this  particular  class.   He  kindly  replied, “like  what?      
I’m  getting  this   class  –  perhaps  I  can   help  you.”   Seizing  upon  the 
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opportunity to ask someone who wasn’t the professor the “foolish 
questions” I had (the vast majority of my fellow classmates did not speak 
English, and I did not speak their languages – other than math, and as 
noted, I wasn’t getting the math), I posed “well, for example, I don’t 
understand what a tensor product is.”  I was so excited when he replied, 
“I can help with that!” and then he continued on by giving me, word for 
word, the definition that was in our textbook.  
I thanked him for his answer, but seeing I wasn’t yet happy he 
inquired what was wrong.  My reply was one that he did not understand: 
“I know the definition of a tensor product, or can look it up, but what I 
want to know is what is a tensor product?  What does it look like?  Does 
it have hands?  If I was to meet a tensor product in a back alley should I 
shake its hand or run away?”  My fellow student was stunned by what 
I’m sure he thought was pure gibberish that was coming out of my 
mouth, and he said “All you need to know is…” and he again supplied 
the definition.  Forcing a smile, I said thank you, and made sure to look 
like his efforts had really helped, but they had not. 
When the course was finished, and I was (again) going to check if 
my marks were posted outside of my professors’ doors, I happened to 
run into the professor for that particular class.  He felt obliged to tell me 
why I had received the second highest mark in the class, and this other 
student (who had told me what a tensor product was) got the top mark. 
It was because that student had picked up the language and I hadn’t.  I 
replied: “true enough – I actually didn’t expect this high of a mark as I 
really don’t understand what we were learning.”   
Two things related to this incident have stuck with me.  First, that 
professor said,  “don’t worry about it – later this year in some other class 
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it will all of a sudden come back to you and make sense.”  I believe, 
although I never formally tested my knowledge, that he was right. The 
second point that I remember is not as positive.  After we finished our 
BSc degrees, that same student became a Master’s student working with 
that same professor.  After less than four months in, the same professor 
informed me that his grading system had been faulty as he now realized 
that just because someone spoke the language didn’t mean they 
understood the concept.  I also found out from the student who had tried 
to help me that he was removed from the Masters’ program because he 
could only speak the language, but did not understand the mathematics.  
I was saddened to realize that for this particular student (and friend), his 
time for realizing that he was missing understandings in mathematics 
did not afford him the opportunity to commit to change and carry on as 
mine had.  Instead, his realization occurred with the firm closing of the 
door to mathematics that I had not so long ago feared myself. 
Another important event occurred in my fourth year when, as a 
math major, I had a weekly honours seminar at which each of us who 
were involved were expected to research some area of mathematics (in 
my case, the mathematics of sounds produced by different drum shapes 
– music to that point had always been another passion of mine that was 
also kept separate from mathematics) and present what we had learned 
to our seminar group.  As the classroom we met in was in use prior to 
our seminar, we frequently met in the department of mathematics and 
statistics lounge.  
One day,  while sitting in the lounge before class,  one of my 
fellow students mentioned how  his partner,  who was  an English  
major, 
was seriously contemplating doing her Masters in mathematics.  One of 
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the professors who ran our seminar said: “well, that’s a bit of leap, isn’t 
it” and I blurted out “not really, after all, mathematics is just another 
language.”  It was a thought that had been trying to push its way 
forward in my thinking for some time as I had worked to relearn 
mathematics, but had not, to date, ever been said out loud.  
As soon as the comment was out of my mouth I braced for the 
onslaught, but was relieved to see that a number of professors in the 
lounge decided to take sides on this point and quickly it led to a debate 
that I was able to observe without involvement.  Gradually, the debaters 
started leaving, but as those of us in the seminar were heading out the 
door, two professors remained.  The last words we heard said from the 
pair, was the professor of a Christian faith saying to the professor of non-
Christian faith: “At least we can agree that God made 0 and 1, and man 
did the rest,” and I heard in my memory my elementary teacher’s 
warning about the cardinal sin of adding and subtracting decimals.  I 
was very happy to get out of the lounge, down the hall to our classroom 
and be safely sitting at a table, waiting for that week’s presentation to 
begin.  I was starting to believe that mathematics and religion were also 
topics best kept isolated. 
After completing my BSc in Mathematics (Honours), and still 
firmly committed to my relearning of mathematics as I promised my 
vector calculus professor (much to the, at first, chagrin, and, often later, 
pleasure of the many university students I tutored in mathematics), I 
entered into an education program.  I had always believed that I wanted 
to  teach,  but  when I  graduated it seemed  like half  the  people  from  
my graduating class of over 600  were  going  into  education,  and  I  had 
started  to  doubt  whether  it was where I should be.   However, after my 
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four years studying mathematics, and more importantly relearning and 
teaching others like me how to relearn mathematics, I knew it was what 
I wanted to do.  
Initially I applied to three university education programs.  Two 
accepted me, sight unseen, merely because I was a mathematics major 
and they desperately needed mathematics teachers in their parts of 
Canada.  Although the two offers were tempting, I decided that the 
financial commitment for making such large moves was not something 
I was willing to take on.  The third called me in for an interview at 
which I was informed that I could not do a secondary education degree 
with math as a major and English as a minor – I needed to take more 
physics and biology classes as part of my program so I could be a math 
major and science minor.  I remember noticing how puzzled the 
advisor I met with was by my combination of major and minors – 
clearly he felt (or the program he was interviewing me for was 
designed) as if English and Mathematics do not go together.  It never 
dawned on me at that time that up until just recently this had also been 
my thinking.  
As a result of not wanting to take additional science classes and 
really wanting to teach both mathematics and English, I decided to 
apply to the Education program at the same university where I got my 
BSc degree.  This time, there was no issue with my having a 
mathematics major and English minor as a prospective teacher, 
although there was one English class that I had to take to fulfill the 
entrance requirements for an English minor.  
Throughout   my   education   classes    and   internship,   I   was 
pleasantly surprised by  some of the things that  I  learned about  –  
such as the  use  of  different concrete models to  help students  develop 
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understandings of abstract notions in mathematics, such as integers and 
operations on integers.  English was still embedded in story and 
relationships and mathematics was still abstracted for absolute truth.  
After 12 months of the education program, I convocated from the College 
of Education and, too late to get a teaching position for the upcoming 
school year, I decided to put my name on the substitute teachers list as 
well as volunteering at my old high school when I had time. 
  
After eight months of being a substitute teacher and volunteer, I 
accepted a full time secondary mathematics teaching position in a small 
rural school.  The student body primarily were from farming families 
and from a near by First Nations reservation.  Although the reservation 
had its own K-12 school, I was surprised to find out that across the 
grades K-12 an average of 10% of the students registering in my school in 
the fall were from the reservation.  The impression that I got was that 
some of the families on the reservation felt that their children would get a 
better education in a public school, although I never thought to actually 
inquire into it.  Early on, a message concerning the students from the 
reservation quickly spread through the teaching staff – if we work hard 
to keep them here until October 1st everything will be great!   
I,  in  my  naiveté,  thought  this  meant  that  if  the  First  Nations 
students stayed until October 1st, they would most likely stay at our 
school all year.  I knew, from what I had been told in University, that the 
drop out  rate  for  First Nations  students was  high  in the province,  so I  
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was happy to hear that there was something that I could do, for the first 
month (although, I was prepared to do it for the entire school year) to 
keep the First Nations students in our school from dropping out.  It was 
years later, when I was elsewhere, that I came to actually understand the 
message – that if the First Nations students were in our school on 
October 1st, we would receive all of the funding allocated by the Federal 
government for each student for the year – regardless of whether the 
students remained in our school or not.  You would think that I would 
have known something wasn’t right given the number of First Nations 
students who left our school after October 1st to go the school on the 
reserve every year, but somehow I never connected the dots.  I do not 
know how many of my colleagues knew this truth behind the message 
that we had all shared – I like to believe none, but I have also never 
asked. 
In each of the grades 10-12 mathematics classes that I taught at 
that school, I never had more than one First Nations student, and, despite 
my gut belief that they didn’t need to be, the vast majority of those 
students were most often slated into general mathematics classes rather 
than the regular academic offerings.  Although the general mathematics 
classes were never intended to be used as modified courses, many 
schools in the province used registered “struggling” students in these 
classes and teachers were expected to “just give them the math they 
really need”, without that math ever being defined. 
At the end of my third year teaching, a grade 11 student who was 
First Nations and in my grade 11 Algebra class told me he would not be 
taking grade 12 mathematics.   I pleaded with him to change his mind 
and  to  tell  me  why   he  was  making  this  decision.   His  answer  that,  
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although he finally understood from my classes what it was that 
mathematics expected of him and that he knew he was capable of doing 
it, he felt he had missed out so much that it really was not worth his 
effort or mine.  I did my best to try to convince him that my effort was 
why I had chosen to be in this job, and that it was actually a privilege 
when I knew I could make a difference in someone’s life.  He thanked me 
and told me I had already made a difference in his life.  He was not in my 
grade 12 mathematics class the next year.  
It was not until my sixth year of teaching at the school that I had a 
First Nations student take a grade 12 mathematics course. In order to 
graduate from grade 12, students were only required to have a grade 11 
mathematics credit.  Where most of my non-First Nations students were 
expected by administration, parents, and even themselves to take at least 
one grade 12 course in mathematics, the same push or motivation did not 
seem to exist for the First Nations students.  In fact, I was often the only 
voice arguing for the First Nations students I had in grade 11 to go on to 
take grade 12 mathematics.  I could not understand why this was 
happening and it bothered me a lot.  
I regularly reflected on how my students from the reserve 
struggled with mathematics, wondering what was happening in the 
prior grades that was causing this chasm in the First Nations students’ 
often they had been in the same prior mathematics classes (as far back as 
Kindergarten) as the students, who were not First Nations, who did go 
into my grade 12 mathematics classes.   As the only mathematics teacher 
in the school,  and not sure how to broach the subject with my 
elementary and  middle  school  colleagues  who may  have  taught  the 
students, this reflection remained an internal  one  –  one of those puzzles  
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in teaching that you know should not exist, yet it does, and what to do 
about it eludes you. 
As I was heading towards my seventh year of teaching, I decided 
that I needed a change.  I had found myself falling into routines I did not 
like – forgetting to consider that I might be unintentionally contributing 
to the occasional issues that would arise in the classroom or school, and 
instead placing blame squarely and solely on particular students.  I was 
catching myself wanting to join in in the staff room rants about particular 
students, and I knew that was not where I wanted to be.  So, I applied for 
and accepted a position across the province from my current school.  My 
new school was larger than the first, although still small, and I was 
fortunate enough to have a second high school mathematics teacher to 
work with.  With the school being within a larger community, the 
students came from a (slightly) more diversified family background.  
Many were from farm families, but others were involved in different 
forms of industry and commercial business.  
The second difference between the two schools is that my new 
school had no First Nations or Métis students.  As a result, I did not have 
the opportunity at this school to further explore the phenomenon of First 
Nations students dropping out of mathematics that I had observed at my 
first school; however, my curiousity and concern in this regard did 
remain with me. 
During my years at both schools, I was fortunate to have the 
support  of  my  director  to,  first,  be  part  of  a  pilot  project  for a new 
mathematics curricula at the high school level, and, second, be an 
implementation leader for those curricula.  It was a big change in 
curricula with respect to how teaching  and learning,  rather than 
content,  
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were viewed.  I was excited to see the emphasis on the use of hands-on 
materials and technology in the teaching and learning of mathematics – 
so much so that I, for the time being, forgot about any questions or 
concerns I had about the “right way” of mathematics.  
Shortly after becoming a pilot teacher I was introduced to a 
mathematics manipulative called “Alge-tiles®” which could be used to 
represent different algebraic expressions and equations and to 
demonstrate what operations on polynomials looked like.  Although I 
knew all about algebra and polynomials, this manipulative was an eye-
opener of the kind I had been looking for all those years back when I was 
struggling with the tensor product.  Now, I could see algebra – I could 
tell if it had hands and I was pretty sure that unless you did not use them 
properly, polynomials would be friendly.  Moreover, the end result from 
having students use this manipulative was that they would naturally 
come to do the math the right way!  The weekend following my Friday 
introduction to Alge-tiles®, I picked up construction paper and glue and 
proceeded to make my own homemade set.   I had a plan. 
In my grade 10 Algebra class at that time, I had a delightful 
student who also was my director’s daughter.  She was bubbly, popular, 
kind, and smart in everyway except, it seemed, in algebra.  Up to this 
point I had struggled to find ways so that she would understand that x + 
x does not equal x2, just as apple + apple does not equal house.   I later 
(much later) realized that when she said “Oh, right – I forgot” each time 
we went over this  idea that what  I was saying made  as much sense as 
what  my  grade 10  teacher  had told me  about the  rule  for the  +/-  
sign and square roots – we both thought we were being told a rule that 
just  was.   There  was  no sense to  it  –  we  just needed  to know  it – like  
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knowing that 8 + 5 = 13 – just know it! 
I arrived at the school early on the Monday morning after my 
weekend of manipulative making so that I would be sure to catch the 
student as she walked in the door and invited her to come see me during 
the lunch hour.  Like clockwork, the student arrived with a smile on her 
face and I introduced her to the Alge-tiles®.  Probably because I was so 
excited about them, the student did not question the validity of the tiles, 
nor did she seem to feel that such “toys” were beneath her.  At the end of 
her introduction to the tiles, I gave the student a bag full of them and told 
her that she was allowed to use them anytime she wanted (on tests, on 
assignments, whenever), and she did.  After about a week, I noticed that 
the bag was opening up less often, and that she was making small 
drawings, often unrecognizable, along the side of her page, or just 
pushing the tiles around a bit within the bag.  By the end of the month, 
she brought me the bag of tiles, telling me that she did not need them any 
more.  I took the bag, put it in the top drawer of my desk, and told her 
they were there for her anytime she wanted them.  
To my knowledge, the student never came for the Alge-tiles®  
again; however, her algebra marks were growing in leaps and bounds, 
and soon other students were turning to her for help.  None of the other 
students ever wanted to try the tiles, but they did accept this particular 
student’s use of and reference to them, and I started to notice small 
drawings on the sides of many of their papers too.  By the end of the 
course,  the  director’s  daughter  had  gone  from  struggling  to  pass  to 
getting grades in the high 80s and 90s.  Of course, I doubted myself (and 
the Alge-tiles®), thinking that I must have been giving her too many 
extra partial marks or not checking her work carefully enough. 
21 
 
  
 28 
 
As an outstanding musician, singer, and dancer, the director’s 
daughter chose to go to a city school to completer her high school 
education – a school where she could be more deeply involved in the 
arts, but that also was known for its high academic standards.  As her 
family still lived in the community, she often stopped by for a visit after 
school hours.  I was excited to hear about all of the drama and musicals 
that she was involved in, but she was even more excited to tell me about 
her excelling in her mathematics classes.  She credited this success to my 
sharing of the Alge-tiles® with her.  As I continued on teaching, this 
incident also became a point of reoccurring reflection for me; perhaps 
serving as a counter-balance to the suffocating tension I still felt when I 
remembered the plight of First Nations students in mathematics that I 
had previously seeing.   
Consequently, I was able to justify the use of the Alge-tiles® as a 
means to the end – in the end, this student was able to do algebra the 
“right way.”  Just like the addition and multiplication tricks I had for a 
couple of number facts in my elementary years, the Alge-tiles® had 
merely acted as a springboard to take her to the “right way.”  After all, 
she no longer needed them – she knew algebra. 
On a different note, as the high school teacher in a small rural 
school without a guidance councilor, I was accustomed to having 
students seeking my advice and knowledge about applying for different 
post-secondary programs:  “What mathematics do I have to take,”  “Do 
you think I could be a veterinarian,” and so on.  In that regard, at our 
first or second  pilot  teacher meeting,  we  were  told  that Math  B20,  the 
second of two consecutive grade 11 mathematics courses being 
developed,   was  intended  to  be  an   entrance   requirement   for   post- 
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secondary programs that did not require students to know about geo-trig 
or to take a Calculus course.  I recall thinking this would be a nice option, 
particularly for students entering the humanities or fine arts – it would 
give them an opportunity to take other courses relevant to them in high 
school.  
However, at the next pilot meeting, when the grade 11 (Math A20 
and Math B20) curricula were to be shared we were instead given Math 
20 and Math A30.  Our inquiries into the change led to the explanation 
that the post-secondary institutions refused to consider a grade 11 credit 
in mathematics for an entrance requirement.  Initially, the curricula 
writer was planning to start the grade 11 curricula over, but it was 
suggested to him through an anonymous phone call that instead he 
rename Math B20 so that it would be a grade 12 course, hence Math A30.   
I was shocked – weren’t entrance requirements based upon what was 
needed, not name or grade level of the course?  Where did this hierarchy 
of knowledge and eligibility come from, and was it part of mathematics?   
I was concerned about making the name, rather than the content, the 
most significant feature of the course, but as always, there is more than 
enough to keep your mind occupied when you are teaching and I soon 
moved this information to the back of my memory. 
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My experiences as a pilot teacher and implementation leader for 
the new curricula also served as a gateway to an unexpected change in 
my life – that of becoming the first educational consultant of K-12 
mathematics at the provincial Ministry of Education.  Because of all the 
experiences I had had working with the new curricula and with teachers 
in the field, and how much I enjoyed it, this position seemed to have 
been crafted just for me.  In addition, as I was now living in a larger 
urban setting, other opportunities arose, such as my seeking of a Masters 
of Education degree.  Throughout my almost 12 years in this position I 
had many experiences that have come to influence how I think about the 
teaching and learning of mathematics, as did my working on my 
Masters. 
My love of learning and my desire to better understand how 
mathematics can be taught and learned made continuing on into another 
degree an obvious pursuit for me.  Looking back, I wonder how it was 
that my interest in the disconnect between First Nations students and 
mathematics did not become the focus of my studies, but then I have also 
many stories and experiences between the start of my Masters program 
and now that are undoubtedly influencing what I remember from that 
time.  It was instead the concept of zero, or more precisely what teachers 
and students understand about zero that became the focus of my studies.  
This decision was greatly influenced by my participation on the 
mathematics team of the Western and Northern Canadian Protocol 
(WNCP) during the renwal of the Common Curriculum Frameworks (CCFs) 
for grades k-9 (WNCP, 2006) and for grades 10-12 (WNCP, 2008) 
mathematics.  The CCFs are documents that outline the mathematics  
content to be taught  in each grade in  the four western provinces and 
three territories of Canada (the WNCP member jurisdictions). 
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Early on in the renewal process, while working on the 
kindergarten, grade 1, and grade 2 outcomes, I, being a secondary 
specialist, inquired why students were learning about whole numbers 
from 1 to 10 and 1 to 100, but never about zero. Those who were 
elementary specialists sitting around the table appeared to be in shock 
that such a question was asked: “Zero is too difficult a concept for young 
children – just look at how late it was developed in history!”  I was 
stymied by the reply,  as  I did not know the  history of zero  at that time, 
so my questioning reply had no real effect: “But if you have  a two year  
old with a  pile of Smarties® in front of them and you ask how many 
they have, they will give you all sorts of numbers from 2 to a zillion, but 
if you take them away, what two year old doesn’t know how many they 
now have?  I’m not suggesting that they learn about limits and infinity – 
just naming having none of something by its quantity name of ‘zero’.”  In 
response, it was stated “Over my dead body will these young children be 
exposed to zero,” and the conversation moved on to a different topic. 
This conversation, or rather, lack of a conversation, reminded me 
of many encounters I had had with students in relation to zero: their 
forgetting to consider it as a number on the number line, ignoring it in a 
list of data because it was just “nothing,” and questioning why 
everything seemed to be caught up in zero (solving equations, solving 
inequalities, non-permissible values, test points…).  Clearly zero was 
more than the “trivial case” that it is commonly referred to in higher 
grades and later courses of mathematics, and I needed to get to know it 
better – so I did.  I started reading about zero, having conversations with 
others about “nothing,” and playing with an empty set.  I found out my 
colleagues  from  the  WNCP  mathematics  team  were  right –  zero  had  
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developed late in history, at least in Western history, and more 
specifically, Western written history.  What I learned about zero is a story, 
or really a set of stories, a few of which I feel are worth sharing as a part 
of my overall story. 
What I found out about zero was both interesting and perplexing.  
In the written histories of zero, claim to the first use of zero is given to the 
Mayan culture.  During their short existence, the Mayans developed 
intricate number and mathematical systems, including a complex 
calendar system that counted backwards to the end of time.  Zero played 
a prominent numerical role in the Mayan society, including each month 
beginning with day zero, and the inclusion of year zero as well (Barrow, 
2000; Kaplan, 1999; Seife, 2000).  I found this illuminating, as it had 
always puzzled me why, when switching from BC to AD we had 
counted back to one and then started moving forwards again, when it 
seemed to make sense to count back to zero – like a timer would. 
As I read further, I found out that zero appeared, anew, in Babylonia 
around 400 BC, while the first place value system of numbers was being 
invented.  At that time, a symbol was introduced to represent an empty 
column on a counting board and even though it was thought of as “a 
digit, not a number” (Seife, 2000, p. 15) it was the first written 
representation of a notion of zero known within that part of the world. It 
seemed odd to me that at that time, zero would not have been recognized 
as a number, representing a quantity with a measure of none. Instead, 
Lydon and Kaplan (2000) noted that this new symbol was more like a 
punctuation mark than a numerical quantity. 
Perplexed by this seeming oversight of the Babylonian zero, I 
continued  to  read  about  zero,   finding  out  that  through  trading  and 
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warfare, the Babylonian symbol made its way to other parts of the 
world, most notably India and Greece (Barrow, 2000; Kaplan, 1999; Seife, 
2000).  In India, the placeholder symbol was not only accepted, but the 
notion of a quantity of zero and the symbolic representation of that 
quantity also came into being.  I was actually filled with a sense of relief 
for zero, it had finally been acknowledged for its quantity (or lack there 
of).  I was also very intrigued to find out that the reason why the Indian 
mathematicians moved so quickly to the incorporation of the symbol and 
its numerical meaning was tied to the Hindu religion.  There it was – 
religion playing with mathematics, yet again. Specifically, I found out 
that because the Hindu religion at that time had numerous deities, all of 
which represented the balancing of two dichotomous or opposite ideas. 
In this case, zero, or the void, balanced the notion of the infinite (infinity). 
(Barrows, 2000; Kaplan, 1999). However, the Indian mathematicians went 
further than to just name a quantity of nothing with the Babylonian 
symbol for zero:  
The Indian calculators readily defined [zero] to be the result of 
subtracting any number from itself. In AD 628, the Indian astronomer 
Brhmagupta defined zero in this way and spelled out the algebraic rules 
for adding, subtracting, multiplying, and most strikingly of all, dividing 
with it. (Barrow, 2000, p. 39) 
Reading about these developments was almost thrilling, as they 
quickly led to the start of the base-ten place value system and its related 
operations  that  are used today and  that I  had  loved  ever  since  I  had 
started playing bingo with my mother all those years before.  Zero and 
the Indian number system quickly spread to Asia and Arabic countries, 
as  astronomers  and   bookkeepers  happily  moved  from   their  use   of  
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additive number systems (where the value of a number representation 
was the sum of all the values shown in the representation, such as used 
in the Roman Numeral system) when it was realized how much simpler 
calculations could be (Barrow, 2000; Kaplan, 1999; Seife, 2000).  
And so, I began to wonder what all the hubbub had been about 
zero having being developed so late in history. Sure, the symbol for zero 
had been developed after those for other quantities, but who really 
wanted to symbolically represent how much of something they had if 
they had none of it?  Moreover, the 7th century isn’t that late in 
mathematical history! Then, I started to read about Greece’s reaction to 
zero, and it was not good.  
Although it is believed that zero officially arrived in Greece 
during the invasion of the Babylonian Empire in 331 BC, during which 
they carried  “zero off with them, along with women and gold”  (Kaplan, 
1999, p. 17), it was only in their work on astronomy that zero appeared in 
Greece at that time.  Even within astronomical papyri, zero was only 
appearing as a placeholder within angle measurements, and not as a 
numeral for a quantity.  In fact, Seife (2000) notes: “the Greeks didn’t like 
zero at all and used it as infrequently as possible. After doing their 
calculations with Babylonian notation, Greek astronomers usually 
converted the number back into clunky Greek-style numerals – without 
zero” (p. 39).  Just like how I never told anyone about my tricks to add 8 
and 5, multiply 8 and 7, or add columns of numbers quickly, the Greeks 
were  apparently trying to  keep their use of zero a secret from everyone 
else.  As I read about their conversions back to the Greek-style (and 
additive) number system, I saw myself erasing my cheating scribbles in 
elementary  school  and  my obviously  incorrect  mathematics during the  
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university exam.  I could almost feel their fear of being caught doing 
their mathematics the wrong way, and the embarrassment of not being 
able to do it the right way. 
But, zero is part of the mathematics I knew and loved – why were 
the Greeks so standoffish about it?  What I found out was that for the 
Greeks, this new number and numeral carried a lot of old baggage.  The 
first problem went back to the work of the Pythagoreans, a basis of not 
only Greek mathematics, but also Greek philosophy.  “To Pythagoras the 
connection between shapes and numbers was deep and mystical” (Seife, 
2000, p. 27); however, there was no such connection between zero and 
shapes.  For the Pythagoreans, the theories of Pythagoras, and the 
mystical properties that accompanied those theories were serious 
business.  They were the “right way” to do mathematics and to live life. 
Accepting zero would put both mathematics and life in jeopardy.  Yet 
again, I was seeing how mathematics and religion could become so 
entangled that religion would dictate what mathematics did and could 
be. 
The second problem I discovered that the Greek civilization had 
with zero was philosophical: “if you were a philosopher, you might have 
had to get a grip on the slippery abstract concept of Nothing and 
persuade your peers that Nothing could be something at all – not least, 
something worth studying” (Barrow, 2000, p. 54).  Notably, it was this 
struggle with zero that became a common plaything for authors in the 
Greek  civilization,  such as in Homer’s story of  Odysseus  and Cyclops. 
Being led to believe that Odysseus’ name was Noman, Cyclops cries for 
help were not heeded, as he claimed “Noman is killing me” (Barrow, 
2000, p. 60).   For,  if no  man was  killing Cyclops,  then Cyclops must be  
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mentally ill, and there was nothing (zero) that could be done for that. I 
enjoyed reading about their use of mathematically referential puns, and 
started to realize that when I had taught mathematics I too liked to play 
with words and make mathematical puns. Perhaps mathematics and 
story were not as isolated as I had always believed them to be. 
Finally, I read about how the Greek civilization at the time had 
problems with a more scientific, or natural philosophy, question about 
zero: how could a perfect vacuum of empty space exist (a physical 
representation of nothing)?  Pondering such questions naturally led to 
questioning of religion and the existence of God. In fact, all three of these 
issues with zero “risked serious disapproval from the religious status 
quo for letting … thoughts stray into such potentially heretical territory” 
(Barrow, 2000, p. 54).  Thus, zero was, officially through laws, banished 
from Greece, although Greek astronomers and Italian account keepers 
often used the Indian zero (and number system) in their “scrap paper” 
calculations. The Hindu-Arabic numerals (including zero) were even 
commonly used in the writing of encrypted messages; however, the 
number system was never allowed to live “above ground,” so to speak. 
As time progressed, other arguments were made against the readmitting 
of zero into Greek life, including the claim that the Hindu-Arabic 
numerals, to which zero (0) belongs, were too easy to falsify: “a 0 could 
be turned into a 6 with a flourish of a pen, for instance” (Seife, 2000, p. 
80). It was not until the 13th century, when the mathematician Fibonacci  
included the Indian zero in his  writing,  that  the government (and 
hence, by that time, the Catholic church as well) gave in to the powers 
and pressures of the economic and academic worlds and zero re-
immigrated ( officially)  to  the  Greek world  and  its  neighbours.   I  had 
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never dreamt that zero, or any of mathematics, might be such a religious 
and philosophical problem.   
My research into the history of zero also led me to explore the 
many roles and unique properties of zero – place holder, quantity, 
additive identity, multiplicative identity, inverse relationship to infinity 
(positive, negative, or both) ….  It was true, zero is a complex concept. 
However, I was, at the end of all my reading and discussions even more 
convinced that the exclusion of zero from the early grades of the 
curricula was not a well-grounded choice.  For the first time ever, I found 
myself questioning why we teach mathematics topics in the order we do.  
Zero did not develop late in every culture – the Mayans, Indians, Asians 
and Arabs all grabbed hold of it immediately and ran.  In fact, without 
zero our number system (base-ten place value) would not exist, so why 
are we not teaching it right away?  Besides, I still could not believe that 
people in Greece (and the areas under the influence of its knowledge 
creation) were not aware of a zero quantity just because it had not yet 
been symbolized.  Sticks with notches on it have been considered 
historically to be evidence of a counting system, but what about sticks 
without notches – could they not have represented zero of something?   
Further, I was beginning to question the emphasis placed on symbolic 
notation as an indication of a concept existing.  Sure, it’s a lot easier when 
you can see the symbol for zero to know that people were using a 
concept, but I could not accept that without symbols the ideas did not 
already exist.  And, there I was, in conflict with my beloved mathematics. 
Mathematics is all about working with symbols – numerals, operations, 
variables, but I was starting to think that the symbols did not make the 
math. 
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This was the first time I started questioning if what I had been 
taught and experienced about mathematics was all it could be, and it was 
a very uncomfortable position for me personally.  I almost felt like I was 
betraying mathematics – but what if mathematics had already been 
betrayed before I came along?  In the end, I was fortunate to have had  
the privilege of being able to make the CCF documents into curricula 
documents for my home province, and in doing so make changes to 
outcomes and indicators that I felt necessary to make the curricula fit in 
my province.  I successfully convinced others involved in this process 
that students needed to be introduced to zero, as a quantity, as soon as 
they started learning about the whole numbers in Kindergarten.  
My Masters’ research also supported this decision when grade 2 
and 3 students told me that although they did not know what zero was, 
they definitely knew it was not a number.  When I inquired how it was 
that they were so sure zero was not a number, I was given two answers: 
if it was, they would have been taught about it when they were taught 
about 1 to 10 (good point) and if it was, then we would say it when we 
say the number names (we say twenty and twenty one – if zero was a 
number we would say twenty-zero – another good point).  And so it was 
that I had made my first public break from the way I had learned to 
know mathematics – I refused to let history, particularly a version of 
history that was not representative of everyone’s history with 
mathematics, determine what mathematics would be learned when. 
At the same time that I was working on my Masters degree, my work at 
the Ministry of Education had a major emphasis on  the development  
and  delivery  of   content  and  pedagogy   based  workshops   to  
teachers of grades K-12 mathematics throughout  the  province.   Initially, 
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I had a team of 20 teacher leaders to help in the design and delivery of 
the workshops, but the team soon grew to 83, with 12 different 
workshops moving from location to location around the province.  
Although the Ministry of Education had consultants who focused 
on issues and initiatives relevant to First Nations and Métis students, 
many of whom I knew to see working diligently on the same floor that 
my office was located on, it was through our offering of these 12 
workshops around the province that I realized that the drop-out rates of 
First Nations students in mathematics was not a phenomenon localized 
to the first school that I taught in, rather it was the norm.  However, very 
few people had even opinions of why, let alone any idea of what might 
be done differently.  
As I started digging into the data collected provincially regarding 
mathematics, I was shocked to see just how great of a drop-out rate there 
was for our provincial Aboriginal students, much greater than that of the 
their non-Aboriginal peers.  Something was going dreadfully wrong – 
there should be no reason for any gap between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal students getting to grade 12 mathematics, let alone 
graduating from grade 12.  Brain research had shown, time and again, 
that everyone was mathematically wired. 
And so, I began talking to my colleagues who worked explicitly 
on Aboriginal education.  They confirmed that the situation was as bad 
as I thought it was, if not worse.  When I asked why it was happening, 
my colleagues explained as best as they could that it was because First 
Nations peoples had different ways of knowing and that the students 
couldn’t see themselves in many subjects, but particularly mathematics 
and science.  I tried  to wrap my  head  around what  these different ways 
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of knowing might be – how were they different, and what did it mean to 
not see yourself in a subject. My colleagues likewise tried to explain this 
phenomenon, but I still could not understand what they meant by 
“different ways of knowing.”   I tried to figure out how I saw myself in 
mathematics, but the task was bewildering to me – I saw myself doing 
and knowing mathematics, not being in it.  If anything, I was even more 
confused with the situation than I had been. 
One day I found a document, hidden online, that was a collection 
of lesson ideas for integrating First Nations content into K-5 
mathematics, but that document has since “disappeared” into the web 
ether.  I also stumbled onto other documents from other sources that 
tried to do the same thing; however, they all seemed so trivial to me – 
counting moccasins and using tipis to study circles.  At the time I did not 
have the active language to describe what I was seeing, but I knew that 
this was trivializing what it meant to be First Nations.  I was sure that 
there had to be something better to do to help First Nations students in 
mathematics, but what that might be remained a mystery to me. The 
thought that mathematics itself might need help never entered my mind 
– after all, mathematics was a collection of everything that was correct 
and done in the “right way.”  
Meanwhile, the statistics continued to tell of the same grim reality for our 
provincial Aboriginal students, and when I left the Ministry to   pursue   
my   Doctorate of   Education   in 2010, the  last publically released 
Indicators Report provided the following data: 
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 Urban Rural Northern 
 M F M F M F 
Mathematics 10       
Non-Aboriginal Students 68.6 73.3 71.1 76.5 58.5 59.1 
Aboriginal Students 54.0 56.8 52.6 57.1 49.7 54.5 
Mathematics 20       
Non-Aboriginal Students 67.7 71.9 69.8 75.4 63.9 66.5 
Aboriginal Students 57.5 59.2 56.3 58.9 54.7 57.9 
Table 1 Mathematics Averages for Non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal Students 
(Saskatchewan Ministry of Education, 2010, p. 21). 
Not only is the gap between the averages for the Non-Aboriginal and 
Aboriginal students shown above a concern, but when the difference in 
drop out rates are considered with this data, the numbers become even 
more alarming.  Lysyk’s (2010) first volume of her 2012 report as 
Provincial Auditor of Saskatchewan expresses concern over the 
provincial graduation rates, with the data showing that while 72.3 % of 
all students entering grade 10 in the 2008-09 school year graduated 
within three years, only 32.7% of the self-declared First Nations, Métis, 
and Inuit students entering grade 10 graduated within the same time 
period.  The numbers told a disconcerting story all on their own, but for 
me, when I read the numbers I saw my former First Nations students and 
their friends, families and communities.  The numbers did not tell me 
their  stories resulting  from those numbers,  nor did  they tell me  of the 
stories that might be possible if things were somehow different. 
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My concern for what was happening to the First Nations, Métis, 
and Inuit students was intensified when I started to consider the impact 
of attaining high school mathematics credits, regardless of graduation 
standing.  Two experiences, in particular, brought these concerns to the 
forefront.  
The first was a phone call from a community organization that 
had advertised a position requiring the successful candidate to plan out 
the pruning of trees, planting of plants, and general maintenance of 
plants and lawns on community property.  With the upcoming 
retirement of the current person in charge, an advertisement had been 
posted and applications were received.  Then it was realized that some of 
the applicants being considered did not have Algebra 30, as stated in the 
advertisement, because Algebra 30 was no longer a course offered when 
the applicants had attended high school.  
The caller posed the question, “So what math class that is offered 
now would be the equivalent of Algebra 30?”  Having issues with 
balancing, clumsiness with tools, and an uncanny ability to kill even 
plants that are supposedly “fool proof”, I had no idea what mathematics 
would be needed by a person employed in such a position, so I asked 
what from Algebra 30 was needed.  The reply was “they need Algebra 
30.”  So, I tried another route and asked what mathematics the person 
would need to use.  The answer was “Algebra 30 – just tell me which 
course is the same as Algebra 30.”  Well, none of the new courses were 
the same as Algebra 30, otherwise the name would not (likely) have been 
changed.  In fact, since the time when Algebra 30 was last offered, 
mathematics content from different disciplines (algebra, geometry, geo- 
trig,  statistics,  probability…) were integrated into a completely different 
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set of classes. In the end, the best I could do was to say that if a student 
took Math A30 and Math B30, they would have mostly all the content 
(and then some extra) that someone who had taken Algebra 30 would.  
The caller thanked me and ended the call. I sat there for some time 
after thinking about who I had eliminated from obtaining that position 
simply by my woefully uninformed answer.  Moreover, I wondered 
whether geo-trig, which is in Math C30 (and not in A30 or B30) would 
not have been beneficial in such a position (to deal with angles and 
length measurements) more so than algebra.  In the end, I had to just 
accept that I had given the most truthful and informed answer to the 
question I could, despite my doubts concerning the validity of the 
question and thus the impact of my answer.  
A second such call I received was from a lady applying for a 
program at a technical institute in a different province.  Her question 
was, what courses (from the Algebra and Geo-Trig courses offered when 
she went to school) would be the equivalent of the mathematics entrance 
requirements for her program.  Because the entrance requirements were 
based upon the WNCP CCF  at  the time,  I was  very familiar with  the 
other province’s mathematics courses, and after determining that she had 
obtained both Algebra 30 and Geo-Trig 30 credits in high school (albeit a 
good number of years earlier), I was able to tell her that she had all the 
mathematics required (and more).  As she gave a big sigh of relief, I then 
took the opportunity to ask her what program she was applying for.  Her 
response, stenography, was not even in the ballpark of courses I had 
been thinking about (like computer science, electrical, engineering …).  
Now, I need to make  something  perfectly  clear – all  the  mathematics  
classes in  the  world  would  not  have  made  me  a  good,   even  an  
acceptable,  
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stenographer. I had no idea what mathematics a stenographer 
would need or why, yet I had told this lady that she was “good to go” to 
enter the program.  From my perspective, both of these cases I’ve just 
described were using mathematics as a gatekeeper – a hoop to jump 
through just to prove you could. These experiences added to my concern 
for First Nations, Métis, and Inuit students struggling with mathematics.  
As I tended to do when I encountered something about 
mathematics that I had not expected, I dug in deeper to see how wide 
spread the implementation of this kind of mathematical barrier was.  I 
was horrified to discover that it was everywhere – in the public sector, 
the private sector, and in post-secondary institutions. How had 
mathematics become this tyrant, judging a person’s ability regardless of 
whether it  pertained  to  the  situation?  When had it been given such 
authority and autonomy?  With the next renewal of the mathematics 
curricula underway, I was determined to make sure that mathematics 
did not become a token barrier to anyone.  Surely mathematics was to 
learn and enjoy, not meant to create a false boundary in one’s life. 
Meanwhile, the renewal of the WNCP CCFs (2006, 2008) continued on 
and, following an implementation plan that the publishers of 
mathematics resources said would be feasible for textbook production, 
each jurisdiction began an annual release of mathematics curriculum 
documents starting with kindergarten, grade 1, grade 4, and grade 7 in 
the first year.  Back home in my own province, this process started with 
the “Saskatchewanizing” of the CCFs – that is integrating the agreed 
upon content within the CCF documents with the initiatives and 
foundations for curriculum renewal that were being developed in the 
province at the same time.  
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The criteria set out by this Learning Program Renewal required a 
fair amount of rewording of the CCF documents.  The Learning Program 
Renewal mandated that curricular outcomes target deep understanding.  
Many of the outcomes in the WNCP CCFs did not meet this criteria, for 
example, outcome 4 in the grade 4 number strand: “Explain the 
properties of 0 and 1 for multiplication and the property of 1 for 
division”(WNCP, 2006, p. 20), which was not only limited in scope, but it 
also was intrinsically related to the next outcome in grade 4  about the 
multiplication facts (up to 9 x 9). Within Saskatchewan, these two 
outcomes were therefore merged into a single outcome, N4.3, in the 
Grade 4 Mathematics curriculum (Saskatchewan Ministry of Education, 
2007). 
 In addition, in order to convey the level of deep understanding intended 
by the outcomes in the Saskatchewan curricula, it quickly became 
evident that the indicators given in the WNCP CCFs tended to read as 
targeting traditional rote learning, and not deep understanding (see 
WNCP, 2006, 2008 for examples).  This was a result of a consensus 
decision by the WNCP mathematics team (obtained by pressure from one 
jurisdiction’s legal department) that the indicators (and outcomes) could 
not contain any terms that suggested how the mathematics could be 
taught.  For example, an indicator could not say “Share and compare…” 
because the lawyers argued that “share” was telling the teachers how to 
teach.  In the Saskatchewanizating of the CCFs, words like share were 
allowed, even encouraged, in the indicators to help teachers   better   
understand   the   kind   of   teaching   strategies   being promoted within 
the new curricula.   
A second initiative from the Learning Renewal Program proved 
more   elusive  in  the  renewal  of  the  mathematics  curricula  –  that  of 
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infusing the curriculum documents with First Nations and Métis content, 
perspectives, and ways  of knowing.   It was at this time that I realized 
that my colleagues who worked in other subject areas at the ministry 
were equally unsure of what the First Nations and Métis ways of 
knowing were.  For all of us engaged in this work, it was unclear what 
might be infused into any curricula to meet this initiative, and what such 
infusion might look like.  
At this point, I feel it’s important to note that my preference would 
have been for such information, ideas, and content to have been put into 
the original CCF documents; however, one jurisdiction, again, hijacked 
the consensus process by refusing to allow this to happen.  Instead, the 
other jurisdictions were told that they could add such pieces to what was 
in the CCF documents when they used the documents to create their own 
jurisdictional curricula.  I did not like the idea of making First Nations 
and Métis content, perspective and way of knowing an add-on; however, 
the only other option would to have been to stand my ground at the 
WNCP table, also refusing to give consensus.  I have no doubt that this 
would have ended the renewal process at the WNCP level, just as I had 
been told by colleagues that the same kind of issue had ended the initial 
CCF developments for social studies.  
Starting with the first wave of mathematics curricula that were to 
be  renewed and released (kindergarten and grades 1, 4, and 7),  those of 
us working on the infusion mandate for the curricula renewal began by  
holding  a  feedback  session (formally  referred  to  as “vetting” session) 
with Elders, First Nations and Métis teachers, and other teachers of First 
Nations  and  Métis students.  It was a  long  day of  powerful stories 
from  the  Elders  followed  by intense work by everyone in attendance to 
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find places in the outcomes and indicators where they felt First Nations 
and Métis content, perspectives and ways of knowing could be added in.   
At the end of the day, only a few suggestions were made for 
incorporation, mainly referencing hunting and fishing, but I eagerly took 
the ideas home and wove them into the outcomes and indicators as 
suggested.  As a part of the vetting process, the suggested incorporations 
were put into the draft curricula documents, highlighted, and then sent 
out to the participants for more feedback.  The drafts were also shared 
with the First Nations and Métis Branch of the Ministry of Education for 
feedback purposes.  The responses were unanimous – the additions 
could have been about anyone, not specifically First Nations and Métis 
people, and thus they did not serve the purpose intended.  Each of the 
respondents explained, in their own way, that First Nations and Métis 
content, perspectives and ways of knowing could not be captured in a 
few words within a single sentence – a mandate of the Learning Program 
Renewal was that all outcomes and all indicators were each to be one 
sentence in length.  I was told that without the inclusion of story with the 
cultural meaning of the additions, the additions did not speak of First 
Nations and Métis content, perspectives, and ways of knowing. Further, 
such additions would not speak to First Nations and Métis students in a 
way that they could see themselves being included in the curriculum and 
hence learning of mathematics.  In the end, nothing was “added” as First  
Nations  and  Métis  content, perspectives or ways of knowing into the 
kindergarten, grade 1, grade 4, or grade 7 and the curriculum documents 
went to print “un-infused.”  
Although there were no curricular changes made, I came to some 
understandings  and  thinking  that  moved  me  forward  personally.   In 
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particular, it was that the message that First Nations and Métis content 
involved story, and the lack of story in mathematics (and curricula) was 
an issue.   I was starting to see that what I had always taken for granted, 
that mathematics and story were two separate islands, was not the only 
way that things could be viewed.  Other vetting sessions (not focused on 
the infusion of First Nations and Métis content, perspectives, and ways of 
knowing) had sometimes raised concerns about the single sentence 
mandate for outcomes and indicators, but it was in relation to the length 
(and difficulty) of reading of some of the sentences as well as the desire 
for more (short and sweet) examples.  I must emphasize here that it was 
not more detail related to an example, not the story of the example, but 
more examples (such as might be used in a typical test or assignment) 
that the other sessions had emphasized.  What I did not yet understand, 
nor even know that I needed to understand, was why story was 
important for at least those involved in the First Nations and Métis 
vetting session.  
In the following year, as we moved on to the grades 2, 5, and 8 
mathematics curricula, we again gathered teachers of First Nations and 
Métis descent to provide insight into what we could incorporate into 
these three documents to reflect, authentically, First Nations and Métis 
content, perspectives, and ways of knowing.  The day flowed much like 
the one a year previously, with much enthusiasm and sharing of ideas, 
but  in  the  end  the  participants  again  found  it  next  to  impossible to 
capture meaningful pieces to incorporate into the documents.  Having 
dreaded such an outcome yet again, I had in preparation, considered the 
question of “if we can’t put the stories into the curriculum documents, 
can  we  find  a  way  to  invite  students  and  teachers  to  do so?”  As 
the 
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group of teachers spoke to this question, it became clear that it was not 
any particular story that they were thinking of including, but stories of 
self, family, and community and how each contributes towards the well 
being of others.  As such, the phrase (and variations there of) “Identify 
and describe situations relevant to self, family, or community” as 
incorporated into indicators whenever possible.   
I was definitely not within my comfort zone.  I loved the idea of 
story in mathematics, but I also feared it as it broke all the rules of 
mathematics I had been so successful with – the one “right way,” the one 
answer, the beauty of abstraction – story called into question these 
foundational strongholds, the glue of mathematics I knew and loved, but 
it also brought a sense of integration, of bringing together the two areas I 
had always loved so much.  In contrast to my internal response, the 
participants in the vetting session felt this was a “good start,” agreeing 
that it did open the door for teachers and students to bring the stories 
that were “too big” to fit into the curriculum documents.  
In the next (and unfortunately final) year that this type of feedback 
session occurred (focusing on the grades 3, 6, and 9 mathematics 
curricula) three things were different from the onset.  First, the above-
mentioned phrase was already included in an indicator for many of the 
outcomes in the curriculum drafts supplied.  Second, I had brought to 
share with the group the finalized version of the four goals of K-12 
mathematics.   And third,  there was a unanimous request from the 
attendees that two new outcomes be included, one for grade 6 and one 
for grade 9, that specifically focused on Indigenous mathematical 
content.  
The  goals  of  K-12  mathematics  that  I  shared  with  the  session  
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participants were also part of the Learning Program Renewal 
expectations – each subject area was to identify three or four goals for 
student learning, to which the outcomes at all grades contributed, that 
defined what students needed to learn in order to become a ‘thinker and 
doer’ within that subject area. Originally in mathematics, the four goals 
were focused on developing logical thinking, numerical sense, spatial 
sense, and a positive mathematical attitude.  The fourth goal however, 
had always seemed too limited, almost too naive for what was the real 
intention of the goal.  
As first written, the fourth goal focused on being positive about 
doing math, persevering, and taking errors in stride; however, what I, the 
Program Team (an internal group from within the Ministry), and the 
Reference Committee (a group comprised of representatives from 
different stakeholder groups such as teachers of mathematics, directors, 
post-secondary institutions, the Federated Saskatchewan Indian Nations, 
and so on), envisioned went much deeper and broader than that.  Our 
desire was to have a goal that informed teachers and students that 
everyone is capable of learning, doing, and using mathematics; that we 
can learn from how others understand mathematics; and that together 
we can all move forward in mathematical thinking and doing.  
The result of these discussions and reflections on the original goal 
was the creation of a new goal focused on mathematics as a human 
endeavor.   When  I  shared the final  draft version of  the goals with  the 
vetting session attendees, this rewritten goal garnered a great deal of 
attention, especially from the Elders.  They believed that if this goal was a 
foundation for what happened in mathematics classrooms (which the 
intention was  that  it  would  be)  then First  Nations and  Métis  students 
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would be able to see themselves in mathematics and would therefore 
become more successful in mathematics learning and doing.  In 
particular, they emphasized the importance of valuing where knowledge 
is from, learning within the context of community, valuing the 
knowledge others bring to learning, valuing of alternative perspectives 
and approaches, and the notion that mathematics is developed to meet 
the needs of situations and determined by the time, place, and people 
involved.  The goal, in final form, follows: 
Mathematics as a Human Endeavour 
Through their learning of K-12 mathematics, students 
will develop an understanding of mathematics as a way 
of knowing the world that all humans are capable of 
with respect to their personal experiences and needs. 
Developing an understanding of mathematics as a 
human endeavour requires students to engage in 
experiences that:  
• value place-based knowledge and learning  
• value learning from and with community 
• encourage and value varying perspectives and 
approaches to mathematics 
• recognize and value one’s evolving strengths 
and knowledge in learning and doing 
mathematics  
• recognize and value the strengths and 
knowledge of others in doing mathematics  
• value and honour reflection and sharing in the 
construction of mathematical understanding 
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• recognize errors as stepping stones towards 
further learning in mathematics  
• require self-assessment and goal setting for 
mathematical learning  
• support risk taking (mathematically and 
personally)  
• build self-confidence related to mathematical 
insights and abilities  
• encourage enjoyment, curiosity, and 
perseverance when encountering new problems  
• create appreciation for the many layers, nuances, 
perspectives, and value of mathematics. 
(Saskatchewan Ministry of Education, 2009a, 
pp.9-10) 
This goal, along with the logical thinking goal, is shown in the 
curriculum documents to be foundational to every outcome, that is, in 
learning towards every outcome, K-12, students should be having 
experiences that help them to attain this overarching goal of 
understanding (and taking part in) mathematics as a human endeavour. 
The Elders’ positive responses to this goal, and its relationship to all the 
outcomes we had been struggling to infuse with First Nations and Métis 
content,  perspectives,  and  ways  of knowing,  were  very rewarding  to 
me, as I felt that, perhaps, I was finally starting to get a glimpse into 
understanding the divide that I had seen (and read about) so often 
between First Nations and Métis students and mathematics.  Moreover, 
the divide need  not exist.   That understanding however,  was starting to 
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put increasing pressures upon what I had always known (and believed) 
mathematics to be. 
The request for the inclusion of First Nations and Métis 
mathematics outcomes in the grades 6, and 9 curricula resulted in my 
writing two new (outcomes not found within the WNCP CCFs), one that 
considered the role and use of quantity in Indigenous cultures and 
communities and the other focusing on chance and data within 
Indigenous cultures and communities.  Ultimately, the outcomes were 
included in the grades 6 and 9 curricula documents (respectively), with 
“Indigenous” being changed to “First Nations and Métis” to make the 
outcomes read as more reflective of Canada and of the province of 
Saskatchewan.  These outcomes have created a fair amount of discussion 
amongst teachers and consultants; however, the level to which they have 
been implemented throughout the province is unknown.  
I also took from this part of our discussions the message that Indigenous 
peoples did have and use mathematics, but that the mathematics often 
looked different, while still achieving similar goals. And there it was – 
my first outright encounter with a challenge to the notion that there was 
one “right way” to do mathematics since my elementary school years.  It 
was thrilling to know that this challenge was being made, but at that 
time, I still did not know the extent to which I would eventually come to 
challenge the  authority of the mathematics I loved so dearly. 
Coinciding nicely, almost prophetically, with the challenge of 
writing the two outcomes about First Nations and Métis use, 
representation, and knowledge of quantity and probability was by my 
attendance at a mathematics education conference.  Although I attended 
many  interesting   presentations   and  was  part   of   a   working   group 
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looking at the use of visualization in the teaching and learning of 
mathematics, there is one moment from my time at this conference that 
trumps all else, that of meeting Louise Poirier.  I met Louise when she 
happened to sit down beside me at the banquet for the conference, and I 
knew instantly that she had a story she was burning to tell, and I just 
knew that I wanted to hear it.  
Louise had just returned from a trip to Northern Quebec where 
she was starting to work with Elders in the Inuit communities on 
developing ways to talk about mathematics in their native language 
(Inuktitut), and in particular, how to speak about the base-ten number 
system. I was astonished that they did not already have such 
terminology in their language, and I asked Louise how this had “slipped 
under the radar” for so long.  
She explained how it had recently been legally mandated that all 
students in Inuit communities in Northern Quebec were to be taught in 
Inuktitut for the first three years of school. The first students to go 
through the three years of schooling in Inuktitut had just moved on to 
grade four and they were (outstandingly) out-performing everyone’s 
expectations in every subject – except mathematics.  Upon looking into 
the situation (thankfully no one believed it was because Inuit people just 
can’t do math!),  the source of the problem soon emerged.   The students 
had, for three years, been learning about numbers and the four 
operations using the Inuit number system, which is base 20 with a sub-
base of 5.  What this means is that in their native language the Inuit of 
Quebec do not have a place values that are powers of 10 (1, 10, 100…). 
Instead, their number system counts by powers of 20 (1, 20, 400…). Thus, 
where,  in  base   ten,   we  would  describe  124  as  being 4  ones,  2  tens, 
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and 1 one hundred, the Inuit of Quebec would describe a quantity of 124 
as being made up of 4 ones and 6 twenties.  But actually, that’s not even 
correct because they subgroup their place values into groups of 5, and 6 
twenties is 5 groups of 20 and 1 group of 20, so 124 would be described 
as 4 ones, 1 twenty and 1 group of 5 twenties.  Further, in Inuktitut, 
higher place values are described first, and so 124 is literally said as 1 
group of 5 twenties, and 1 twenty, and 4 ones. 
To say my socks were blown off is a huge understatement!  I had 
never before heard of anyone in the present day using any number 
system other than base 10 (except for the occasional use of Roman 
Numerals by clock and film makers).  How could this be the case?  
Louise told me that the answer partly lay in the fact that the teachers for 
this new initiative first and foremost had to speak Inuktitut, which meant 
that many were not “academically” trained teachers, and they taught the 
students the mathematics of their language.  The second reason was that 
never before had the Inuit people of Northern Quebec had Western 
schooling delivered in Inukitut – they had always learned in either 
English or French as decided upon by the individual communities (or as 
decided for them).  Therefore, no one had ever had a need to work with 
base-ten mathematics in Inuktitut.  
The difference in number system bases was not the only reason 
that the students in grade four  “couldn’t do math,” there was still   more 
that Louise had to share regarding their base 20 (sub-base 5) number 
system.  Another part of history of the number system of the Inuit in 
northern Quebec was that until colonization their language was strictly 
oral and so the students had learned the traditional ways of calculating in 
Inuktitut  –  orally and in their heads.   What was eventually realized was  
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that these Inuit students were not only really good at base 20  (sub-base 
5) math – they did it all in their heads – no paper and pencil, no written 
algorithms.  
But Louise wasn’t done her story!  A final complication in the 
work that she was just starting with the elders was that, within Inuktitut, 
numbers were not considered in isolation or abstraction.  Rather, 
numbers were part of the story of a context or place, and as such, there 
are up to six different words for each number that were are for different 
types of contexts.  As an example, Louise gave me a sheet of paper with 
six squares drawn on it, and in each square were an image and a (very 
long) word written below it.  The images showed the six contexts for the 
quantity three and the word used for each: three in something, three of 
something, groups of three, the digit (numeral) three, a playing card that 
is a 3, and the arrangement of dots for three on a die.  The first of the 
three words and images were from pre-colonial Inuktitut, while the other 
three words and images originated from post-colonial contexts.   
Consequently, when talking about numbers or doing calculations (in 
their heads), the Inuit students had to be careful to use the correct word 
so that the situation made sense.  However, very little (if any) of the 
mathematics that they would have been tested on (in English or French) 
in grade four would have been in context and the emphasis was 
undoubtedly on symbolic computations designed to test if the students 
“knew their math.”  The grade 4 students knew their math, but the test 
designers did not know the students’ language, math, or history.  I still 
have the original copy that Louise gave me on that day (you can find a 
copy in Poirier, 2007) – I kept it because of how much it impacted me at 
the time – little did I know just how far that impact would reach (into this  
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dissertation and beyond). 
Shortly after my return from this conference, as I was working on 
the renewal of the mathematics curricula, I sought out additional 
assistance from Dr. Edward Doolittle, a mathematician at First Nations 
University of Canada.   I had asked Edward to help me edit the renewed 
documents and to provide any grammatical, mathematical, or First 
Nations and Métis content, perspectives, and ways of knowing 
suggestions that he might have.   
As I too was reading over the documents, I pondered out loud if a 
particular indicator might be too difficult for the students in that grade.  
It wasn’t the mathematical idea behind the indicator that I was 
wondering about, but rather the language I had used in writing the 
indicator.  When Edward read over the indicator, one about having 
students explain with examples what the word equal meant to them, he 
told me that he wasn’t sure if it was too difficult for the grade, but that it 
was very important for First Nations and Métis students.  Caught off 
guard by the second part of his reply, I inquired why it was important for 
those students.  He explained that in his experience, in many First 
Nations and Métis communities, the English word equal was used to 
mean “fair or for the good of the community.” 
 For years I had been hearing from my French colleagues at the 
ministry that translating from English to French (or vice versa) was never 
a one-to-one correspondence.  I thought, with my limited French 
language knowledge, I understood what they meant, but Edward’s 
comment took me to a far deeper level of thinking about translation.  It 
wasn’t just  a  case  of  “we  don’t say it that way, we say it this way”,  it 
was  a  case  of  the  word  carrying a completely different,  culturally and 
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place-based, meaning.  I later learned that this was called polysemy (a 
word having multiple meanings).  
 Of course, I knew many examples of polysemy, such as “grave” – 
it can be where someone is buried, but it also can be that person’s serious 
mood or expression.   The case of the polysemy of “equal” however, was 
fundamentally different, at least from my perspective. What Edward had 
made me aware of was not just an alternate meaning – it was a 
completely different view of the same general notion.  It had to have 
been a consequence of colonization, of the forced translation between 
two languages, which had resulted in this difference in meaning, yet 
within this process of translation the original meaning managed to 
survive within the new word in the new language. 
In my mind’s eye, I imagined being a First Nations person (or 
more likely an English speaking person making decisions for the First 
Nations), finding the closest translation for the First Nations word for 
“fair or for the good of the community” to be this English word “equal,” 
and despite them not being exactly the same it “would have to do.”  I 
thought about how in English we have both equality and equity, and I 
was wondering why the translation had not been to the word equity. 
However, I  then thought  about  how “equity”,  although a word I  had 
known  for  some time,  was  not one did  not seem to  come into regular 
use until the recent years.  The notion of making things equitable for 
different people was something that had only recently come to be de 
rigueur in my experience within Western society.   
Curious if this was nothing more than just whimsical speculation 
on my part, I looked into the etymology of the words equal and equity 
and found the following in the Online Etymology Dictionary (2015): 
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equity (n)  
early 14c., "quality of being equal or fair, impartiality in 
dealing with others," from Old French equite (13c.), from 
Latinaequitatem (nominative aequitas) "equality, 
uniformity, conformity, symmetry; fairness, equal 
rights; kindness, moderation," from aequus "even, just, 
equal" (see equal (adj.)). 
With colonization, and specifically the translation between English and 
the First Nations languages (I cannot speak to translations between 
French and First Nations languages), even if equity was being used by 
English speakers, there was a good chance that equity and equality were 
being used interchangeably to imply sameness (just like in mathematics), 
so there would have been no reason to pick “equity” over “equality.”  I 
found these nuances about the words “equal” and “equity” intriguing to 
say the least – how was it that these two different languages ended up 
emphasizing a different idea in their language – sameness or fairness? 
From a mathematical perspective, on the other hand, I had other 
concerns.  What would mathematics look like to a student who carries 
the  understanding   of   equal   meaning   “fair  or  for   the  good  of  the 
community” instead of “same?”  It wasn’t that I wanted to go running 
into all such First Nations and Métis communities screaming “equal 
means the same,” I actually like the fact that this difference exists.   But 
what if teachers don’t know that this is happening and therefore don’t 
know to recognize, value, and celebrate this alternative meaning while 
also helping the students understand equal within a mathematics 
context?  And, what other (what I have come to term) culturally 
polysemic  words  are   out  there  that  need  to  be  recognized,   valued, 
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celebrated, and possibly given a different context within mathematics 
teaching and learning?  Initially, this was to be my dissertation, but as 
my experiences continued, it became obvious that there were many other 
questions that I needed to answer, or at least grapple and become 
comfortable with, first. 
My experiences with the renewal of the mathematics curricula 
(and all others that were related to it) had stoked the embers of my 
curiousity, rekindling my desire to think deeper and more broadly about 
mathematics – what it is, and its relationship to schooling – for all 
students, including First Nations and Métis.   
Synchronizing, perhaps perfectly, with the renewal, other events in my 
life contributed to my desire to pursue these ideas with more ardour. 
There was my introduction to the field of ethnomathematics (a 
contentious word, but which for now I will define as mathematics as 
found within and defined by culture), which introduced me to even more 
examples of mathematical thinking and approaches foreign to my own 
experiences. Within my inauguration into the field of ethnomathematics 
also came my first concrete yet academically documented introduction to  
colonization and the impacts  it has had on Indigenous people around 
the world.  It was as ethnomathematics and colonization moved to the 
forefront of my thinking that I embarked upon the journey that this 
writing is seeking to bring to culmination – my PhD dissertation. 
However, before I can get to the end, I must continue from where I left 
off, which is the start of my PhD studies. 
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In the first term of my PhD program, I took two courses, Trends 
and Issues in Mathematics Education and Decolonizing Aboriginal 
Education.  Whereas the Trends and Issues in Mathematics Education 
was in many ways a confirming and consoling course for me (allowing 
me the space to explore my at least self-controversial thoughts about 
mathematics), Decolonizing Aboriginal Education was like a tornado of 
new ideas, new understandings, and new challenges.  
The Trends and Issues in Mathematics Education course 
confirmed for me, academically, that there was something legitimate 
about the way I had, for a number of years, been coming to question, at 
least internally, what mathematics was and could be.  In that way, the 
class helped to, if not alleviate, then lesson the severity of my  
nervousness  to  pursue  thinking about mathematics differently. In 
giving me that comfort and security, this class allowed me to formally 
verbalize my thoughts in discussions with others (I do beg forgiveness 
for those who perhaps I pushed too hard to come to my way of thinking 
and questioning – like    a bully of mathematical reform – and I thank 
them for pushing back and ultimately encouraging me to better ground 
and fortify my thinking).  
The Decolonizing Aboriginal Education course, on the other hand, 
continuously overwhelmed me with ideas and understandings related to 
colonization and its (continuing) impacts upon Indigenous peoples, and 
ultimately non-Indigenous peoples as well. Although internally I had 
always found it odd that my relatives had just been given land to 
homestead on and set up communities, I had not been aware of the cost 
of that kindness upon the first peoples of this land.  I was starting to 
understand the great privilege I had been born into and its cost to others.  
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Reflecting upon the teaching and learning of mathematics in this 
light, and considering the things and experiences I had learned over the 
past 10 or more years, I was now starting to wonder if my beloved 
mathematics wasn’t part of the mechanisms of colonization.  Far beyond 
its being a gate keeper, was it also the source of an outright denial of 
anything that an Indigenous person, being newly introduced to the 
Western word “mathematics” might want to associate with it? And then I 
started our assigned reading for the next week, Leroy Little Bear’s (2000) 
Jagged Worldviews Colliding – almost instantly the margins of every page 
were filling up with notes, notes that said “this is what mathematics is 
missing” and “this is what mathematics should be”, and then later on 
“this is what the mathematics in schools is” and “this is why 
mathematics is not working for so many students.”  Finally, I had the 
(start) of a framework that might give me insight (and possible solutions, 
if I was lucky) into all of my amassing questions about mathematics, the 
teaching and learning of mathematics, First Nations and Métis students, 
and the relationships between the three.  
And so ends the story of mathematics and me, at least up to this 
point in time.  What now might be the continuation of this story is not yet 
far enough removed from myself to share.  My story will continue, but 
for now my research needs to take center stage, starting with a more in-
depth study of the two worldviews introduced to me in Little Bear’s 
(2000) Jagged Worldviews Colliding. 
  
56 
 
  
 63 
 
 
  
 64 
 
Contrasting Worldviews and the Emergence of a Theoretical Framework 
As noted at the end of my story, Little Bear’s (2000) description of the two different 
worldviews, which he and other Indigenous people often find themselves both trapped within 
and torn apart by, was an eye-opening and soul stirring event in my life.  Finally, I had found 
someone who could speak to me about First Nations ways of knowing, and what they said 
resonated with the many twists, turns, conflicts, and ultimately philosophical changes that I had 
experienced with respect to my thinking about mathematics and the teaching and learning of 
mathematics over the years.  His descriptions called to me both intellectually and emotionally, 
and I knew it was a call I needed to immerse myself within.   
As I researched and explored these two worldviews, I also started to see a foundation, a 
theoretical framework, emerging that might be useful in both theoretical and empirical research.   
Through the sharing of my ideas about this framework in discussion groups, workshops, and at 
conference presentations; however, I realized that there were a number of understandings about 
worldviews that I was assuming, but not explicitly revealing.  Having learned from these 
experiences, I first clarify what I mean by worldview and what the name given to a worldview 
does and does not imply in my thinking and research before elucidating the theoretical 
worldview framework that is central to this dissertation. 
An Introduction to Worldviews 
In the broadest sense, one’s ‘worldview’ is how one views and is in the world: 
“Worldview may be defined simply as the way people think about themselves, their 
environments, and abstract ideas such as truth, beauty, causality, time, and space” (Allen & 
Crawley, 1998, p. 113).  Worldviews are how we make sense of the  world  around  us and  how  
we function on  our own and with others.  However, Shelbert (2003) explains that worldviews 
are structures that are often unknown to the holders of them:  
They are taken for granted as the roads to be traveled and often escape the processes of 
questioning.  Thus the realm of worldview structures is neither sacred practice nor 
embraced doctrine of what is true and normative, but the frame, the pattern, the 
paradigm that shapes understanding. (p. 62)   
Yet, “worldviews are important precisely because they provide us with an overall meaningful 
perspective about life and the world in which we live” (Irzik & Nola, 2007, p. 95).  Often, 
worldviews become apparent first to outsiders grounded within a different worldview when they 
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begin to question why other groups of people make decisions and act in the ways they do.  
Many different worldviews have been documented, researched, and classified.  For 
example, there are different religious worldviews, political worldviews, cultural worldviews, and 
economic worldviews, to name just a few categories in research and literature. In each instance, 
at the heart of each of these identified worldviews are guiding principles based upon which 
holders of those worldviews are said to be in the world, and those principles set foundations with 
respect to the category (categories) that the worldview might classified as.  For instance, 
religious worldviews, which generally speaking focus upon questions such as “Who am I?”, 
“Where do I come from?”, “What is my purpose in life”, provide foundations about how one is 
to live one’s life, what to believe about the origin of one’s self, community, and the world, as 
well as for how to analyze and judge alternative or new information related to these questions.  
Likewise, an economic worldview presents a foundation of how to analyze, judge, and 
implement alternative or new information related to economic theories, decisions, and 
undertakings.  
In essence, “social practices promote the worldviews; the worldviews dictate the 
appropriate thought processes; and the thought processes both justify the worldviews and support 
the social practices” (Nisbett, 2003, Introduction section, para. 18).  Considering the two 
examples of religious and economic worldviews, it can be seen that a worldview sets guidelines 
for ascertaining the value of different kinds of knowledge and different ways of coming to that 
knowledge.  In this way, broader than these two examples, yet more specific than “how one 
views and is in the world”, worldviews delineate how to determine what knowledge and ways of 
knowing are of value to the holder of the worldview.  A worldview is like a lens through which 
we look at and seek knowledge, a lens that filters in very specific ways, what we see and where 
we go looking.  
“Worldviews”, as I have come to know, understand, and work with the term, are also 
sometimes referred to in different literature sources as paradigms, epistemologies, beliefs, or 
belief systems; however, I must emphasize that these terms are not always interchangeable.  In 
some contexts, these alternate words are used in ways which are quite different from that which I 
present here (and quite rightfully so in my thinking), so it is important to note that where I might 
reference work that uses these alternate terms, it should not be assumed that I would consider all 
references using these terms, or even worldview, as relevant to my work that is to follow.  
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Although there are many (I think ‘an infinite number of’ would even be appropriate here) 
different worldviews, my reading of Jagged Worldviews Colliding (Little Bear, 2000) introduced 
me to two specific worldviews, which have ultimately come to be the foundation of the 
theoretical framework I will soon describe in detail.  Feeling the academic need to name these 
two worldviews, I have come to call them the Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous 
worldview, and the reason for these names, including the article introducing each of them, will 
be explained when the nature of these worldviews are discussed in the upcoming sections.  Right 
now however, I must explain that first, I acknowledge that in naming the worldviews my actions 
can be viewed as firmly placing the kind of knowledge I am valuing within that of the 
Traditional Western worldview.  Second, in reference to the terminology noted above, the two 
terms I have assigned to the worldviews are not standardized in the literature.  Each of these 
worldviews is described, and sometimes named using different but inconsistent terminology, but 
it is only within Little Bear’s (2000) work that I have found a comprehensive study of the two 
worldviews presented together.  Further, in that work no “names” are every officially given to 
either of the worldviews.  Instead, in what one might describe as being grounded within an 
Indigenous worldview, Little Bear resists the Western worldview temptation to classify, 
choosing instead to be at all times descriptive.  I on the other hand have given in to this 
temptation, not to take credit for the identification and explanation of the two worldviews, but in 
attempt to present my research in what I believe will be seen as a scholarly way.  However, I also 
wish to note that on one front of Western worldview temptations, I am choosing to resist, and 
will not be using acronyms for the two worldviews.  This is the only place where the reader will 
find IW or TWW in this document. 
In so naming these two worldviews, it is essential to qualify that “the qualities identified 
for both Indigenous and Western systems represent tendencies rather than fixed traits, and thus 
must be used cautiously to avoid overgeneralization” (Barnhart & Kawagley, 2005, p. 11). 
Therefore, although the descriptions to be given of the knowledge and ways of knowing that are 
of value within an Indigenous worldview and the Traditional Western worldview are being 
linked to two cultures via their names (Indigenous and Western, respectively), it is paramount to 
not misconstrue one’s membership within one of these two particular cultures to imply one’s 
worldview as well.  An Indigenous person need not hold an Indigenous worldview, nor a person 
of Western origins hold the Traditional Western worldview (or any other specific or general 
  
 67 
Western worldview).  Likewise, someone grounded within the Traditional Western worldview 
need not be of Western descent, nor someone grounded within an Indigenous worldview need be 
of Indigenous descent.  These names for the worldviews do not indicate membership; rather, they 
reflect what one or more individuals have noticed (what was believed to be a trend) within a 
particular group (cultural, religious, political, socio-economical…).  Further, these two 
worldviews should not be held as the only worldviews that might be associated with either 
Western or Indigenous cultures.  There are very likely other Western worldviews (although a 
general Western worldview would seem unlikely) as well as worldviews specific to particular 
indigenous peoples.  
With the above caveat given regarding worldview membership, “it has become infinitely 
clear that you will notice differently if you come from a distinct cultural background” (Meyer, 
2003a, p. 251) because of cultural differences and nuances.  Meyer further explains that “how 
one experiences the environment plays a huge role in how the world is understood and defined” 
(Meyer, 1998 p. 23).  It is thus no surprise that “Differences between Western and indigenous 
conceptions of the world have always provided stark contrasts” (Smith, 1999, p. 43).  It is within 
these differences that I contend, and hope the reader will find, the strength of this theoretical 
framework lies.  
And so, as I head into my re-presenting (as I am merely pulling together the work of 
many different researchers and theorists) of my understanding of two worldviews, I am reminded 
by Ermine (1995) that 
The year 1492 marked the first meeting of two separate world-views, each on its own 
uncharted course of exploration and discovery for purposeful knowledge.  The 
encounter featured two diametric trajectories into the realm of knowledge.  One was 
bound for an uncharted destination in outer space, the physical, and the other was on a 
delicate path into inner space, the metaphysical. (p. 101)  
The following discussion of the theoretical framework, and more specifically the two 
worldviews that the framework is built upon, takes us along both trajectories that Ermine 
describes, each of which will eventually help to illuminate themes or concepts underlying my 
story of mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics.  And, in the end, I look 
forward to the prospect that this framework may suggest a way to remove or re-envision the 
tensions and conflicts I experienced and still experience in relation to mathematics and the 
teaching and learning of mathematics. 
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And so, this excursion into the two worldviews begins with the Traditional Western 
Worldview as I have come to understand it (through the works of Absolon, &, 2005; Ermine, 
1995; Kovach, 2009; Little Bear, 2000; Malcolm, Sutherland, & Keane, 2008; Matthews, 2011; 
Meyer, 2003b; Michell, 2005; Nisbett, 2003; Roy & Morgan, 2008; Shelbert, 2003; Snively, & 
Coriglia, 2001; Sternberg, Barrett, Blood, Glanfield, Lunney Borden, McDonnell, Nicol, and 
Weston, 2010; Strega, 2005; Van Eijck, & Roth, 2007).  Although I understand that “a 
worldview should not be judged with respect to another, because any worldview is 
transcendental by nature” (Kawasaki, 2006, p. 43), I also acknowledge that the understandings I 
have developed as I explored what these worldviews are about – what knowledge and ways of 
knowing each values – is necessarily influenced and biased by my own worldview.  So too, I 
acknowledge that the works I have read and engaged with may also be afflicted by this same 
condition, as the writers try to capture their (inevitably self-biased) understandings within words.  
It will be this way when trying to understand any worldview; however, the openness (level of 
rigidity) of the worldview will, in and of itself, define what kinds of bias may actually enter in.  
One might then think that exploring worldviews in any circumstance is pointless, but I hold, 
based upon my personal experiences, that if all one gains out of the process is a better 
understanding of how one views and is in the world, the exercise is, for no other reason, worth it.  
There is one more concern that, entering into worldview explorations, discussions, and 
ultimately the using them as tools in research analysis, that I would be remiss in not reflecting 
upon at this point, and that is the concern of cultural appropriation.  As a Western woman and 
person (although not subscribing to the Traditional Western worldview), I need to be very 
cautious in how I portray an Indigenous worldview and the claims that I make in reference to it, 
because I cannot claim to have any Indigenous knowledges that would necessarily ensure my 
enactment of an Indigenous worldview in a truly Indigenous way.  All I can do is to understand 
and use an Indigenous worldview as my own worldview allows me to.  Having stated that, I have 
informally received confirmation from various Indigenous elders, knowledge keepers, and others 
that the work I am doing is “good work” and that its importance and significance should not be 
underestimated.  It is with those reassurances that I continue to move forward in my research. 
The Traditional Western Worldview 
There are many different worldviews that can be related to Western culture(s) and by 
choosing to use the name the Traditional Western worldview I am attempting to highlight that 
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what I am about to describe is a very particular and distinctive worldview amongst all possible 
Western worldviews.  It is a singular and unique worldview that is common within Western 
culture, which is strongly grounded within notions stemming from Greek and other European 
history, such as atomism, positivism, logical reasoning, and Descartes’ philosophy of man.  For 
this reason, I intentionally call this worldview the Traditional worldview as opposed to a 
Traditional worldview, as I have come to believe that it is unique amongst other Western 
worldviews, along with being very distinct from an Indigenous worldview. 
In the broadest sense, it can be said that the knowledge and ways of knowing valued by 
the Traditional Western worldview are grounded within separation, decontextualization, and 
abstraction. (Ermine, 1995; Little Bear, 2000; Malcolm et. al., 2008; Meyer, 2003b; Michell, 
2005; Nisbett, 2003; Roy & Morgan, 2008; Shelbert, 2003).  These fundamental foundations of 
this worldview give rise to distinct values that are very specific and definite about what are 
acceptable kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing.  
The Traditional Western worldview upholds “the value systems of Western Europeans 
[which are] linear and singular, static and objective” (Little Bear, 2000, p. 82).  Further, the 
Traditional Western worldview “rests on a dualistic foundation, in which quantities such as 
rationality, reason, objectivity and impartiality are privileged over and opposed to irrationality, 
emotion, subjectivity, and partiality” (Strega, 2005, p. 203).  The Traditional Western worldview 
“presupposes certain metaphysical and procedural or methodological commitments: first the 
existence of an external world that is independent of the observer; second the universality of 
causation in that world … and third the constancy of causation” (Matthews, 2011, p. 6).   It is 
upon these assumptions that the more specific characteristics of the Traditional Western 
worldview are built.  
 
 
Absolute truth. 
Within the Traditional Western worldview, absolute truth is the kind of knowledge that is 
sought and valued.  This absolute truth is believed to be possible because the world is viewed as 
“objects – discrete and unconnected things” (Nisbett, 2003, Holism vs Analysis section, para. 7), 
therefore “keeping everything separate from ourselves” (Ermine, 1995, pp. 102-103) renders 
ideas about the objects necessarily true or false.  Thus, by distancing the knower from the object 
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to be known, and by separating the object from all other objects, the Traditional Western 
worldview holds that the truth of that object, the universal knowledge of that object, can be 
discovered.  
Compartmentalization, categorization, and isolation = hierarchies and abstraction. 
The foundational beliefs about Nature within the Traditional Western worldview are 
essential to the search for and upholding of its truths.  Specifically, 
Nature is viewed as a threefold entity: the world of inanimate forces of wind and rock 
and earth, the world of organic life, from micro-organisms such as viruses and bacteria 
to grasses, flowers, trees, and plants; the world of animals, those beings with amima, yet 
not a soul, and radically positioned below humans.  In contrast to this tripartite ‘nature,’ 
humans, it is claimed are radically different: they are animate beings endowed with 
reason, with self-consciousness, and with genuine decision-making power. (Shelbert, 
2003, p. 62) 
This compartmentalization of Nature, with humans positioned above all else, results in an 
assumed hierarchy within Nature and amongst humans.  Ultimately, “the natural world is divided 
up, and that nature serves as a backdrop to human society” (Roy & Morgan, 2008, p. 237).  With 
hierarchies being established amongst the objects that are to be known and amongst the knowers 
of those objects, the natural consequence is that the knowledge itself is also viewed as 
hierarchical (Little Bear, 2000).  Consequently, because of the hierarchies of knowledge and 
knowers, the Traditional Western worldview is most “concerned with personal goals of self-
aggrandizement” (Nisbett, 2003, The Non-Western Self section, para. 1), that is, moving up the 
“ladder” of hierarchy of humans happens by moving up the “ladder” of hierarchy of knowledge.  
In this way, “knowledge is more a novelty than functioning as an integrated whole” (Meyer, 
2003b, p. 251); knowledge is sought for the sake of knowledge. 
In order for this knowledge hierarchy to exist, it is essential that knowledge “exist [as] 
pieces of matter that can be discovered, uncovered, manipulated and sorted.  The knower, the 
known, and the process of knowing can be thought of separately” (Malcolm et. al., 2008, p. 617). 
Thus, in the Traditional Western worldview, knowledge is fragmented, abstracted from the 
specifics of the context, and then put into categories that allow the value of the knowledge pieces 
to be assessed and placed appropriately within the hierarchy.  A consequence is that 
“knowledges are organized around the idea of disciplines and fields of knowledge” (Smith, 1999, 
p. 65) – the constituent levels of the hierarchy – and, “While disciplines are implicated in each 
other… they are also insulated from each other through the maintenance of what are known as 
  
 71 
disciplinary boundaries” (p. 67).  Knowledge of value within the Traditional Western worldview 
is thus fragmented, sorted, compartmentalized, and isolated. 
Dichotomization.  
The Traditional Western worldview also defines the worth of different kinds of 
knowledge in terms of dichotomies.  The dichotomization of humans and nature and knower 
from object (Shelbert, 2003) ultimately leads to the belief that “mind and body must be separate 
if knowledge [is] to ever be trusted” (Meyer, 2003b, p. 12).  Since knowledge is the key to 
personal progression up the knowledge and knowers hierarchies, this separation becomes yet 
another dichotomy that is bound to the Traditional Western worldview.  In fact, Shelbert (2003) 
explains how the Traditional Western worldview is grounded in “‘a mind-set of dualisms which 
claims an all pervasive polarity of what is’, the duality of positive and negative, of human and 
divine, of humans and nature, of right and wrong…” (p. 63).  Nisbett (2003) adds to the list of 
embraced dichotomies that of “the external, objective world and the internal, subjective one” 
(Science and Mathematics in Greece and China section, para. 1).  Thus, within the Traditional 
Western worldview, “dualism is everywhere… and it is always oppositional and hierarchical, 
never neutral” (Strega, 2005, p. 203).  By viewing knowledge through a framework of 
dichotomies, certain knowledges naturally “rise to the top” while others “sink to the bottom” of 
the hierarchical system of the Traditional Western worldview.  
From the valuing of separation of both mind and body, and the external and the internal, 
comes the dichotomizing of subjective and objective knowledge, with a valuing of objective 
knowledge as knowledge that comes from the mind of the knower about an external object.  The 
Traditional Western worldview holds that “Objectivity… can only be achieved through the 
application of reason, and therefore can be applied only by those who are rational” (Strega, 2005, 
p. 202).  Since the sought-after objective knowledge is isolated from knowledge that comes from 
the body or that is internal, connecting the knowledge and knower, it is important that data be 
collected “without any understanding of its context and without any personal connection or stake 
in the data” (Absolon, & Willet, 2005, p. 105) so that it results in valuable knowledge.  In this 
way, not only is knowledge of value fragmented and categorized, it is also abstracted to a general 
universally applicable fact.  Conversely, subjective knowledge, knowledge that relates knower to 
object, mind to body, and human to nature, is not valued within the Traditional Western 
worldview. 
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Rationality and universality. 
Within the Traditional Western worldview, “‘facts’ speak for themselves” (Smith, 1999, 
p. 31).  That is, the rational knowledge of the Traditional Western worldview is thought to be 
indisputable, and because of these facts and their associated rules, people with such knowledge 
“can control events because they know the rules that govern the behavior of the objects” (p. 
Nisbett, 2003, Introduction section, para. 1).  The basic premise behind the valuing of facts is 
that “things don’t change much, or if they are really changing, future change will continue in the 
same direction, at the same rate, as current change” (Nistbett, 2003, Stability of Change section, 
para. 3).  With things not changing, or if they do change they do so in a known direction, the 
hierarchy of knowledge, of facts, can remain intact and universal. 
The notion of universality in the Traditional Western worldview extends beyond the facts 
of objects, to the assumption that “there are fundamental characteristics and values which all 
human subjects and societies share” (Smith, 1999, p. 30).  Consequently, the facts of the 
Traditional Western worldview are assumed to be universal to all people, places, and times. This 
is possible within the Traditional Western worldview because “Everyone has the same basic 
cognitive processes … same tools for perception, memory, causal analysis, categorization and 
inference” (Nesbitt, 2003, Introduction section, para. 3a). Combining the notions of universality 
and decontextualization of knowledge results in the Traditional Western worldview holding that 
“scientific knowledge is superior to local knowledge” (Van Eijck, & Roth, 2007, p. 930), as local 
knowledge pertains only to local contexts; whereas, scientific knowledge is meant to reflect 
universal ideas and conditions. Therefore, not just any facts are sought, but scientific facts, 
because science claims: “that’s the way it is” (Little Bear, 2000, p. 82). 
Scientific method and knowledge. 
Inevitably, because of the features of the Traditional Western worldview that value mind 
(rational thought) over body, objective over subjective, and external over internal, the high value 
placed upon scientific knowledge should not be surprising, as the scientific method holds the 
same values. Within the Traditional Western worldview, “science is the ‘best’ kind of 
knowledge, superior to various forms of unreliable and unverifiable non-scientific knowledge” 
(Strega, 2005, p. 202).  The first way that science is able to achieve its supremacy as a way of 
knowing is that: “observation is attempted in isolation and in an artificial environment” (Little 
Bear, 2000, p. 82).  By isolating the object both from the knower and the environment in which it 
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naturally occurs, all outside influences on the knowledge sought can be eliminated. Thus, 
scientific knowledge, emerging from the scientific method, is “free of bias” and as such it is 
“positioned as the only kind of knowledge that can be relied upon for tasks that require 
prediction and control” (Strega, 2005, p. 202), a desired quality within the Traditional Western 
worldview.   Further, scientific knowledge, and the scientific method, are valued most within the 
Traditional Western worldview because of the incorporation of both observation and 
measurement; since, “observation by itself is not good enough … If something is not 
measureable, then it is not scientific” (Little Bear, 2000, p. 83).  This emphasis on measurability 
is important because it ensures the right kind of knowledge is being sought: physical processes 
and objects can be measured while anything subjective cannot.  Thus, by insisting on scientific 
knowledge to be based upon measurement, the dichotomy of subjective and objective knowledge 
within the Traditional Western worldview is preserved: “Science sees the notions of intuition and 
feelings as something that ‘dirties’ knowledge, objective reality, and pure reason” (Meyer, 
2003b, p. 12).  
Verification is also central and crucial to scientific knowledge and the scientific method. 
“Science becomes truth or ‘verifiable knowledge’ through the stringent application of various 
tests.  These verification methods include observation, mathematical calculation, experiment, and 
replication” (Strega, 2005, p. 202).  Replication of scientific studies ensures the truth of the 
knowledge determined.  Ultimately the Traditional Western worldview holds, “The application 
of rigorous scientific methods that derive from mathematical logic ensures objectivity, neutrality, 
and the absence of bias” (Strega, 2005, p. 202).  These properties of scientific knowledge result 
in a “collective knowledge that is coherent with any observation of this natural world and that, as 
far as we know, counts everywhere irrespective of local contexts” (Van Eijck, & Roth, 2007, p. 
930).  Thus, scientific knowledge is highly valued within the Traditional Western worldview 
because it comes from physical observation, measurements, and logical reasoning within a bias-
free environment by a knowledge seeker who is distanced from the object to be known. 
Credibility is further gained for these truths based upon the ability of any other person to 
replicate the findings of the scientific study.  In addition, because the knowledge is gained in a 
position of isolation, it is abstracted from any context and is thus universally applicable.  
Linearity, singularity, objectivity, and staticity = power and authority. 
The emphasis placed upon scientific knowledge creates the necessity for knowledge of 
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value to be viewed, as Little Bear (2000) describes, as not only objective, but linear, static and 
singular as well.  The foundation of linearity emerges from the hierarchies of knowledge and 
knower, with progression upward through the hierarchies viewed as desirable, leading to the 
pinnacle of all knowledge and humans.  Further, “Socially, [linearity] manifests itself in terms of 
bigger, higher, newer, or faster being preferred over smaller, lower, older, or slower” (Little 
Bear, 2000,p. 82).  Once again, linearity emphasizes the existence of dichotomies, with “even the 
either-or orientation of [the] logic” (Nisbett, 2003, Philosophy in Greece and China section, para. 
6) resulting in a linear progression of actions, decisions, and knowledge.  The assumed linearity 
of knowledge of value also results in specialists who can study and know about each different 
stage within the hierarchical linear trajectory of knowledge, the result of which is “a social 
structure consisting of specialists. … Specializations are ranked in terms of prestige” (Little 
Bear, 2000, p. 82).  Within the Traditional Western worldview, then, the more specialized and 
abstracted the knowledge a knower has, the higher up in the hierarchy of humans the knower is, 
and the greater authority and power that person has over others and their world.  
Through the combination of linearity, specialization, and dichotomy, singularity of 
knowledge emerges “in concepts such as one true god, one true answer, and one right way” 
(Little Bear, 2000, p. 82).  This singularity of existence and truth results in the Traditional 
Western worldview to hold that “certainly [it is] only rational ideas, the only ideas, which can 
make sense of the world, or reality, of social life and of human being” (Smith, 1999, p. 56).  In 
this way, the singularity of knowledge translates into being the power and authority of the 
knowledge valued within the Traditional Western worldview, “[conveying] a sense of innate 
superiority” (p. 56) to all those who hold such knowledge.  It is the seeking of singularity within 
one’s knowledge that brings a person grounded within the Traditional Western worldview to the 
search for “the ultimate truth, the ultimate particle out of which all matter is made” (Little Bear, 
p. 82). Moreover, because this is the particle out of which all matter is made, what is also being 
sought must be static knowledge, knowledge without change, knowledge without need for 
revision.  Linearity, singularity, and being static in nature are inherently crucial within the 
hierarchy of the knowledge valued by the Traditional Western worldview. 
Preservation of knowledge through writing. 
As the knowledge of value within the Traditional Western worldview is factual, singular, 
static and objective, with the hierarchical linearity of it playing an important role in the 
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development and learning of knowledge, it is necessary to, likewise, record all such knowledge 
in a way that is also remains constant.  To this end, the Traditional Western worldview 
recognizes writing (both in words and symbols) as the means to preserve knowledge of value.  
Recording knowledge in written form promises to keep permanently the knowledge as abstracted 
– objective truths – available to all to access and apply, provided they access it rationally, to their 
own lives as well as to build new knowledge of value upon.  In fact, “Writing has been viewed as 
the mark of a superior civilization” (Smith, 1999, p. 29), and since the knowledge of value within 
the Traditional Western worldview is superior to all else (because it is necessarily truth obtained 
in the right way), writing, like the scientific method is as a way of knowing, is the perfect fit 
when the documenting of knowledge is considered within this worldview. 
Summary of the Traditional Western worldview. 
In summary, the Traditional Western worldview relies upon science (and the scientific 
method) to determine knowledge of value about objects that are external to the knower.  This 
knowledge, which is objective, static, singular, and linear in relation to other knowledge is 
preserved in written form where it is sorted and categorized into hierarchical levels.  In this 
worldview, knowledge is sought for the sake of knowledge, as it is through the creation and 
gaining of knowledge that is higher within the hierarchy that prestige, control, authority, and 
power are gained by the knower.  Through the processes of fragmentation and categorization, 
knowledge becomes abstract and therefore universal, applicable to all contexts in which the 
object of study might be found. 
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An Indigenous Worldview 
Unlike the Traditional Western worldview, identifying an Indigenous worldview might, 
at the outset, seem like an impossible task, as there are many different Indigenous cultures from 
all around the world.  In fact, it is for this very reason that I have chosen to name the worldview I 
am about to describe an Indigenous worldview rather than the Indigenous worldview – it is one 
of many possibilities and realities.  Many of the different Indigenous cultural worldviews, 
however, are based upon a very similar set of understandings related to what knowledges and 
ways of knowing are valued.  As a consequence, the worldview I am about to describe is general 
enough for many, perhaps most if not all, Indigenous worldviews to find a home within it.  In 
many cases, the only variations between an Indigenous worldview and other worldviews related 
to Indigenous cultures is in how the worldview is enacted, such as through ceremony and 
protocols.  As evidence of this similarity, in this description of an Indigenous worldview I will be 
referencing African, Alaska Native, Asian (in particular Chinese), Blood Blackfoot, Maori, 
Native Hawaiian, Plains Cree, Salteaux, and Woodlands Cree worldviews. Again, it must be 
emphasized that an Indigenous worldview is not the worldview as lived by any particular 
Indigenous people, but a conglomerate of commonalities found between multiple Indigenous 
worldviews.  Furthermore, this worldview can neither be assumed to represent the worldview of 
any Indigenous person, nor can it be assumed that this worldview cannot be held by a non-
Indigenous person. 
Sternberg, Barrett, Blood, Glanfield, Lunney Borden, McDonnell, Nicol, and Weston 
(2010) identify “seven principles of reverence, respect, reciprocity, responsibility, synergy, 
interrelatedness and wholism” (p. 8) as foundational to Indigenous knowledge and ways of 
knowing.  These principles result in the convictions: “(a) place educates, (b) beauty develops our 
thinking, and (c) time is not simply linear” (Meyer, 2003a, p. 251).  These same ideas are echoed 
by Kovach (2009) when she writes “Descriptive words associated with Indigenous 
epistemologies include interactional, interrelational, broad-based, whole, inclusive, animate, 
cyclical, fluid and spiritual” (p. 56) ways of thinking.  Like for many Indigenous Africans,  
commitments to the collective-self … relationships, harmony, and context see 
knowledge quite differently, more as a process than discovery, more as a relationship 
than entity, and more as verb than noun. At the same time, those commitments do not 
require us to reject the idea of knowledge as entity; rather we need to take account of 
context and purpose. (Malcolm, Sutherland, & Keane, 2008, p. 617) 
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Within these four accounts by four different sets of authors and researchers, the parallels and 
continuities between the worldviews that they are speaking of are evident.  In fact, even in a 
Chinese worldview “concerns about harmony, holism, and the mutual influence of everything on 
almost everything else” (Nisbett, 2003, Philosophy in Greece and China section, para. 9) are 
present.  In each of the distinct worldviews just referenced, there are many different common 
factors that influence what kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing are of value, but central to 
them all is the notion of relationship. 
Within an Indigenous worldview, establishing, strengthening, and maintaining 
relationships with all of creation (including people, the earth, nature, the spirit world, and the 
cosmos) is foundational to the creating, gaining, and sharing of knowledge – knowledge   
“[results] from interactions with the group and with all of creation” (Little Bear, 2000, p. 79). 
Significantly, human beings are considered part of the animal kingdom, “humans are not 
regarded as more important than nature” (Snively, & Coriglia, 2001, p. 12), and thus they are not 
designated any special position, authority, or power in relation to knowledge or use of it. 
Moreover, an Indigenous worldview sees “The natural world as one large system that is 
inseparable from human experience” (Roy, & Morgan, 2008, p. 237); therefore, how humans 
relate to the natural world has consequences for the human experience.  Within the notion of 
relationship, therefore, an Indigenous worldview holds that humans are an integral part, but no 
more significant than any other, of the relationships that serve to create and share knowledge.  
Relationship, context, and the whole. 
Relationship holds this central positioning within an Indigenous worldview because this 
worldview considers the world and experiences within it as wholes.  That is, an Indigenous 
worldview considers the world from the perspective of complex contexts and events, finding “the 
world [is] simply too complex and interactive for categories and rules to be helpful” (Nisbett, 
2003, Science and Mathematics in Greece and China section, para. 8).  This holistic view of 
experiences and ultimately knowledge means that within an Indigenous worldview, “coming to 
know the natural world… is not a separate discipline in isolation from everyday living.  Learning 
takes place within the messiness and complexity of life” (Michell, 2005, p. 38).  In coming to 
understand an Indigenous worldview, then, one must explore what is considered important when 
relating with this messiness and complexity. 
Relationship and place. 
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Within an Indigenous worldview, place is also always of paramount significance. It is 
important that relationships, and the resulting knowledge that emerges and is preserved through 
them, occur and be associated in particular contexts and places, and not in isolation.  Michell 
(2005) says of the importance of place “our lives, stories, experiences, challenges, births and 
deaths are written all over this landscape” (p. 35).  There is a fundamental recognition that place 
influences who people are and what they do, and objects are understood within the contexts that 
they are created, found, or used.  Simply put, “Place matters” (Meyer, 2003b, p. 143).   
Consequently, since place matters, and knowledge is in relationship to place, then place is 
a source of knowledge.  As the source of knowledge, it is therefore important within an 
Indigenous worldview that knowledge “never be taught in a decontextualized format; it must be 
tied to the land and the community” (Malcolm et. al., 2008, p. 619), it must be tied to place.   
Many authors and researchers (for example, see Kovach, 2009; Little Bear, 2000; Meyer, 
2003b; Smith, 1999) connect an Indigenous worldview’s emphasis upon place to the importance 
of knowledge of the land to survival for Indigenous people.  As Meyer (2003b) explains, “The 
quality of our survival was tied to the intimate knowledge we had of nature’s moods, planting 
secrets, weather patterns, history and seasonal temperaments.  The environment: plants, wind, 
stones, rains – they were the stuff of poetry, wisdom, healing, food, inspiration” (p. 98), making 
place the centerpiece for all knowledge.  Within an Indigenous worldview, place is central to 
relationships because the establishment, strengthening, and maintenance of relationships all 
happen within place.  
Relationship, ways of knowing, and diversity. 
The acceptance of the messiness and complexity of place, and the knowledge related to 
place, also connects to the understanding within an Indigenous worldview that “there are both 
physical and spiritual laws that govern the universe.  What is done in one realm is mirrored in the 
other.  The sacred and the secular are not separate” (Michell, 2005, p. 37).  Meyer (2003b) 
emphasizes the connection amongst relationships, knowledge, and spirituality when she writes: 
“Knowledge/spirituality were interwoven in almost every description of how Hawaiians viewed 
intellect, skill acquisition, wisdom, learning, knowledge and understanding” (p. 93).  Sacred 
knowledge has this important role in an Indigenous knowledge because “In Aboriginal 
philosophy, existence consists of energy.  All things are animate, imbued with spirit, and in 
constant motion.  In this reality of energy and spirit, interrelationships between all entities are of 
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paramount importance, and space is a more important referent than time” (Little Bear, 2000, p. 
77).  Spirituality is the result of relationships with the land (Michell, 2005) and “ancestors, both 
alive and dead” (Meyer, 2003b, p. 93).  Spirituality becomes part of relationships through “the 
quest for visions” (Ermine, 1995, p. 109), intuition (Kovach, 2009), “environmental signs” 
(Meyer, 2003b, p. 104), “prayer” (Ermine, 1995, p. 109), “dreams” (Meyer, 2003b, p. 166), and 
other cultural ceremonies and protocols.  An Indigenous worldview does not insist on each of 
these ways of being within a spiritual or spiritually impacted relationship; moreover, an 
Indigenous worldview is broad enough to accept any way in which the sacred might be brought 
into relationships.  In an interview with Margaret Kovach, Graham Smith commented “that the 
Maori do not have the same traditional beliefs around dreams, but he would not dismiss this as a 
valid knowledge source” (Kovach, 2009, p. 58).  Regardless of the origins of the sacred for 
Indigenous peoples, spiritual relationships arise within “the inner space in the individual [giving] 
rise to a subjective world-view out onto the external world” (Ermine, 1995, p. 108).  Thus, 
spirituality, as a source of knowledge within an Indigenous worldview also connects relationship 
to the valuing of diversity in knowledge and ways of knowing.  
From the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, relationships, and as a result the 
knowledge they embody, can take on any form, for example, physical, emotional, spiritual, and 
intellectual.  Since knowledge is created and shared through relationships that are not just 
intellectual in nature (but also emotional, physical, and spiritual), the criteria that knowledge of 
value come from objective sources and processes is not found within an Indigenous worldview  
(Ermine, 1995; Kovach, 2009; Little Bear, 2000; Meyer, 2003b; Smith, 1999).  Instead, 
subjective knowledge is often viewed as just as valuable as objective knowledge – the value 
depending upon the context within the knowledge is gained, shared, or to be applied.  Personal 
experience and intuition (based upon the past, present, and future) are also considered valid 
sources of knowledge within an Indigenous worldview (Ermine, 1995; Kovach, 2009; Little 
Bear, 2000; Meyer, 2003b; Smith, 1999).  
An Indigenous worldview recognizes that, “‘Even within our species, our minds, 
memories, and personal experiences make us diverse from each other (McGaa, 2004, p. 14)’” 
(cited in Michell, 2005, p. 35).  Further, because of viewing all of aspects of the natural world as 
interdependent, an Indigenous worldview also respects and values cultural diversity.  Within this 
worldview, it is recognized that “a certain practice that works for one person may not necessarily 
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work for another person.  Openness and flexibility is encouraged” (Mitchell, 2005, p. 40).  For 
Hawaiians’, “epistemology is the study of difference.  Because formulating ideas in Hawaiian 
epistemology needs contrasts from which to emerge” (Meyer, 2003b, p. 76), diversity in 
knowledge and ways of knowing are not only accepted, but sought: “I tell this story to remind 
myself to not simply ‘tolerate diversity.’  We should, instead, be fully engaged, changed and 
humbled by it” (p. 4).  An Indigenous worldview seeks out and celebrates a “Multiplicity of 
sources comprising Indigenous ways of knowing” (Kovach, 2009, p. 78) including the intuitive, 
subjective, emotional, physical, spiritual and intellectual ways and kinds of knowledge 
mentioned previously.  Therefore, “Each being ought to have the strength to be tolerant of the 
beauty of cognitive diversity” (Little Bear, 2000, p. 80) as it is foundational to an Indigenous 
worldview. 
Within an Indigenous worldview, the five senses, touch, sight, hearing, smell and taste, as 
part of physical ways of knowing, are also valued sources of knowledge. This “idea that 
knowledge comes from our five sense is shaped by a distinct relationship we have had with the 
world as cultural people” (Meyer, 2003b, p. 110).  Sensory knowledge is not only gained from 
one’s personal physical experiences.  It is also mediated “by a whole host of historical and 
metaphorical images that continue to explain, educate and inspire” (p. 107) through stories of 
place and context.  Thus, sensory knowledge belongs both to the sacred and the secular realm, to 
inner and outer space.  This notion is confirmed by Aboslon and Willett (2005) when they write: 
“Memory is more than a mental process of recalling facts, experiences, and information. Human 
beings also have a capacity for sensory, physical, spiritual, and emotional memory” (p. 116). 
Thus, the five senses play an important role in the creating and sharing of relationships, and 
therefore knowledge, within an Indigenous worldview.  
Connectedness: mind and body, objective and subjective. 
The valuing of relationships based upon these different ways of knowing, and the 
knowledge that is bound within those relationships and their places, inherently implies that the 
mind and the body are not separate entities: “The mind is body and the body is mind. … 
Thinking and feeling are not separate” (Meyer, 2003b, p. 124).  In fact, “For Hawaiians, 
separation of [mind and body is] an illusion: the stomach region [is] indeed the seat of emotion 
as well as the seat of intellect” (p. 123).  As a consequence, within an Indigenous worldview, 
“exploring existence subjectively” (Ermine, 1995, p. 104) is valued as well as doing so 
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objectively.  It is place, and the relationships connected to place, that determine whether 
subjective, objective, or both kinds of knowledge are of value.  
Relationship, flux, cycles, and a holistic view. 
Part of the messiness and complexity of relationships within an Indigenous worldview is 
the recognition that “The world is constantly changing” (Nisbett, 2003, Philosophy in Greece 
and China section, para. 10).  Consequently, “Indigenous knowledge and culture is dynamic – 
ever flowing, adaptable, and fluid. … opinions, thoughts, ideas, and theories are in a constant 
flux” (Aboslon, & Willett, 2005, p. 111).  The recognition of the flux and the valuing of 
wholeness ultimately confirm and support each other: “The value of wholeness speaks to the 
totality of creation, the group as opposed to the individual, the forest as opposed to the individual 
trees… the constant flux rather than on individual patterns” (Little Bear, 2000, p. 79); wholeness 
highlights flux, and flux encourages one to focus on the whole.   
As well, the focus on flux discourages (but, in accepting diversity, does not deny) 
abstraction and compartmentalization – keeping emerging and shared knowledges relevant and 
meaningful through place.  To this end, Michell (2005) writes: “Cree people also do not sub-
divide and fragment the natural world into small units such as biology, chemistry and physics; 
rather, the Woodlands Cree regard all life as being mutually independent” (p. 37).  Further, the 
notion of flux not only leads to a holistic perspective, but also a “cyclical view of the world” 
(Little Bear, 2000, p. 78), where repetitive patterns within the whole help to create and clarify 
knowledge.  As a consequence of a focus on cycles and patterns, “For Indigenous people there is 
a recognition that many unseen forces are at play in the elements of the universe and that very 
little is naturally linear, or occurs in a two-dimensional grid or three-dimensional cubic form” 
(Barnhart, & Kawagley, 2005, p. 12).  Ultimately, these understandings of flux, cycles, patterns 
and non-linearity, also lead to values regarding other aspects of knowledge and ways of knowing 
as well. 
Relationship and process. 
One consequence of an Indigenous worldview’s recognition and valuing of the whole, 
flux, cyclical patterns, and non-linearity is that it also places greater emphasis on process than 
product in relation to knowledge creating and sharing (Absolon, & Willett, 2005; Meyer, 2003b). 
Kovach (2009) explains that it is “a worldview that focuses as much, if not more, attention on 
process than on product or outcome” (p. 66).  It is important to note however, that products 
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(outcomes) are not considered unimportant unless the process is not correct or done properly, 
such as within relationships and respecting diversity.  
Relationship and time. 
Another impact of the seeking and valuing of cyclical patterns within an Indigenous 
worldview is that “Time is not simply linear” (Meyer, 2003b, p. 63); rather, it “is dynamic but 
without motion.  Time is part of the constant flux but goes nowhere. Time just is” (Little Bear, 
2000, p. 78).  I am sure that for many people, including myself, this view of time is perplexing to 
say the least; however, I have come to understand through these ideas that time does not need to 
dominate knowledge nor the relationships (to others and to place) that ground knowledge 
because of the cyclical patterns of the flux.  Therefore time, specific linear time, need not have 
any impact upon the knowledge emerging from relationships tied to place within an Indigenous 
worldview. 
Relationship and dichotomy. 
The recognition of flux within the whole also brings out specific types of relationship in 
an Indigenous worldview amongst the knower, knowledge, and dichotomies:  “The world is 
constantly changing and is full of contradictions.  To understand and appreciate one state of 
affairs requires the existence of its opposite; what seems to be true now may be the opposite of 
what it seems to be” (Nisbett, 2003, p. 12 of 217).  In other words, like the separation of mind 
and body, within an Indigenous worldview, dichotomies are an illusion.  Even the separation of  
mind and body is seen as an illusionary dichotomy.  In an Indigenous worldview, “all dualities 
merge and knowledge becomes less a thing than an event” (Meyer, 2003b, p.253); in fact, within 
an Indigenous worldview, it is assumed “that we can hold polar truths as part of one truth” (p. 
66).  Thus, seemingly dichotomous notions, such as good and evil, become part of the whole, 
contributing to the flux and cycles of knowledge and relationships, they are “vital sequences into 
the all encompassing Self that unfolds through time and space” (p. 66), being recognized and 
valued as part of the diversity of the complexity and messiness of knowledge, relationships, and 
life.  Biases, as dichotomous ideas to something else, then are also not actively sought out and 
eliminated in an Indigenous worldview; rather, they are recognized as “an energy to be directed 
toward good” (Meyer, 1998, p. 26).  
Relationship, reciprocity, and the greater good. 
An Indigenous worldview also seeks knowledge that is useful making “everything 
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learned something of value” (Meyer, 2003b, p.113).  Both Nisbett (2003) and Meyer (1998) 
explain that knowledge is sought to fulfill a need and not for the sake of knowledge itself; 
however, “This does not suggest that utility did not have some aspect of aesthetic or psychic 
relevance” (Meyer, 2003b, p. 113).  Utility and the aesthetic and psychic are not positioned as a 
dichotomy; rather, they were viewed as a likely pairing within all knowledge of value.  
Since knowledge of value is seen as one that fulfills a need within a particular place and 
relationships, reciprocity is a natural part of the seeking and gaining of knowledge within an 
Indigenous worldview: “The Cree ethic of reciprocity teaches that what you take you must share 
and give back” (Michell, 2005, p. 37); thereby, ensuring the continuation of good relationships. 
This also implies that a “community’s local Indigenous knowledge … [cannot] just be taken; it is 
a body of knowledge that must be earned” (Malcolm et. al., 2008, p. 614).  Moreover,  
As gifts of truth and knowledge are shared, we take what we need out of respect in order 
to become whole and complete.  We decide what works in our own lives, what works 
for a specific situation, and then determine what needs to be left behind. (Michell, 2005, 
p. 36) 
What is taken from the knowledge is what is needed for the current situation – the place – and as 
such new knowledge is formed in relation to this place.  Because place determines what 
knowledge is shared and what knowledge is taken, the way in which the knowledge is shared is 
of great importance, as it needs to have the ability to adjust according to the variability of the 
world. 
Relationship and orality. 
Within an Indigenous worldview, the way in which knowledge is held to be best shared is 
through oral traditions.  By housing knowledge within oral stories, it is possible to “tell our 
stories one way today, then revise and retell them tomorrow” (Absolon, & Willett, 2005, p. 112). 
Whereas writing freezes what is known and how it is shared, oral approaches to knowledge allow 
the sharer of that knowledge to adjust it to meet the needs of the person or people receiving that 
knowledge.  In this way, knowledge can be adjusted to better align with the particular place and 
relationships of the knower.  This aspect of an Indigenous worldview is also connected to the 
acceptance and seeking of diversity in knowledge, as it recognizes that knowledge, in its entirety, 
is not transferable because of the fluidity of place and relationships.  Meyer (2003b) adds: 
“When stories are shared, they are filtered through the listener’s own historical lens, sensuous 
training, gender and political context” (p. 141), yet again connecting oral transmission of 
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knowledge to the valuing and acceptance of diversity.  It is not expected that all people will take 
the same knowledge from a story; rather, it is expected that all knowledge will be reformed by 
both the speaker and the listener to meet the needs of the listener and knower. 
Summary of an Indigenous worldview. 
Little Bear (2000) speaks an Indigenous worldview as being based upon wholeness: “like 
a flower with four petals.  When it opens one discovers sharing, honesty, and kindness.  Together 
these four petals create balance, harmony, and beauty” (p. 79).  These desired traits resonate with 
and emerge from within an Indigenous worldview through its valuing of knowledge that is based 
in positive and meaningful relationships with all of creation grounded within place.  Such 
knowledge includes the subjective and the objective, the sacred and the spiritual.  This 
knowledge is flexible and diverse, responding to changes in place and relationships as well as 
being informed through many ways of knowing (spiritual, emotional, physical, intellectual, 
intuitive, experiential, cultural…).  An Indigenous worldview does not separate humans from the 
rest of nature, nor does it separate the mind from the body; instead, dichotomies are embraced as 
sources of diversity and possibility.  All knowledge of value within an Indigenous worldview is 
sought in response to need, the need to survive and the need to live in balance, harmony, and 
beauty.  This knowledge is remembered and shared through oral stories and traditions so that it 
might remain flexible, able to change according to the cyclical flux of the world.  
  
 
 
The Two Worldviews: Implications and Concerns 
As is by this point undoubtedly evident, these two worldviews do indeed provide stark 
contrast (Smith, 1999) to one another.  Whereas within the Traditional Western worldview each 
foundational belief builds upon the linearly and hierarchically previous ones, the foundational 
beliefs of an Indigenous worldview are directly tied to all others through the cohesion of 
relationships.  The result is two worldviews that are built upon very different premises: 
interconnectedness and isolation – one (the Traditional Western Worldview) is looking for linear 
trajectories of knowledge, while the other (an Indigenous Worldview) is seeking knowledge 
  
 85 
within cycles of patterns.  The implications of these differences as a result of these two 
worldviews interactions are beyond the scope of this dissertation; however, there are a few points 
in this regard that I would be remiss in not presenting here. 
As Nisbett (2003) points out,  
there is great potential for conflict when people from cultures that have different 
orientations must deal with one another.  This is particularly true when people who 
value universal rules deal with people who think each particular situation should be 
examined on its merits and that different rules might be appropriate for different people. 
(Independence vs Interdependence section, para. 24) 
The conclusion commonly reached (or assumed) is that one group must give in to the “wisdom” 
of the other.  Therein lies a further complexity to this situation, for one group, in allowing for 
diversity of thinking, is forced to give way to the other group which allows only for one 
conclusion; thus, an Indigenous worldview would ultimately (be expected, at least) to acquiesce 
to the Traditional Western worldview.  This is a consequence of the Traditional Western 
worldview’s conviction that it’s knowledge is absolute truth, and must therefore be applicable to 
every situation.  Strega (2005) notes: “The hegemony of the world view [(the Traditional 
Western worldview)] is more than one way to view the world; it is successfully positioned as the 
most legitimate way to view the world” (p. 201).  It is the lack of emphasis on singularity of 
knowledge within an Indigenous worldview that has allowed the Traditional Western worldview 
to claim that their singularity is superior.   
Snively and Corsiglia (2001) explain that this same authority housed within the 
Traditional Western worldview allows its knowledge to then be a “vigorous ‘gatekeeper’ that has 
certainly succeeded in screening out metaphysical, pseudo-science” (p. 9) in order to protect the 
hierarchy of truth it has produced.  In this way, the Traditional Western worldview is “indifferent 
to the processes of Indigenous knowledge” (Battiste, 2002, p. 17), holding “the subjective as an 
unwanted stepchild to objective data” (Meyer, 2000a, p. 252).  This central assumption of the 
Traditional Western worldview therefore is able to create an illusion of superiority over the 
knowledge of an Indigenous worldview, and thereby “disrupts the balance” (Michelle, 2005, p. 
36) for the holders of the Indigenous worldview and between the two worldviews. 
The differences between the Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous 
worldview ensured the door to colonization (and it’s impacts) was wide open: “Indigenous 
peoples were classified alongside the flora and fauna; hierarchical typologies of humanity and 
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systems of representation were fuelled by new discoveries; and cultural maps were charted and 
territories claimed and contested by the major European powers” (Smith, 1999, p. 1).  Because of 
the kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing valued within the Traditional Western worldview, 
colonizers were able to relegate Indigenous peoples (from around the world) to subhuman 
members of the hierarchy of knowers and of humans (Smith, 1999).  It also allowed the 
Indigenous subjective (or subjective and objective) knowledges of place and relationships to be 
converted into compartmentalized and abstracted truths to be stored within the Traditional 
Western hierarchies.  Ultimately, the power and authority assumed by the Traditional Western 
worldview allowed colonization to “[suppress] the diversity of human worldviews” (Little Bear, 
2000, p. 77), “confining Indigenous people to alienation in perpetuity” (Henderson, 2000, p. 69).  
Colonization, and all of the consequences for both colonizers and the colonized are directly 
(along a linear trajectory) related to the Traditional Western worldview and its all but eradication 
of an Indigenous worldview (Henderson, 2000; Little Bear, 2000; Meyer, 2000b; Smith, 1999).  
When considered from the perspective of specific aspects of life, such as law, education, 
medicine, and so on (note: these are all Traditional Western categorizations of aspects of life), 
the results are the same – when the two worldviews meet, the Traditional Western worldview 
assumes power and authority while an Indigenous worldview is virtually dismissed as pointless 
in the process.  However, I believe that the antagonistic relationship between these two 
worldviews is a possible source of both frustration and of possibility. 
 
 
Concluding Thoughts on the Worldviews 
Becoming aware of these two worldviews has made me curious about how each would 
view my story about mathematics and me.  Nisbett (2003) claims: “The Westerner sees an 
abstract statue where the Asian sees a piece of marble; the Westerner sees a wall where the Asian 
sees concrete” (Holism vs section, para. 6).  Looking through the two lenses of an Indigenous 
worldview and the Traditional Western worldview at my story, what can be seen through each?  
Further, what does mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics look like through 
each lens?  What impacts would grounding mathematics and the teaching and learning of 
mathematics in the Traditional Western worldview or an Indigenous worldview have upon 
Indigenous (and other) students?  How might mathematics itself be changed, improved, or 
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fortified through worldviews?  Should we, in education and in society, be changing the lens 
through which we view mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics, or is there 
even a way, despite that the two “forms of knowledge are incommensurable with each other” 
(Van Eijck, & Roth, 2007, p. 935), for the two worldviews to exist in harmony, or at least in a 
state of cooperativeness and non-interference?  These reflective questions, which have emerged 
from my coming to better understand these two worldviews, have resulted in the formulation of 
my research question: 
What ways of knowing and kinds of knowledge are, and possibly could be, valued within 
mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics? 
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Methodology and Methods 
With my story told and the theoretical worldview framework discussed, I can now move 
into a discussion of the methodology and methods that I will be using within my research.  The 
forward positioning of the framework and of my story (even the inclusion of my story at all), 
may seem unconventional; however, there is purpose behind what I have done.  In order to 
answer my research question, there are three different methodological approaches 
(auto/ethnography, Gadamerian hermeneutics, and grounded theory) that I will be calling upon, 
and it is within my discussion of these methodologies that one will find justification and purpose 
for both my story and the theoretical framework.  
If I were to follow the naming tradition within qualitative research, what I propose as my 
research methodology is actually a “bricolage” (see Denzin & Lincoln, 2011) of 
auto/ethnography, Gadamerian hermeneutics, and grounded theory; however, the word 
“bricolage” does not fit how I envision the formulation of my research methodology.  Bricolage, 
as defined by Merriam-Webster (2015) is “construction  (as of a sculpture or a structure of ideas) 
achieved by using whatever comes to hand; also something constructed in this way.”   
WiseGEEK (2016) gives the following extended definition: “Bricolage is a word which is used 
to mean an assemblage of objects, along with the trial and error process of putting such objects 
together.”  Further, The Association for Qualitative Research (2015) calls methodological 
bricolage “a pragmatic and eclectic approach to qualitative research”.   What I am proposing for 
the methodological framing of my research is not constructed of whatever might happen to be 
available, it is not the result of a trial and error process, and its contributing methodologies are 
not eclectic, as they braid together with meaning and purpose.  I prefer, instead, to refer to my 
overarching methodology as a collage, “a combination of a collection of various things to create 
a new whole” (Merriam Webster, 2015).  I also choose not to name this collage, as it is 
contextually bound, and even if the same three methodologies were to be encompassed in 
another methodological collage, it would inherently be different because of the difference in the 
context of use and the difference of user (even if that user is myself).  For me, the methodology I 
propose is purposeful and connected both internally amongst its component parts and externally 
with my research questions and data.  In so saying, I now will introduce you to my collage, 
detailing the pertinent features of each of the three methodologies in play and then how they 
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relate to one and another within the context of my research, starting with the methodology of 
auto/ethnography. 
Auto/ethnography  
Before entering into a discussion of why I choose to use “auto/” over “auto” when 
writing of auto/ethnography, it is probably best that at least a general definition of what I mean 
by a methodology of auto/ethnography be given.  Ellis, Adams, and Bochner (2011) define 
auto/ethnography as “an approach to research and writing that seeks to describe and 
systematically analyze (graphy) personal experience (auto) in order to understand cultural 
experience (ethno)” (History of Autoethnography section, para. 1).  As a part my research I will 
be analyzing, through the lenses of the Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous 
worldview, my story in order to try to better understand both the cultures of and experiences 
within mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics.  In particular, I will be 
seeking to identify what kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing are being valued within 
mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics, and to explore both the impacts and 
possibilities as a result of that analysis.  With this broad brushstroke understanding of 
auto/ethnography, I will now return to the questions of why “auto/”.  
Choices in naming. 
Like W. -M. Roth (2005a), I choose to denote the methodology most commonly named 
autoethnography as auto/ethnography with the intention of emphasizing “What an individual 
does is always a concrete realization of cultural-historical possibilities” (p. 4).  That is to say, in 
auto/ethnography, cultural-historical possibilities contribute to the research process as much as 
the story of one’s self, because that story is always part of the cultural-historical possibilities: 
“The specifically human form of existence is possible only because of society” (p. 3).  More 
directly stated, auto/ethnography is a “concretely realized form” (p. 4) of ethnography in general, 
with the concreteness being in the positioning of the ethnography within the context of one’s 
self.   Thus, in auto/ethnography, the focus is not solely on the auto, but also on the ethnography 
and biography and their cultural-historical possibilities.  As a researcher employing 
auto/ethnography, my writing and analysis will naturally flow between and bring together the 
auto, the ethnographic, and the biographic.   For me, the introduction of self into ethnography is 
not done through a merger; rather, it occurs through a meaningful dance between self, 
ethnography, and biography. 
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Methodological differences. 
It is also important to note that my research differs from the auto/ethnographic research 
most frequently described and documented in the literature (for example, see Roth, 2005a) in two 
ways.   First, I am not considering one culture and a set of related experiences, rather two: 
mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics.  Some may argue that they are 
actually part of the same culture, but there has been enough discussion, especially in the last ten 
years or more (for example, see Schoenfeld, 2004), over whether the mathematics as perceived 
and done by mathematicians and the mathematics that is taught and learned in school are 
mutually compatible, let alone similar.  In order to better understand this divide, if it exists, they 
must therefore be, at least initially, considered as two different cultures.  This deviation from the 
“norms” of auto/ethnography should not be viewed as problematic; however, as the goal of my 
research remains the same as that found within the literature: “to study a culture’s relational 
practices, common values and beliefs” (Ellis, et. al., 2011, Doing Autoethnography: The Process 
section, para. 3) emerging from the experiences shared within the researcher’s own 
auto/biography. I am merely aiming to meet this goal twice, and then, hopefully, find a way to 
connect the results. 
The second way that my research differs from other auto/ethnography research is in the 
way that I am not only analyzing my story about mathematics and the teaching and learning of 
mathematics from my own perspective, but I am also analyzing them by assuming the role of 
two “others” – one grounded within the Traditional Western Worldview and one grounded 
within an Indigenous worldview.  This is important to note, because as Roth (2005a) warns: “the 
study of personal experience requires a radical suspension of judgment and submission to 
systematic method of dealing with one’s own prejudices and prejudgments – lest … 
auto/ethnography are to lead to ideology, delusion, and conceptual blindness” (p. 9).  As before, 
however, I do not see this variance as a cause for concern.  Instead of focusing only on my own 
prejudices and prejudgments, I will also be revealing possible prejudices and prejudgments of 
two Others.  In the analysis of my personal story, what appears as prejudices and prejudgments 
will depend upon whether I am looking through my personal lens, or one of the two worldview 
lenses.  Each of these lenses will reveal prejudices in relation to the kinds of knowledge and 
ways of knowing that are to be valued, with my own prejudices very likely moving somewhat 
fluidly between those of the two worldviews.  Moreover, the reader will respond differently to 
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these differing values and associated prejudices and prejudgments based upon their own 
worldview.  Overall, the revealing and interplay of all of these prejudices and prejudgments will 
broaden the reader’s understanding of these two mathematically situated cultures, and in so 
doing, will continue and, more importantly, expand the meaningfulness and responsiveness of 
the resulting dialogue. 
Intentionality. 
There is one particular type of prejudice which Rodrigues (2005) argues definitely must 
be addressed by the auto/ethnographer (and researcher), namely intentionality: “Intentionality is 
defined here in terms of the consciously driven ideological, political, pedagogical, and 
theoretical motives behind the desire to tell a chosen story of self” (p. 121).   In fact, Rodrigues 
contends: “the author’s intentionality for sharing a chosen story of self should be as important as 
the telling itself. … This intentionality should be made visible to readers in order to reveal often 
taken-for-granted political and ideological agendas” (p. 122).  It is through such revelations that 
“more spaces for critical engagement with the author’s lived text are possible” (p. 123), in 
particular the space to critique that very intentionality.  My story, at least indirectly, exposes my 
intentionality in pursuing this research: to understand, and expectantly find ways that may serve 
to rectify, the social injustices that the “outsiders” to mathematics and the teaching and learning 
of mathematics have to endure.  Such social injustices include the social stigma of “failing” at 
mathematics, of not finding ways to relate ones life to mathematics, and the facing of the 
frequently insurmountable barriers that mathematics has created within their lives.  Thus, my 
intentionality is focused upon understanding and confronting social injustices related to 
mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics.  
“I” as researcher and researched. 
Following from my intentionality, a significant feature (and point of contention within 
the world of research) of auto/ethnography is that it fundamentally “challenges canonical ways 
of doing research and representing others and treats research as a political, socially-just and 
socially-conscious act” (Ellis, et. al., 2011, Abstract section, para. 1).  In particular, “The idea of 
an independence of the observer (and therefore his/her knowledge) and the world observed has 
been seriously questioned both in the natural and the social sciences” (Roth, 2005a, p.7).  
Auto/ethnography does this by recognizing and highlighting that the researcher is central to both 
the data and its analysis, it includes “I” as a central figure, overtly active within all aspects of the 
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research.   Within research in the natural sciences, the focus of research is typically on that which 
is outside of the researcher; the knower and what is coming to be known are methodologically, 
methodically, and purposefully kept separate from each other.  When reading such research, the 
identity of the researcher is only known through the association of their name to the work, and 
not their presence within the analysis and documentation.  Auto/ethnography, on the other hand, 
fully embraces the researcher as part of what is being researched; in fact, “in auto/ethnography, 
researchers constitute their own object of research so that the knowing subject and the research 
object become one” (Breuer, 2005, p. 109).  Thus, “I” is prominently featured throughout such 
research, resulting in the exploration of the conditions and thoughts of the “insider” providing a 
more informed understanding of possibilities.  
The prominence of “I” as a feature of this methodology speaks loudly to me.  I have 
always felt that one could never completely remove their biases from their research activities. 
Who one is, and what they believe, necessarily influences how they interpret and understand 
things, and thus, I prefer approaches to research that choose to lay bare the researcher.  In so 
doing, the reader might ascertain what biases and prejudices are at play in the research processes 
and engage in informed discussions and make informed decisions.  Thus, as auto/ethnography 
researchers “assert the presence of the ‘I,’ the knower alongside the known in a dialectical 
knower/known relation, the knower and the known presupposing one another “ (Roth, 2005a, p. 
13), so too do I enter into this same kind of dialogue between knower and known.  As noted 
before, however, “I” am not in my research as a singular I, but a multiplicity of Is – myself, as 
well as Others, who I have chosen because they and their knowledge are grounded within either 
an Indigenous Worldview or the Traditional Western Worldview.  
As a warning to researchers considering the use of auto/ethnography as their 
methodology, Reed-Danahay (2009) states:  
Autoethnography is not the kind of autobiography in which the author as hero or 
heroine is neither constrained nor assisted in life by economic, social, or cultural 
position; autoethnography is also not a form of writing ethnography that erases the 
anthropologist and his or her encounters (Reed-Danahay, 2009, p 43)  
from the research.  Consequently, in my presentation of my auto/biography, my story, I have 
reported all that I can recall about my interactions with mathematics and the teaching and 
learning of mathematics, regardless of whether, from my current standpoint, I am proud or 
ashamed, pleased or disgusted, by my actions and thoughts.  The “I” in the story is presented as I 
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recall it, without embellishment or edits, it is my authentic self as I know it at this time.  Further, 
in the analysis of the story, the reader will note that I will not attempt to distance myself from the 
“I” of the story, for that I is part of me and part of my history, and in choosing to engage in 
auto/ethnography, I am explicitly choosing to keep myself always within my research and the 
analysis therein.  
Researcher and reader as insiders. 
 Adams, Jones, and Ellis (2014) further explain that in auto/ethnographic research,  
complex, insider accounts of sense-making and [illumination of] how/ why particular 
experiences are challenging or important and/ or transformative” (p. 27) are of central 
focus.  By carrying out analysis of his or her auto/biographies, the researcher not only 
seeks to reveal what can be learned from his or her story, but also to demonstrate, 
through their own work, how others might also “make sense of similar experiences. (p. 
27)   
Through the processes of auto/ethnography, the researcher hopes to engage readers in an 
exploration of their own experiences and stories, and to respond, whether within their own 
personal lives or directly with the researcher, to what has been presented.  “Autoethnographers 
invite participants and readers/ audiences to engage in the unfolding story of identities, 
experiences, and worlds, to creatively work through— together— what these experiences show, 
tell, and can mean” (Adams, et.al., 2014, p. 34) through both intrapersonal and interpersonal 
dialogue.  For me, dialogue is one of the most important consequences that can result from any 
research because it leads to greater understanding and at times, agreement.  Consequently, 
auto/ethnography speaks to me in a very personal way.  
Intersubjectivity. 
Another important point regarding engagement in auto/ethnographic researcher is that 
Researchers do not exist in isolation.  We live connected to social networks that include 
friends and relatives, partners and children, co-workers and students, and we work in 
universities and research facilities.  Consequently, when we conduct and write research, 
we implicate others in our work. (Ellis, et. al., 2011, Relational Ethics section, para. 1)   
This is of course true within my current research.  My story, in itself, explicitly invokes the spirit 
of others in my life, for example my grade one teacher (who taught me about the right way in 
mathematics), my father (who taught me a different right way to add columns of numbers), my 
vector calculus professor (who made me tea and showed me how little mathematics I 
understood), and my fellow mathematics major (who disastrously “hit and then saw the wall” of 
not understanding mathematics when it literally was too late), to name just a few.  It is because 
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of all of these people that I have this story to tell and it is because of these people that I came to 
do this research.  Roth (2005a) argues these ways in which others, both directly and indirectly, 
are involved and implicated in auto/ethnographic research with us “are legitimate ways of 
establishing intersubjectivity that escapes the false dichotomy opposing objectivism and 
subjectivism” (p. 6), bringing both interpersonal and intrapersonal agreement to new 
understandings.   
Auto/ethnography research seeks to find understanding from the perspectives of both 
insiders and outsiders to the culture, and potentially develop ways to bridge the divide between 
them.  Within my research, the insiders in the cultures of mathematics and the teaching and 
learning of mathematics are those who were “successful” (in terms of school evaluations) and 
who have gone on to at least like, if not specialize, within at least one of the two named 
mathematics-centered cultures.  The outsiders, on the other hand, are those who at some point 
stopped being (or painfully, may never have been) successful in mathematics and who feel 
disenfranchised from or diminished by their experiences with mathematics and the teaching and 
learning of mathematics.  It is my hope that the analytic lenses of the two worldviews, focusing 
on what kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing are being valued (and not valued) in 
mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics, will create a deeper understanding of 
these two cultures, and more importantly, highlight possible inroads for those who currently sit 
outside them.  Like Barton, and Darkside (2005), I “think about [auto/ethnography] as both the 
telling of one’s story and the using of that story with others to understand and use difference 
productively” (p. 23).  
Reliability, validity, and generalizability. 
Some authors and researchers critique auto/ethnography in terms of its reliability, 
validity, and generalizing; however, Ellis, et.al. (2011) argue: 
Those engaging in auto/ethnography and auto/biography openly recognize the fallibility 
of memory over the passage of time.  As such, the reliability, validity, and 
generalizability of one’s auto/biography is construed in the same way as it is when the 
researcher is not part of what is being researched. (Ellis, et. al., 2011, Reliability, 
Generalizability, and Validity section, para. 1)  
Thus, by overtly acknowledging the fallibility of this methodology within the research, the 
relative reliability, validity, and generalizability is determined by each individual who interacts 
with (or is indirectly influenced by) the research through their own particular lenses of prejudices 
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and prejudgments.  Auto/ethnography does not claim authority, universality, or absolute truth – 
only deeper understanding of complexities and awareness of possibilities. 
Reflexivity. 
Reflexivity is also an important aspect within auto/ethnography: “Reflexivity consists of 
turning back on our experiences, identities, and relationships in order to consider how they 
influence our present work.  Reflexivity also asks us to explicitly acknowledge our research in 
relation to power” (Adams, et.al., 2014, p. 29).  The first part of reflexivity, of looking at the 
personal experiences that have influenced my research I am conducting, is most obviously 
present in the construction of my research question.  Without the examination of my past story, I 
would have no reason, other than possibly coincidence, to have created and engaged with this 
question.  As Denzin (2013) states, “autoethnographic work must always be interventionist, 
seeking to give notice to those who may otherwise not be allowed to tell their story or who are 
denied a voice to speak” (p. 6), calling to attention and into question sites of power and authority 
within the culture being studied.  I believe the most significant way that power is considered and 
engaged within my research is through my desire to understand what it is about mathematics and 
the teaching and learning of mathematics (specifically, what is or is not being valued within 
these two cultures) that is denying some people access to them, and in doing so, limiting their 
sense and enactment of personal power within different aspects of their lives.  It is my hope that 
this research will help to uncover the sources of hegemonic behaviors within mathematics and 
the teaching and learning of mathematics so that ways of addressing and eliminating them might 
be found.   
Epiphanies. 
Many of the researchers and authors who have written about auto/ethnography reference 
the importance of “epiphanies” within one’s biography (for example, Adams, et. al., 2014; 
Denzin, 2013; Ellis, et.al., 2011), those moments in the researcher’s life that have resulted in 
conflict and possibly significant change.  It is these epiphanies that cause one to reflect upon and 
explore aspects about our selves and others that might have otherwise gone unnoticed.  As my 
analysis will show, my story contains many epiphanies, some of which reoccur in different forms 
with increasing intensity throughout.  
In summary, as Roth (2005a) explains,  
The stories ethnographers create are as much a reflection of their own cultural 
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positioning as they are descriptions of the positioning of others.  Making these 
historically constituted positions clear to the reader, that is, writing auto/biography and 
auto/ethnography, is one way of understanding and incorporating our prejudices into our 
practices and into what we produce.  Making sense and use of representations of some 
Other involves our own positioning in relation to what we are seeing as much as any 
meaning inherent in the images themselves; auto/biography is one of the central means 
of making this positioning salient. (p. 14)   
Thus, with the telling of my story, I have begun my auto/ethnographic research and analysis.  
Moreover, the theoretical worldviews framework that I have described will become the 
prominent lenses through which I will read and analyze that story (and other data that will 
emerge later).  In doing so, I am seeking understanding of the political, socially-just or unjust, 
and socially conscious and unconscious acts that are a result of the kinds of knowledge and ways 
of knowing that are being valued, devalued, or ignored.  
Questioning the unquestionable. 
Pereira, Settelmaier, and Taylor (2005) contend:  
Through auto/biographical inquiry, we might start to question that which seems 
unquestionable to us, a given fact, something that ‘has always been there.’  We might 
begin to confront what the phenomenologists call our ‘natural attitude,’ that is, our 
everyday way of thinking and valuing whose naturalness makes this process invisible to 
us in much the same way that the fish is unaware of the water in which it exists. (p. 54) 
I therefore choose to enter into auto/ethnography in order to expose my thinking and valuing 
related to mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics, as well as that of those 
who are grounded in either the Traditional Western worldview or an Indigenous worldview.  I 
also openly invite those who, through interest or requirement, engage with my work to do the 
same so that we might all come to a greater understanding of both cultures.  
 
Writing. 
As a final note on auto/ethnography, in the writing and documenting of this researcher,   
“the language should be expressive, contextualized.  The text should create a virtual reality and 
present an aesthetic form.  It should carry the author’s signature and above all, it should show a 
degree of textual ambiguity” (Pereira, et. al., 2005, p. 57).  Thus, my story is at times fanciful, it 
is grounded in contexts, and it is true in so far as memory can carry truth.  In the conducting of 
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this research, I never attempt to hide who I am, how I am thinking, or what assumptions I am 
making.  Instead, I share these aspects of myself in hopes of encouraging others to do likewise 
and thereby further clarify (while also possibly complicating) and expand understanding.  
Positioning my research within auto/ethnography. 
My research is intrinsically connected to and grounded in my story of mathematics and 
me, and to have not revealed my story would have felt I was denying its existence and influence.  
It exists, it is part of my history, and it continuously informs and influences my current (and 
future) thinking about mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics.  To hide my 
story would be to remove myself from the picture of my research, but it is foundational to my 
research.  My biases, my assumptions, my beliefs, and my prejudices are all found and 
questioned within my story, and thus it is a story that I must share.  It is also provides the reader 
a potentially new window of opportunity to consider and reflect upon their own stories.  I cannot 
separate my current thinking about mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics 
from my story, thus without my story my research would be incomplete.  Consequently, I choose 
to engage in the methodology of auto/ethnography.   However, there are aspects of my research 
for which auto/ethography alone are not sufficient as a methodology.  As such, I continue in the 
explanation of my methodological collage by next considering Gadamerian hermeneutics and its 
role within my research.  
Gadamerian Hermeneutics 
Although engaging in auto/ethnography fulfills in many ways how I wish to conduct my 
research, the usefulness of this methodology comes into question when I go to move beyond my 
own story and consider other kinds of data.  In particular, the auto/ethnographical analysis of my 
story (done in ways also consistent with Gadamer’s hermeneutics) will lead me to explore 
aspects of mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics through data that comes 
not from myself, but from literature.  I have chosen Gadamer’s hermeneutical methodology as 
the second in my collage of methodologies because it embraces the dialogue that I seek to have 
between myself, the data, and the two worldviews.  Moreover, as is noted throughout the 
discussion of Gadamer’s hermeneutics that follows, these two methodologies (auto/ethnography, 
and Gadamerian hermeneutics) in many ways entwine and support each other in their goals, 
enactment, and concerns, particularly in relation to the kinds of data that I will be analyzing.  
With this overview of a justification for the inclusion of this next methodology, I will now 
  
 98 
present my understandings of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. 
Interpretation, communication, and the ‘trickster’. 
Moules (2002) explains: “Hermeneutics is derived from the Greek verb hermeneuein, 
which means to say or interpret; the noun hermeneia, which is the utterance or explication of 
thought; and the name hermeneus, which refers to the playful, mischievous, ‘trickster’ Hermes” 
(p. 2).  In relation to this definition, Gadamerian hermeneutics is specifically concerned with the 
interpretation, and hence understanding, of experiences and texts.  Further, as will be explained 
later, Gadamerian hermeneutics emphasizes the role of language within that interpretation, as it 
is through language that thought is communicated.  Even the mischievous nature of Hermes can 
be found within Gadamer’s hermeneutics in its being “organized around the disruption of the 
clear narrative, always questioning those things that are taken for granted”  (p. 3).  For Gadamer, 
“To understand … is, in general, to grasp something (‘I get it’), to see things more clearly (say, 
when an obscure or ambiguous passage becomes clear), to be able to integrate a particular 
meaning into a larger frame” (Grondin, 2002, p. 36).  In general, Gadamerian hermeneutics, 
through the interpretation of text, seeks to expand one’s horizon of understanding of a concept or 
situation. 
Dialogue and a hermeneutic circle.  
The dialogue of Gadamerian hermeneutics is often described as a hermeneutic circle,  
“the to-and fro- motion of any attempt at understanding, from the parts to the whole and from the 
whole back to the parts… [it is a] constant process that consists of the revision of anticipations of 
understanding in light of a better and more cogent understanding of the whole” (Grondin, 2002, 
p. 47).  In my research, the analysis will take on this to-and fro- motion through the varying 
dialogues between my understanding, the two worldview understandings, and the text.  It will 
begin with the text of my story, but will ultimately carry on into the other, non-self generated, 
data that I will present.  As the analysis continues, the parts from each horizon interaction with 
the text will merge to form wholes of interpretation and understanding, that with each successive 
incident of analysis will change and grow to expand understanding of my research question for 
both the reader and I.  
Horizons of understanding. 
Central to Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy and methodology is his concept of 
horizons of understanding.  Barthold (n.d.) explains:  
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Just as the visual (that is, literal) horizon provides the boundaries that allow one to see, 
so [Gadamer’s] epistemic horizon provides boundaries that make knowledge possible.  
Just as the literal horizon delimits one’s visual field, the epistemic horizon frames one’s 
situation in terms of what lies behind (that is, tradition, history), around (that is, present 
culture and society), and before (that is, expectations directed at the future) one. 
(Prejudice, Tradition, Authority, Horizon section, para. 4) 
More specifically, Gadamer explains that each person’s understanding of any word, 
concept, condition, or experience is based upon an interplay of a past (or historical) horizon and 
a present horizon.  
Gadamer (1989) explains that the historical horizon of understanding for such an instance 
is comprised of beliefs and knowledge about which we are trying to understand.  These beliefs 
and knowledge come from the past, a past that unconditionally extends beyond our lifetime, 
which is steeped in the knowledge traditions of history within culture.  One’s past horizon of 
understanding remains fixed, regardless of one’s experiences, simply because it emerges from 
the past. 
The present horizon of understanding, on the other hand, although using the past horizon 
as a starting point, takes into account new interpretations, and thus new understandings, as they 
are experienced.  With each new encounter with an idea or concept, one engages in a dialogue 
with that experience, ascertaining how it might be interpreted, both within one’s existing present 
horizon of understanding and outside of it.  These new understandings, regardless of their 
perceived truth or value are integrated into one’s overall horizon (past and present) of 
understanding.  Also, through dialogue with others, one can come to new or additional 
interpretations brought forward by others, which are also added to one’s overall horizon of 
understanding.  This process is referred to as the fusing of horizons and is significant within what 
Gadamer (1989) calls “agreement” between different horizons (to be discussed later).    
Temporal positioning. 
 In addition to the past and present horizons of understanding, within Gadamerian 
hermeneutics,  
When we try to understand ourselves, our past and our future, we do so from a 
constantly changing temporal position.  Moreover, we do so from a temporal position 
affected by a history that reflects understandings other than our own.  The narratives in 
which we are involved and which we have to understand in one way or another not only 
continue even as we try to understand them, but they also continue as a confluence and 
even conflict of different interpretations of different narratives. (Warnke, 2002, p. 81)  
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Coltman (1998) furthers this discussion of the temporality of history within hermeneutical 
understanding when he states:  
every heremenutical engagement is thoroughly conditioned and mediated by its 
historical circumstances and so, in a sense, is always already underway, any specific 
conversation (even a counter turning dialogue) must have a beginning – or at least our 
discussion must begin somewhere. (p. 11)   
Thus, Gadamer claims that even concepts or ideas which may seem new to us, already have a 
historical and present horizon of understanding, limited in scope to be sure, but ready to be 
engaged as soon as the opportunity arises.  This position of temporality is also central to 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics because of its impact on fallibility. 
Fallibility, language, and words. 
Just as auto/ethnography recognizes the fallibility inherent to the methodology, 
Gadamerian hermeneutics also acknowledges that,  
Of course, understanding often fails. But it then fails to say what would need to be said.  
The failure of words can only be measured by what they fail to say. The unsayable is 
only the unsayable in light of what one would like to say, but cannot.  The limits of 
language thus confirm – and very eloquently – the universality of language as the 
medium of understanding, as Gadamer sees it.  (Grondin, 2002, p. 42) 
In fact, Gadamer acknowledges that all understanding is contingent upon interpretation, and 
within interpretation “One can always find better words for what needs to be understood, more 
suited’ applications’” (Grondin, 2002, p. 43).  Thus, Gadamer’s hermeneutics is again in 
consonance with the methodology of auto/ethnography, seeking the best interpretation possible 
at the given time, but at the same time acknowledging that a full or true understanding has yet to 
be achieved.  It is in this sense that through Gadamerian hermeneutical dialogues, “meanings of 
words are expanded and negotiated, ultimately shimmering” (Silverman, 1991, p. 33), giving 
brief flashes of nearer truths and further falsehoods that combine within one’s horizon of 
understanding as part of the methodological agreement regarding understanding of the word.   
Not only is beauty importantly related to the true for Plato and Gadamer, it is also 
closely related to the good.  Although Gadamer never attempted to develop an ethics or 
a politics, his hermeneutics is both ethical and political.  The basic posture of anyone in 
the hermeneutical situation has profound implications for ethics and politics, inasmuch 
as this posture requires that one always be prepared that the other may be right.  The 
ethic of this hermeneutic is an ethic of respect and trust that calls for solidarity. (Dostal, 
2002a, p 32)   
Ethical knowledge, intersubjectivity, and openness. 
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Within his hermeneutical methodology, Gadamer (1989) describes the knowledge sought 
as “ethical knowledge.”   Gadamer states:  
Not only must [this] ethical knowledge deal with a constantly changing set of 
circumstances and not only is its application determined by a history that is, in the 
course of its becoming, unceasing in its demands on us.   In addition, we make and 
remake our ethical knowledge and ourselves in these changing circumstances, in the 
actions we take to apply the ethical knowledge we already possess. (Warnke, 2002, p. 
85)   
The seeking of ethical knowledge is done for the sake of everyone who may take understanding 
from one’s work.  Consequently, Gadamer (1989) asserts:  
Both the person asking for advice and the person giving it assume that they are bound 
together in friendship.  Only friends can advise each other or, to put it another way, only 
a piece of advice that is meant in a friendly way has meaning for the person advised … 
we discover that the person who is understanding does not know and judge as one who 
stands apart and unaffected but rather he thinks along with the other from the 
perspective of a specific bond of belonging as if he too were affected. (Gadamer, 1989, 
p. 323) 
Thus, like auto/ethnography, Gadamerian hermeneutics is based upon the interconnectedness and 
intersubjectivity of those seeking understanding.  
Gadamer (1989) calls the interconnectedness and intersubjectivity of his methodology 
“openness”, explaining: “When two people understand each other, this does not mean that one 
person ‘understands’ the other… Openness to the other … involves recognizing that I myself 
must accept some things that are against me, even though no one else forces me to do so” (p. 
361).  Of course, it is important to remember that in saying acceptance, Gadamer is referring 
only to accepting the understandings of others into one’s own horizon of understanding in 
recognition, without necessarily compromising one’s beliefs.  He is not implying that one must 
forfeit their entire horizon of understanding by accepting that of another; however, as Coltman 
(1998) notes: “openness to the other and a willingness to put one’s own prejudices at risk 
constitute the principal modes of comporting oneself in a genuinely dialectical hermeneutic” (p. 
53).  By starting with the analysis of my story, which will expose my own prejudices, and by 
taking on the role of the Other when analyzing my research data through the lenses of the 
Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous worldview, I contend that I will bring such 
openness to my work. 
Language. 
As alluded to earlier, language also plays a central role within Gadamerian hermeneutics: 
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“Understanding for Gadamer, is itself always a matter of interpretation.  Understanding is also 
always a matter of language”  (Dostal, 2002b, p. 1).  In fact, Gadamer (1989) asserts  “Being that 
can be understood is language” (p. 432).  In other words, understanding is as a result of language 
(p. 432).  Consequently, Gadamerian hermeneutics, in direct contradiction to quantitative 
methodologies and the Kantian view of the world,  “affirms the primacy of the spoken over the 
written” (Dostal, 2002b, p. 2). 
Grondin (2002) further explains the role of language within Gadamerian hermeneutics:  
When presenting his own ideas or analyzing concepts, Hans-Georg Gadamer likes to 
follow the lead of language.  The fact that basic notions he is unfolding often have many 
very different meanings does not bother him.  Quite on the contrary, he sees in this 
plurality of meaning an indication that language, long before thinking, is perhaps up to 
something essential. (p. 36)   
It is important within my research that I too keep an open mind to alternate meanings for 
language, particularly as I will be engaging with text both through my own horizon of 
understanding as well as my present understandings of horizons of understanding of Others who 
are either grounded within the Traditional Western worldview or an Indigenous worldview.  
Consequently, I should not be surprised, but actually anticipate that the same text will result in 
different understandings through these particular analytic lenses.  Even if the interpretations from 
the different horizons of understanding result in the same concepts, it is very likely that the 
horizons of understanding will interpret or respond to those concepts in the same ways. 
Grondin (2002) explains:  “To understand in Gadamer’s sense is to articulate (a meaning, 
a thing, an event) into words, words that are mine, but at the same time those of what I strive to 
understand.” (p. 41).  The goal then of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, “is that the [interpreter] be 
taken up by what he seeks to understand, that he responds, interprets, searches for words or 
articulation and thus understands” (p. 41).  Understanding in Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
emphasizes both intrapersonal and interpersonal, the same intersubjectivity as sought and valued 
within auto/ethnography.  
Authority of traditions and frameworks. 
As in the methodology of auto/ethnography, Gadamerian hermeneutics holds that 
“individual’s understanding occurs in larger historical and heremenutical contexts” and it 
“accords great importance to the role of traditions and … in any interpretation” (Dostal, 2002b, 
p. 3).  Further, Gadamer (1989) acknowledge that traditions, and any frameworks that are 
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brought into research necessarily exercise “authority” (p. 277) over understanding.  The assumed 
role of traditions and prejudice within Gadamer’s hermeneutics parallel those within 
auto/ethnography; however, his concern about frameworks claiming of authority within the 
creation of understanding causes me to pause given the role of the theoretical worldview 
framework within my research.  In defense of the incorporation of this framework into my 
research, however, I argue that the worldviews defining it were specifically chosen, at least in 
part, because they presented two very different sets of values relating to knowledge and ways of 
knowing.  Consequently, throughout the analysis of my research, each worldview will take turns 
assuming the authority.  It is my intention to allow each worldview to speak from its own 
perspectives both to and about the text without interference, influence, or prejudice from the 
other worldview.  I therefore contend that in this instance, since the framework is not based upon 
a hierarchy of authority, the implementation of it need not lead to a corruption of understanding 
through an assumption of authority.  
Like Moules (2002), I recognize that “I cannot remove my subjectivity from my work, 
but I can take it up with a sense of responsibility in recognizing how it translates into the way I 
listen to my participants, what I hear, what stands out to me, and how I interpret it” (p. 12).  
Gadamer (1989) also contends that within dialogue: “The important thing is to be aware of one’s 
own bias, so that the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against 
one’s own fore-meanings” (p. 269), which my use of auto/ethnography is meant to achieve.  
Another connection between Gadamerian hermeneutics and auto/ethnography is in relation to the 
role of self: “to understand always implies an element of self-understanding, self-implication, in 
the sense that it is always a possibility of my own self that is played out in understanding” 
(Grondin, 2002, p. 38).  Therefore, the inclusion and exploration of “I” within both 
methodologies are complementary, demonstrating how auto/ethnography and Gadamerian 
hermeneutics might be used as co-methodologies.  
Practical application of knowledge. 
Within his hermeneutic methodology, Gadamer also posits:  
that the practical application of knowledge is inherent in the very understanding of 
something. Practical application is not, on Gadamer’s account, an external, after the 
fact, use of understanding that is somehow independent of understanding.  All 
understanding is practical. (Dostal, 2002b, p.3) 
  In other words, “ one who ‘understands’ something is not so much someone endowed 
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with a specific knowledge, but someone who can exercise a practical skill” (Grondin, 2002, p. 
37).  Within my research then, it is through the inclusion of Gadamerian hermeneutics within my 
methodological collage that I am therefore able to speak to possible actions that might be taken, 
applications that might be possible from the understanding gained through my research. 
Agreement. 
Understanding within Gadamerian hermeneutics “can also mean in German ‘to agree,’ ‘to 
come to an agreement,’ ‘to concur’” (Grondin, 2002, p. 39).  The agreement Gadamer is 
addressing, however, should not be confused with having attained true understanding or 
interpretation of the text.  Rather, it is the acknowledgement of the fusion of horizons of 
understanding.  All those involved in the dialogues of Gadamerian hermeneutics are not expected 
to come to consensus or acquiesce to one person’s horizon.  Instead, the intention is to bring to 
light as many different understandings as possible within a single horizon that everyone shares, 
regardless of whether they all accept the same parts of that horizon as their individual truths. 
Finitude. 
Within his hermeneutical methodology, Gadamer (1989) also acknowledges that all 
humans are finite, that is, that it is not possible for a human to understand everything.  However, 
Gadamer also speaks to the “finitude” of human knowledge, which “points to a dependency of 
knowledge on conditions that the human knower can never fully know.  And if these conditions 
cannot be fully known, then this challenges us to revise our understanding of the type of 
autonomous control we can hope to exercise over our own cognitive endeavors” (Wachterhauser, 
2002, p. 57).  However, Gadamer does not only associate this finitude of human knowledge as a 
deficit within his hermeneutics.  Rather, he argues that it is in relation to all methodologies and 
methods of research.  Like the revealing and analyzing of Self in auto/ethnography, Gadamerian 
hermeneutics discloses rather than denies its limitations. 
Positioning of my research within Gadamer’s hermeneutic methodology. 
Gadamer (1989) argues that in engaging in his hermeneutic methodology, “is 
substantively driven rather than methodologically given … it is not possible to determine a way 
to proceed without being guided by the topic” (Moules, 2002, p. 13).  It was my story, and its 
temporal culmination with Leroy Little Bear’s (2000) exploration of the values of Western and 
Indigenous cultures that urged me towards this research.  In so doing, the story became a 
necessary part of my research, bringing me to auto/ethnography.  However, how to engage with 
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my story, and how to move beyond it within my research, brought me to Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics (as well as the soon to be discussed grounded theory).  Gadamer (1989) declares 
that hermeneutic inquiry begins with an experience of being addressed by a topic, and in my 
research it does so as the process behind my use of auto/ethnography.  Although there is at least 
one subtle difference between Gadamer’s hermeneutics and auto/ethnography, in that in the latter 
methodology the “practitioners sometimes return to the participant for member checks to 
authenticate and substantiate how well they were represented” (Moules, 2002, p. 15).  Because 
my research only involves one real participant, myself as I am the one who will be engaging in 
the dialogue on behalf of the two worldviews, this step in the auto/ethnographic and 
methodology is of no consequence anyway.  With no other notable discrepancies between the 
two methodologies, I contend that the many ways in which I have detailed about how Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics and auto/ethnography align and support one another make the use of both 
methodologies within my collage of appropriate and effective. 
Grounded Theory: Methodology 
While the methodologies of auto/ethnography and Gadamer’s hermeneutics form a strong 
foundation for the researching of my story in relation to the question of what kinds of knowledge 
and ways of knowing are valued in mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics, a 
third methodology is needed within my methodological collage that will allow me to move my 
research beyond my story.  In my research I also want to move into less personal, and more 
literature-based data.  Further, as so many of the conflicts and tensions within my story have yet 
to find a comfortable (at least for me) resolution, I ultimately am seeking new theory to address 
these issues.  In order to fill this need, I have chosen to also include grounded theory within my 
methodological collage.  How grounded theory fits with and complements auto/ethnography and 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics within my research will be made clear through the following discussion 
of grounded theory.  
Grounded theory in general. 
Heath and Cowley (2004) explain: “Fundamental to grounded theory is the belief that 
knowledge may be increased by generating new theories rather than analysing data within 
existing ones” (p. 142).  In other words, the function of grounded theory is to analyze data for the 
purposes of generating new theory, which can then (later) be applied to other data, rather than 
continuing to try to use existing theories that have not proven sufficient in explaining and 
  
 106 
resolving tensions and problems found within contexts and their data.  Importantly, grounded 
theory may be turned to when the researcher “is already aware that there is a lack of knowledge” 
(Heath, & Cowley, 2004, p. 143).  It is precisely this lack of  (sufficient) knowledge present 
within literature and theory to address the epiphanies within my story that are most concerning to 
me that has (at least in part) led me to the selection of grounded theory as my third 
methodological approach.   
Grounded theory most notably came to the attention of researchers, and in particular 
qualitative researchers, with the release of Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) The Discovery of 
Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research.  What the authors proposed was a new 
methodology (as well as an accompanying method) for “the discovery of theory from data” 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967, The Discovery of Grounded Theory section, para. 1).  More 
specifically, Glaser & Strauss explained:  
Generating a theory from data means that most hypotheses and concepts not only come 
from the data, but are systematically worked out in relation to the data during the course 
of the research.  Generating a theory involves a process of research. (Grounded Theory 
section, para. 8) 
Traditionally, within most research methodologies and methods, new theory results from a 
researcher’s hypothesis, followed by the collection of data related to the testing of that 
hypothesis.  In grounded theory, on the other hand, the researcher does not start with a 
hypothesis, only an interest or curiosity – the researcher starts with a research question only. 
Within grounded theory, “the research process itself guides the researcher towards 
examining all of the possibly rewarding avenues to understanding.  This is why the research 
method is one of discovery and one which grounds a theory in reality” (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, 
p. 6).  It should be noted that, just as within Gadamerian hermeneutics and auto/ethnography, 
grounded theory also emphasizes determining all possibilities that can be identified through the 
research process.  
Where it begins. 
Flick, (2014) notes that “there can be several starting points for a grounded theory study 
... researchers’ curiosity... personal experience or concern, gaps in the state of a scientific field... 
the emergence of a new phenomenon or the discovery of a new problem” (p. 399).  As my 
research begins with my personal experiences as shared through my story, and is seeking 
understanding about aspects of mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics which 
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are not yet understood and problems not yet resolved, this makes grounded theory an ideal 
choice for inclusion in my methodological collage.  In addition, “grounded theory sees 
researchers as social beings whose experiences, ideas and assumptions can contribute to their 
understanding of social processes observed” (Heath, & Cowley, 2004.p. 143).  In the case of my 
research, personal experience and concern, as found within my story, are the impetuses for 
engaging in grounded theory (as well as auto/ethnographic and Gadamerian hermeneutic) 
research. 
Seeking understanding. 
Within grounded theory “one enters the field open to realising new meaning and, via 
cycles of data gathering and analysis, progressively focuses on a core problem around which 
other factors will be integrated” (Heath, & Cowley, 2004,p. 143).  Like Gadamerian 
hermeneutics then, grounded theory is focused on creating and expanding understanding.  
Moreover, the two methodologies are similar in that they both acknowledge the interplay 
between data (text) and the researcher.  Within Gadamer’s hermeneutics, this interplay is the 
back and forth (part to whole) dialogue between the researcher and text, while in grounded 
theory the part to whole process is supported through the introduction of new data regarding 
influencing factors.  The possibility to merge these two methodologies lies in engaging in 
research that involves a hermeneutic dialogue with an expanding of sets of data which are sought 
as a consequences of the hermeneutic dialogues. 
Conceptual labels.  
In grounded theory, “incidents, events, and happenings are taken as, or analyzed as, 
potential indicators of phenomena, which are thereby given conceptual labels” (Corbin & 
Strauss, 1990, p. 7).  Thus, when analyzing a set of data, the researcher seeks to identify possible 
relationships in terms of actions and meanings between the details of the phenomena and their 
research question, and then those relationships are noted and labeled accordingly (Charmaz, 
2012).  As the conceptual labels emerge through analysis, the researcher then collects further 
data related to the concepts that have been labeled.  The purpose of collecting additional data is 
to either confirm or invalidate the labeled concept in relation to the research question.  
Throughout the iterations of data collection and analysis, the researcher is making “constant 
comparisons” (Corbin, & Strauss, 1990, p. 9) to ensure at least the reduction of bias in the 
researcher’s analyses.  Any conceptual labels that do not reappear or contradict evidence within 
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new data are not researched further.   
Conceptual categories. 
As the iterative process of collecting and analyzing new data continues, “one generates 
conceptual categories or their properties from evidence; then the evidence from which the 
category emerged is used to illustrate the concept.  The evidence may not necessarily be accurate 
beyond a doubt (nor is it even in studies concerned with only accuracy), but the concept is 
undoubtedly a relevant theoretical abstraction about what is going on in the area studied” (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967, Accurate Evidence section, para. 2).  An important part of grounded theory is 
that the conceptual labels, and ultimately the conceptual categories are not pre-determined; 
rather, they emerge from the analysis of the data, in response to the question asked.  When the 
collection of data and analysis for conceptual labels and categories no longer produce new 
insights, the researcher is said to have reached “theoretical saturation” (Flick, 2014, p. 403) or 
“conceptual … ‘density’” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 161), and the researcher decides that there 
is no point to collect any further data.  At this point, the researcher looks to either integrate 
categories that come from the conceptual labels in order to describe an emerging theory (Strauss, 
& Corbin, 1988) or in the process of refining the conceptual labels into categories, integrating 
them into an emerging core which becomes the theory (Glaser, 2004).  
The divergence of Glaser and Strauss. 
Although somewhat foreshadowed within their initial work, over time Glaser and Strauss 
have diverged in their approaches to grounded theory, particularly in relation to the role of 
literature  
Glaser and Strauss both acknowledge that the researcher will not enter the field free 
from ideas, but differ considerably in the role they see for the literature.  Discovery is at 
the heart of both researchers’ ideas; one enters the field open to realising new meaning 
and, via cycles of data gathering and analysis, progressively focuses on a core problem 
around which other factors will be integrated” (Heath & Cowley, 2004, p. 143).  
Glaser argues for the researcher to have an overview of the literature related to the research 
question and its source; however, he cautions that in-depth literature based knowledge can 
desensitize one to the data.  Instead, he argues: “More focused reading [should] only [occur] 
when emergent theory is sufficiently developed to allow the literature to be used as additional 
data” (Heath & Cowley, 2004, p. 143).  Strauss, on the other hand, argues: “while diffuse 
understandings provide sensitivity, both specific understandings from past experience and 
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literature maybe used to stimulate theoretical sensitivity and generate hypotheses” (Heath & 
Cowley, 2004, p. 143).   
 Given the importance of my story, and thus my past, as well as my intended use of 
literature as data within this research, it would be prudent that I assume that my use of grounded 
theory within this research be aligned with Strauss.  This is more an alignment of necessity and 
convenience than necessarily one of conviction, as I also see merit to the claims made by Glaser. 
It is because of the dominant role that literature plays as informant to my research (i.e., as data) 
that I necessarily will have to be engaging with literature deeply throughout my study.  The use 
of literature as a data source is supported by Corbin & Strauss (1990): “the data for a grounded 
theory can come from various sources.  The data collection procedures involve interviews and 
observations as well as such other sources as government documents, video tapes, newspapers, 
letters, and books--anything that may shed light on questions under study” (p. 5), which gives 
wide berth to the researcher in seeking appropriate and meaningful data to analyze. 
With the above understandings of the methodology of grounded theory, and of how it 
serves to complete the methodological collage for my researcher, I must now turn to my 
methods, to how I plan to use this triad to conduct the research.  Of the three methodologies, 
grounded theory has the most explicit delineation of methods of research in relation to the 
methodology, and so I return to grounded theory in my explanation of my methods.  
Grounded Theory: Method 
In turning to grounded theory to define and justify the methods I will be using in my 
research, I return to an earlier statement in which I specified that I would be specifically 
engaging in Strauss’ approach to grounded theory. Thus it is to Strauss (and Corbin) that I also 
turn to for my detailing of my methods.  In so doing, I will first provide a brief explanation of 
Strauss’ methods, after which I will provide more specific details of how implementing those 
methods will occur within my research. 
Codes, categories and constant comparing. 
In grounded theory, how one codes the data is foundational to working towards the 
development of theory.  When analyzing the data,  “The incidents, events, and happenings are 
taken as, or analyzed as, potential indicators of phenomena, which are thereby given conceptual 
labels. (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 7).  As the data is coded, the incidents and the conceptual 
labeling are constantly compared in order to “accumulate the basic units of theory.  In the 
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grounded theory approach such concepts become … more abstract as the analysis continues” 
(Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 7).  As the analysis of new data continues, the researcher also 
analyzes the relationships between concepts, as “Concepts that pertain to the same phenomenon 
may be grouped to form categories” (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, p. 7).  Naturally, not all concepts 
should be expected to fit into categories, and the categories that do emerge will be more abstract 
in nature.  
These “Categories are the ‘cornerstones’ of a developing theory.  They provide the means 
by which a theory can be integrated” (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, p. 7).  Corbin and Strauss warn, 
however, that the simple grouping of concepts under a more abstract title does not make that 
grouping a category: “To achieve that status … a more abstract concept must be developed in 
terms of its properties and dimensions of the phenomenon it represents, conditions which give 
rise to it, the action/interaction by which it is expressed, and the consequences it produces” 
(Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 7-8).  It is the goal of grounded theory that, over time (i.e., 
successive data collection, analysis, and comparisons), the categories will merge into a theory. 
Data collection and sampling. 
As noted, grounded theory requires ongoing collection of data (“sampling”); however, 
sampling is not done “in terms of drawing samples of specific groups of individuals, units of 
time, and so on, but in terms of concepts, their properties, dimensions, and variations (Corbin & 
Strauss, 1990, p. 8).  That is to say, when new data is collected it is done so because it is believed 
to connect to the concepts (and categories) that have emerged so far.   
The analysis cycle. 
Constant comparisons between incidents within the data, concepts, and categories “assists 
the researcher in guarding against bias” (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 9) by consistently checking 
if the new data supports the concepts and categories that have been emerging.  Thus, the general 
method for conducting grounded theory research can be described as:  
1. analyzing initial data for concepts (open coding) 
2. collecting new data to verify the concepts 
3. analyzing the new data for concept validation  
4. analyzing of concepts for relationships to determine (sub-)categories (axial 
coding) 
5. collecting new data to verity the concepts and categories 
6. analyzing the new data for concept and category validation 
7. analyzing of concepts for relationships to determine categories 
8. analyzing of categories to determine broader categories (axial and possibly 
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selective coding). 
The third step in the process is repeated until no new relationships between concepts or 
categories can be determined and there is a strong unification of a number of categories and 
concepts into a single “core” category (selective coding).   
The core category represents the central phenomenon of the study.  It is identified by 
asking questions such as: What is the main analytic idea presented in this research?  If 
my findings are to be conceptualized in a few sentences, what do I say?  What does all 
the action/interaction seem to be about? (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 14) 
 
Once a core category has been identified it becomes the foundation of the new theory proposed 
via the methodology of grounded theory.  Thus, this theory emerges from a “detailed and dense 
process” that is “fully described” (Heath, & Cowley, 2004, p. 146).   
An additional note should be made with respect to the coding proposed by Corbin and 
Strauss (1990): “A single incident is not a sufficient basis to discard or verify a hypothesis.  To 
be verified (that is, regarded as increasingly plausible) a hypothesis must be indicated by the data 
over and over again” (p. 13).  This tells the researcher that in order for a concept to become a 
part of a category, and a category to become part of the final theory, it is necessary that there 
must be consistent and abundant validation of the concept or category.  
Positioning research within grounded theory methodology and methods. 
As previously noted, the addition of grounded theory within my methodological collage 
provides me with an avenue for expanding outward from my auto/ethnographic consideration of 
my story to other sources of data.  At the same time, my choice of additional sources of data will 
be informed by my auto/ analysis of my story.  Moreover, Gadamer’s hermeneutical 
methodology provides me the format through which I will be carrying out the continuous coding 
and constant comparing of data, concepts, and categories of grounded theory, that of engaging in 
dialogues between the data and the two worldviews (the Traditional Western and an Indigenous).  
All three methodologies are also in agreement with respect to the often-contentious issues of the 
inclusion of self, prejudice, and intersubjectivity.  In this research, I will begin with an 
auto/ethnographic analysis of the story of Mathematics and Me through a Gadamerian 
hermeneutical dialogue involving the worldviews of the framework and using the methods of 
Glaser’s grounded theory.  This analysis will be followed by similar dialogues and analysis of 
additional data advocated for by my auto/ethnographic positioning and gathered and analyzed 
(hermeneutically) through grounded theory. Thus, the methodological collage that I will be 
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engaging in is a purposeful and directed interplay between the three methodologies, giving my 
research and it’s analysis cohesion and purpose.   
My Research Methods 
Taking the lead from this general understanding of the method of engaging in grounded 
theory as proposed by Corbin & Strauss (1990), I will now explain how I will enact and 
document these processes within my research.  As noted before, my starting set of data is my 
story (the auto/ethnographic contribution to my research).  
Coding of my story. 
As previously noted, I will be analyzing the data in my story from the perspective of two 
different lenses (that of the Traditional Western worldview, and that of an Indigenous 
worldview), and in particular I will be looking for indicators of phenomenon within the data that 
may indicate, relate to, or influence, the kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing that are or are 
not being valued.  Upon identification of any such phenomena, I will use open coding to label 
the concept it represents, and record in my notes both that concept and a description of 
characteristics pertaining it found within the data.  As the coding of my story progresses, I will 
continue to add new concepts as they present themselves, as well make edits to descriptions to 
reflect my growing understanding of the concepts. 
The coding of my story may also result in some axial coding, in which concepts 
identified within previous parts of my story may be seen to relate to or even merge together.  In 
such cases, I will be identifying the new category that results, as well as documenting its defining 
characteristics as seen within the data. 
Data sampling and continued open and axial coding. 
Upon completion of this initial data analysis, I will then use my story and its analysis to 
determine other kinds of data that I feel would contribute to my overall research and speak to the 
particular concepts and descriptions I have identified thus far.  Repeating the analysis process 
that I used for my story, I will be either verifying, questioning, or creating additional concepts.  
In addition, I will be analyzing my concepts to see if broader categories are emerging that relate 
and include any number of those concepts. I will repeat this process of presenting and analyzing 
new data until I find that many concepts are merging into categories and that at least some of 
those categories are merging into a core category.  At that point, I hope to be able to propose a 
new theory that speaks to the kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing that are, could be, and 
  
 113 
should be valued within mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics, along with 
the possible consequences of actualizing that theory. 
Saturation. 
When my coding of the data is no longer providing new concepts and the creation of 
categories has come to a point where a core category (or core categories) is emerging, the coding 
will have become saturated and I will end the sampling of new data and its analysis.  At that 
point, I will turn my attention to the proposing of a new theory based upon the core category/ 
categories that have emerged. 
 
Documentation of my research. 
The presentation of this part of my research will need to follow the flow of my 
engagement with it, as did my story and the theoretical worldview – they were presented first 
because they are where my research and my research question came from.  Therefore, I will next 
provide the analysis of my story, as the data is already present.  Following that analysis, I will be 
documenting the cycle of sampling and coding as it occurs, hopefully ending the cycle through 
the proposal of a new theory.  Within each analysis section, the reader will be provided with a 
summary of the prominent features of the particular data set that speak to the valuing of kinds of 
knowledge and ways of knowing, the response of the two worldview positionings with respect to 
those prominent features, and finally an explanation of the coding (open and axial) that is 
implied by those responses. 
Personification of the worldviews. 
One final note needs to be made regarding my use of the theoretical worldview 
framework in the analysis of the data.  In order to cut back on wordiness, I will often make 
statements such as “an Indigenous worldview would see this incident as….”  Of course, neither 
an Indigenous worldview nor the Traditional Western worldview “sees” or “views” anything, but 
someone holding such a worldview does.  In so writing that the worldviews “see” or “view” a 
particular incident or context in a certain way, I am, in fact,  asking the reader to think of the 
worldview in terms of a person who holds that named worldview. 
Back to the beginning. 
With my methodological collage and methods explained, my research can now move 
forward into the analysis, and subsequent data collection and analysis, sections.  Having come 
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this far, I now take the reader back to the beginning – back to my story.   
  
 
  
 115 
Analysis of My Story 
At this point in my analysis, I call upon all three methodologies within my collage.  I 
bring forward auto/ethnography as I read and analyze my personal story for its epiphanies related 
to the cultures of mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics; I engage in 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, as I use dialogue between my story and each of the two worldviews to 
obtain greater understanding of these two cultures; and, I use grounded theory coding and 
comparisons to label incidents that provide indications of concepts inherent within the story, as 
illuminated by the worldviews, that speak to the valuing of mathematics and the teaching and 
learning of mathematics.  As each part of my story highlights awakenings, shifts, or outright 
changes in my thinking about mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics, I 
consider each part separately within this analysis.  
“Long before I ever entered school” Analysis 
In this introductory section of my story, the reader is provided a very general overview of 
how, as a young child, I thought about mathematics.  In particular, I focus on how mathematics 
and story was categorized within my mind.  
Prominent features within the data. 
In the introduction, the emphasis is on my separating of mathematical knowledge from 
story-based knowledge, demonstrating my belief that one type of knowledge should not interfere 
with the enactment of another.  My view was that mathematics and story were two very different 
kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing, each of value on their own, but not of value to each 
other or with each other.  Thus, mathematics and story were strongly categorized, isolated, and 
even abstracted in my earliest memories.  
Dialogue with the Traditional Western worldview. 
When considered through the lens of the Traditional Western worldview, my beliefs 
about mathematics and story are in agreement with the worldview’s emphasis on valuable 
knowledge being categorized and isolated.  As well, someone grounded within the Traditional 
Western worldview would likely consider my view of the distinction between mathematics and 
story, and what can be known about and through them, as a valuable way of knowing. 
Dialogue with an Indigenous worldview. 
Alternatively, when considered from the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, my 
rigidity in the separation and categorization of the two kinds of knowledge would be seen as 
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counter-productive to the seeking of knowledge for the purpose of constructing, maintaining, and 
expanding relationships.  Consequently, the knowledge that I held in relation to either 
mathematics or story would be seen as possibly being of less value because I have actively not 
sought connections between them.  Further, because of an Indigenous worldview’s acceptance 
(and seeking) of diversity in ways of knowing, my stance on the isolation of mathematics and 
story would also be deemed as not as valuable as it could be. 
Coding and explanation. 
Overall, there is a single concept label that I have assigned to the introduction to my 
story, specifically, categorization and isolation.  Associated with this concept, I have noted that, 
depending upon one’s worldview, dealing with knowledge in a categorizing or isolating manner 
may be perceived as either an advantage or a limitation.  In particular, my view of mathematics 
at that time is one that would be seen as an advantage within the Traditional Western worldview, 
yet a limitation within an Indigenous worldview.  From this first moment in my story, the first 
epiphany, and through the engaging in dialogue between my description of that epiphany and 
each of the worldviews, the first concept has emerged from my data: categorization and isolation.  
“My first mathematical memory” Analysis 
This part of the analysis of my story focuses on my time before entering school.  In 
particular, it focuses on the common activities that I engaged in as a child.  In this part of my 
story, there are two kinds of epiphany events: one defined by my responses to television, and the 
other in response to activities I was engaged in outside of the TV programs in question. 
Prominent features within the data. 
My need for the separation of different kinds of knowledge continues in my memories of 
the TV shows that I did or did not like to watch.  Those shows that I liked, such as Kingo Bingo 
and Mr. Dress-up, had, for me, a defined knowledge purpose (mathematics and story, 
respectively).  From my perspective these shows did not cross the knowledge boundaries that I 
believed in.  I also preferred those shows that moved me beyond what I already knew, creating a 
sense of a learning trajectory for me.   
Interestingly, in more recent discussions with friends, I was at first surprised to hear them 
speak in detail about the host of Kingo Bingo, and aspects of The Friendly Giant and Mr. 
Dressup that were strongly related to the learning of mathematics.  Although I have memories of 
the aspects of which my friends speak, such as common things the Kingo Bingo host would say, 
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or particular episodes of The Friendly Giant or Mr. Dressup, I did not recognize, at the time of 
my story, that this was an infringement upon my need for knowledge separation.  Essentially, I 
appear to have blocked these features of the programs from the memories that are most clearly 
defined to me.  It was not that I was not aware of the other things happening in each program, but 
determined that I knew the sole purpose of a program I was only interested in that aspect of the 
program.  
From this perspective, it is no wonder that I disliked Sesame Street at that time. For 
whatever reason, I had decided that the show’s purpose was mathematical in nature, so when it 
did not challenge me mathematically, I decided it had no real value.  Likewise, when I think now 
on my engagement with Kingo Bingo, I realize that there was so much more than just the 
identifying of the numbers called with those on the cards in front of me, even more than the 
personality of the host, was of value.  After my Mom and I moved the piano bench, and after my 
parents and grandparents had picked up the bingo cards for me, my need for relationships with 
others while working with the numbers was gone.  It was all about my manipulation of the 
numbers – my specialization in my knowledge of the Natural numbers.  I have no immediate 
recall of the bingo caller or if there were other people on the show – I was completely focused on 
the numbers in isolation of all else.  Just as auto/ethnography aims to do, this part of my story 
has illuminated my propensity to isolate and have singular focus on one type of knowledge at a 
time.  
My short recounting of playing Sorry with my grandfather is very much analogous to that 
of bread making in its emphasis on the categorization and isolation of knowledge.  The game, to 
me, was all about numbers – rolling numbers and counting numbers.  It was not about sound 
effects or silliness; it was serious mathematical business.  This part of my story also highlights 
my valuing of absolute truth and the correct way.  Even though I knew my grandfather was 
teasing me, trying to play with me in a non-mathematical way, I was annoyed with him because 
number is not something to be played with.  What a number is is fixed and indisputable.  Even 
the twinkle in my grandfather’s eye as he double counted a square or as he animated his moves 
with sound effects was not enough to shake my resolve.  Numbers had to be right and they had to 
be respected because they were much more important than goofiness when playing Sorry.  I now 
recall how those same sound effects, in a different situation, such as when my brothers and I 
played Twister or Checkers, were not a distraction or annoyance to me.  They added to the 
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experience, because the experience was, in my mind, not about mathematics, it was about 
playing and relationships. 
Similarly, although I now tend to focus on and value aspects of my mother’s making of 
bread beyond the counting of the cups of flour such as the flour dust puffing out of the bowl, the 
tea towel slowly pushing upwards from the bowl as the dough rose, and Mom and I pounding 
down the inflated dough, only to set it to rise again, at the time what was most important was the 
mathematics involved.  Making bread was an excursion into mathematics.  Everything else about 
the experience sat of the periphery of importance.  Interestingly, from my older perspective and 
broader knowledge of mathematics, I now realize how even my enthusiasm for engaging in the 
mathematics of the experience was even more isolated than it first appears, as I failed to 
acknowledge or value the geometrical and measurement knowledge that is also housed within 
the event.  I knew about shapes and I new about measuring, but my complete focus was on the 
number, thus again reflecting my tendency to abstract experiences into a single focus determined 
by a hierarchy of knowledge that I valued.  It is quite possible that mathematics of quantity, 
rather than spatial mathematics, was positioned higher within this hierarchy because I viewed the 
spatial aspects of the experience part of the story as not as important as the mathematics. 
Dialogue with the Traditional Western worldview. 
Thus, just as was the case for the introduction to my story, when viewed through the lens 
of the Traditional Western worldview, this part of my story is supported by the worldview’s 
valuing of knowledge that is categorized and isolated.  Moreover, my persistence in associating 
various TV programs with particular kinds of knowledge (in this case, mathematics or story), 
whether subconsciously intentional or an oversight, also resonates slightly with the Traditional 
Western worldview’s valuing of a knowledge within a hierarchy.  Given set parameters, based 
upon my decision regarding the purpose of each of the programs, certain types of knowledge 
were, in my mind, more important (and valuable) than others, and those programs that did not 
align with this hierarchy of knowledge were programs that I deemed not worthy of watching. 
Even my method of establishing these hierarchies of knowledge, which resulted from my 
condensing of an entire program into a single kind of knowledge repository, aligns with the 
Traditional Western worldview.  
Further, from the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview, how I responded to 
playing Sorry with my grandfather would also be seen as engaging with valuable knowledge and 
  
 119 
disregarding knowledge of no value.  My irritation with my grandfather was also my way of 
telling him that his silliness and sound effects were not valuable within the game.  There was one 
important focus in the playing of Sorry, a mathematical focus, and that focus was needed to 
achieve my goal – to win.  Mine was the right way to play Sorry, a stance that would be highly 
regarded by someone grounded within the Traditional Western worldview.  
Thus, whether it was in the way I responded to TV programs, or how I engaged in 
activities with friends and family, my focus was consistently one-sided.   In these particular 
cases, either number (and mathematics) was what I valued in the moment, or story and 
relationships was what I valued, but never both.  As such, my approach to both types of 
endeavours was to be grounded in a single, isolated phenomenon that I had identified as most 
important in the situation.  For me, there was a purpose for everything I engaged in, and that 
purpose was singular in nature, which is indicative of thinking grounded within the Traditional 
Western Worldview and it’s valuing of categorization, abstraction, isolation, and singularity.  
Dialogue with an Indigenous worldview. 
Conversely, from the perspective a person grounded within an Indigenous worldview, my 
decisions regarding what programs were worth watching and why would be subject to scrutiny 
on many fronts.  As previously noted in my analysis of the introduction to my story, my need to 
categorize and isolate different kinds of knowledge would not be considered especially 
advantageous from such a person’s viewpoint.  Further, my thinking about knowledge in terms 
of hierarchies of importance would also be seen as somewhat questionable, or limiting, within an 
Indigenous worldview, as it would not allow me the flexibility to recognize or value kinds of 
knowledge that were not deemed valuable within my hierarchy.  Likewise, my engagement with 
TV programs, which may include complex relationships and understandings, in abstracted ways 
in which I only seek a particular kind of knowledge, would be seen restricting of the knowledge 
that I could gain.     
With respect to the non-TV related activities, my thinking would not have been rejected 
from the perspective of an Indigenous Worldview, but my refusal (or inability) to reconcile and 
relate different kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing would be viewed as limiting.  If my 
thinking had been grounded within an Indigenous Worldview, I would have actively sought and 
established relationships between the types of knowledge and ways of knowing within all of the 
encounters that I recalled in my story.  Thus, although within an Indigenous Worldview my 
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stance on isolating knowledge would have had a place (based upon the context in which it 
occurred) the rigidity of my positioning at this young age would have been challenged if I was 
trying to be grounded within an Indigenous Worldview. 
Coding and explanation. 
According to the methodology of grounded theory, I found that within the analysis of this 
section of my story, the previously identified concept of categorization and isolation is again 
present and the same relationship between worldview and this concept, that of being 
advantageous or limiting (the Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous worldview, 
respectively) has been upheld.  The hermeneutic dialogues between the two worldviews and the 
epiphanies throughout have also given rise to additional concepts.  First, is the concept of 
hierarchy.  The hierarchy that this part of my story assigns to different kinds of knowledge is one 
that is in agreement with the Traditional Western worldview, while within an Indigenous 
worldview creation of such a hierarchy would have been accepted, but questioned in terms of 
how it might not result in the most valuable of knowledge.   
Abstraction also emerged as a concept when this part of my story was viewed through 
both of the two worldviews, and as is true of the concepts of categorization and isolation, and 
hierarchy, it sits comfortably within the Traditional Western worldview, but would be seen as 
overly narrow from the perspective of an Indigenous worldview.  Again, an Indigenous 
worldview would not reject the abstraction, but it would question the value of doing so when 
other possibilities have not been considered or included. 
Finally, this section has introduced a concept, which I have labeled singularity, related to 
the notion of  “the right way” of doing mathematics.  This concept is one that is foundational 
within the Traditional Western worldview in its valuing of knowledge being singular (or 
absolute) in nature and that singularity of knowledge is accompanied by a singular correct way 
of knowing.  An Indigenous worldview, however, does not seek singularity of knowledge or a 
singular way of knowing; instead, it values diversity of knowledge and ways of knowing.  
Within a specific context, the concept of singularity might be valuable from an Indigenous 
worldview; however, since I did not give any consideration to other ways of playing Sorry, I 
could not, from the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, argue that in this particular case the 
singularity that I was expecting and demanding was most valuable. 
 “When I started school” Analysis 
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This part of my story that focuses on my time in school from grades 1 to 12 (I did not 
attend kindergarten).  The events and epiphanies that most stand out (from an 
auto/ethnographical perspective) includes the continued separation of story and mathematics, in 
fact, of all subject areas; my experience when attempting to help my friend; my encounters with 
doing mathematics the wrong way; and my encounters with rules.   
Prominent features within the data.  
Within these 12 years, all of my learning was separated into subject areas, taught in 
detachment from each other.  Although I had no other way of learning to compare it to, I was 
successful and thus did not bother to consider alternatives.   
This part of my story is also full of examples of when I struggled with not following the 
rules of mathematics.  My first encounter with these rules occurred when I unintentionally 
challenged the rule of “the right way to do mathematics,” a rule, that despite my own application 
of it earlier on, came as a surprise to me.  It was while attempting to help my friend understand 
how to do something in mathematics that my teacher brought this rule to my attention.  Although 
my first reaction was to feel bad because it meant my friend was continuing to struggle, I also 
accepted the rule as necessary.  Likewise, when I was learning to add and subtract decimals, I did 
not question the “right way to do it” rule.  Instead, I followed it religiously, although not because 
to do the addition and subtraction differently was to break a “cardinal sin”; instead, I followed 
the rule because “it worked” for me.   This absolute commitment to the “right way rule” can also 
be seen in my experience when solving quadratic equations and the placement of the +/- sign.  I 
did not understand the rule, but I did my best to remember it and follow it, because it was the 
“right way”.   
My other encounters with doing mathematics the “right way” were not so 
straightforward.  In the cases of finding the answers for 8 + 5 and 8 x 7, “the right way” 
(memorization) had failed me (although I saw it as I had failed it), and it was only by breaking 
the rule that I was able to get the right answer.  The torment I experienced within myself as a 
result of having to break the rule, to do the mathematics in a wrong way in order to get the right 
answer, filled me with guilt every time I did it.  Eventually, the answers did become memorized, 
but I still knew how I had come to know them and consequently the guilt continued for a very 
long time.   
My final experience with the “right way” rule (which I recall) was like a middle road 
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experience for me in which I continued to always add columns of numbers in the right way for 
my teacher, but on the side I played with, and checked my work using, Dad’s wrong way.  In this 
instance, because I was able to carry out the “right way,” I did not experience the same kind of 
guilt when I did my work the wrong way; however, I did question whether it was always a good 
use of my time. 
Dialogue with the Traditional Western worldview. 
As has been true up to this point, most of this part of my story is in strong alignment with 
the Traditional Western worldview.  From this perspective, my emphasis on and desire for 
adherence to doing the mathematics as my teacher had taught me conforms to the valued way of 
knowing through a specialist, and the rules that I memorized and diligently tried to follow would 
be seen as contributing to my singular correct knowledge.  A person grounded within the 
Traditional Western worldview would, however, likely view my inability to just memorize all of 
my addition and multiplication of facts as a weakness within my ways of knowing and in the 
knowledge that resulted.  
Interestingly, my secret practicing of my Dad’s method for adding columns of numbers, 
and using it to verify my application of the teacher’s rule, again brings in the notion of 
hierarchies, but this time hierarchies of specialists.  The notion of a hierarchy of specialization is 
one that is valued within a Traditional Western worldview, but I could only speculate (which I 
will refrain from doing at this time) as to how someone grounded within this worldview would 
position my teacher and my dad within such a hierarchy.  
Dialogue with an Indigenous worldview. 
From the perspective of an Indigenous worldview there would actually seem to be a bit 
closer alignment at some points in this part of my story.  In particular, my devising of alternative 
ways to find answers to the addition and multiplication facts that I struggled with would be easily 
accepted as valuable, since it brought diversity in terms of my ways of knowing as well as 
increasing my overall knowledge.  Similarly, my holding onto, and incorporating (on the side) of 
my Dad’s strategy for adding columns of numbers would also be valued for the way in which it 
diversified my ways of knowing.  Now I had two ways to answer this kind of problem.  It is only 
in the examples of my unquestioning following of the rules (not to help my friend, and to put in 
the +/- sign in certain cases), that a person grounded within an Indigenous worldview might 
question the value of my knowledge and ways of knowing, since I am not seeking alternative 
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perspectives or approaches, nor am I attempting to relate this knowledge to other knowledge.  
Further, by conceding to not help my friend, I would be seen as devaluing our relationship, 
which, according to an Indigenous worldview, the seeking of knowledge should not do. 
Coding and explanation.  
Following from the application of the processes of grounded theory, I have identified 
examples, which validate, and even expand, particular concepts previously discussed, as well as 
a new concept.  First, this part of my story again brings forward the concept of hierarchy.  The 
hierarchy of knowledge is again present in my feeling of guilt over not being able to just 
memorize the addition and multiplication facts; my way of knowing them is not as valuable of a 
way of knowing as strict memorization.   
This set of experiences, however, take the concept of hierarchy a step further through the 
introduction of the idea of the specialist, of a hierarchy of people based upon the knowledge they 
have.  Within my story, the teacher, and her knowledge and ways of knowing, is placed higher in 
that hierarchy than I am (hence, I am not to help my friend); however, no definitive conclusion 
can be reached from these memories as to who sits higher within the hierarchy – my teacher or 
my dad.  Perhaps they even occupy the same level.  From the perspective of the Traditional 
Western worldview this second implication of hierarchy would also be deemed appropriate, 
whereas within an Indigenous worldview such a leveling of specialists would be deemed as 
potentially problematic (but not overall unacceptable) as the hierarchy of knowledge was.  The 
expansion of the concept of hierarchy to include hierarchies of specialization, is a possible 
example of axial coding as the concepts of hierarchy and specialization appears to be merging 
into a larger concept or category.  However, further analysis of data is required to validate this 
unification. 
Singularity of knowledge and ways of knowing also reemerges as a concept from this 
section of my story.  In this case, the belief that there is a right way is often problematic for me 
personally, in that I either cannot do the right way, or I am starting to question its claim to 
singularity.  The problematic nature of the concept of singularity has an interesting effect upon 
the relationship between the worldviews and myself in that when problems arise (i.e., when I 
create or explore alternative ways of knowing), the Traditional Western worldview would 
question my response, while an Indigenous worldview would embrace it. 
It should also be noted that, although not discussed in the worldview analyses, because 
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there is no change in the concept to be noted, categorization and isolation also is present, mostly 
in the background, of this section through my discussion of the separation of learning by subjects 
in grades 1 to 12.  My response to this separation of kinds of knowledge remained the same as it 
had been from the very beginning – I accepted it without challenge or reflection.  Thus, with 
respect to categorization and isolation this part of my story confirms my strong link to the 
Traditional Western worldview and my acceptance within an Indigenous worldview, with the 
caveat that holding this belief is limiting many of the valuable kinds of knowledge and ways of 
knowing that I might alternatively seek. 
Finally, relationship emerges in this section of my story as a new concept.  Here, 
relationships are of focus in two main ways: my relationship with my friend, and my recognition 
of the relationship between my dad’s method of adding columns of numbers and the 
commutative property of addition. one is a relationship between people being influenced by a 
assumed rule of mathematics and the other is a relationship between myself and doing 
mathematics based upon a relationship with my dad.  Each of these incidences of relationships 
are intrinsically bound in story, the story of my wanting to help my friend feel successful (and 
being told not to), and the story of Dad taking an interest in me, my homework, and my ways of 
knowing.  
From the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview, these relational aspects 
would primarily be viewed as superfluous – extraneous to the actual (mathematical) knowledge 
of value.  Not even my relating of the commutative property of addition to my dad’s method of 
adding columns of numbers would be seen as necessarily important since all I needed at that 
point was to be able to add the numbers, and the teacher’s rule told of how to do that.  The only 
possible saving grace, from the view of the Traditional Western worldview in my recognizing 
this particular mathematical relationship, might be in that it might be assumed that I was 
engaging in seeking knowledge for the sake of knowledge.  In reality, I was seeking this 
relational knowledge in order to justify and make sense of both ways of doing the mathematics, 
and in that light, a person grounded within the Traditional Western worldview would likely view 
this as an unnecessary pursuit that would not result in knowledge of value.  Alternatively, and 
requiring less discussion, a person grounded within an Indigenous worldview would not only 
value the addition of these relationships to my mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing, 
but would encourage me to explore these relationships more fully and to seek new ones as well.  
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Thus, in performing open coding on this section of my story, the previously noted 
concept of categorization and isolation was again validated.  The concepts of hierarchy, 
abstraction, singularity, and specialist were also validated as well as having their characteristics 
further elaborated.  Further, a new code, relationships, was also identified within the data.  
Finally, the analysis of this section also gave rise to the first instance of axial coding, as evidence 
was found to link the concepts of hierarchy and singularity.  As I continue to code the next 
sections, I will continue to look for evidence of the individual concepts of hierarchy and 
singularity, as well as of the broader category including hierarchy and singularity. 
 “As it came time to apply for university” Analysis 
The next section in my story relates to my time as a university undergraduate student. 
Within this section of my story, four epiphanies of importance are presented:  one related to my 
experiences in vector calculus, another surrounding my friend’s (and fellow honours student’s) 
crushing realization regarding the value of his mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing, 
the third being the professorial debate about mathematics and language, and finally, my 
experiences in relation to applying for entrance into education programs. 
Prominent features within the data. 
My experience in the vector calculus course was monumental in terms of my relationship 
with mathematics.  Until this point, mathematics had been my forte.  Other than the two 
previously noted dalliances into knowing my addition and multiplication facts in a way other 
than rote memorization, I had been extremely successful in mathematics, and had often 
wondered how it could be that some of my fellow classmates “just didn’t get” math.  I knew 
mathematics and how one comes to know mathematics and I was confident in my mathematical 
abilities and aptitude.   
The vector calculus class led me to question everything I thought I knew about 
mathematics and how I knew it.  The specific incident, in which I solved and erased the final 
exam problem over and over, highlights my complete commitment both to the right way to do 
things and the absolute truth of the knowledge that I had.  It was not until I had the meeting with 
my professor that I realized that perhaps those commitments should be called into question.  I 
was beginning to think that perhaps the right way is not always the only (or best) way to do 
mathematics, and that perhaps different ways of knowing and different kinds of knowledge were 
better suited to different situations (contexts).  Further, I was beginning to think that mathematics 
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could (and should) be learned and understood relationally, and not in separate pieces.  When my 
professor pushed at the heel of my hand so that the angle of my student card changed, my eyes 
were opened to the notion that perhaps abstracted knowledge was not always the most useful or 
meaningful mathematical knowledge.  As a result of these contemplations, I began to think about 
and do mathematics differently, and I started to invite others to do so as well. 
My commitment to, and struggles with, making these changes with respect to the kinds of 
mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing that I valued, is quite evident in the event when 
my friend offered to help me in a later mathematics class.  My question to this friend was 
seeking more than the mathematical knowledge that I had sought and valued before my vector 
calculus incident.  I wanted to understand tensor products in a relational and non-abstracted way, 
and not just through definitions and procedures.  Unfortunately for me at the time, but for my 
friend in the long run, the kind of knowledge that he shared with me was not a kind of 
knowledge that I was seeking.  Further, he did not understand that my question was informed by 
a desire for knowledge different from rules.  My loss in seeking, but not obtaining (at least at that 
time) a different kind of knowledge resulted in my receiving a mark lower than that of my friend 
(which was of no real consequence in the long run), but my friend’s loss in not also seeking the 
kinds of mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing that I sought (within and beyond that 
class) had devastating results upon his future goal of becoming a mathematician.  
The next epiphany of interest within this section of my story begins with my statement in 
the lounge of the Department of Mathematics and Statistics, “mathematics is just another 
language.”   I was surprised by how quickly the professors who were present took up this debate, 
as I had been sure that, like it had been for me for many years, the professors would have the 
right view of mathematics, that is, that mathematics and language (and hence, story) were 
isolated islands of knowledge.  My surprise then turned to shock, and even a bit of horror, when I 
heard that this debate regarding mathematics and language had somehow made its way to 
questions of religion.  Other than my elementary teacher’s tongue in cheek (I believe) reference 
to the “cardinal” rule for adding and subtracting decimals, and perhaps some whispered sighs 
and prayers from fellow classmates when mathematics was mentioned, I had never experienced 
or considered a relationship between religion and mathematics.  I was afraid of where this debate 
might head next, what insults might be levied in either the name of God or mathematics, and so I 
was relieved to be able to leave the lounge for the religion-free security of the classroom.  
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However, even within that safe place, I could not completely disconnect from what I had heard 
and experienced in the lounge, and I pondered questions regarding the truth of the statement of 
“God created zero and one” and consequently about what zero and one were, and why I was so 
unsure about all of this. 
The final epiphany from this section of my story relates to my applications to different 
university education programs.  Most striking for me is the different reactions that I received 
from each of the universities.  For two of the universities, all that mattered was that I had a 
previous degree in mathematics.  For a third university, my mathematics major was only 
considered good enough if it came with a science minor, and for the fourth university my degree 
in mathematics was received with great enthusiasm; however, my minor in English was deemed 
lacking and in need of rectifying because I had not taken one particular English class.  Up until 
this time, I naïvely believed that acceptance into a university education program as a 
mathematics major would involve the same process regardless of the institution, at least in terms 
of expectations regarding minors.  In trying to recall where this notion originated, I have come to 
believe that it was related to my thinking that within the “real world” if you could do 
mathematics, you could do anything, and I could do mathematics.  
 
 
Dialogue with the Traditional Western worldview. 
From the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview my experience in vector 
calculus gives rise to the possibility of an interesting dichotomization of a response.  Since I was 
relying on the mathematical knowledge as I had been taught it, the “right way”, the Traditional 
Western worldview would hold that my seeking of new vector calculus knowledge based upon 
the correctness of my existing knowledge, my struggles would have seemed, without further 
information, unexplainable and unfortunate.  My subsequent transitioning to the seeking of 
understanding of mathematics through different ways of knowing, however, would have been 
deemed as tantamount to heresy, with the only possible saving grace being that I had one 
instance in which my professor, by tilting my hand, had shown me the real “right way”.   
With respect to my friend’s adherence to learning mathematics in the way that it was 
taught to him – as a set of singular, categorized and isolated, and abstracted rules, definitions, 
and procedures in no way challenges the Traditional Western worldview’s ideals regarding the 
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kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing that should be valued.  From the Traditional 
Worldview perspective, his failure to succeed would again have been unexplicable without 
further research.  
The debate over whether mathematics is a language is also an interesting event to analyze 
through the lens of the Traditional Western worldview.  On the one hand, such a claim obviously 
disregards the importance of categorizing, isolating, and abstracting knowledge, as to argue for 
such a claim would be to create a relationship between mathematics and language.  On the other 
hand, the last argument that I heard, “God created zero and one, and man did the rest” is 
introducing a level of power and authority (resulting from a hierarchy whose pinnacle is God?).  
This statement is openly giving authority to mathematics, and particularly 0 and 1 within 
mathematics, within a hierarchy of knowledges, and it is also placing the human ability to create 
mathematical knowledge almost as high up within that same hierarchy.  It gives humans power 
and authority over mathematical knowledge creation, and in so doing, also assigns power and 
authority to mathematical knowledge itself.  Thus, from the perspective of the Traditional 
Western worldview, this debate is both in contradiction to the worldview’s valuing of 
categorized, isolated, and abstract knowledge and in agreement with the worldview’s valuing of 
hierarchical knowledge and knowers as well as of power and authority.  I therefore choose to not 
draw a definitive conclusion regarding how a person grounded within the Traditional Western 
worldview would respond to this experience. 
Finally, my experiences coming from applying to different education programs across 
Canada can also be considered from the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview.  
Putting aside my assumption that all entrance requirements would be the same for a moment (a 
“right way” and thus Traditional Western worldview way of thinking), each of the responses to 
my applications do seem reasonable from a Traditional Western worldview perspective.  For 
example, the two universities who accepted me immediately because of my previous degree in 
mathematics would have been working from the mandate that they required mathematics majors, 
and their jurisdictions required high school mathematics teachers who were mathematics majors. 
In this way, my previous degree was providing me the power to gain automatic acceptance 
because my mathematical knowledge was being perceived as the most valuable (hierarchically 
speaking) criteria in the application.   
Although the other two universities did not value my mathematical knowledge above all 
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else, they each did have a hierarchical set of entrance requirements.  In the one university, high 
up on the hierarchical levels of the entrance requirements was specific pairings of majors and 
minors.  My being an English minor did not fit those entrance requirements and thus was deemed 
insufficient in terms of the specializations that I offered.   
In the other university, my English minor, as a pairing to my major in mathematics, did 
not challenge the entrance requirements (or its hierarchy), although there may have been other 
major-minor pairings that would have done so, and thereby again implying a hierarchy in terms 
of the valuing of major and minor combinations.  However, this university did have a hierarchy 
of requirements with respect to what constituted, beyond the number of courses, a minor in 
English, and I had not met those requirements.  Of course, the requirements at any of the four 
universities would have been determined methodically and logically.  In particular, there is 
evidence that the methods and logic used would have been such that it would meet with approval 
from a person grounded within the Traditional Western worldview. 
Dialogue with an Indigenous worldview. 
A person grounded within an Indigenous worldview would see both my vector calculus 
experience and my friend’s abrupt failing out of a Master’s program in mathematics very 
differently.   My struggles within vector calculus would have been directly attributable to the 
inadequacy of the kinds of knowledge and ways of valuing that I had been taught, knew, and, up 
to that point, valued.  My professors tilting of my hand would be seen as allowing me an 
alternative way to think about the mathematics, and her expectation that I would live up to my 
promise to relearn mathematics for understanding or else go back to majoring in English, would 
be viewed as supportive of an Indigenous worldview’s valuing (and encouraging pursuit) of 
alternative kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing.  Thus, what I would describe as my 
lessons learned out of my vector calculus experience would align strongly with the thinking 
about kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing that are valued within an Indigenous worldview.  
When considered from the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, my friend’s deeply 
lamentable and short experience within a Masters program in mathematics strangely aligns with 
the worldview.  It aligns in that the lesson my friend learned, that the mathematical knowledge 
he had been taught, the rules, procedures, and definitions that he had memorized, was not 
mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing of value in and of itself.  From the viewpoint of a 
person grounded within an Indigenous worldview, my friend’s failure would be easily 
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attributable to the lack of flexibility and diversity in the knowledge and ways of knowing that he 
had been taught and valued.  Had my friend instead be taught mathematics in ways that valued 
diverse ways of knowing and kinds of knowledge, a person with an Indigenous worldview 
perspective would have found what he knew about mathematics, and how he knew it, to be of 
great value and thus use. Instead, an Indigenous worldview would find what he actually knew 
and how he knew it to be extremely limiting, and in the end, that is unfortunately how he also 
found it. 
From the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, the direct and immediate acceptance 
by two of the universities, as they were desperate for math teachers in their jurisdictions, would 
be seen as responding to the particular context of the moment, an essential part of in determining 
the value of knowledge within this worldview. The responses from the other two universities, 
however, are missing the essence of the context.  As the applicant, I did not know why the one 
university could not accept a math major, English minor combination – just that it was not 
acceptable.  Similarly, I was not given a reason for the absolute need of the class I was missing.  
In both cases, because I do not know the contexts or stories behind these knowledges that are 
necessary for entering the universities programs, it is not possible to determine how or whether 
these two experiences of mine would correlate to an Indigenous worldview’s values.  
Coding and explanation.  
Continuing on with a grounded theory analysis of this part of my story, I will first 
consider concepts that have previously emerged, beginning with hierarchies of knowledge.  
Notably, in my vector calculus experiences, and my experience with my friend’s explanation of a 
tensor product, my valuing of knowledge seems to be flattening out the hierarchy that I had 
previously held to.  That is to say, upon my commitment to relearning mathematics to my vector 
calculus professor, I was actually challenging the hierarchy (and singularity – another concept to 
be discussed shortly) of “the right way to know and do mathematics.”   I did not, however, 
dismiss those ways from before, but refused to let them dominate my thinking in mathematics. 
Instead, I engaged in learning and understanding that tended to flatten the hierarchy, and to make 
the relationship (another concept to be discussed later) between the ways of knowing and 
understanding mathematical knowledge central to what I valued.  From the Traditional Western 
worldview perspective, this change in valuing of knowledge and ways of knowing would be 
deemed useless (as the right way is the only and best way); however, from the perspective of an 
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Indigenous worldview, the leveling of the hierarchy of knowledge would be seen as significant 
and of great value.   
With my friend’s attempt to help me with tensor products, the difference in my 
relationship with knowledge hierarchies and my friend’s are made quite clear.  Where, as 
mentioned above, I was seeking to expand what kinds of knowledge I held as worth knowing, 
and thereby challenging the hierarchy that I had before upheld, my friend was “stuck” within the 
valuing of that very same hierarchy, unaware, at that point, that it was possible to seek other 
kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing (for example, in terms of the tensor product), let alone 
that the alternatives may prove just as valuable, even complementary to his knowledge, rather 
than subordinate to it.  While my seeking of knowledge was changing what so far the concept of 
hierarchy has represented (and thus its relationship to the Traditional Western worldview and an 
Indigenous worldview), my friend’s response confirms what had emerged about this concept in 
my grades 1 to 12 experiences. 
Likewise, my applications to the education programs of the four different universities, 
also relate strongly to the hierarchy of knowledge.  At the two universities that accepted my 
applications immediately, there was (a need driven?) hierarchy of knowledge that placed my 
having a mathematics major above all other knowledge considerations.  At the other two 
universities, there appears to have been different hierarchies of knowledge at play.  In the one 
case this hierarchy placed varying levels of value on different combinations of majors and 
minors, while at the other university, this hierarchy was more directly related to a hierarchy of 
completeness of an area of knowledge (in this case, English language courses).  These 
applications’ hierarchical valuing kinds of knowledge again reflects what was found in my 
grades 1 to 12 experiences, with little variation, and echoes how this concept was seen at that 
time from the perspectives of the Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous worldview.   
Of course, this discussion of the role of hierarchies of knowledge within this part of my 
story is also tied to the previously noted concepts of specialization, singularity.  Within the 
hierarchical flux that is occurring, my valuing of power and authority, abstraction, categorization 
and isolation, specialization, relationship, and singularity, as well as the valuing by others, is also 
in flux.  As a consequence of my challenging of the establishment of hierarchies of knowledge, I 
am also challenging the authority (and power) of the knowledge in question and the push to 
specialize that knowledge into singular (dichotomized) categories of “right” or “wrong”.  
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Moreover, my challenges to the hierarchy are also challenges to the valuing of abstract, 
categorized, and isolated knowledge.  In this part of my story I am trying to move valued 
knowledge from the abstract and separated world of the hierarchy to what could be referred to 
that of a “level playing field”.  However, I am not just challenging the hierarchical steps to make 
a flattened field of opportunity, but I am also seeking relationships between myself and 
mathematical knowledge in different ways.  These changes in my stance towards knowledge and 
ways of knowing is challenging many of the foundations of the Traditional Western worldview 
and as such a person grounded within such a worldview would counsel me to focus on the 
singularity of what is most important (in their perspective).  These same changes would be 
openly accepted within an Indigenous worldview as steps towards the gaining and creation of 
more valuable knowledge.  
Thus, from the perspective of axial coding within grounded theory, I have found evidence 
of not only a merging of the concepts of hierarchy and specialization, but of the merging of these 
two codes with those of power and authority, abstraction, categorization and isolation, 
relationship, and singularity.  The merger is based upon a very different response to these 
concepts; however, as, instead of valuing these concepts, I am now challenging the dominant 
values that have been afforded to them in my life. 
Finally, I have coded a new concept for this section, that of context.  Context has shown 
up previously, such as in the context (story) in which my father influenced how I viewed “doing” 
certain mathematics, but in this part of my story this concept is much more prominent and plays 
a leading role.  My vector calculus experience directs me towards looking for contexts that can 
lead to greater and different kinds of understanding (such as between the tilt of the heel of my 
palm of my hand and the slicing of my pencil with my student card).  Up until this time, I had 
not valued context or story, and unfortunately my friend still did not.  Context is also central to 
the knowledge and ways of knowing that were being valued by the universities I applied to.  I 
did not always know the context, but clearly context was defining why there was a difference in 
what the universities were looking for; there was not a single “right” kind of knowledge or 
application that defined a successful admission across the four universities, so context must 
matter.  From the Traditional Western worldview perspective, this focus on context as being part 
of knowledge of value would be seen as distracting and trivial, not worth time considering. 
However, from an Indigenous worldview perspective, this seeking and valuing of knowledge 
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within context is significant and important.  Thus, in the Traditional Western worldview, context 
is distracting, but from an Indigenous worldview it is enlightening.  
One can likely see that context, despite being a new concept in this part of my story, is 
also inextricably linked to the merging of all the other codes previously discussed.  The 
introduction of context changes hierarchy, it questions power and authority, it emphasizes 
relationships, it reverses abstraction and categorization and isolation, and it limits the absolute 
nature of specialization.  In this way, all of the concepts coded and remarked upon in this part of 
the data analysis are connecting together, providing a less disjointed perspective on what can be 
uncovered in my story.  
 “After eight months of being a substitute teacher and volunteer” Analysis 
The next section of my story focuses on experiences I had while teaching mathematics in 
two different rural schools.  Of particular note are those epiphanies I had in relation to the 
retaining of First Nations students at school and in mathematics classes,  to Alge-tiles®, and to 
the changing of the mathematics course titles in order to gain post-secondary acceptance.     
Prominent features within the data. 
One of the prominent features within this part of my data has also come to be a dominant 
influence and focus in my life – how First Nations students are viewed within schools and how 
they view themselves in schools, particularly in relation to mathematics.  First, there was the 
“miscommunication” to the staff at my first school regarding why it was important to keep the 
First Nations students at our school until October 1st.  I choose to call it a miscommunication 
because I would like to believe that there was some reason other than the appropriation of money 
that drove these efforts.  To this day, even thinking about this incident leaves me feeling noxious, 
and without further evidence in any direction I will leave the discussion of this incident.  I do 
have grave concerns regarding how schools (and those within them) view First Nations students; 
however, these concerns are beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
The isolation of First Nations students from mathematics is, however, very significant in 
the particular research that I am presenting right now.  Wanting to understand why my First 
Nations students were dropping out of mathematics (and at times school) prior to grade 12, is 
one of the main influences on my coming to wonder about the kinds of knowledge and ways of 
knowing that are valued within mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics.  
These experiences, combined with my enlightenment with respect to the two worldviews that 
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now form the theoretical framework of my research, have been the primary causes for this 
research I am seeking to make sense of the isolation of so many First Nations students from 
mathematics, and from there determine how this relationship might be changed. 
The next epiphany from this section of my story is my experience with using Alge-tiles® 
with the one student.  Although I had previously started accepting other ways of knowing in 
mathematics, this was the first time that I had seen such a drastic improvement in the 
understanding of mathematics when someone else was looking for and using a different way of 
knowing from the rational approaches most often used in mathematics teaching and learning.  
This experience strengthened my resolve in the valuing of different kinds of knowledge and 
ways of knowing in mathematics. 
Finally, the unwillingness of post-secondary institutions to consider using a grade 11 
credit in mathematics for any of its entrance requirements (in my province), followed by the 
immediate acceptance of the same course with a grade 12 name was a major epiphany for me.  It 
spoke about the prestige and powers afforded to entrance requirements and to mathematics, and 
the naïve and insignificant ways that such decisions are sometimes made.  It made me question 
what other potential barriers might exist for students (such as being able to enter specific 
programs of study) that came down to mathematics. 
Dialogue with the Traditional Western worldview. 
Considering the motive behind the call to keep the First Nations students in school until 
October 1st came from is difficult from the perspective of either worldview simply because the 
motive behind it is not an absolute given.  Assuming a neutral motive, however, from the 
perspective of the Traditional Western worldview on calling for such actions within the school 
would be deemed as reasonable because, regardless of what was being sought in achieving the 
goal, that goal was presented as the right thing to do.  Although no statistical data was provided 
with the call, it was worded in such a way to give the impression that this goal was grounded in 
some form of scientific knowledge, making it knowledge of value.  Once October 1st was 
reached, there would be no need to speculate beyond that date since the goal had been reached.   
Whereas the goal of keeping the First Nations students attending school until October 1st 
aligns well with the Traditional Western worldview, the dropping out of mathematics classes by 
grade 12 by the First Nations students in my school does not. Mathematics as the students saw it, 
as a logic-based, rational subject, would be seen within the Traditional Western worldview as 
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knowledge (and a way of knowing) of great value, so failing to continue to take mathematics 
would be seen as a detriment to one’s gaining knowledge of great worth. Further, the sentiment 
of my student who said he now understood “what mathematics wanted from him” would be 
viewed within this worldview as nonsense.  Mathematical knowledge of value is not about 
relationships or about emotional or even spiritual bonds, it is strictly about logic and rationality.  
To seek anything else within the gaining of mathematical knowledge would be seen as frivolous 
and a waste of time.  
The third epiphany’s relationship to the Traditional Western worldview is a contentious 
one.  From the perspective of this worldview, my introduction of the student to Alge-tiles® and 
her subsequent use of them over a period of time, would be tantamount to heresy.  From the 
Traditional Western worldview perspective, there is no need for such gimmicks, since the 
algebra the student was learning has very clear rules that should be learned and applied.  Failure 
to do so was failure to achieve algebraic competence.  In the end, this student did come to 
algebraic competence (and confidence), but she did so by deriving and negotiating the rules that 
she applied from her interactions with the manipulatives and not through direct memorization 
and application.  Such learning strategies would be seen as challenging the authority of 
mathematics and of the teacher, while also questioning the notion of the one “right way” to do 
mathematics.  Ultimately, the Alge-tiles® would be seen as removing the abstract nature of 
algebraic manipulation by suggesting a context for it.  Overall, these (and other) manipulatives 
would be seen by someone grounded within the Traditional Western worldview as unnecessary 
and even counterproductive. 
Finally, I consider the renaming (and consequently the immediate acceptance) of the 
Math B20 course to Math A30, a purely cosmetic response to the post-secondary refusal to 
accept Math B20 as an entrance requirement for any program.  From the perspective of the 
Traditional Western worldview, this action and its consequences would not be seen as anything 
but making sure that the name was right.  From this viewpoint, what matters is how things look 
from the outside, not what is on the inside.  Of course, this is very much in alignment with the 
Traditional Western worldview – the name is external to the knower, and as such it must present 
the object (the curriculum) with the correct appearance to anyone who hears, sees or reads it.  
Moreover, the insistence on a grade 12 level an entrance requirement course at a university sends 
the message of the importance in perceived hierarchies of knowledge. 
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Overall, the Traditional Western worldview would have mixed responses to the 
epiphanies within this part of my story.  The October 1st deadline would be accepted 
unquestionably, the First Nations students’ dropping out of mathematics (and school) prior to 
grade 12, and the renaming of the grade 11 course to a grade 12 course title are rational 
consequences of rational thought and the valuing of the right kinds of knowledge and ways of 
knowing.  The use of the Alge-tiles® by both my student in her learning and I in my teaching, 
however, challenges the Traditional Western worldview’s valuing of the right way of knowing in 
an abstract and singular way.  
 
Dialogue with an Indigenous worldview. 
Unlike within the Traditional Western worldview, the goal of keeping the First Nations 
students in our school until October 1st (still assuming a neutral motive), would likely have been 
questioned by someone grounded in an Indigenous worldview as they would be wanting to know 
the context for coming to the particular date.  As well, since knowledge is valued for the 
relationships that it creates, contributes to, and strengthens, a plan for moving forward, for what 
to be focusing on after October 1st in relation to the First Nations students would be expected; 
after all, the context of their being in the school does not end at that time.  From the perspective 
of an Indigenous worldview, the singularity and abstraction of one specific date would seem too 
simplistic for describing what is undeniably a complex set of relationships. 
Alternatively to the October 1st goal, the choice by so many of my First Nations students 
to not take grade 12 mark could quite easily be acceptable within an Indigenous worldview.  For 
these students, as evidenced by the one’s comment that he now knew “what mathematics wanted 
from him,” learning mathematics did not connect with them, their lives, or their ways of 
knowing.  Instead, what these students experienced in mathematics classrooms denied almost 
everything that an Indigenous worldview sought, such as a valuing of diverse ways of knowing 
and kinds of knowledge, context, and relationships through and for knowledge.  For these 
reasons then, the mathematics that the students were being taught was not a kind of knowledge 
or way of knowing that they would have seen as of value.   
At this point it is probably prudent to return to one of the caveats given earlier in the 
discussion of the naming of worldviews and membership in them.  Although my story speaks to 
the First Nations students I had, there were other, non-First Nations students who also expressed 
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similar lack of meaning in mathematics for them.  Many of these students continued on into 
grade 12 mathematics classes (mostly because of parental expectations), some passing and some 
not, but I knew their “hearts” were not in it.  I mention these other students to draw to the 
attention of the reader how the kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing valued by an individual 
is not dependent upon one’s culture or ethnicity, even though the two worldviews in use in my 
research (and many other worldviews beyond these two) are named after particular cultures (e.g., 
Western and Indigenous). 
My experience using the Alge-tiles® to help my student understand and succeed at 
algebra, as an alternate way of knowing and kind of knowledge, would be readily accepted 
within an Indigenous worldview.  Not only did the Alge-tiles® provide this student with more 
diverse ways of knowing, they gave her a way to relate image and concrete representation with 
the abstract, providing context to the opaque questions that her mathematics classes were filled 
with.  
Finally, the necessity of the renaming of Math B20 to Math A30 would not be valued 
within an Indigenous worldview.  The only relationship that is served by this change is one of 
perceived authority and hierarchy within entrance requirements.  The content of the curricula, 
which did not change through the renaming of the course, is the story of the knowledge and ways 
of knowing that are to be valued, not the name.  Thus, for a person grounded within an 
Indigenous worldview, the course renaming would be seen as a trivial undertaking that 
contributed little, if anything, to the value of the knowledge or ways of knowing. 
Again then, it can be seen that viewing my teaching and curriculum piloting years 
through the lens of an Indigenous worldview gives a reverse correlation to that when viewed 
through the lens of the Traditional Western worldview. Except for the use of the Alge-tiles®, the 
feature characteristics of the epiphanies from this part of my story do not align strongly, or at all 
for the most part, with an Indigenous worldview.  However, in my telling of this part of the story, 
there is strong evidence that my valuing of what is or is not being valued was aligning more 
strongly with an Indigenous worldview than the Traditional Western worldview. 
Coding and explanation. 
During this part of my story, that of my time as a high school mathematics teacher and as 
a pilot teacher for the new mathematics curricula at the high school level, most of the same 
concepts appeared as have been seen in the previous sections.  In particular, the concepts of 
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hierarchies, singularity, specialization, categorization and isolation, relationships, power and 
authority, abstraction, and context and story are all strongly tied to the epiphanies I have 
highlighted. 
The hierarchy of knowledge appears most clearly in the renaming of the mathematics 
course.  By officially changing the course name from Math B20 (indicating a grade 11 course) to 
Math A30 (indicating a grade 12 course), concerns from post-secondary institutions about 
whether the course was appropriate for entrance requirements into their programs disappeared.  
However, there was no content change, just a name change, and so there is an inherent hierarchy 
within the grade level of courses by (at least) the post-secondary institutions.  Knowledge which 
is not valued when labeled at a grade 11 level becomes valuable in the eyes of the post-
secondary institutions when labeled as grade 12.  This valuing would seem to be associated with 
beliefs about perceptions based upon grade level, rather than content of a course. 
 There are also implicit implications of hierarchies of ways of knowing within the other 
epiphanies of this part of my story.  For example, there is the hierarchy that is present in the First 
Nations student’s response to mathematics, and in particular to where he felt he was within the 
hierarchy of the kinds of knowledge that are expected and valued in mathematics (rational and 
logic-based).  During this part of my story I also am challenging the notion of these hierarchies 
of knowledge and ways of knowing through my use of the Alge-tiles® in helping my student 
come to understand and have success in algebra.  At this time I deny the authority of the 
hierarchy of the right way of knowing and doing mathematics by placing this alternative way on 
the same level as the abstract and relationship-free approach that the student had originally (by 
me, at least in part) been taught. 
Changing focus from hierarchy, the concept of singularity is evident in the October 1st 
deadline for keeping the First Nations students in the school.  Regardless of the motive behind 
the setting of the date, there is one single, particular, and specific date that is to be reached.  
Beyond that date, there is nothing specified, and before it, all that is important is reaching it as 
described.  Further, singularity comes into question in my use of the Alge-tiles® to help teach 
the one student algebra.  By introducing and recommending the use of these manipulatives, I am 
directly contradicting how I had taught this student previously – that there is one right way to 
work in algebra and that is to know (i.e., memorize) and follow the rules of algebra.  Even the 
renaming of Math B20 to Math A30 emphasizes a singularity based upon a singular, right name, 
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for the content.  It is a singular correctness that stands removed from the needs of the students or 
the impacts of the decision upon students.  The decision meets the need of the post-secondary 
institutions (the top of the hierarchy in this case), and that is what matters most.  In many ways, 
this also indicates the role of specialization in the hierarchy of knowledge, as the post-secondary 
programs are designed to take students into more specialized fields of knowledge and their 
accompanying ways of knowing and the people with that knowledge.  
Categorization and isolation is also seen again in this part of my story in a number of 
ways.  First, the deadline of October 1st is specifically labeled and categorized in relation to First 
Nations students.  This marker, nor any other date, is not given for non-First Nations students, 
and it is associated with all First Nations students, whether from a reserve or not.  The First 
Nations students are in this way segregated from other students, differentiated by their ethnicity 
and by the relationship to being in school. 
This same concept of categorization and isolation is also supported (by the Traditional 
Western worldview) and questioned (by an Indigenous worldview) in this part of my story 
through the separation of perceptions about mathematics courses based upon their title.  At least 
for the post-secondary students, but I would also argue for most students, teachers, parents, and 
the public in general, the title of a course (both grade and identifying name) serves to classify not 
only a particular kind of mathematics, but a hierarchical level of perceived difficulty.  
Relationship also plays a major role as a concept in this part of my story.  In the case of 
the Alge-tiles® use, relationships between the student and mathematics is emphasized, while in 
the case of the renaming of the course, the possibility of there being a relationship between the 
name given to a course and its grade level is downplayed, perhaps even dismissed. 
The concept of relationship is of greatest importance; however, in the epiphany I shared 
regarding the avoidance of mathematics by my First Nations students, particularly at the grade 
12 level.  For at least one of my students, this retreat from mathematics classes and learning is all 
about relationship.  In fact, it is about failed relationships between the students and what they 
have experienced the purpose and way of being of mathematics to be, that is, no relationship at 
all.  In at least his learning of mathematics, the particular student had been frustrated throughout 
all of his mathematics classes trying to understand what kind of relationship he was to have with 
mathematics (“what mathematics wants from me”).  Ultimately, he realized that therein lay the 
inherent problem – mathematics did not want a relationship with him.  It wanted to remain 
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isolated, yet known by him, in an abstract and decontextualized way. 
Power and authority also runs through this part of my story as a major concept.  The 
power and authority of the singular date of October 1st determined how teachers were to interact 
with their First Nations students, and what their goal in those interactions was to be.  Similarly, 
the lack of relationship between the one First Nations student and mathematics, as he had come 
to know it, was also based upon power and authority.  His comments to me indicated that despite 
having come to understand what was expected from him, under the guise of the authority of 
mathematics and how it was taught to him, he did not have the desire to meet the demands of that 
authority.  Thus, by not taking mathematics classes beyond grade 11, this student was both 
giving in to the power and authority of the mathematics by conceding “victory” to it, and 
challenging that same authority by refusing to give in to that authority by relinquishing the kinds 
of knowledge and ways of knowing that he valued.  Finally, the power and authority of the 
valuing of specific kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing within the teaching and learning of 
mathematics was challenged in my introduction of the one student to Alge-tiles® and in her 
refusal to give in to “the right way” of knowing and doing algebra.  
The last two concepts present in this portion of my story are abstraction and context.  As 
can be noted throughout the prior discussion of the coding for this section, the notions of 
abstraction and context frequently entered into the discussion of the other concepts.  However, 
these two concepts are even more strongly present in how they give rise to each other throughout 
the various epiphanies.  For example, it is in his seeking of the context through which he can 
relate to mathematics that my one First Nations student came to understand that mathematics, as 
he was being taught and learning it, denied context in order to create knowledge that was 
considered of more value because of the high regard given to abstract knowledge within his 
classes. 
Conversely, my other student’s use of Alge-tiles® to learn to do and understand algebra 
places context in the teaching and learning of mathematics at most on a level par with abstract 
knowledge.  In fact, this epiphany stresses the relationship between contextual and abstract 
understanding, as the student gradually abstracted her understanding, putting the Alge-tiles® 
away after developing her confidence in the rules and understandings she had created using 
them. 
Even in the renaming of the new mathematics course from Math B20 to Math A30 
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context and abstraction play a role.  Context is what gave rise to the original naming of the 
course; that is, the students who took this course would mostly be in grade 11 and the bulk of the 
course material came from previous grade 11 curricula documents (specifically, Algebra 20 and 
Geo-Trig 20).  Abstraction, however, called for the changing of this name.  From an abstract 
perspective it had been decided that a grade 11 credit, regardless of the mathematical content, 
was not appropriate for the entrance requirements to a post-secondary program of study.  Simply 
put, mathematics courses serving as entrance requirements to post-secondary institutions must be 
grade 12 credits. 
Overall, the relationships and connections between the two worldviews (the Traditional 
Western worldview and an Indigenous worldview) continue to have the same alignment to each 
of these concepts as seen before.  There is one notable exception in considering the concepts 
from the worldview perspectives, and that more than ever before, my epiphanies dramatize 
perspectives aligned with an Indigenous worldview that are directly challenging those that align 
more with the Traditional Western worldview. 
Further, the discussion of the coding explanations also emphasizes that the various codes 
revealed thus far are continuing to interact with and impact each other.  None of the codes at any 
time stand alone; rather, they work together in various ways to capture the concepts depicted in 
my story.  Thus, the axial coding noted previously related to the merging of the codes into a 
broad category continues on in my story of teaching and piloting mathematics in the two rural 
schools. 
“My experiences as a pilot teacher and implementation leader” Analysis 
In the next section of my story I shared memories of experiences I had during the time 
that I worked as the K to 12 Mathematics Consultant at the Ministry of Education while also 
working towards my Master’s degree.  It is during this time I had the greatest number of 
epiphanies of direct consequence to my current research. 
Prominent features within the data. 
My auto/ethnographic analysis of this time period in my story lead to the identification of 
the first epiphany I will speak to – that of my encounter with how my colleagues at the WNCP 
CCF renewal table responded to my suggestion to include zero in the earliest grades of 
curriculum outcomes.  I was completely caught off guard by the opposition to having students 
learn about zero in the early grades, as it seemed to me to be a concept that they could not only 
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handle (from the perspective of representing a quantity of none) but, that it would be beneficial 
in developing the students’ understanding of the base-ten place value system that they would be 
working with for the rest of their lives.  
My curiosity regarding the heated opposition to my proposal to include zero in the 
earliest years of the mathematics curricula ultimately lead me to find out about the history of 
zero.  I was amazed to read about the variety of ways that different cultures, and different 
individuals within the cultures, responded to and dealt with zero.  As I had seen earlier, both in 
elementary school and during my pursuit of a mathematics degree, the history of zero again 
brought together mathematics and religion.  At times, this encounter was positive (such as with 
India’s whole-hearted embracing of zero when it arrived as a place holder from Babylonia) and 
at other times it resulted in fear and disguise (such as when the Hindu-Arabic number system 
first reached Greece and where it was both rejected and used clandestinely). In both cases, the 
acceptance or rejection of zero was driven by religious beliefs.  In Greece, these religious beliefs 
were themselves tied to philosophy and mathematics, making the divide between religion and 
zero even greater.  
In addition, a vast majority of the epiphanies that I have noted within this section of my 
story again link to situations, questions and issues related to First Nations and Métis students and 
cultural relations to mathematics.  The first of these epiphanies is my digging deeper into the 
dropout rates of First Nations students with respect to mathematics (and school, in general).  It 
was during this time that I started to see the larger picture of the divide between these students 
and mathematics was not only common to the first school I taught in, but was actually an 
“epidemic” across the province, Canada, and the world (in relation to Indigenous students). 
Whereas much research into mathematics was continuously revealing that all humans are 
mathematical beings (Butterworth, 1999; Devlin, 2000; Wynn, 1992), the data I was finding 
seemed to deny this inherent human relationship to mathematics to Indigenous peoples, and this 
was a conclusion I was not willing to accept.  In many ways the apparent divide between “all 
humans are mathematical beings” and the struggles of so many Indigenous students with 
learning mathematics was too reminiscent of Smith’s (1999) comments on how humanism was 
often used to “Other” certain groups of people, presenting them as sub-human, or less valuable 
beings, and I refuse to accept such a classification of Indigenous peoples, or to anyone. 
Connecting to the struggles of the Indigenous students with mathematics (as well as 
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likely to other students who struggle in mathematics) is my epiphany with respect to First 
Nations and Métis ways of knowing.  As epiphanies go, this particular one (at this time) was 
disappointing because I could not find out, let alone understand, what was meant by First 
Nations and Métis ways of knowing.  It was a concept that I was eager to understand, but also 
one that continued to allude me. 
My work with the First Nations and Métis teachers and elders during the mathematics 
curriculum renewal provides evidence regarding my attempts to understand what these First 
Nations and Métis ways of knowing were and how they might fit into the teaching and learning 
of mathematics.  Each of the failures and successes (partial or otherwise) that emerged through 
our work together steadily helped to introduce me to aspects of First Nations and Métis ways of 
knowing.  For example, I learned that such ways of knowing value story and context, and that 
without either one, the knowledge sought or used in mathematics was isolated from the student 
and important relationships were thus not forged.  I also learned that context and relationship to 
connections were important within First Nations and Métis ways of knowing.  Moreover, I 
realized that these alternative ways of knowing also related to how mathematics was represented 
and applied.  
Also related to the renewal of the mathematics curricula in Saskatchewan, is the epiphany 
resulting from the reflections of Dr. Edward Doolittle while we were discussing the draft of one 
of the curricula documents.  Dr. Doolittle’s revelation to me that the English spoken in many 
First Nations and Métis communities did not necessarily carry the same meanings for words as 
when I speak them was astonishing to me.  Despite my knowledge that translation between 
languages is rarely, if ever, a direct one-to-one correspondence, I had never considered that the 
result of translation might be the assigning of different meanings to words in the new language.   
However, this is not to say that it does not make sense that this would happen, or to imply that it 
is a negative consequence of translation.  In fact, especially in cases of forced language denial, as 
the First Nations and Métis of Canada experienced starting with the first days of colonization, I 
would argue that the polysemy that Ed had brought to my attention is a powerful and important 
consequence.  It is within the resulting polysemy that much of the original First Nations and 
Métis languages might still exist, continuing to deny the oppressive authority of colonization and 
its processes. 
All of these previous epiphanies relating to First Nations and Métis students struggles 
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with mathematics and ways of knowing and doing mathematics are brought together into one 
story, that of Louise Poirier and her sharing of her work with the Inuit of northern Quebec with 
me.  This particular epiphany is full of examples of First Nations and Métis kinds of knowledge 
and ways of knowing.  At the surface, there is the Inuit base 20 (sub-base 5) number system, 
which is a completely different way of knowing and representing quantity from what is 
traditionally taught in Western schools.  Going deeper into this different way of thinking about 
and knowing quantities, however, there exists other aspects of quantity within the language of 
the Inuit of northern Quebec that do not exist in the English language nor the base 10 number 
system.  The recognition of context within the identification and naming of quantity is a feature 
of the Inuit number system that is not present in the number system taught in most schools 
around the world.  Further, the doing of mathematics orally only, with no symbolic 
representation system existing, also challenges what is typically taught in schools about how to 
do mathematics.  Thus, Louise’s story opened my eyes to mathematical possibilities that I had 
never before considered. 
My second last epiphany from this section of my story moves from a focus on First 
Nations and Métis students and mathematics to the broader perspective of ethnomathematics, or 
mathematics that is situated and grounded within culture.  As such, the previous discussions 
belong to ethnomathematics.  For me, this was a welcome set of knowledge to be introduced to, 
as it provided a home for the many changes in my thinking and doing of mathematics that had 
occurred up to this point.  Within ethnomathematics, I found justification for my valuing of 
different kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing in mathematics, as well as gaining valuable 
insights taking me further into pursuing these possibilities.  
Finally, my growing awareness and reflection upon how mathematics has become a 
gatekeeper for many pursuits in today’s world, is another crucial feature from this part of my 
story.  Through requests that I received to update and correlate job descriptions and program 
entrance requirements so that decisions could be made about applications coming from 
individuals who had gone through a different mathematics program, the level of authority in 
defining a successful applicant that was given to mathematics was shocking.  For example, in the 
case of the administrative position looking after the people doing tree maintenance in an urban 
setting, the level of mathematics required was not based on the mathematics they needed to 
understand and be able to do; rather, the mathematics was being used to position the applicant in 
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a hierarchy of proficiency somehow, but not obviously, deemed to be tied to the level of 
mathematics achieved.  Similarly, this same kind of hierarchy seems to have been in place in the 
mathematics requirement for a stenography course.  Stenography, as a profession, would not 
seem to be reliant upon mathematics (particularly not high school or university level 
mathematics), yet applicants to a stenography program were required to have credits for specific 
abstract and theoretical mathematics courses.  This requirement appears to have been solely for 
the purpose of gauging some kind of intelligence, and perhaps perseverance, that an applicant 
had; an intelligence that does not require doing mathematics, but does require being able to do 
mathematics, and only mathematics.  When I consider these barriers that were being created by 
the seemingly unsubstantiated requirement for particular mathematics courses along side the 
struggles of First Nations and Métis students with mathematics, my concerns about both 
situations are intensified. 
Having completed my highlighting of the pertinent features of the epiphanies of my story 
during my time at the Ministry of Education and while working on my Master’s degree, I can 
now turn to the hermeneutic analysis of this part of my story and this discussion.  I begin by 
considering how these epiphanies relate (or do not relate) to the foundations of the Traditional 
Western worldview. 
Dialogue with the Traditional Western worldview. 
A Gadamerian hermeneutic analysis of this part of my story in relation to the Traditional 
Western worldview reveals both connections and divergences.  My WNCP colleagues’ rejection 
of including zero in the earliest grades of the mathematics curricula correlates well with the 
foundations of the Traditional Western worldview, especially in light of there being a 
hierarchical (chronological) order in which mathematical ideas were developed, and that 
particular order must necessarily be the right order for students to be taught mathematics as well.  
In addition, an assumed hierarchy between cultures can also be seen to be at play either within 
my colleagues thinking or within what is accepted as general knowledge about the development 
of zero.  The late arrival of zero into the number system was only true in the Greek world (and 
those who followed it’s knowledge).  The Mayan’s had used zero centuries before it was even 
considered (and rejected) within Greek society.  Thus, from the perspective of the Traditional 
Worldview, the belief that zero developed late historically is based upon a hierarchical view of 
the value of knowledge between different cultures.  From the perspective of the Traditional 
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Western worldview, the early incorporation of zero into Mayan mathematics and even Indian 
mathematics holds no significance (and hence, no real value) in comparison to when zero was 
accepted into Greek mathematics.  
Likewise, the claim that zero was too difficult of a concept for elementary students is also 
strongly situated within the hierarchical view of knowledge within the Traditional Western 
worldview.  Through such a view, mathematical knowledge is seen as falling into a hierarchy of 
difficulty (complexness) based upon both the ideas present and where within history the concept 
was developed. 
When actually looking into the historical reasons for the immediate or delayed 
acceptance of the concept of zero as both a place holder and a quantity does not likewise connect 
with the perspectives of the Traditional Western worldview.  By relating the valuing of 
knowledge about zero to religion (by the Greeks and the Indians) as the basis of deciding 
whether it should be incorporated into mathematical knowledge, in general, is based on the 
valuing of religious (and spiritual knowledge) which the Traditional Western worldview 
explicitly distances itself from.  Knowledge which is not rational or logic-based and which 
cannot be substantiated through physical representation and measurability, which is how 
religious knowledge is viewed from the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview, is not 
knowledge of value.   
Alternatively, from the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview, the high 
dropout rates of First Nations students in relation to mathematics education would be seen as a 
clear indication of a failure, on behalf of the students, to do mathematics “the right way”.   Since 
mathematical knowledge is both rational and logical in origin, the problem would necessarily be 
placed squarely upon the ability and commitment of the students only. 
Further, the notion of singularity of the “right way” to know and do mathematics within 
the Traditional Western worldview would contradict my interest in, and pursuit of, understanding 
First Nations and Métis ways of knowing.  The arguments given by my Ministry colleagues was 
that these ways of knowing were different from the rational and logical ways of knowing that are 
valued within the Traditional Western worldview, so from that worldview perspective, what 
these other ways of knowing were was of no consequence; these alternative ways of knowing 
would necessarily be of no real value.  Thus, a person grounded within the Traditional Western 
worldview would outright dismiss consideration of the First Nations and Métis ways of knowing 
  
 147 
that I was trying to understand.  
The vetting sessions with the First Nations and Métis teachers and elders during the 
renewal of the k to 9 mathematics curricula would also not be valued from the perspective of the 
Traditional Western worldview.  The purpose of these sessions was to try to capture within the 
curricula First Nations and Métis ways of knowing as well as contexts and perspectives relevant 
to First Nations and Métis students.  Within the Traditional Western worldview, such extra 
knowledge and grounding of knowledge distracts from the actual knowledge and ways of 
knowing – the rational and the logical.  Everything else would be viewed as extraneous and 
pointless. 
Likewise, the Traditional Western worldview would not value the polysemic meanings 
used by First Nations and Métis when speaking the English language.  In fact, such alternative 
meanings would be viewed as not just unnecessary, but also as challenges to the hierarchical 
positioning of the English language and the authority that it thus holds.  The polysemic meanings 
to words such as equal would be shunned and eliminated (whenever possible) by a person 
grounded within the Traditional Western worldview.  In the particular case of the world “equal” 
the negative response to the polysemy by the Traditional Western worldview would be 
immediate, since in the “right way” of knowing, the polysemic meaning being given in to equal 
in First Nations and Métis communities belongs to the word “equity”.  Two words need not be 
given the same meaning when the “true” meanings of each word suffices in all instances of use. 
As the Traditional Western worldview is grounded in the valuing of the singularity and 
abstraction of knowledge, as well as their being “one right way” to do mathematics, Louise’s 
story of the number system and mathematics of the Inuit of northern Quebec would be viewed as 
possibly interesting, but overall not contributing to mathematical knowledge.  The inclusion of 
context within their working with numbers would make the mathematical knowledge of the Inuit 
of northern Quebec as too diffused and not abstract enough to be of real value.  Further, by 
positioning the doing and knowing of mathematics in strictly oral circumstances would also be 
seen as a deficiency from the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview.  Overall, the 
mathematics of the Inuit of northern Quebec that Louise shared with me would not be seen as 
having any real value by a person grounded within the Traditional Western worldview, and if 
working in Louise’s situation, such a person would have sought ways to change Inuit knowledge 
so that they knew and did mathematics using the correct and most valuable base 10 number 
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system. 
With the move from this particular Inuit mathematics knowledge and ways of knowing to 
the broader landscape of ethnomathematics, the previously discussed divide between what I was 
experiencing and what is valued by the Traditional Western worldview continued to grow.  My 
initial foray into ethnomathematics took me deeper into consideration of different kinds of 
knowledge and ways of knowing that can be valued in mathematics, and thus moved me further 
from the Traditional Western worldview which would view such dalliances as a waste of time. 
From this worldview perspective, there is no need to explore other possibilities when the “right 
way” (rational and logical), was already known and given to me. 
Finally, the requirement of needing to have mathematics beyond the mathematics that 
will be used within particular jobs or programs of study would likely not raise an eyebrow in 
concern for people grounded within the Traditional Western worldview.  From their perspective, 
it would seem obvious that such a requirement should be in place because the mathematical 
knowledge that is required would position the knower high up in the hierarchy of learning and 
knowledge.  Thus, applicants with the required mathematics courses would be seen to be 
competent learners, capable of learning the “right way” to do things and to be proficient in doing 
them. 
As has been noted in the previous analyses of different sections of my story, the 
Traditional Western worldview both aligns and contradicts with the experiences I had during my 
work at the Ministry of Education and a student pursuing their Master’s degree.  Further, my 
positioning in relation to these experiences also puts me in different relationships with the 
Traditional Western worldview.  Next, I will consider how the epiphanies within this section of 
my story compare to the values of an Indigenous worldview. 
Dialogue with an Indigenous worldview. 
Considering the epiphanies from this part of my story through the lens of an Indigenous 
worldview, a much different set of relationships between the story and worldview emerges from 
those relating the same epiphanies and the Traditional Western worldview.  In the case of my 
WNCP colleagues response to the suggestion to include zero as part of the mathematics 
outcomes in the earliest grades, a person grounded within an Indigenous worldview would 
question the temporal authority assigned to any knowledge.  That is to say, within an Indigenous 
worldview, the relevance of the knowledge to the person, their place and context (hence their 
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time, not the time of others) determines the value of knowledge.  Within an Indigenous 
worldview, a person’s ability to use and value any knowledge is dependent upon who they are 
and where they are at, and not on the experiences of others.  
From the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, the categorizing of mathematical 
knowledge into hierarchies of complexity would also be seen as an unnecessary and limiting 
attitude towards knowledge of value.  One’s current context and needs defines the value of 
particular knowledge.  How complex or simple that knowledge is does not influence the value 
assigned to the knowledge at a particular time since if it is knowledge that is needed then it is 
knowledge of value.  Thus, a person grounded within an Indigenous worldview might argue that 
since students in the early elementary years need to use zero in the writing of whole numbers, 
and since they have experiences in their daily lives that involve their recognition of having none 
of something, zero is a concept that is appropriate for these children to learn. 
Likewise, the relationship between religion (and possibly spirituality) and zero would not 
devalue knowledge about zero within an Indigenous worldview.  Instead, religious reasons either 
supporting or questioning the inclusion of zero within mathematical knowledge would be viewed 
as valuable contributions to the diversity of knowledge and understanding being constructed 
around zero.  It should be noted, however, that the exclusion of zero, solely on the basis of 
religious reasons would likely be viewed as a limiting stance regarding the perception of value 
for knowledge about zero.  Just as an Indigenous worldview would accept, but also question 
knowledge that is confined to a different way of knowing, such as logic, so too would it accept 
but also question the devaluing of knowledge on the basis of only a single way of knowing, in 
this case religion. 
Furthermore, an Indigenous worldview would dismiss the historical arguments in relation 
to when knowledge about zero is appropriate for students.  Students’ contexts make the 
knowledge of value, not someone else’s past experiences.  Furthermore, the valuing of one 
culture’s mathematical knowledge over that of another in determining the emergence of any 
mathematical concept would be seen as limiting from an Indigenous worldview perspective 
because the diversity of ways of knowing and kinds of knowledge would not be valued 
equitably. 
When considering the high dropout rates for First Nations students through the lens of an 
Indigenous worldview, the question of what do the students have to say about the situation would 
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arise.  There would not be an automatic assumption that there is a deficiency in the students 
causing their struggles and separation from mathematics, because the assumption that the way 
mathematics is taught and learned, even what mathematics is or can be, would not be assumed to 
be singular and unrelated to the learner and knower.  Instead, a person grounded within an 
Indigenous worldview would likely investigate what is being valued and whether there are other 
ways of mathematical knowing and other kinds of mathematical knowledge that could also be 
valued. 
Likewise, the suggestion by my Ministry colleagues that there are First Nations and Métis 
ways of knowing would be of great interest to a person grounded within an Indigenous 
worldview.  From that person’s perspective, alternative ways of knowing are important to 
consider, and even embrace, so that the knowledge one creates is the knowledge of most value 
for your particular place, time, and context.   Thus, such a person would encourage my pursuit of 
understanding of these alternate ways of knowing. 
Consequently, the holding of the curriculum renewal feedback sessions with Nations and 
Métis teachers and elders to try to find ways to infuse First Nations and Métis content, 
perspectives, and ways of knowing into the mathematics curricula would be well received by a 
person grounded within an Indigenous worldview.  These sessions encouraged the sharing of 
different kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing, and were an attempt, in reality, to permeate 
the valuing of alternative knowledges and ways of knowing throughout the curricula documents.  
From the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, such actions concretize the seeking of 
knowledge and ways of knowing that are most valuable.  
Similarly, an Indigenous worldview would be receptive to the polysemic meanings that 
Edward referenced in our discussion about the way the word “equal” is used in First Nations and 
Métis communities.  Within an Indigenous worldview, a person’s context, which includes how 
they think and speak about the context, is of great value when seeking knowledge and ways of 
knowing.  
A person grounded within an Indigenous worldview would also be happy to hear of 
Louise’s work in trying to value the mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing of the Inuit 
of northern Quebec.  Such a person would be further pleased to note that Louise’s work also 
focuses on trying to find authentic and respectful ways to have students also learn about 
mathematics within a base 10 number system and the related representation of such mathematics.  
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Such a valuing of the kinds of mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing of both Western 
schooling and of Inuit communities in northern Quebec would be accepted within an Indigenous 
worldview as commitments to working towards not limiting, but rather seeking, alternative kinds 
of knowledge and ways of knowing. 
My move into exploring the field of ethnomathematics would also be viewed favorably 
from the perspective of an Indigenous worldview. An Indigenous worldview’s seeking and 
valuing diversity in kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing within any context would approve 
of and support the diversity of ways of knowing and kinds of knowledge found within 
ethnomathematical research and discussions. 
The same, however, cannot necessarily be said of the mathematics requirements for jobs 
and programs of study that do not align with the mathematical needs within those areas.  A 
relevant context for needing these particular mathematics courses is not present within the 
requirements.  Moreover, from the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, which values 
diverse ways of knowing and kinds of knowledge, the assumption that mathematics courses are 
the only way one can prove their ability to be successful in furthering their position at work or in 
their schooling would be seen as unfounded. Instead, these requirements would be regarded as 
unnecessarily adding barriers and limitations upon people seeking to enter into these areas, 
thereby oppressing individuals on irrelevant (and unsubstantiated) grounds. 
From the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, then, this part of my story has also 
highlighted experiences and values that are both supported and questioned (although never fully 
rejected).  From this part of the analysis, I now move on to using grounded theory methods to 
code the concepts I found throughout this part of my story and my analysis of them. 
 
 
Coding and explanation. 
Once again, consideration of the concept coding of this section of my story reveals the 
same concepts and the merging of those concepts as have been seen before.  Hierarchy, 
specialization, singularity, categorization and isolation, relationship, power and authority, 
abstraction, and context/story regularly emerge as concepts underlying the various epiphanies 
that have just been discussed.  
Hierarchy appears in the coding of this section of my story in a number of ways.  The job 
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and programs of study mathematics requirements create an artificial hierarchy of applicants by 
using mathematics courses that have no relevant content in relation to the situation as the 
determining factors for whether an application is even considered.  
A different kind of hierarchy, one based on chronology, is also in play in the WNCP 
considerations of the order in which mathematics content should be taught.  In the case of 
teaching students about zero in the beginning years of their mathematics learning, the argument 
is made that this is not appropriate because zero was not developed early in mathematics.  Thus, 
history defines a chronological hierarchy of events, and teaching and learning is meant to follow 
that same sequence.  In this case, another hierarchy lays hidden below (and supporting) the 
chronological one, namely that of a cultural hierarchy that classifies the relative value of 
mathematical knowledge in different cultures in relation to each other.  This cultural hierarchy is 
evident in how the chronological hierarchy of mathematics development ignores many cultures’ 
mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing, such as those of the Mayans and the Indians.  
This section of my story also raises the notion of a hierarchy of mathematical difficulty.  This 
hierarchy is likewise supported by the chronological and cultural hierarchies previously 
mentioned.  
Even languages appear to be placed in a hierarchical relationship, with English having 
dominance over First Nations and Métis languages.  It is this presumed authority of the English 
language over the other languages that ultimately gives rise to the polysemic meanings for 
English words used in First Nations and Métis communities that Dr. Doolittle brought to my 
attention.   
The concept of specialization again goes hand-in-hand with the concept of hierarchy 
within this section of my story.  The dominance given to (historical) Greek knowledge and, as a 
result, Greek chronology, speaks to an assumption of specialization within Greek knowledge and 
ways of knowing.  In particular, the knowledge and ways of knowing associated with Greek 
developments are considered the most specialized in their abstractness and authority.  Similarly, 
the hierarchy of mathematical difficulty presumes greater specialization, knowledge, and thus 
authority for any person who is able to progress upwards through the hierarchy.  
Much of the discussion and analysis of this section also is grounded within either the 
pursuit of or, more frequently, the challenging of singularity in knowledge and ways of knowing. 
My many encounters with the notion of First Nations and Métis ways of knowing are in 
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particular challenging of the notion of knowledge of value being singular in nature (as is held by 
the Traditional Western worldview).  This concept is perhaps most evident in Louise’s story of 
her encounters with aspects of the mathematics of the Inuit of northern Quebec, such as their 
emphasis on context determining how the mathematics is communicated and done. 
Within this part of my story, the concepts of singularity and hierarchy also attach to the 
concept of categorization and isolation.  Parts of the story, as previously noted, categorize 
mathematical knowledge into hierarchies that isolate different pieces of mathematical knowledge 
from each other thereby strengthening the perceived singularity of the knowledge pieces.   This 
isolation of knowledge became particularly noticeable during the feedback sessions held with 
First Nations and Métis teachers and elders.  During this time, they expressed extreme concern 
about the limitation upon the infusing First Nations and Métis content, perspectives, and ways of 
knowing into the mathematics outcomes and indicators because of the over-riding mandate of the 
use of single sentences and of limiting details in examples.  For those involved in this process, 
these limitations prohibited connecting of the outcomes together and to students’ lives in 
meaningful ways.  
 Relationship was also a frequent and strong concept that again merged in this part of my 
story.  First, the statistical data seems to imply a harmful relationship between many First 
Nations and Métis students and mathematics as they drop out of mathematics, and thus more 
barriers are put into place for their futures.  Further, the feedback sessions for the curricula 
renewal brought to light how the avoidance of context or story prevented students from finding 
meaningful ways to build a relationship with mathematics, denying them the possibility to 
understand “what mathematics wants from [them].”  As well, the (possibility of a) relationship 
between religion and mathematics was again present in this section of my story.  Finally, this 
part of the story marks an even greater distancing of myself in my valuing of knowledge and 
ways of knowing from the Traditional Western worldview, and the continued strengthening of 
my relationships with an Indigenous worldview.   
As noted in the discussion of the concepts of hierarchy, specialization, and singularity, 
authority and power also is a major concept within this part of my story.  What my analysis has 
brought to light is the power and authority that has been given (by some) to the English language 
and (historical) Greek culture, and some of the consequences arising from wielding that 
supremacy.  It also gives some examples in which this same power and authority is being 
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challenged, such as through ethnomathematical research and passively (almost unnoticeably) 
through the polysemy found in some First Nations and Métis communities when English is 
spoken.   In addition, this part of my story speaks of temporal (chronological) authority that often 
defines when different knowledge is to be learned.  
With hierarchical, singular, and categorized and isolated knowledge being sought and 
valued, abstraction also becomes a significant concept to consider.  In my epiphany related to the 
barriers that mathematics can create, there is evidence that mathematics at a particular grade, 
regardless of specific content, has been abstracted to be a reflection of the level of a person’s 
ability to gain and use knowledge in significant ways.  The higher the grade of mathematics 
achieved, the more reliable a student or worker will be.   The concept of valuing abstraction of 
knowledge is also challenged within this part of my story.   In particular, Louise’s experience 
with the concrete and contextual mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing of the Inuit 
students from northern Quebec, and their efficiency and fluency in working with that knowledge 
and ways of knowing, raises the question of whether the valuing of abstract knowledge over all 
else is actually substantiated.  
Finally, the concept of context (story) is again present throughout this section of my 
story.  It exists in the lack of contextual attention in the historical considerations given to zero, as 
well as in the occurrence of polysemy within First Nations and Métis communities. Context is 
also central to the mathematics of the Inuit of northern Quebec that Louise told me about.  In 
some cases, context specifically is excluded and in others it is explicitly included; however, it is 
frequently a central feature within the epiphanies of my story.  
As my analysis of my story continues, it is becoming harder and harder to keep the 
various concepts isolated from each other as how each concept is encountered within the story is 
dependent upon and informs what is also present in relation to the other concepts.  Thus, axial 
coding is quickly coming to dominate the grounded theory analysis of my story.  I am, however, 
avoiding the naming of the categories originating within these conceptual interactions and 
mergers.  I choose to not label the categories at this point because I know that even after the next, 
and final section, of my story is analyzed, the categories will only be representative of the first 
section of my analysis, that of my story (the auto/ethnographical part of my research).  The 
methods of grounded theory, however, will also be taking me into the analysis of data that comes 
from other sources, and I do not want to specify any categories until I have had a chance to 
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engage in those analyses as well. 
“In the first term of my PhD program” Analysis 
This final part to my story focuses on my starting into the PhD program for which this 
dissertation is being written.  It is a small section that bridges over into my current research. 
Prominent features within the data. 
Within this part of my story, there are three epiphanies.  The first epiphany, that of taking 
the Trends and Issues in Mathematics Education course, provided me with safe opportunities to 
bounce my evolving understandings of what is, can be, and even should be valued in terms of the 
kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing in mathematics and the teaching and learning of 
mathematics, off of different individuals.  
The second epiphany, the Decolonizing Aboriginal Education course, although still a safe 
place to express feelings and thoughts, was continuously challenging my beliefs, my knowledge, 
and my ways of knowing, both with respect to the impacts of colonization on First Nations and 
Métis and to the impacts (including privileges) of colonization upon me.  Over and over, this 
course connected to and reinforced my valuing of alternative ways of knowing and kinds of 
knowledge, particularly in mathematics (despite my being the only person in the class who ever 
mentioned it).  
It is out of the Decolonizing Aboriginal Education course that the final epiphany of my 
story emerged, the reading of Leroy Little Bear’s (2000) Jagged Worldviews Colliding.  This 
reading invited me to consider what kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing are valued within 
the Traditional Western worldview and within an Indigenous worldview in relation to 
mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics.  It also provided me the foundations 
for a framework through which to consider such values in mathematics and the teaching and 
learning of mathematics, and ultimately it is this reading that became the foundation for the 
research I am now engaged in. 
Dialogue with the Traditional Western worldview. 
From the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview, all three of my epiphanies 
would be evidence of time and effort wasted.  A person grounded within this worldview would 
see no need to study trends or issues in mathematics education, as the “right way” to learn and do 
mathematics is already known.  This right way emphasizes the abstract, compartmentalized, 
hierarchical, and singular knowledge and ways of knowing that are based in rational thought and 
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logical reasoning. 
Likewise, a person grounded within the Traditional Western worldview would not find 
justification in spending time considering the decolonizing of education; after all, education is 
being done in the “right way.”  If anyone was experiencing negative impacts from the education 
system it would be because they were not valuing the abstract and authoritative knowledge and 
ways of knowing that the system brings to its student.  Moreover, no one is privileged over 
another if they are valuing the correct knowledge and ways of knowing. 
Finally, the Traditional Western worldview would also refuse to assign any significance 
or importance to the work of Leroy Little Bear.  Little Bear, in writing about and contrasting the 
two worldviews would not be seen as contributing to valuable knowledge, since the Traditional 
Western knowledge is assumed to be correct (the “right way” of looking at things), while an 
Indigenous worldview offers nothing of value that is not already in place as a consequence of the 
Traditional Western worldview.   
Thus, my considerations of context, story, and relationships within all three of the 
epiphanies would appear as frivolous or even sacrilege within the Traditional Western 
worldview.  Great concern would be expressed about the likelihood that these courses and 
readings would ultimately lead to the questioning of the authority, specialization, and power that 
are central to mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics, which they did.  A 
person grounded within the Traditional worldview would question my need to seek the 
understanding that I gained in these epiphanies, reminding me that knowledge of value comes 
from isolating and distancing oneself from what is to be known and not relating oneself to the 
knowledge.  I was not seeking knowledge for the sake of knowledge, and that ultimately calls 
into question the validity and worth of the knowledge. 
Dialogue with an Indigenous worldview. 
From the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, my focus, investigations, and 
learnings within the Trends and Issues in Mathematics Education course would be seen as 
valuable pursuits of knowledge and ways of knowing.  Likewise, my new experiences and 
knowledges emerging from the Decolonizing Aboriginal English class would be seen as 
strengthening the diversity of my knowledge and ways of knowing, not only in terms of 
mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics, but in relation to life and 
relationships within life.  As a specific context for these learnings, Little Bear’s (2000) writing 
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would also be valued as a further extension of my new knowledges, and ways of knowing; it 
would be appreciated for providing me a new context of understanding and for broadening the 
diversity of my knowledge. 
According to an Indigenous worldview, these three epiphanies would be seen as 
important because they explicitly challenged any assumptions of absolute power and authority 
associated with the construction and maintenance of hierarchies, categorization, abstraction, and 
decontextualizing of mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing.  The knowledge I was 
seeking and gaining in these contexts would be viewed as good knowledge, and knowledge for 
the sake of the greater good. 
Coding and explanation. 
Thus, although far less detailed then the rest of my story, the three epiphanies from the 
start of my entering the PhD program again related to the previously identified and described 
conceptual codes: hierarchies, specialization, singularity, categorization and isolation, 
relationships, power and authority, abstraction, and context (story). Moreover, how each of the 
two worldviews would respond to each of these concepts is in the same ways as previously 
discussed.   
Likewise, the interplay and interdependence of each of these concepts also continues to 
play out in the same ways through these three epiphanies, giving even a stronger basis upon 
which to claim the emergence of axial coding, the grouping together of initial concept codes into 
a larger conceptual category.  This larger conceptual category is also becoming clearer through 
the final epiphanies of my story, that of the purpose of seeking knowledge.  In particular, this 
conceptual category focuses the question of how are these concepts related to the kinds of 
knowledge and ways of knowing of importance?  For now, however, I will hold back on further 
clarifying and naming this broader conceptual category as it appears to be merging; rather, I will 
wait to see what emerges from my data that comes from non-personal sources, allowing the 
individual concepts, and this emerging conceptual category, to evolve without my overt 
interference. 
My Story: Summary of the Analysis and Moving Forward 
Within analyzing and coding data in grounded theory, one is seeking for “saturation” of 
themes within the data, and in the proceeding analysis of my story, such saturation can be seen in 
all of the emergent codes: hierarchy, specialization, singularity, categorization and isolation, 
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relationship, power and authority, abstraction, and context (story).  Once each of these concepts 
emerged within my story, they continued to play a role within my analysis of the rest, and the 
elaborations about the codes also quickly became consistent. 
If this research was purely auto/ethnographic, I would now be content to head toward my 
conclusions, but the question that I am asking, “what kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing 
are of value in mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics” and the implications 
of the answer to that question, has not been addressed by simply considering my personal story.  
This is where grounded theory, beyond conceptual coding, now takes hold of my research 
by requiring that I now continue on by researching areas that my initial set of data analysis and 
concepts leads me to.  As a slight deviance to the common use of grounded theory, however, my 
original data set is not leading me to investigate one arising area of data; rather, it has me now 
wishing to explore four areas outside of my personal context:  
1) how people view and think about what mathematics is (the philosophies of 
mathematics),  
2) show it is believed that mathematics should be taught and learned (the math 
wars),  
3) how mathematics relates to culture and individuals (Indigenous students’ 
mathematics struggles and ethnomathematics), and  
4) how curriculum represents mathematics content with an eye to emerging 
mathematics content (risk education).  
In so continuing with the documentation of these sets of data, each will be followed by an 
analysis using the same procedures as was used in the analysis of my story: an identification of 
the prominent features or epiphanies found within the data, the results of a Gadamerian 
hermeneutic dialogue between the two worldviews (the Traditional Western worldview and an 
Indigenous worldview) and the data presented, and a conceptual coding and related descriptions 
emerging from the epiphanies and dialogues.  
Thus, although officially moving away from the auto/ethnography of my collage of 
methodologies, I still carry forward the notions of epiphanies and prominent features from that 
methodology to maintain consistency and clarity within the rest of my analysis.  With these 
understandings of how that presentation and analysis of data will now proceed, I move to the 
next data set – the philosophies of mathematics. 
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Figure 1: Philosophies of mathematics, embodied mathematics, mathematical 
enculturation 
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Philosophies of Mathematics: Literature Review and Analysis 
Many of the epiphanies in my story that were analyzed raise a different wording of my 
research question, namely, what is mathematics and consequently, how should it be taught and 
learned?  Even the disparity between dialogues between my story and the two worldviews within 
that analysis present two very different conceptions of what mathematics is and how it should be 
taught and learned.  It is this theme emerging from my story that I now explore in more depth, by 
turning to the literature that speaks to this very question: the philosophies of mathematics. 
Philosophies of mathematics are concerned with the nature of mathematical knowledge, 
and thus also consider (albeit sometimes implicitly) the two questions (among others) of “what is 
mathematics” and “what is knowledge?”  The varying answers to these two questions ultimately 
result in a variety of different philosophies of mathematics.  It is also in the answers to these 
questions that proponents of alternate philosophies frequently find loopholes and paradoxes that, 
at least for them, render the philosophies under consideration ineffectual or obsolete.  In the 
sections that follow, I will be explaining each of the many philosophies of mathematics that have 
been written about.  During these explanations, I will endeavor to avoid the criticisms made by 
champions of one philosophy or another, but during the analysis of the philosophies I have no 
doubt that my comments will resonate with my own personal biases based upon my evolving 
stance with respect to a worldview.  It is my belief that these biases will be evident to the reader 
and that my arguments will not be rendered irrelevant because of my openness in disposition.  
For interested readers, the specific arguments between and against the various philosophies of 
mathematics can be found, and quite elegantly in this regard, within the work of many other 
authors and researchers (e.g., Ernest, 1991; Hersch, 1997; Lakatos, 1978).   
In his discussion of the philosophies of mathematics, Ernest (1991) categorizes the 
differing (past and present) philosophies of mathematics into two camps: the absolutists and the 
fallibilists.  The difference between these two camps lies in their response to the notion of 
mathematical truth.  For the absolutists, mathematics is “a body of infallible and objective truth, 
far removed from the values of humanity” (p. xi); moreover, “mathematics is the one and 
perhaps the only realm of certain, unquestionable and objective knowledge” (p. 3). For the 
fallibilists however, “mathematical truth is corrigible, and can never be regarded as being above 
revision and correction” (p. 3).  Lakatos (1978) similarly categories the philosophies of 
mathematics, but uses the alternate names of Euclideans and quasi-empiricists for absolutists and 
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fallibilistis, respectively.  
Hersch (1997), alternatively, uses Kitcher and Aspray’s (1988) classification system for 
categorizing different philosophies of mathematics: the mainstream, and the humanists and 
mavericks.  In this schema, the categorizing criteria are based upon the relation of mathematics 
knowledge to humans.  That is, the Mainstream philosophies are those that “see mathematics as 
superhuman or inhuman” while the humanist and maverick philosophies (and philosophers) “see 
mathematics as a human activity” (p. xiv).  Although argued from a different perspective from 
Ernest and Lakatos, Hersch’s categorization scheme results in the same split in philosophies. 
Different nomenclature is frequently used in the naming of the various philosophies of 
mathematics, as is evidenced by Ernest’s, Lakatos’, and Kitcher and Aspray’s alternate titles for 
the same categorizations.  As well, even for one particular philosophy there are often many 
names used (for example foundationism is often equated with conventionalism, logicism, 
structuralism, constructivism and intuitionism).  Moreover, certain philosophies of mathematics 
combine aspects (or could be seen as links) between two or more other philosophies that from a 
broader perspective might have seemed dichotomous (for example, intuitionism can be thought 
of as connecting absolutists and fallibilists through humanism).  In essence, the philosophy of 
mathematics as a overarching picture is not precise or obvious, especially as one moves away 
(both historically and philosophically) from the original written philosophy of the Platonists and 
moves to the most recently conceived philosophies related to fallibilism and humanism (see 
Figure 2 below). 
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Figure 2: Relationships between the philosophies of mathematics 
Generally speaking, the figure above represents a historical progression (moving forward in time 
from left to right) of the developments of the philosophies of mathematics, although many, if not 
all of the philosophies, do have ties back to the times of (for example) Pythagoras, Plato, and 
Descartes (making even the historical perspective of the philosophies of mathematics 
convoluted).  
In my re-presenting of the characteristics of each of the philosophies of mathematics in 
Figure 1, I have chosen an new organizing classification of ‘neither modern nor postmodern-like’ 
(no label), ‘modern-like’ (M), and ‘postmodern-like’ (PM) to categorize the philosophies.  In one 
case (intuitionism) both M and PM are given as labels because this philosophy of mathematics 
has features that are both modern and postmodern in nature.  For the purposes of this paper, the 
classification of modern-like is given to those philosophies that are grounded in rationalism (the 
belief that knowledge is gained through reason), empiricism (the belief that knowledge is gained 
through the scientific method), and materialism (the belief in only a physical universe).  
Alternatively, philosophies in this paper that are classified as postmodern-like have 
characteristics that demonstrate an acceptance of ambiguity, paradox, disorder, differing 
approaches and methods, diversity, incommensurate interpretations, and skepticism (Molslehian, 
2004).  As is so often the case with classification systems, the one chosen for this paper leaves 
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one philosophy of mathematics without a specific place to call home.  This philosophy, 
embodied mathematics, is re-presented after the postmodern-like philosophies. In addition, 
although it is not a philosophy per se, Bishop’s (1991) values of mathematics culture 
(mathematical enculturation), also warrant consideration, and as such are re-presented after 
embodied mathematics.  
The numerous philosophies of mathematics are now presented in the specific categories 
described above (a very Traditional Western Worldview approach).  Immediately following the 
descriptions of the philosophies of mathematics within a particular category, this data will be 
analyzed.  As was the case in the analysis of my story, each category will undergo four different 
analyses: identification of prominent features or epiphanies in the data, discussion of what would 
be prominent within Gadamerian hermeneutic dialogues between the Traditional Western 
worldview and an Indigenous worldview and the data, and finally the coding and explaining of 
concepts emerging from the data using grounded theory.  I begin by considering Platonism and 
fictionalism, the two philosophies of mathematics that are absolutist while also being neither 
modern-like nor post-modern-like in nature. 
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Figure 3: Neither modern nor postmodern-like philosophies of mathematics. 
There are two philosophies of mathematics that are neither modern nor postmodern-like in 
nature: Platonism and fictionalism.  Both of these philosophies are branches off of absolutism 
and therefore hold that mathematical knowledge is comprised of absolute and objective 
unquestionable truths.  Each of these philosophies is now described in turn. 
Platonism 
The oldest (recorded in writing) philosophy of mathematics is Platonism, which is often 
referred to as Realism.  It is also one of the most (if not most) common philosophies held by 
mathematicians and non-mathematicians alike today.  Stemming from the work and beliefs of the 
Pythagorean’s, and firmed up through Plato’s writings (hence another common name for this 
philosophy being Pythago-Platonism), the main premise of this philosophy is that “mathematical 
entities exist outside space and time, outside thought and matter, in an abstract realm 
independent of any consciousness, individual or social” (Hersch, 1997, p. 9).  Thus, “doing 
mathematics is the process of discovering [these entities] pre-existing relationships” (Ernest, 
1991, p. 29).  In its entirety, the Platonists view mathematical knowledge as being made up of 
descriptions of these outside entities, the relationships between them, and the structures that 
connect them to each other.  As a consequence of this view of mathematics, complete objectivity 
is afforded to mathematics; truth exists in mathematics as it has its own inner laws and logic that 
it obeys to preserve the truth. 
As well as the objectivity of mathematics in the Platonic philosophy, there is also the 
universality and absoluteness of the entities and their existence beyond the regular world of 
humans, like they are “members of the mathematical zoo”  (Hersch, 1997, p. 11).  In this 
philosophy of mathematics, “Every mathematical statement about number should be absolutely 
true or false.  There should be no equally valid alternative forms of mathematics” (Lakoff, & 
Núñez, 2000, p. 80); “these objects exist outside physical space and time.  They were never 
created.  They never change” (Hersch, 1997, p. 11).  Thus mathematics is construed as an 
infallible collection of knowledge that exists in “an independent, immaterial abstract world – a 
remnant of Plato’s Heaven, attenuated, purified, bleached, with all entities but the mathematical 
expelled” (Hersch, 1997, p. 12), and having the distinct pleasure of being purely objective and 
always true. 
Despite these commonalities in the view of where mathematics exists, and how it relates 
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to truth and objectivity, there are different ‘sects’ of Platonism derived from alternate 
foundations for this superhuman knowledge.  Two such examples are Thom’s geometric 
grounding of mathematical ideas (i.e., the structure and relationships of the mathematical entities 
are grounded within geometric logic and laws) and Godel’s set-theoretic grounding of 
mathematical ideas (in which the structure and relationships of the mathematical entities are 
grounded within the logic and laws of set-theory).  Regardless of the foundation used to 
understand the mathematical entities, Graham’s (a combinatorialist) sentiment: “I personally feel 
that mathematics is the essence of what’s driving the universe” (as sited in Hersch, 1997, p. 11) 
is a seemingly natural conclusion based upon the infallibility and otherworldly nature assigned to 
mathematics by the Platonists’ philosophy. 
Fictionalism 
The second philosophy of mathematics that is neither modern-like nor postmodern-like is 
fictionalism.  For fictionalists, there does not need to be actual mathematical entities; “there can 
be representation without a represented” (Hersch, 1997, p. 20).  A common example used to 
describe fictionalism, is that there is no real Mickey Mouse, despite there being many 
representations of Mickey Mouse (on film, on t-shirts, in theme parks).  This view of 
mathematics comes from the perspective of other natural sciences, which make use of 
mathematics: “[fictionalists] try to show that science doesn’t require… actual existence of 
mathematical entities.  You can do science, they say, while regarding mathematical entities as 
fictional – not actually existing” (Hersch, 1997, p. 197).  In this way, fictionalists argue that 
“Nonfiction corresponds to empirical science; fiction corresponds to mathematics” (Hersch, 
1997, p. 180). 
Fictionalism is in some ways similar to constructivism (to be discussed under modern-
like philosophies of mathematics) and ultimately to humanism (to be discussed under 
postmodern-like philosophies), in that  
it is sometimes possible to account for features of a mathematical discovery by the 
interests, tastes and attitudes of the discoverer and sometimes also by the needs or 
traditions of his country.… the way in which it’s thought of by its creators, mathematics 
is like an art such as fiction or sculpture. (Hersch, 1997, p. 140)   
However, fictionalists do not stress the formal aspects of the construction of mathematical 
objects, nor are they concerned with the humanness of the activity.  
 Fictionalists are often described as materialists: “They notice that mathematics is 
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imponderable, without location or size.  Since only material objects, ponderable and volume-
occupying, are real, mathematics isn’t real” (Hersch, 1997, p. 180).  Ultimately, in the 
philosophy of fictionalism, mathematics is a fiction, and thus although re-presented in this paper 
along with Platonism, fictionalism contradicts the premises of Platonism while remaining 
absolutist in nature. 
Analysis of the Neither Modern-like nor Postmodern-like Philosophies of Mathematics 
With the above understandings of Platonism and fictionalism, the two absolutist 
philosophies of mathematics that are neither modern-like nor postmodern-like, I will next 
proceed to the analysis of them.  This analysis will first consider the prominent features, or 
epiphanies, with the discussion of the two philosophies, followed by a discussion of the 
responses of the two worldviews (the Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous 
worldview) to the two philosophies, and then will end with coding of concepts that emerge from 
the three previous forms of analysis. 
 
 
Prominent features of the philosophies. 
It is important to first note why these two philosophies have been placed within their own 
category, as neither modern-like nor post-modern-like.  Although Platonism does support the 
rationalism of modern philosophies, rationality and a structured rational method of creating 
knowledge is not a part of this philosophy of mathematics because mathematics is assumed to 
exist a priori to human reasoning and thinking.  Whether someone has discovered a mathematical 
idea or element, that element already exists within its own abstract reality, and it will continue to 
exist, even if it is never discovered.  Likewise, Platonism is not a postmodern philosophy of 
mathematics because there is no ambiguity associated with or allowed within mathematical 
knowledge.  Within Platonism, mathematical knowledge is absolutely true and has absolute 
authority, without question.  
Fictionalism, on the other hand, allows for a certain level of mathematical diversity 
across varying contexts, but within a context, all ambiguity is gone, making this philosophy not 
postmodern-like.  As well, fictionalism does not depend upon absolute rationalism and reasoned 
approaches free of personal preferences, in fact it encourages the creators and users of 
mathematics to think about and use mathematics in ways that make the most sense to them 
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individually.  Thus, fictionalism is also not a modern-like philosophy. 
These two philosophies of mathematics are based firmly upon the assumption that 
mathematics, and mathematical entities are not part of the reality that we live our daily lives 
within.  Platonism and fictionalism differ from each other instead upon the question of whether 
mathematics and mathematical entities even exist, or need to exist.  Whereas Platonists hold that 
mathematics exists in an abstract realm, completely isolated and independent of our reality and 
ourselves, fictionalists view mathematics as creative constructs whose existence is 
inconsequential. 
As a result of the difference of opinion regarding whether mathematics is fact or fiction, 
reality or make-believe, the two philosophies also vary in their perceptions of the relationships 
between mathematics and the mathematical knower and user.  For Platonists, mathematics is 
made up of absolute facts, and there is only one mathematics.  Fictionalists, on the other hand 
acknowledge that mathematics is formed by the interests and needs of the user of the knowledge, 
that is, mathematics is formed and represented by individuals rather than being pre-determined in 
a singular form.  It should be noted however, that this does not imply that fictionalists deny the 
absolute truth of mathematical knowledge, only that they believe that it can be thought of in 
many different forms.  
Dialogue with the Traditional Western worldview. 
Considering Platonism from the perspective of a person grounded within the Traditional 
Western worldview, the singularity, compartmentalization, abstraction, and authority that is 
assigned to mathematics and its entities would be viewed as reasonable and logical.  Since there 
exists only symbolic representation of mathematics, the notion that true mathematics sits outside 
of the human realm would also be acceptable within the Traditional Western worldview, 
particularly as it puts more distance between the knower and the known. Consequently, the 
knowledge is made more rationally and logically based, and less likely to be interfered with by 
relationship and context. 
On the other hand, from the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview, the notion 
that knowledge could be something that does not actually exist, almost spiritual in nature, as the 
fictionalists maintain, would be seen as highly suspect.  Knowledge of value must be of an object 
external from oneself, but it must be of an object, not of something within one’s imagination. 
Further, the notion that mathematics could be different for different people, depending upon their 
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context and needs would be viewed as foolhardy by a person grounded within the Traditional 
Western worldview.  Knowledge must be singular and abstracted to be of value, and there is only 
one way to come to that knowledge – the “right way”.  The Traditional Western worldview 
would, however, approve of the fictionalists belief in the absolute truth of mathematics, despite 
their insistence on making it responsive to the individual or context. 
Dialogue with an Indigenous worldview. 
In contrast to the responses to these two philosophies from the perspective of the 
Traditional Western worldview, an Indigenous worldview aligns better with fictionalism than 
Platonism.  A person grounded within an Indigenous worldview would find the Platonists 
insistence upon mathematical knowledge having to be that of absolute truths with singular 
representations applying to all contexts because of its abstract form far too limiting upon the 
value of the knowledge.  Even the Platonists’ maintaining that mathematics and its entities must 
exist in some form beyond our reality would not provide enough diversity in thinking from the 
perspective of an Indigenous worldview, as Platonists would not allow this “otherworldly” 
existence of mathematics to be part of a spiritual, physical, or emotional realm.  Mathematics’ 
abstract reality within Platonism is strictly intellectually bound. 
Fictionalism, on the other hand, would be more appealing to a person grounded within an 
Indigenous worldview.  Within fictionalism, such a person would find openness, even 
responsiveness, to relationships between knowledge and knower and the valuing of context, both 
of which are of value within an Indigenous worldview.  As well, by not really worrying about 
whether mathematics exists or how it might exist, fictionalism allows emotional, physical, 
spiritual, experiential, and intuitional knowledge to be considered and potentially valued.  This 
potential for the acceptance of diverse ways of knowing and kinds of knowledge would be 
greatly valued within an Indigenous worldview.  In fact, the only aspect of fictionalism that 
would be seen as limiting the kinds of knowledge that are valued from the perspective of an 
Indigenous worldview, would be its belief in the absolute truth of mathematics and its necessity 
in creating and applying scientific knowledge. 
With understandings of how both of the two worldviews (the Traditional Western and an 
Indigenous) would respond to the Platonism and fictionalism, I now move on to a discussion of 
the concepts that emerge from the data and these analyses.  As has been seen before, there is 
much repetition between the concepts that are present and how they are being interpreted and 
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understood.  
Coding and explanation. 
Within these two, neither modern-like nor postmodern-like philosophies of mathematics, 
a number of the same concepts that emerged from my story likewise can be found.  In particular, 
singularity, compartmentalization and isolation, abstraction, relationship and context all are 
significant (either for their encouragement or their denial) within Platonism and fictionalism.  
Singularity as a concept is found in Platonism in the emphasis on the absolute truth of the 
mathematics and mathematical entities that are discovered and assumed to exist within the 
abstract realm of mathematical knowledge.  Singularity, in terms of the “right way” of doing 
mathematics is also deeply embedded in Platonism.  Within fictionalism, the notion of the “right 
way”, both in terms of representing and doing mathematics, is challenged, and thus singularity in 
this sense is denied.  However, fictionalists do uphold the singularity of truth of the mathematics, 
regardless of how it is represented or used.  
Compartmentalization and isolation are also present in the two worldviews perspectives 
of the two philosophies of mathematics.  From the Platonic perspective, mathematical knowledge 
is isolated in a different reality from the one of day-to-day life, as well as in terms of 
mathematical elements and knowledge being categorized within that alternate reality.  Within 
fictionalism, compartmentalization of mathematics is based upon the context and needs of the 
particular user of mathematical knowledge.  Therefore, the same mathematical knowledge could 
be categorized in different ways, sometimes isolated and sometimes embedded within other 
mathematics and other contexts. 
The concept of abstraction is directly connected to the singularity and 
compartmentalization that has just been described.  For Platonists, abstraction of mathematics 
begins in their identification of an abstract reality within which mathematics exists, and it 
continues in their viewing of mathematics as absolute truths that can be used in the solving of 
any problem.  These truths must therefore be housed as abstract knowledge, capable of being 
applied at any time without change being required.  Fictionalism, on the other hand, can be seen 
as questioning the authority of abstract mathematical knowledge, as it holds that it is fictitious 
knowledge that is created to meet the needs of the individual in their particular context.  
Abstraction of this knowledge is not required by fictionalists; they simply create the knowledge 
and use it as they see need to while they work with other knowledge that actually exists. 
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Likewise, the concept of authority and power is also present in both philosophies of 
mathematics.  In Platonism, the authority and power of mathematics is situated within the 
absolute truth of the mathematical knowledge and its entities as well as within the isolation of 
mathematics from the everyday real world.  In this way, the authority of the mathematics is not 
challenged by its relationships to a changing world.  Mathematics sits both removed from the 
objects to which it is applied and in authority over them.   
This notion of the authority and power of mathematics is also present in the philosophy 
of fictionalism, although its location (or lack there of) and its representation and use are not 
subjected to the same sense of singularity as found within Platonism.  The purpose of 
mathematics for fictionalists is to give them the ability to work with other kinds of knowledges, 
and in that sense it is imbued with unquestionable authority and power.  
Finally, the concepts of relationship and context are also central to the thinking behind 
both the Platonic and the fictionalist philosophies of mathematics.  Specifically, from the 
perspective of Platonism, relationship and context are irrelevant in consideration of mathematical 
knowledge; in fact, relationship and context would be seen as unnecessary for, and even 
interfering with, the singular, abstract, compartmentalized and isolated, and authoritative nature 
of mathematical knowledge.   
Fictionlism, on the other hand, values context and relationship because they allow an 
individual to construct mathematics in the way that they need and want it.  Like a novelist, 
fictionalists create mathematical knowledge to suit the problem (story) that they are exploring 
and in doing so, establish relationships between how they represent and frame the mathematics 
they need and the context that they are inevitably applying it to. 
Reflection upon these concept codes and the explanations provided leads to two 
important findings.  First, with the exception of hierarchy and specialization, the concepts of 
relevance within the analysis of the first two of the philosophies of mathematics are the same 
concepts that emerged from the analysis of my story.  Further, the elaborations of these concepts 
concur with those previously seen for the same concepts.  In addition, similar merging and 
interdependence of the concepts to that seen in the analysis of my story are also present within 
the analysis of Platonism and fictionalism, leading to not only continued saturation of the 
individual concepts themselves, but also of the conceptual category noted previously.  
With the completion of the analysis of the two neither modern-like nor postmodern-like 
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philosophies of mathematics completed, the next category of philosophies will be presented and 
analyzed.  In particular, the philosophies of mathematics to be considered are those that are 
modern-like in their positioning, while still remaining absolutist in nature. 
  
 
Figure 4: Modern-like philosophies of mathematics 
The philosophies of mathematics in the modern-like category are naturalism, logical 
positivism (a subdivision of naturalism), and foundationism.  Foundationism is subsequently 
broken into six subcategories: logicism, structuralism, conventionalism, formalism, 
constructivism, and intuitionism.  With the exception of intuitionism, these philosophies of 
mathematics are grounded in beliefs that emphasize rationalism, empiricism, and/or the existence 
of only a physical universe, just as modernism does.  Intuitionism does have this same 
grounding, but it also challenges the singular voice of modernism; therefore, I have chosen to 
label it as both modern-like and postmodern-like, with the emphasis being on the modern. Each 
of these modern-like philosophies is now discussed in turn. 
Naturalism 
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A naturalist is  “someone who rejects superstitious appeals to anything super- or non-
natural, and rejects the conclusions of philosophical arguments when those conclusions conflict 
with what, on other grounds, it clearly appears rational to acknowledge” (Macbeth, 2001, p. 87). 
Moreover, naturalism is “the recognition that it is within science itself, and not in some prior 
philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described” (Quine, 1981, p. 21).  As a 
consequence, in naturalism, mathematics’ truths and knowledge are judged by scientific and 
rational methods.   
Naturalism stems from absolutism, seeing mathematics as infallible objective truth, and it 
is so because it can be judged both scientifically and rationally.  Like fictionalism, naturalism 
rejects Platonism, but for a different reason.  Whereas fictionalism posited that mathematics was 
fictitious, and thus could not be otherworldly as Platonism suggests, naturalism outright denies 
the possibility of mathematics being beyond the natural world.  With time, a branch of 
naturalism formed which narrowed the scope of how factual knowledge of mathematics could be 
determined and proved: logical positivism. 
Logical positivism 
Logical positivism (also known as logical empiricism) emerged as a philosophy of 
mathematics out of the perceived need to “find a natural and important role for logic and 
mathematics and to find an understanding of philosophy according to which it was part of the 
scientific enterprise” (Creath, 2013, para. 1).  Logical positivists view scientific knowledge as 
the only factual knowledge humans have and, as such, the development of scientific knowledge 
depends upon experimental verification (such as formal proofs in mathematics) rather than upon 
personal experience. 
Like naturalists, logical positivists reject the consideration of mathematical knowledge as 
being superhuman or inhuman, but the logical positivists are even more stringent in that they 
only accept scientific (including logic-based) verifications of mathematical truths.  Thus, 
although also a branch of absolutism, logical positivism opposes both Platonism and fictionalism 
on the grounds of their acceptance and promotion of an inhuman and unreal nature of 
mathematics. 
Foundationism 
Foundationism (sometimes referred to as foundationalism) is the last branch of 
absolutism to be re-presented in this paper.  Hersch (1997) argues that foundationism’s roots “are 
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tangled with religion and theology” (p. 91), but its ultimate goal “is to provide a systematic and 
absolutely secure foundation for mathematical knowledge, that is for mathematical truth” 
(Ernest, 1991, p. 4).  The result is that “Since Dedekind and Frege in the 1870s and 1880s, 
philosophy of mathematics has been stuck on a single problem – trying to find a foundation to 
which all mathematics can be reduced, a foundation to make mathematics indubitable, free of 
uncertainty, free of any possible contradiction” (Hersch, 1997, p. 22).  
In its original form, as foundationism has many branches of its own (to be discussed in 
following sections), the foundation was seen to be the real number system and the justifying of 
all mathematics, including this foundation, was central.  “Foundationism,” as coined by Imre 
Lakatos, has had many famous mathematicians amongst its followers: Frege, Russell, Brouwer, 
and Hilbert, to name a few.  Many of these same mathematicians became more specific 
regarding the foundation that they believed to be correct grounding for mathematics, resulting in 
a number of branches for foundationism, including structuralism, logicism, formalism, 
constructivism, and intuitionism.  
Structuralism 
Structuralism is a branch of foundationism that defines “mathematics as ‘the science of 
patterns’” (Hersch, 1997, p. 177), making patterns the foundation that this philosophy seeks to 
secure.  The structuralists qualify this notion by arguing “not everyone who studies patterns is a 
mathematician.  What about a dress-maker’s patterns? What about ‘pattern makers’ in machine 
factories?” (Hersch, 1997, p. 178).  As part of their philosophy, structuralists restrict the meaning 
of pattern, within the context of mathematics, to be a nonmaterial pattern which defines a 
mathematical structure, as opposed to something that is created on a piece of paper or metal.  As 
both an advantage and disadvantage of the philosophy of structuralism, Hersch (1997) notes: 
“The structuralist definition fits mathematical practice, because it’s all-inclusive.  All 
mathematics easily falls under its scope” (p.179), as unfortunately does much other knowledge, 
which structuralists do not accept as mathematics.  
Logicism 
As indicated by its name, logicism as a philosophy of mathematics finds its foundation in 
logic.  In fact, logicists views “pure mathematics as a part of logic” (Ernest, 1991, p. 8), where 
“‘logic’ is the fundamental laws of reason, of contradiction and implication – the objective, 
indubitable bedrock of the universe” (Hersch, 197, p. 147).  Mathematical knowledge is 
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knowledge which is grounded within logic. 
Bertrand Russell, one of many notable mathematicians who are associated with logicism 
(others include Leibniz, Frege, Whitehead, and Camp), made two claims regarding logicism as a 
philosophy of mathematics.  First, “All the concepts of mathematics can ultimately be reduced to 
logical concepts, provided that these are taken to include the concepts of set theory or some 
system of similar power,” and second, “All mathematical truths can be proved from the axioms 
and rules of inference of logic alone” (Ernest, 1991, p. 9).  Logicists argue that “showing 
mathematics is part of logic would show it’s objective and indubitable” and ultimately 
redeeming “all mathematics by injecting it with the soundness of logic” (Hersch, 1997, p. 147). 
Unfortunately, Russell’s paradox, known colloquially as the Barber’s Paradox, at the very least, 
added a fly to the ointment that logicism offered as a philosophy of mathematics, hence Russell’s 
addition of “some system of similar power” to his two claims. 
Conventionalism 
In conventionalism, the foundation of mathematical knowledge and truth is viewed to be 
linguistic conventions.  As such, conventionalists argue that “linguistic conventions provide the 
basic, certain truths of mathematics.  Logic and deductive logic (proofs) transmits this truth to 
the remainder of the body of mathematical knowledge, thus establishing its certainty” (Ernest, 
1991, pp. 30-31).  Because of the prevalence of its use in conventionalism arguments, this 
philosophy of mathematics is often referred to as “if-thenism”, where the ‘if’ portion of 
mathematical statements provides the linguistic conventions, including meanings, which through 
deduction, result in the ‘then’ portion of the statement and mathematical certainty.  For some 
scientists (and mathematicians), conventionalism served a utilitarian purpose: “in physics 
Poincare was a conventionalist.  He thought it a matter of convenience which mathematical 
model one uses to describe a physical situation” (Hersch, 1997, p. 200).  Thus Poincare, like 
others, appreciated the freedom that conventionalism afforded them through its grounding in the 
selecting and use of different linguistic conventions. 
Formalism 
Another branch off of foundationism is formalism.  Formalism “is often condensed to 
two short slogans: “Mathematics is a meaningless game [where] ‘Meaningless’ and ‘game’ 
remain undefined” (Hersch, 1997, p. 7); and mathematics is a “meaningless formal game played 
with marks on paper, following rules” (Ernest, 1991, p. 10).  Ernest further provides two specific 
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rules for the game of formalism (of mathematics):  
1. Pure mathematics can be expressed as uninterpreted formal systems, in which the 
truths of mathematics are represented by formal theorems. 
2. The safety of these formal systems can be demonstrated in terms of their freedom 
from inconsistency, by means of meta mathematics (p. 10). 
An interesting part of formalism is that rules need to be made; however, the making of 
rules does not have any rules, yet the rules themselves are never arbitrary: “The rules of language 
and of mathematics are historically determined by the workings of society that evolve under 
pressure of the inner workings and interactions of social groups, and the physical and biological 
environment of earth” (Hersch, 1997, p. 8).  It is in this recognition of the role of society that 
formalism has ties to humanism (to be discussed under the heading of Postmodern-like 
Philosophies of Mathematics).   
Hersch continues by noting that in the philosophy of formalism, “what mathematicians 
publish, cite, and especially teach, will decide the rules…. [The] rules are set by our consensus, 
influenced and led by our most powerful or prestigious members (of course)” (p. 9).  Thus, the 
foundation for formalism is that “Mathematics is axioms, definitions, and theorems – in brief, 
formulas. A strong version of formalism says that there are rules to derive one formula from 
another, but the formulas aren’t about anything.  They’re strings of meaningless symbols” 
(Hersch, 1997, pp. 138-139).   Harkening back to fictionalism, in the formalist philosophy of 
mathematics, it is only when a formula is used in a physical context, giving it a physical 
interpretation, that the formula has meaning.  At that point, the formula can be true or false, but 
“the truth or falsity refers only to the physical interpretation.  As a mathematical formula apart 
from any interpretation, it has no meaning and can be neither true nor false” (Hersch, 1997, p. 
139). 
Constructivism 
All of the branches of foundationism can be related to the ideas of the constructivism 
philosophy of mathematics, but they are fundamentally different based upon what is to be 
constructed first and how new constructions are to occur.  “For constructivists knowledge must 
be established through constructive proofs, based on restricted constructivist logic, and the 
meaning of mathematical terms/objects of the formal procedures by which they are constructed” 
(Ernest, 1997, p. 11).  Hence, constructivism has ties to logicism and formalism; however, it 
differs greatly by limiting what logic and formulas can be used – in particular, indirect proofs 
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(such as proof by contradiction) are not accepted. 
Constructivists work within their restrictions on logic to “reconstruct mathematical 
knowledge (and reforming mathematical practice) in order to safeguard it from loss of meaning 
and contradiction” (Ernest, 1997, p. 11).  Thus, they focus on recreating mathematical truths and 
mathematical objects through constructivist methods, which are grounded in deductive proofs. 
For constructivists, “mathematics is the study of constructive processes performed with pencil 
and paper” (Ernest, 1997, pp. 11-12) and these constructive processes are the foundation that 
grounds mathematics and through which all mathematical knowledge is derived.  
Intuitionism  
Intuitionism, the last of the modern-like philosophies of mathematics, can be seen to have 
ties to absolutism, foundationism and constructivism in that it seeks a foundation upon which all 
mathematics can be constructed and deemed to be unquestionably true.  In a seemingly 
humanistic way (to be discussed in the next section on postmodern-like philosophies of 
mathematics), intuitionism “acknowledges human mathematical activity as fundamental in the 
construction of proofs or mathematical objects, the creation of new knowledge” (Ernest, 1991, p. 
29).  Like constructivism, intuitionism looks to human endeavours for the creation of new 
mathematical knowledge. 
What distinguishes intuitionism most from constructivism is that it seeks “secure 
foundations for mathematical knowledge through intuitionistic proofs and ‘ur-intuition’” (Ernest, 
1991, p. 29), implying that “mathematics takes place primarily in the mind, and that written 
mathematics is secondary” (p. 12).  This stance is contrary to constructivism (and all other 
philosophies of mathematics), which seeks to construct formal proofs within restricted 
constraints on the logic applied.  Intuitionism, on the other hand, proposes that one’s intuition, 
and other informal methods, can and should be used to reveal more mathematical truths to help 
fill the gaps in the axioms of mathematical theory that intuitionists view as being “fundamentally 
incomplete” (p. 29). 
Brouwer, a leader in the development of intuitionism, stated: “mathematics is founded on 
intuitive truths” (Hersch, 1997, p. 153).  In so saying, Brouwer proposed a First and Second Act 
of intuitionism to define the premises and functioning of intuitionism in relation to mathematics.  
In the First Act, Brouwer describes intuitionist mathematics as “an essentially languageless 
activity of the mind having its origin in the perception of a move of time” (Hersch, 1997, p. 154). 
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This perception of a move of time is described as a moment when two distinct things are 
separated, with one becoming more prominent than the other; it is this separation and change in 
prominence “which is the basic intuition of mathematics” (p. 154).  Brouwer describes this 
movement in time as the intuitive beginning of natural numbers, and explains that all other 
natural numbers (as well as all mathematics) can be constructed from this first intuition of 
movement in time (the number 1). 
In his Second Act of intuitionism, Brouwer explains that new mathematical entities can 
be created from the resulting infinite sequences of mathematical entities that emerge intuitively 
from the original movement in time, and secondly through the properties of those entities that 
have already been acquired.  These properties must obey the intuitionism condition that they 
hold for all mathematical entities that are “defined to be ‘equal’ to” (Hersch, 1997, p. 154) the 
original entity. 
Intuitionism also calls into question the notions of truth in mathematics, suggesting that 
instead of ‘true’ and ‘false’, mathematical entities and properties should be classified as 
‘constructively true,’ ‘constructively false,’ and ‘neither’”  (Hersch, 1997, p. 154).  The removal 
of the dichotomy of mathematical knowledge being either true or false, but true, false, or neither, 
based upon how that knowledge is constructed, is the main departing point for intuitionism from 
being exclusively a modern-like philosophy of mathematics and taking on at least a hint of 
postmodernism. 
Analysis of the Modern-Like Philosophies of Mathematics 
With the above understandings of the modern-like philosophies of mathematics 
(naturalism, logical positivism, foundationism, structuralism, logicism, conventionalism, 
formalism, constructivism, and intuitionism), I will next proceed to the Gadamerian 
hermeneutics and grounded theory analyses of them.  This analysis will again first discuss the 
prominent features of these philosophies, followed by a discussion of Gadamerian dialogue 
responses of the two worldviews (the Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous 
worldview) to the philosophies, and then will end with coding of concepts that emerge from the 
three previous analyses. 
Prominent features of the philosophies. 
To begin with, it should be explained why these nine philosophies of mathematics have 
all been categorized as modern-like.  Without exception, they all perceive mathematics as being 
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based upon rationalism, empiricism, and materialism; mathematics is part of reality and it is 
known through logic and rational thinking.  Intuitionism does stand out from the other 
philosophies in this section in that along with this modern-like stance, it also does accept a 
certain level of diversity and ambiguity, letting intuition guide individuals to potentially different 
approaches to and methods for defining the same mathematical ideas and concepts that are never 
considered absolutely true or absolutely false.  For this reason, intuitionism has also been 
classified as postmodern-like; however, the limitations upon its postmodernist characteristics by 
its modernist foundations have resulted in its overall positioning within the modern-like 
classification of the philosophies of mathematics within my research. 
The philosophies of naturalism and logical positivism are directly related to one another 
(as illustrated in Figure 4) because they both strictly hold that mathematical knowledge can never 
be super- or non-natural in origin.  Likewise, both of these philosophies see mathematics as 
being comprised of compartmentalized, abstract and singular truths.  As an offshoot of 
naturalism, logical positivism is more specific about the type of rational thought through which 
mathematical knowledge can be derived, and that is through experimental verification (such as 
mathematical proofs) and not just personal experience.  
Within foundationism, and the six related philosophies of mathematics (structuralism, 
logicism, conventionalism, formalism, constructivism, and intuitionism), the securing of a strong 
foundation upon which all mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing can be built and stored 
is the primary focus.  These philosophies, in general, still seek the rational knowledge favoured 
by naturalism and logical positivism, but they also aim to find an overarching organizing scheme 
upon which all mathematics can be built, housed, and preserved.  
The focus of structuralism is on building mathematical knowledge based upon patterns.  
These patterns must necessarily be mathematical patterns, and not patterns that can be associated 
with trades or other human-dependent activities.  
Logicism, instead, looks to formal logic for the grounding and organization of all 
mathematics.  Logicists seek to logically deduce all mathematical knowledge thereby securing 
the mathematics within the logic used. 
Conventionalism, on the other hand, looks to the language of mathematics, and in 
particular that of linguistic conventions within mathematics for the underlying structure of 
mathematical knowledge.  These linguistic conventions are the way through which the logic and 
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deductive truths of mathematics are disseminated, and thus conventionalists argue that these 
conventions form the backbone of the development and preservation of mathematical 
knowledge.   
The next of the foundationism philosophies, formalism, argues that mathematics has a 
foundation of “axioms, definitions, and theorems” (Hersch, 1997, p. 138), and that these 
foundations are to be used to develop mathematics.  Formalism is perhaps more allusive in its 
securing of mathematics because it seems to permit some sense of ambiguity by not saying what 
the rules are for using the axioms, definitions, and theorems, as well as by saying that the 
mathematics that results is a meaningless combination of symbols until it is applied.  In either 
case, without physical interpretation or application, formalism argues that all mathematics is 
meaningless.   
Constructivism sees the foundation of mathematics to be formal proofs that are used to 
construct new mathematical knowledge.  Only certain kinds of mathematical proofs are accepted 
within constructivism based upon a restricted view of logic.  In particular, indirect  and other 
inductive proofs, are not permitted within constructivism.  The goal of the use of deductive 
proofs in constructing mathematical knowledge is to ensure that the resulting knowledge is 
unquestionable.  Thinking about, hypothesizing about, and even applying mathematical 
knowledge are not part of what is held to be true mathematics by constructivists.  
Finally, intuitionism also argues that mathematical knowledge is constructed knowledge; 
however, intuitionists, such as Brouwer, argue that the foundation of mathematics is not the 
deductive proofs of constructivism; rather, the foundation of mathematics is intuitive 
mathematical knowledge.  Intuitionists argue that mathematics emerges through intuition and 
other informal methods, thereby filling the gaps in the knowledge that already exists.  By arguing 
that mathematical knowledge is personally constructed through intuition, this philosophy also 
contends that there are no absolute mathematical truths or falsehoods, only mathematics that is 
true, false, or neither in relation to the intuition of the person considering the particular 
mathematical notion.  
Thus, although each of the foundationism philosophies seeks to ground mathematics 
within a particular foundation defining the kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing that 
mathematics is based upon, they differ significantly in terms of the kind of foundation chosen 
and the resulting limitations from that foundation choice.  With these understandings of the 
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modern-like philosophies of mathematics, I now turn to the results of using Gadamer’s 
hermeneutic dialogues by considering how the Traditional Western worldview would respond to 
each of them. 
Dialogue with the Traditional Western worldview. 
From the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview, both naturalism and logical 
positivism seem reasonable in their valuing of mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing.  
Grounded within rationalism, and dismissing the super- and non-natural would be seen as the 
best option.  Of these two philosophies of mathematics, logical positivism would be seen as the 
strongest because of its move towards clarification of exactly what kind of rational and logical 
thinking is required. 
In general, the Traditional Western worldview would be in favour of foundationism and 
its related philosophies of mathematics because of their pursuit to define an underlying structure, 
a kind of hierarchy emphasizing the singularity and compartmentalization of mathematical 
knowledge, the “right way” to do and know mathematics.  The response by this worldview to the 
specific foundations, however, needs to be considered in greater detail.  
By eliminating consideration of patterns of design and other human-dependent activities, 
structuralism abstracts mathematics knowledge from the knower, and also defines a hierarchy of 
patterns and their perceived values.  This underlying characteristic of the philosophy of 
structuralism therefore has strong ties to the Traditional Western worldview, both in terms of the 
focus on rational and logical patterns, and in the creating of a hierarchy of value for patterns. 
Similar to structuralism, the Traditional Western worldview would consider the premise 
behind logicism one of value.  By turning to logic, a very specific form of rational thought, and 
insisting on mathematics being grounded within logic and logically determined, logicism is 
valuing precisely a kind of knowledge and way of knowing that is also valued within the 
Traditional Western worldview.  It is possible that someone grounded within the Traditional 
Western worldview might question not considering other forms of rational thought and reasoning 
with respect to mathematical knowledge generation; however, as it is logic being presented the 
“right way” to do mathematics, it is unlikely that this concern would be too loudly expressed. 
Instead, in the spirit of compartmentalization, those grounded within the Traditional Western 
worldview would likely put knowledge gained through other forms of rational thinking into a 
category of its own (not mathematics). 
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How a person grounded within the Traditional Western worldview would respond to the 
mathematical philosophy of conventionalism is an interesting question.  Although the rational 
nature associated with the mathematics knowledge would be appealing to a person grounded 
within the Traditional Western worldview, the association of mathematics with language would 
require deeper reflection.  After all, from the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview, 
language and mathematics should stand apart from each other, two different disciplines, two 
different categories.  Closer inspection of conventionalism, however, reveals that the kind of 
language being centered within this philosophy of mathematics is a very particular kind of 
language, one that communicates mathematical logic and deductive proofs through symbols and 
other linguistic conventions specific to mathematics.  With this specialization of the language 
being considered within the philosophy of conventionalism, all concerns would likely be 
alleviated, and the alignment with the Traditional Western worldview would be very strong.  
From the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview, formalism’s reliance upon 
axioms, definitions, and theorems would be firmly accepted.   Presented as truths, these elements 
of mathematics would be rationally used to develop more mathematical knowledge of value.  
The lack of definite rules for working with the axioms, elements, and theorems, however, would 
be seen as somewhat concerning as would the notion that the abstract symbols and other notation 
is meaningless without a context.  The ultimate conclusion, that without physical interpretation 
all mathematics is meaningless, would actually be of less concern, because within the Traditional 
Western worldview, knowledge is sought for the sake of knowledge only, not necessarily for 
how it might be used or what other roles it might play in the future. 
Constructivism, perhaps more than any of the other modern-like philosophies of 
mathematics, strongly aligns with the Traditional Western worldview.  The focus on formal 
(rational) proofs as the source of new mathematical knowledge in constructivism fits perfectly 
with the Traditional Western worldview’s pursuit of logic-based and rational knowledge. 
Further, the exclusion of indirect proofs, because it is argued that their results remain 
questionable based upon assumptions that must be made, also aligns with the Traditional 
Western worldviews pursuit of absolute truth.  Finally, the separation of mathematical thinking, 
hypothesizing, and applying what is viewed as mathematical knowledge within constructivism, 
confirms the Traditional Western worldview’s categorization and isolation of knowledge, as does 
the defining of a hierarchy of kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing.  
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The last of the foundationism philosophies, intuitionism, poses the greatest challenge to 
the Traditional Western worldview.  The less rigorous, less overtly rational approach to the 
creation of mathematical knowledge (through intuition) would be seen as focusing on knowledge 
that has very little value.  Further, the denial of absolute truth and falsehood in relation to 
mathematical knowledge challenges the Traditional Western worldview’s seeking of singular, 
abstract, and authoritative knowledge.   Only the desire to fill gaps in mathematical knowledge 
within intuitionism would appear rational to a person grounded within the Traditional Western 
worldview, but given how that knowledge is to be created, the same person would not feel that 
this goal could actually be achieved through this philosophy of mathematics.  
Thus, although there is much alignment between the modern-like philosophies of 
mathematics and the Traditional Western worldview, there are also divergences between them.  
As will next be discussed, the relationships between an Indigenous worldview and the modern-
like philosophies of mathematics are also not straightforward. 
Dialogue with an Indigenous worldview. 
From the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, both naturalism and logical positivism 
would seem very limited in the kinds of mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing 
mathematics that are valued.  The outright rejection of the super- and non-natural as sources of 
mathematical knowing runs contrary to an Indigenous worldview’s valuing of spiritual, 
emotional, physical, and intuitional ways of knowing.  Of these two philosophies of 
mathematics, logical positivism would be seen as the furthest removed from the values of an 
Indigenous worldview because of its specificity in relation to the kinds of rational and logical 
thinking that are valued.  However, because an Indigenous worldview values rational and logical 
reasoning as part of the diversity of ways of knowing, it would not entirely reject these 
philosophies; instead, they would be seen as lacking in depth and conceptual value. 
In general, an Indigenous worldview would be cautious in embracing foundationism or 
any of its related philosophies of mathematics because of their seeking to find a single, 
abstracted foundation for mathematical knowledge to be grounded in and built upon.  This 
worldview would question the reasonability of assuming a “one size fits all” approach to 
thinking and doing mathematics as it restricts what is possible within specific contexts and in 
relation to individual people.  With this understanding, however, it is still important to consider 
how an Indigenous worldview would respond to the individual foundations for each of the six 
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philosophies. 
The focus in structuralism on patterns as the foundation for mathematical knowledge 
would at first seem enticing to a person grounded within an Indigenous worldview; however, the 
further requirement that the patterns considered be restricted to rational and logical patterns that 
are not human-dependent (that is, they reside outside of the knower) would call this philosophy 
of mathematics into question.  Within an Indigenous worldview, structuralism would be seen as 
privileging some kinds of knowledge while denying any value to others, and thus it would be 
regarded as having very limited value with respect to knowledge construction and use. 
An Indigenous worldview’s response to logicism would be similar to that of 
structuralism.  Although it would concede that logic may well be one way to obtain mathematical 
knowledge, the notion that it is the only way to do so would seem far too restrictive to a person 
grounded within an Indigenous worldview to be of much value.  The mathematical knowledge 
accepted within logicism would thus be accepted within an Indigenous worldview; however, 
further kinds of mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing would also be sought. 
Alternatively, initially, a person grounded within an Indigenous worldview might be 
pleased to see the fusing of two categories of knowledge, mathematics and language, within the 
philosophy of conventionalism.  Upon digging deeper into what specifically about language this 
philosophy considers to be foundational to mathematics, however, one soon realizes that a 
person grounded within an Indigenous worldview would question the need for the highly 
abstracted symbols and other linguistic conventions that are encouraged within conventionalism.  
Once again, an Indigenous worldview would have space within it for the philosophy of 
conventionalism, but because of the restrictions placed upon the language associated with 
mathematics by this philosophy, the kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing emanating from 
conventionalism would be seen as severely restricted and of limited value.  
From the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, formalism presents many concerning 
limitations upon mathematical knowledge.  The absolute truth and abstractness associated with 
the axioms, definitions, and theorems that are assumed to be the foundation of all mathematical 
knowledge would be very restricting upon the kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing valued 
within formalism.  Likewise, the development of mathematical content knowing that unless it is 
applied the knowledge is meaningless opposes an Indigenous worldview’s pursuit of knowledge 
for a purpose, for a greater good.   
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Likewise, constructivism, when viewed through the lens of an Indigenous worldview, 
would appear overtly constricting.  Although an Indigenous worldview accepts formal proofs as 
a way of knowing, to restrict knowledge construction to only this way of knowing would be seen 
as eliminating the possibility of pursuing and finding knowledges which may be more relevant 
and valuable in certain situations.  The further elimination of indirect proofs only increases the 
degree of limitations that would be seen within this philosophy by a person grounded within an 
Indigenous worldview.  Finally, the isolation of proof from other mathematical endeavours, such 
as hypothesizing and applying, would further restrict the value of constructivism as a philosophy 
of mathematics from the perspective of an Indigenous worldview.  
The last of the foundationism philosophies, intuitionism, is perhaps the most closely 
aligned with an Indigenous worldview.  Intuitionism’s acceptance of intuition, which may be 
rationally based, but need not be, would be viewed by a person grounded within an Indigenous 
worldview as allowing a greater diversity of knowledge and ways of knowing to be considered 
of value.  An person grounded within an Indigenous worldview would have a concern, however, 
with intuitionists’ pursuit of knowledge gap filling if those gaps were not related to knowledge 
that is actually needed.  Seeking knowledge merely for the sake of filling in a gap that one can 
notice is not a valuable reason for seeking knowledge within an Indigenous worldview.  
Thus, from the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, the modern-like philosophies of 
mathematics, although contributing some knowledge of value, would be seen to be mostly 
restricting the creation and sharing of knowledge and ways of knowing of mathematics that are 
of equal value.  With the obvious differences between the two worldview responses to the 
modern-like philosophies of mathematics described, I now move onto the conceptual coding and 
explanation of the codes as found through out the modern-like philosophies of mathematics data 
and the responses from the two worldviews. 
Coding and explanation. 
Within this data set and the results of the dialogues between the two worldviews and the 
modern-like philosophies of mathematics, the concepts seen previously are again present.  Each 
of these concepts is now discussed in relation to the modern-like philosophies of mathematics 
and their analysis thus far. 
Hierarchy as a concept is quite prominent in many of the modern-like philosophies of 
mathematics, with there often being only two levels within the hierarchy: valued and not valued.  
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Within naturalism and logical positivism, hierarchy is present in the valuing of some knowledge 
(rational and logical) and the dismissal of other knowledge (super- and non- natural).  Logical 
positivism takes this hierarchy one step by placing further restrictions upon how the rational and 
logical knowledge must be attained.  
Similarly, all of the foundationism philosophies of mathematics are based on hierarchies 
that assume that mathematical knowledge needs to have a particular foundation to be of value.  
Consequently, any mathematics-related knowledge that does not come from that foundation is 
devalued.  For example, within structuralism, the hierarchy is based upon knowledge of value 
emerging from patterns; however, not all patterns are assigned the same worth.  Rather, material 
patterns are not valued, while nonmaterial patterns that define a mathematical structure are.    
Logicism focuses instead on a hierarchy of logically derived mathematical truths; while 
conventionalism considers the abstract symbolic linguistic conventions to determine the value of 
mathematical knowledge.  For formalists, knowledge of value must come from axioms, proofs, 
and theorems; however, within their hierarchy of knowledge of value, they explicitly state that it 
does not matter how these mathematical concepts are to be used in the construction of the 
knowledge.  Furthermore, formalists do not differentiate between mathematical knowledge that 
is meaningful on its own and mathematical knowledge that is detached from specific meaning.  
The hierarchy present in constructivism, on the other hand, closely relates to that of logical 
positivism, differing only in that it further restricts what ways of knowing are of value (and 
hence what knowledge is generated) to exclude indirect proofs.   
Intuitionism is perhaps the only one of the modern-like philosophies which does not 
emphasize a hierarchy of knowledge because this philosophy views mathematics as being based 
upon one’s personal intuition and does not attempt to determine overall absolute truths.  Thus, 
the only hierarchies that might be present within intuitionism are those placed by individuals 
upon their own personal knowledge. 
Specialization, in particular, specialization in relation to ways of knowing, is also 
commonly present within the modern-like philosophies of mathematics.  Most of the 
philosophies emphasize specialized approaches to the creation of mathematical knowledge, such 
as rational and logical thought, rigor and proofs, linguistic conventions, pattern recognition, and 
knowledge of axioms, definitions, and theorems.  Only intuitionism and formalism might be 
argued to not require specialism because they allow for mathematics to be developed by 
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individuals for individual purposes through methods that they see fit in order to fill gaps within 
mathematical knowledge.  
Abstraction is also very prominent within all of the modern-like philosophies of 
mathematics.  The overt emphasis that is placed on logical and rational thought (naturalism, 
logical positivism, structuralism, logicism, conventionalism, and constructivism), nonmaterial 
patterns (constructionism), linguistic conventions (conventionalism), deductive proofs (logical 
positivism, and logicism), and symbolism (formalism) requires abstract knowledge and ways of 
knowing.  Only within intuitionism does the possibility exist that some less abstract way of 
knowing may enter into the creation of mathematical knowledge; however, the intuition that is 
sought and valued, in and of itself, is very often abstract in nature as well. 
Singularity is also present throughout the philosophies of mathematics, as most, 
excluding again (somewhat) intuitionism and formalism, seek a “right way” for creating and 
using mathematics through the specializations mentioned above.  Singularity is also discernable 
through the emphasis of many of the philosophies on absolute truth (intuitionism and formalism 
again being the exception).  
The concept of isolation = also emerges through the modern-like philosophies of 
mathematics descriptions, but this time most notably through intuitionism and formalism.  In 
intuitionism, the isolation of knowledge occurs because the knowledge is isolated to the knower 
and their intuitions; whereas, in formalism, the isolation of the knowledge emerges from the 
viewing of the abstract symbolism of the mathematics as meaningless and without rules to be 
followed.  By assuming the knowledge to be meaningless combined with no preset rules as to 
how to use the knowledge, all of the knowledge that is created is naturally isolated from the rest.  
Unlike in previous analysis sections, categorization and isolation do not necessarily work 
together within the modern-like philosophies of mathematics.  In fact, other than in 
conventionalism, where two categories of knowledge (mathematics and language) are merged, 
there is no indication of any of the modern-like philosophies of mathematics having a concern 
with categorization of mathematical knowledge beyond knowledge of value and knowledge of 
less or no value.  Once the knowledge is deemed valuable, the philosophies do not appear to 
attempt to further categorize it. 
Relationship and context (story) are most conspicuous in relation to their almost absence 
from the modern-like philosophies.  However, formalism does bring relationship and context into 
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the discussion by positioning mathematical knowledge as meaningless when not being 
practically applied.  Thus, within formalism, mathematical knowledge changes when it is in 
relation to a context.  Likewise, intuitionism’s acknowledgement of “constructively true,” 
“constructively false,” and “neither” also recognizes the role of context in the construction of 
mathematical knowledge.  All of the other modern-like philosophies of mathematics seek 
knowledge in ways that would separate the knowledge from the knower, and thus eliminate the 
need, and even the desire, for mathematical knowledge that is related to context.  
Finally, the concept of power and authority is also embedded within each of the modern-
like philosophies of mathematics. Within most of these philosophies, the power and authority 
assigned to mathematical knowledge is directly connected to the hierarchies of knowledge of 
value that the philosophies embrace.  Alternatively, for formalism and intuitionism, the power 
and authority of the mathematical knowledge is determined by the individual knower within their 
particular contexts. 
Although the contexts through which these concepts have emerged are different from 
those that have been seen in previous analysis sections, the kinds of explanations remain 
consistent, contributing to the saturation of the concepts.  Further, the undeniable links between 
different groupings of these concepts, such as between hierarchy, specialization, singularity, 
(categorization and) isolation, abstraction, and power authority, as well as the conflict that other 
concepts present to these mergers, such as relationship and contexts challenges to those same 
concepts, is indicative of the emergence of a conceptual category. 
Moving on from the modern-like philosophies of mathematics, the next category of 
philosophies will be discussed – the postmodern-like philosophies of mathematics.  All of the 
philosophies of mathematics within this category are fallibilist in nature, that is, they 
acknowledge what they perceive to be the imperfection of mathematical knowledge because of 
its dependence upon human intellect.  The reader will note that these philosophies are provided 
in greater detail then those that came before.  This difference is due to the availability of 
literature on them, and not due to a personal preference.  Whether greater detail is provided in 
the literature because the people following the fallibilist philosophies of mathematics feel a need 
to justify their existence to the absolutists, because it is just the nature of taking a fallibilist 
stance that one feels the need to provided detailed explanations, or for some other reason I have 
not considered, I regardless chose to provide as much detail for all of the philosophies of 
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mathematics that I could within in the literature review. 
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Figure 5: Postmodern-like philosophies of mathematics 
Although not always made explicit in the philosophical theories, or not emphasized to the 
same extent as in the modern-like philosophies, the postmodern-like philosophies of 
mathematics, excluding intuitionism, which has both modern and post-modern characteristics, 
are fallibilist in nature.  As noted earlier, the fallibilists are those who view mathematical 
knowledge as not being indubitable, rather subject to regular revision and correction.  As a result 
of this fallibilist nature, mathematics cannot be categorically divorced from the empirical (and 
hence fallible) knowledge of the physical and other sciences.  Since fallibilism attends to the 
genesis of mathematical knowledge as well as its product, mathematics is seen as embedded in 
history and in human practice.  Therefore mathematics also cannot be divorced from the 
humanities and the social sciences, or from a consideration of human culture in general.  Thus 
from a fallibilist perspective, mathematics is seen as connected with, and indissolubly a part of 
the whole fabric of human knowledge. (Ernest, 1991, p. 26) 
The fallibilist philosophies of mathematics are postmodern-like in that they, in their own 
ways and to their own extent, all accept or tolerate ambiguity, paradoxes, differing approaches 
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and methods, and diversity.  Fallibilism is foundational to all of the postmodern-like 
philosophies of mathematics, including humanism, quasi-empiricism, social constructivism and 
radical constructivism. 
Humanism. 
In defining the humanistic philosophy of mathematics, Hersch (1997) explains: “I use 
‘humanism’ to include all philosophies that see mathematics as a human activity, a product, and 
a characteristic of human culture and society.  I use ‘social conceptualism’ or ‘social-cultural-
historic’ or just ‘social-historic philosophy’ for my specific views” (p. xi).  In humanism, 
“mathematics must be understood as a human activity, a social phenomenon, part of human 
culture, historically evolved, and intelligible only in a social context” (p. xi).  As a result, Hersch 
argues that mathematics has no hidden meaning or existence beyond the use of it within the 
social-cultural-historic setting that the mathematics is situated within, explaining that “A socio-
cultural-historical object exists only in some representation, whether physical (books, computer 
‘memories’, musical scores, and recordings, photographs, drawings) or mental (knowledge or 
consciousness of people) or both” (p. 223).  Humanism views mathematics as a cultural, 
historical, and human activity – a much different stance from those of the absolutists. 
Hersch (1997) further delineates four key features of the humanist philosophy of 
mathematics: 
1. Mathematics is human.  It’s part of and fits into human culture. 
2. Mathematical knowledge isn’t infallible.  Like science, mathematics can advance by 
making mistakes, correcting and recorrecting them.… 
3. There are different versions of proof or rigor, depending on time, place and other 
things… 
4.  Mathematical objects are a distinct variety of social-historic objects. They’re a 
special part of culture.  Literature, religion, and banking are also special parts of culture.  
Each is radically different from the others. (p. 22)  
 
In so defining humanism, the characteristics that make it, at least partially, postmodern are 
readily visible – the accepting of different forms of validation, the fallibility of mathematics, and 
the recognition that mathematics and mathematical objects are socially constructed and 
reconstructed.   
Arising from the basic premises of humanism are three other philosophies of 
mathematics: quasi-empiricism, social constructivism and radical constructivism.  Although the 
names “social constructivism” and “radical constructivism” would seem to relate these two 
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philosophies more to the foundationism philosophy of constructivism, the similarity between 
these two humanistic philosophies and constructivism ends at the agreement upon the view that 
mathematical knowledge is constructed.  Quasi-empiricism, social constructivism, and radical 
constructivism are now re-presented in turn. 
Quasi-empiricism. 
Unlike foundationalists, quasi-empiricists view the seeking of foundations for 
mathematics upon which all other mathematics can be developed as a pointless endeavor. 
Instead, the quasi-empiricists focus their philosophy on the methods of doing mathematics. 
Quasi-empiricism, as a philosophy of mathematics, emerged with the posthumous publishing of 
Irme Lakatos’ final papers.  Key to this philosophy are “three central themes… history, 
methodology and fallibilist epistemology” (Ernest, 1997, p. 116).  Although none of the themes 
are original within the philosophies of mathematics, what is different is that all three are 
considered important within this one philosophy.  
Ernest (1997) identifies Lakatos’ major contribution to the history component of the 
quasi-empirical philosophy of mathematics as “ his detailed case-study-based treatment of … the 
logic of mathematical discovery” (p. 117).  The historical component of Lakatos’ work explains 
the general cycle of methodology (the second theme) through which mathematics is developed, 
contested, and adapted:  
[it is] a cyclic process in which a conjecture and an informal proof are put forward (in 
the context of a problem and an assumed informal theory).  In reply, an informal 
refutation of the conjecture and/or proof are given.  Given some work on the topic, this 
leads to an improved conjecture and/or proof with a possible change of the assumed 
problem and informal theory. (p. 118) 
 
Lakatos (1976) contended that “[foundationism] disconnects the history of mathematics from the 
philosophy of mathematics” in an attempt to ignore the uncertainty of mathematics, the existence 
of informal mathematics, and the reality of growth in mathematical knowledge.  Thus, for quasi-
empiricists, following Lakatos’ lead, history plays a major role within their philosophy of 
mathematics as does defining the methodology of developing, accepting, rejecting, and adapting 
mathematical knowledge. 
The third theme within quasi-empiricism, that of mathematics being fallibilist, or as 
Ernest (1997) writes “radical fallibilist” (p. 119), focuses on the necessity of informal 
mathematical theories when working with and on formal proofs.  As fallibilists also argue, quasi-
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empiricists hold that no mathematical knowledge or object is definitively true; all mathematical 
knowledge is continuously subject to the possibility of revision or rejection.  
Quasi-empiricists differ from other fallibilists in that within their mathematical methods, 
counter-examples as well as proofs are sought:  
Proof explains counter-examples, counter examples undermine proof … Each step of 
the proof is subject to criticism, which may be mere skepticism or may be a counter-
example to a particular argument.  Lakatos calls a counter example that challenges one 
step in the argument a ‘local counter-example’; one that violates the conclusion itself, 
he calls a ‘global counter-example.’ (Hersch, 1997, pp. 211-212) 
Quasi-empiricists actively seek both local and global counter-examples for new and old 
mathematical knowledge with the goal of expanding and continuously editing or rewriting that 
knowledge. 
Social constructivism. 
In social constructivism, mathematics is viewed as being constructed within social 
contexts and through social processes, and “is largely an elaboration and synthesis of pre-
existing views of mathematics, notably those of conventionalism and quasi-empiricism” (Ernest, 
1991, p. 42).  In particular, social constructivists agree with conventionalists “that human 
language, rules and agreement play a key role in establishing and justifying the truths of 
mathematics” p. (42), with much emphasis being placed upon the role and use of language in the 
construction of mathematics.  Social constructivists also support Lakatos’ quasi-empirical 
approach to the methodology of mathematics in that “mathematical knowledge grows through 
conjectures and refutations, utilizing a logic of mathematical discovery” (p. 42).  
Ernest (1991), a proponent of social constructivism, explains that it “is a descriptive as 
opposed to a prescriptive philosophy of mathematics, aiming to account for the nature of 
mathematics understood broadly as in the adequacy criteria” (p. 42).  Ernest also defends the use 
of the word ‘social’ in the naming of this philosophy in three ways:  
(i) The basis of mathematical knowledge is linguistic knowledge, conventions and rules, 
and language is a social construction. 
(ii) Interpersonal social processes are required to turn an individual’s subjective 
mathematical knowledge, after publication, into accepted objective mathematical 
knowledge 
(iii) Objectivity itself [can] be understood to be social. (p. 42) 
It is to the third of the above defenses that social constructivists give the most attention.  Social 
constructivists consider new mathematical knowledge, the creation of an individual, as 
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subjective.  Once that new knowledge has been shared publicly (through publication or 
presentation to mathematician peers) and has withstood or been corrected by the social critiques 
involved in these processes, social constructivists say that the knowledge is then objective 
knowledge.  Both subjective and objective knowledge, as defined above, are accepted as 
mathematical knowledge by social constructivists and are the basis of a cycle of mathematical 
development and revision:  
new mathematical knowledge is from subjective knowledge (the personal creation of an 
individual) via publication to objective knowledge (by intersubjective scrutiny, 
reformulation and acceptance).  Using this knowledge, individuals create and publish 
new objective knowledge of mathematics, (Ernest, 1991, p. 43) 
and thus the cycle continues with the creation and recreation of both objective and subjective 
knowledge.   
In the critique process of the subjective knowledge, in its transition towards objectivity, 
social constructivists follow the cycle of mathematical verification as defined by Lakatos in 
quasi-empiricism.  Of course, social constructivism adds to this cycle that the criteria for 
refutation depends “to a large extent on shared mathematical knowledge, but ultimately they rest 
on common knowledge of language, that is, on linguistic conventions [the conventionalist view] 
of the basis of knowledge” (Ernest, 1991, p. 43).  Using the same definition and reasoning as 
above, social constructivists also hold that the linguistic conventions are objective because they 
are socially accepted.  The objectivity of the criteria for refutation strengthens the argument for 
the objectivity of published mathematical knowledge. 
Radical constructivism. 
In radical constructivism, as described by von Glasersfeld, knowledge is said to be 
constructed by individuals as a result of their repeated experiences and that it cannot be 
determined if that knowledge is representative of an outside “real” world.  In fact, “[von 
Glasersfeld] develops the provocative … proposition that all we can ever know about the real 
world is what the world is not” (Watzlawick, 1984, p. 14).  Thus, for radical constructivists, it is 
only when the result of applying one’s knowledge leads to negative or contradictory results that 
you can be sure of whether your knowledge is a reflection of the real world, and at that point you 
know for sure is that the real world is not how you thought it was.  The radical constructivist 
believes the “real world” exists, but that is also unknowable.  As a result, for a radical 
constructivist, it makes no sense to talk about the existence of any particular part of the “real 
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world.” 
In addition, radical constructivists hold that knowledge is not “discovered” but 
“constructed.”  “Radical constructivism, thus, is radical because it breaks with convention and 
develops a theory of knowledge in which knowledge does not reflect an ‘objective’ ontological 
reality, but exclusively an ordering and organization of a world constituted by our experience” 
(von Glasersfeld, 1984, p. 24).  The result of this stance on knowledge is that coming to know 
mathematics does not result from passive receipt – rather it is created through active processes of 
the learning subject. 
Radical constructivism also holds that the active construction of knowledge by a person 
not only takes place within one’s experiences of the world, but that it is done so consciously to 
meet particular goals of that person: “The products of conscious cognitive activity, therefore, 
always have a purpose” (von Glasersfeld, 1984, p. 24).  As to the question of whether the 
knowledge constructed is “good knowledge,” radical constructivists do not attempt to develop a 
detailed process through which the “subjective” knowledge of the individual can become 
“objective” knowledge of the individual or a group.  Instead, the test for what is good knowledge 
is how well that knowledge fits, or is viable for use, in a new experience.  Radical constructivism 
is based upon the idea “that knowledge is good knowledge if and when it solves our problems” 
(von Glasersfeld, 1991b, p. 8). 
Reflective of both Piaget’s developmental theory, and Darwin’s evolutionary theory, 
radical constructivism looks at the construction of knowledge by humans as the same in principle 
to that of all organisms: “Organisms live in a world of constraints.  In order to survive, they must 
be ‘adapted’ or, as I prefer to say, ‘viable.’  This means that they must be able to manage their 
living within the constraints of the world in which they live” (von Glasersfeld, 1991b, p. 11).  
The knowledge of the subject must ‘fit’ with their new experiences.   
The substitution of the concept of fit (and its dynamic corollary, viability) for the 
traditional concept of truth as matching, isomorphic, or iconic representation of reality, 
is the central feature of the theory of knowledge I have called radical constructivism. 
(von Glasersfeld, 1991c, p. 64)   
Thus, radical constructivism is focused on the applicability of mathematical knowledge rather 
than the absolute truth of knowledge. 
Radical constructivists also hold that the processes of adaptation and assimilation are 
central to the construction of knowledge.  Von Glasersfeld, via Piaget’s developmental theory, 
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posits that in the construction of knowledge, the cognizing subject seeks cognitive equilibrium 
(which is never actually reached):  
by assimilating the signals he is actually coordinating at a given moment (or stage) to 
the structures he has formed in the past; and he also works towards it by 
accommodating the already formed structures, whenever the signals with which he is 
operating cannot be fitted into one of the available structures as they are. (von 
Glasersfeld, 1991d, p. 85) 
Thus, radical constructivism also views the construction of new mathematics as dynamically 
involved with previous mathematical knowledge. 
Further, von Glasersfeld stipulates that radical constructivists are interested only in 
rational knowledge, although he does not dismiss what he terms “mystic knowledge” in general.  
In placing this limitation on the knowledge of interest for radical contsructivists, von Glasersfeld 
also turns to Manturana’s description of the scientific method for direction in how the creation of 
such rational knowledge occurs, and that as a result: “once [a] belief has been established, there 
is powerful resistance against any suggestion of change” and a kind of “scientific tunnel vision” 
(von Glasersfeld, 1991e, p. 127).  Along this same line, von Glasersfeld stresses that  
having constructed a viable path of action, a viable solution to an experiential problem, 
or a viable interpretation of a piece of language, there is never any reason to believe that 
this construction is the only one possible, (von Glasersfeld, 1991b, pp.12-13) 
thereby emphasizing the fallibility of knowledge accepted within the radical constructivist 
philosophy. In fact, radical constructivism, itself,  
does not claim to be anything but a model, that is, a construct whose value depends 
exclusively on its viability.  In other words, it will sink or swim according to whether it 
manages to establish and maintain equilibrium in the sphere of rational cognition. (von 
Glasersfeld, 1991a, p. 98) 
This stance towards mathematical knowledge is significantly at odds with those of the previously 
discussed philosophies of mathematics, which emphasized the absolute truth of mathematical 
knowledge or the fortification of mathematical knowledge, or both.  Radical constructivists do 
not seek to strengthen known mathematics; rather, they aim to evaluate it for its usefulness in an 
ongoing and case-by-case fashion. 
Analysis of the Postmodern-like Philosophies of Mathematics 
With the above understanding of the postmodern-like philosophies of mathematics 
(humanism, quasi-empiricism, social constructivism, and radical constructivism), I will next 
proceed to the analysis of them.  This analysis will again first discuss the prominent features of 
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these philosophies, followed by a discussion of the responses of the two worldviews (the 
Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous worldview) to the philosophies, and then will 
end with the coding and discussion of concepts that emerge from the data and the three previous 
forms of analysis of it.  
Prominent features of the philosophies. 
Within the postmodern-like philosophies, the most prominent feature relates to how 
mathematical knowledge is seen as fallible, and therefore it is granted only limited power and 
authority.  How the postmodern-like philosophies regard and respond to this fallibility (and thus 
what power and authority they attribute to the mathematical knowledge) is how the philosophies 
are most easily distinguished. 
Humanism, and all of the postmodern-like philosophies begin from the stance that 
mathematical knowledge is the product of human activity.  As such humanism views 
mathematics as a social and historically defined knowledge set that only makes sense within 
related contexts; beyond those historically defined social context, the mathematics does not exist 
or have any significant meaning.  Humanism is postmodern-like because of its attributing of 
meaning and value of knowledge to time and place, as well as in its acceptance of different ways 
of knowing based upon those same conditions.  
Quasi-empiricists argue that the humanists’ mathematics, which is informal mathematical 
knowledge, can then be developed into formal mathematical knowledge.  Specifically, quasi-
empiricists actively engage in trying to provide examples of the fallibility of the informal 
mathematics by seeking counter-examples to it.  Thus, within this philosophy, mathematical 
knowledge is put through a rigorous and cyclical process of conjecture and refutation.  The 
conjectures are described as being proven through the use of informal mathematical knowledge, 
which itself is also caught in this cyclical process of scrutiny.  Thus, quasi-empiricism 
acknowledges that mathematical knowledge can never be an absolute truth.   
Within social constructivism, the social nature and components of the development of 
mathematical knowledge are the central focus within the cycle of conjecture and refutation of 
quasi-empiricism.  Subjective and objective knowledge, which also play an important role within 
social constructivism, are defined quite differently from other uses of the words.  Specifically, 
mathematical knowledge is deemed subjective knowledge when it is the knowledge of the person 
who created it.  However, through the cycle of conjecture of refutation, and ultimately the social 
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review, sharing, and publication, this subjective mathematical knowledge is said to become 
objective knowledge (accepted, until refuted, within the broader society).  Through these 
processes, linguistic conventions are strictly adhered too, and those conventions are themselves 
considered objective knowledge, making the objective knowledge emerging from the 
conventions stronger. 
Finally, radical constructivism emphasizes that mathematical knowledge, which is the 
product of an individuals repeated experiences, can not be claimed to be representative of the 
world of the knower.  Instead, radical constructivism argues that the only thing that one can 
know about the real world is what it is not.  Like quasi-empiricism and social constructivism, 
radical constructivism values a process of conjecture and refutation, but this time refutation 
comes through demonstrations of the knowledge not being viable within a particular context (any 
context).  Thus, radical constructivism demonstrates a shift in philosophical thinking from the 
absolute truth of mathematical knowledge is to the viability of it.  Radical constructivists do not 
argue that any particular mathematical knowledge is always true, rather that in particular cases it 
has proven to be viable.  Thus, within this philosophy, mathematical knowledge is viewed as a 
model that can be tried within different situations, but it is also a model that is not guaranteed to 
work.  
All of the fallibilist (postmodern-like) philosophies of mathematics focus on logical and 
rational knowledge and construction of knowledge.  However, radical constructivism does 
acknowledge that “mystic knowledge” may exist, but such knowledge is not included within its 
consideration of mathematical knowledge and its viability.  
Thus, although each of the postmodern-like philosophies of mathematics acknowledge 
the fallibility of mathematical knowledge, the reason why fallibility is attributed to the 
knowledge, and how that fallibility is responded to differs across the four philosophies 
(humanism, quasi-empiricism, social constructivism, and radical constructivism).   With these 
understandings of the postmodern-like philosophies of mathematics, I now turn to the results of 
hermeneutically (grounded in Gadamer’s theory) considering how the Traditional Western 
worldview would respond to each of them.  
Dialogue with the Traditional Western worldview. 
In general, the Traditional Western worldview would unequivocally reject all of the 
postmodern-like philosophies of mathematics on the basis that they are proposing the 
  
 199 
development and pursuit of knowledge that may (or even can) never be proven absolutely true.  
A person grounded within the Traditional Western worldview would appraise such knowledge as 
trivial and the pursuit of it pointless.  
Specific to humanism, the Traditional Western worldview would also have difficulty 
accepting that mathematical knowledge is dependent upon social and historical conditions, as the 
social and the historical should sit outside of both each other and the mathematical.  
Furthermore, the restriction of such knowledge to contexts that are in relation to the social and 
historical conditions would be viewed as even more interfering in the determining of abstract 
knowledge of value.  
At first glance, quasi-empiricism might be seen within the Traditional Western 
worldview as correcting the errors within humanism by proposing that the informal knowledge 
of humanism could be turned into formal mathematical knowledge.  However, the dependence 
upon a cyclical process, for which there is no end, and thus no absolute conclusion once again 
throws this philosophy out of alignment with the Traditional Western worldview.  This 
divergence between the worldview and the philosophy of mathematics then becomes a 
dichotomy, when the way that the informal knowledge moves to formal knowledge is described 
as being through contradiction rather than logical or rational proof and reasoning. 
The issues that the Traditional Western worldview has with quasi-empiricism are 
somewhat compounded by the introduction of yet another layer of societal interference in the 
determination and validation of mathematical knowledge.  However, a person grounded within 
the Traditional Western worldview would recognize some value in how social empiricism 
depends upon the specialization and knowledgeable authority of others.  In order to move 
mathematical knowledge forward from the subjective (and thus inferior, from the perspective of 
the Traditional Western worldview) to objective, social constructivism requires the input of 
others who are recognized for their expertise in the particular mathematical area being explored, 
and thus it is acknowledging that some people have more authority in determining the “right” 
knowledge than others do. 
Radical constructivism is possibly the furthest removed of the four postmodern-like 
philosophies of mathematics from the Traditional Western worldview in that it seeks viability 
and usability over abstraction and truth.  The variability of mathematical truths across different 
contexts of use would seem absurd to a person grounded within the Traditional Western 
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worldview because it does not provide a definitive answer, way of knowing, or even kind of 
knowledge that can be named as mathematics. 
Thus there is far more divergence and disparity between the postmodern-like 
philosophies of mathematics and the Traditional Western worldview than has been noted with 
respect to any of the other philosophies that have been discussed.  With this in mind, the 
relationships between an Indigenous worldview and the postmodern-like philosophies of 
mathematics will next be considered. 
Dialogue with an Indigenous worldview. 
Contrary to the Traditional Western worldview, an Indigenous worldview would be very 
accepting of the postmodern-like philosophies of mathematics stance that mathematical 
knowledge can never be proven or assumed to be absolutely true.  A person grounded within an 
Indigenous worldview would agree with knowledge needing to be flexible and uncertain in order 
to be of value in all contexts. 
The acknowledgement by humanism that mathematical knowledge is the product of 
human activity could both be accepted and questioned within an Indigenous worldview.  
Although a person grounded within an Indigenous worldview would be pleased to see that 
knowledge is being associated to human activity, the limited kinds of human activity, to that of 
rational thought would be seen as reducing the valuableness of the knowledge overall.  Within 
humanism, there is no consideration given to emotional, physical, intellectual, experiential, or 
intuitional knowledge, nor to knowledge that is not for just the sake of human needs.  An 
Indigenous worldview would, however, value how the philosophy of humanism attributes 
meaning and value to mathematical knowledge according to the context in which it is 
constructed and used. 
As quasi-empiricism attempts to further formalize, even abstract, mathematical 
knowledge through the cyclical process of conjectures and refutations, an Indigenous worldview 
would also recognize limitations within this philosophy of mathematics knowledge pursuits.  
Instead of emphasizing the diversity of knowledge and ways of knowing that a person grounded 
within an Indigenous worldview would seek, that person would find that quasi-empiricism is 
actually attempting to narrow the diversity, to abstract its conclusions away from the specific 
context (by using contexts do dispute it).  Since within an Indigenous worldview, knowledge is 
sought for the purposes of usability and giving back, spending time trying to refine and dispute 
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knowledge when there is no obvious need other than the generation of more abstracted 
knowledge would likely be seen as time wasted.  Thus, while the mathematical knowledge of 
quasi-empiricists would not be totally rejected within an Indigenous worldview, the overall value 
of this knowledge would be seen as narrow and lacking in overall significance to life. 
The importance of social contributions to knowledge, and the social construction of 
knowledge within the philosophy of social constructivism, would alternatively be well received 
by an Indigenous worldview.  Such recognition and seeking of social inputs to knowledge 
construction would be seen as an opening up to diverse ways of knowing and considerations.  
However, this same opening is narrowed substantially by the restriction placed upon the social 
membership, namely those perceived to have rational authority in relation to the area of 
mathematics being considered, thus again decreasing the value of this kind of knowledge 
(without eliminating it) within an Indigenous worldview.  
The last of the postmodern-like philosophies of mathematics, radical constructivism, does 
make a strong tie to an Indigenous worldview in its argument that mathematical knowledge 
comes from an individual’s experiences.  Within an Indigenous worldview, the knowledge and 
experiences of an individual are greatly valued for the understandings that they contribute to the 
whole and to the particular situation.  However, a person grounded within an Indigenous 
worldview would take exception to the notion that one can never really know the world, or 
something within the world.  Instead, they would argue that an individual can have such 
knowledge, as it is the knowledge that they have.  Moreover, that knowledge is not only based in 
logic and rationalism, but in other ways of knowing (such as emotional, physical, spiritual, 
cultural, and intuitional), which radical constructivism does not consider to be valid sources of 
mathematical knowledge.  Alternatively, from the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, the 
valuing of knowledge for its viability within specific contexts within radical constructivism 
would be seen as appropriate.   
Thus, from the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, the four postmodern-like 
philosophies of mathematics (humanism, quasi-empiricism, social constructivism, and radical 
constructivism) do hold some notions about mathematical knowledge and its construction that 
align well with the worldview.  However, there are also many features to these philosophies 
which a person grounded within an Indigenous worldview would find very limiting, and thus 
would result in knowledge that is seen as not as valuable as it could have been.  
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Interestingly, both the Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous worldview have 
more points of concern than alignment with any of the four postmodern-like philosophies of 
mathematics.  With the understanding of these concerns and differences between the two 
worldviews and their responses to humanism, quasi-empiricism, social constructivism, and 
radical constructivism, I now move onto grounded theory’s conceptual coding and explanation of 
those codes as they appear within this section of the data and the analyses of it so far.  
Coding and explanation. 
A very significant concept that emerges from the data and preliminary analysis of the 
postmodern-like philosophies of mathematics (humanism, quasi-empiricism, social 
constructivism, and radical constructivism) is undoubtedly the underlying notion of authority and 
power, and the tension that these philosophies have with the Traditional Western worldview 
around this concept.  Since all four of these philosophies of mathematics are based upon an 
assumption of a fallibilistic nature of mathematical knowledge, they also all challenge any prior 
notions of mathematical knowledge carrying absolute authority and power.  Although quasi-
empiricism, social constructivism, and radical constructivism do propose a cyclical process 
through which the authority or power of mathematical knowledge might be strengthened, the 
three philosophies still maintain that the achievement of unconditional abstract truth can never be 
attained, and therefore, unquestionable authority and power can never be assigned to 
mathematical knowledge.   
Despite the denial of absolute truth as well as authority and power, however, humanism, 
quasi-empiricism, social constructivism, and radical constructivism do still emphasize a 
hierarchy of knowledge.  Humanism’s presumed hierarchy is based upon its emphasis on rational 
and logic-based knowledge over other knowledges, and quasi-empiricism further delineates this 
hierarchy by putting more worth upon certain ways of knowing, and upon the knowledge 
progressing through the cyclical process of conjecture and refutation.  The more cycles that a 
conjecture withstands through the process, the more valuable that knowledge is perceived to be, 
and the higher it’s standing within the hierarchy of mathematical knowledge that it will be.  
Social constructivism, on the other hand, creates a hierarchy of what it defines as subjective 
(individual) and objective (societally approved) knowledge.  Finally, radical constructivism 
places mathematical knowledge within a hierarchy of viability; the more useful a piece of 
mathematical knowledge shows itself to be, the more valuable it is perceived to be. 
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Specialization, on the other hand, only plays an explicit role within one of the four 
postmodern-like philosophies of mathematics, social constructivism.  In the transitioning of the 
subjective knowledge of the individual to the societally approved objective knowledge, social 
constructivism turns to the part of the society that is comprised of individuals with specialized 
knowledge in relation to the mathematical knowledge proposed.  Thus, the subjective knowledge 
is not assessed for it’s potential or value by just anyone; instead, it is assessed by those who have 
been deemed (or possibly who have deemed themselves) as specialists capable of making these 
decisions. 
Singularity, in fact the lack of singularity, within mathematical knowledge is also 
emphasized in all four of the postmodern-like philosophies of mathematics.  This lack of a “right 
way” of knowing or doing mathematics is directly connected to the assumption of the fallibility 
of mathematical knowledge that is central to humanism, quasi-empiricism, social constructivism, 
and radical constructivism.  
Categorization and isolation of knowledge also plays a less significant role within the 
four postmodern-like philosophies of mathematics, although it is still somewhat present.  In 
quasi-empiricism mathematical knowledge is loosely categorized into “informal” and “formal” 
knowledge, dependent upon where in the cycle of conjecture and refutation the knowledge 
currently resides.  Thus, the categorization of mathematical knowledge within quasi-empiricism 
can change depending upon the context and what has occurred previously.  A similar form of 
categorization and isolation is also present within the philosophy of social constructivism.  In 
this case, the categories are labeled “subjective” and “objective” knowledge; however, the 
premise is still the same – how a particular piece of knowledge is categorized depends where 
within the cycle of conjecture and refutation the knowledge is.  Of course, how the change from 
one category to the other is different between the two philosophies; however, the kind of 
categorization and changes within categorizations are very similar.  Also different from the 
categorization and isolation concept as it has appeared before is that, because of the assumption 
of the fallibility of mathematical knowledge, any piece of mathematical knowledge can be 
moved from one category to no category at all because it has been demonstrated to be incorrect. 
Within radical constructivism, there are again two categories, viable or not viable.  Being 
not viable ultimately equates with being shown incorrect within the philosophies of quasi-
empiricism and social constructivism, so from that perspective, one might argue that radical 
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constructivism does not categorize mathematical knowledge at all, just as humanism does not. 
Something is either mathematical knowledge or it’s not considered within the philosophy. 
Abstraction as a concept also appears differently within humanism, quasi-empiricism, 
social constructivism, and radical constructivism.  Although the assumption of the role of logical 
and rational knowledge and ways of knowing within the construction of potential mathematical 
knowledge is present in all four philosophies, none of them assume the possibility of creating 
mathematical knowledge that is abstract from the contexts in which it is constructed and applied. 
This lack of abstraction is most notable within radical constructivism where the value of 
mathematical knowledge is directly associated with its viability in specific contexts and under 
specific conditions.  There is no attempt within this philosophy of mathematics to seek or make 
claims to mathematical knowledge that can be applied to any situation, only to eliminate those 
that are not viable in particular situations.  
Finally, the concept of relationships and context are also present throughout the four 
postmodern-like philosophies of mathematics.  In quasi-empiricism and social constructivism, 
the relationship between conjectures and example, and the relationship between the individual 
and others in terms of knowledge production and valuing are central.  Furthermore, radical 
constructivism places great importance upon the context in which particular mathematical 
knowledge is developed and in which it can be applied successfully. 
Thus, the analysis of humanism, quasi-empiricism, social constructivism, and radical 
constructivism has again highlighted the same concepts that emerge from the analysis of my 
story as well as the analysis of the other philosophies of mathematics.  During this particular part 
of the analysis so far, some new explanations and understandings of some of the concepts, such 
as for singularity and abstraction, have been provided.  However, these new additions do not 
contradict previous understandings, rather they broaden, in the sense of the Gadamerian horizons 
of understandings, what is understood about those concepts. 
Although with the presentation and analysis of the postmodern-like philosophies of 
mathematics, all of the (so far) identified philosophies of mathematics within the literature have 
been considered, there are two more views about mathematics and its origins that are worth 
considering: Lakoff and Núñez’ (2000) embodied mathematics and Bishop’s (1991) 
mathematical enculturation.  These two notions explore what is going on beneath the surface of 
mathematical knowledge production – how the brain conceives of mathematics (Lakoff and 
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Núñez) and what the ideals and values of mathematics are.   Each of these ways of thinking 
about mathematics will next be presented, with each, in turn, undergoing the same analysis for 
prominent features, relationships to the two worldviews (the Traditional Western and an 
Indigenous) and the coding and explanation of concepts emerging from the literature presented 
and the other analyses of it.  I begin by considering embodied mathematics. 
  
 
Figure 6: Lakoff and Núñez’s Embodied Mathematics 
Although conceived of as a cognitive learning theory, the work of Lakoff and Núñez 
(2000) and their study of the embodiment of mathematics through metaphors results in a 
completely different philosophy of mathematics that contradicts both the absolutist and fallibilist 
philosophies previously described. In Where Mathematics Comes From, the two researchers first 
report on a mythology, an almost romantic view of mathematics, that they encountered 
repeatedly in their research.  In particular, they found that it was commonly held that: 
Mathematics is abstract and disembodied – yet it is real. 
Mathematics has an objective existence, providing structure to this universe and any 
possible universe, independent of and transcending the existence of human beings or 
any beings at all. 
Human mathematics is just a part of abstract, transcendent mathematics. Hence, 
mathematical proof allows us to discover transcendent truths of the universe. 
Mathematics is part of the physical universe and provides rational structure to it. 
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There are Fibonacci series in flowers, logarithmic spirals in snails, fractals in 
mountain ranges, parabolas in home runs and π in the spherical shape of stars and 
planets and bubbles. 
Mathematics even characterizes logic, and hence structures reason itself – any form 
of reason by any possible being. 
To learn mathematics is therefore to learn the language of nature, a mode of thought 
that would have to be shared by any highly intelligent beings anywhere in the 
universe. 
Because mathematics is disembodied and reason is a form of mathematical logic, 
reason itself is disembodied. Hence, machines can, in principle, think. (p. xv) 
 
It should be noted that most of these characteristics, excluding possibly only that of 
disembodiment of reason, can be easily tied to one or more of the previously discussed 
philosophies of mathematics.   
At the same time that they collected these myths, the two researchers “discovered that a 
great many of the most fundamental mathematical ideas are inherently metaphorical in nature”, 
such as “The number line where numbers are conceptualized metaphorically as points on a line” 
(p. xvi).  Along with these findings, Lakoff and Núñez (2000) considered recent research which 
had demonstrated that babies have inherent mathematical understandings, such as being able to 
distinguish between collections of two or three objects (including sounds) and knowing 1 + 1 = 2 
and 2 – 1 = 1.  Moreover, this knowledge was related to number (quantity) and not to any 
particular objects.  Within just a few months, infants mathematical knowledge continues to 
expand to larger quantities (without intentional outside interference).  By seven months, the 
infants are able to recognize if different collections of objects (or sounds) have the same quantity 
of elements. 
As other mathematical abilities, such as subitizing (the recognition of “how much” at a 
glance), were being recognized within babies, infants, and young children, Lakoff and Núñez, 
like other researchers and authors (e.g., Butterworth), concluded that the human brain is wired 
for learning and doing mathematics.  However, Lakoff and Núñez went further, tapping into 
cognitive science research and the use of metaphors, where metaphor is “not a matter of words, 
but of conceptual structure”.  As one of many examples they provide for a conceptual structure 
metaphor, ‘affection’ “is conceptualized in terms of warmth and disaffection in terms of cold” 
(2000, 41).  This conceptualization creates a metaphor of the concept of affection, going well 
beyond a strict dictionary definition, and which is useful in interpreting and understanding how 
individuals understand the concept.   
  
 207 
In the same way, Lakoff and Núñez (2000) have considered the question of what 
metaphors, if any, are foundational to the understanding of mathematics, and how those 
metaphors interact with each other as further mathematical knowledge is gained.  Part of the 
metaphor building process is called coflation: 
the simultaneous activation of two distinct areas of our brains, each concerned with 
distinct aspects of our experience, like the physical experience of warmth and the 
emotional experience of affection.  In a coflation, the two kinds of experience occur 
inseparable.  The coactivation of two or more parts of the brain generates a single 
complex experience … It is via such coflations that neural links across domains are 
developed – links that often result in conceptual metaphor, in which one domain is 
conceptualized in terms of the other. (p. 42) 
By linking physical and cognitive experiences, coflation results in embodied metaphors. 
Conceptual metaphors are made up of “a unidirectional mapping from entities in one conceptual 
domain to corresponding entities in another conceptual domain” (Lakoff and Núñez, 2000, p. 
42).  Thus, conceptual metaphors are seen to be part of the system of how we think, allowing us 
to “reason about relatively abstract domains using the inferential structure of relatively concrete” 
(p. 42) metaphors.  Moreover, what is created are “metaphorical mappings [that] are systematic 
and not arbitrary” (p. 41).  Lakoff and Núñez used these notions of metaphors, coflation, 
conceptual metaphors, and metaphorical mappings to try to understand mathematical knowledge 
and its creation. 
An example of a common conceptual metaphor that Lakoff and Núñez describe as being 
part of mathematical knowledge is the container metaphor: “Categories are Containers, through 
which we understand a category as being a bounded region in space and members of the category 
as being objects inside that bounded region” (Lakoff, & Núñez, 2000, p. 43).  The two 
researchers go on to say that the container metaphor explains why “the Venn diagrams of 
Boolean logic look so natural to us” (p. 45).   
In addition, Lakoff and Núñez (2000) argue “that the ‘abstract’ of higher mathematics is 
a consequence of the systematic layering of metaphor upon metaphor, often over the course of 
centuries” (p. 47), resulting in a conceptual blend of metaphors for two distinct cognitive 
structures, such as when the properties of a circle are combined with the properties of the 
coordinate plane.  If a metaphor is created to signify this conceptual blend, Lakoff and Núñez 
call the metaphor a metaphor blend.  
In Where Mathematics Comes From, Lakoff and Núñez (2000) begin with metaphors for 
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basic mathematical understandings and arithmetic, blending the resulting cognitive structures 
with further metaphors ,and ultimately working towards creating an understanding of 
mathematics as embodied knowledge.  This view of mathematics is the foundation for what I 
term their philosophy of mathematics. 
Contrary to the absolutist philosophies discussed previously, the philosophy of embodied 
mathematics holds that “mathematics, as we know it or can know it, exists by virtue of the 
embodied mind” (Lakoff and Núñez, 2000, p. 364).  Moreover, the philosophy of embodied 
mathematics holds that all mathematics (known and not yet known) comes to being through 
“embodied mathematical ideas” (p. 364) of which many are “metaphorical in nature” (p. 346).  
In so positioning the origins of mathematical knowledge, Lakoff and Núñez step out of the 
philosophical arguments over whether mathematics is real-worldly or not and position 
mathematics as something internal to the human mind.  
In response to the fallibilist philosophies, the philosophy of embodied mathematics 
argues that because mathematics is embodied.  It “uses general mechanisms of embodied 
cognition and is grounded in experience in the world” (Lakoff and Núñez, 2000, p. 365), and as a 
consequence is not arbitrary.  This conclusion results in the philosophy of embodied mathematics 
viewing mathematical knowledge as not purely subjective, not only the result of social 
agreement and not just dependent on history and culture. 
The philosophy of embodied mathematics also addresses what mathematical objects are – 
embodied concepts – whether or not mathematical truths exist.  In reference to truth, Lakoff and 
Núñez (2000) posit: “A mathematical statement can be true only if the way we understand that 
statement fits the way we understand the subject matter and what the statement is about. 
Conceptual metaphors often enter into those understandings” (p. 366).  It is in this comment, that 
although they are arguing for different processes for the construction of knowledge than those 
proposed by radical constructivists, one can see that this philosophy of mathematics also looks 
for knowledge that fits, and one could argue is viable; in attempting to confirm the “good” of the 
knowledge. 
Embodied mathematics, as a philosophy, is neither modern nor postmodern.  Moreover, it 
has characteristics that are both absolutist and fallibilist, making it an outlier, yet a player 
amongst, all of the other philosophies of mathematics. 
Analysis of Lakoff and Núñez’s Embodied Mathematics 
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Based on the above understanding of Lakoff and Núñez’ (2000) cognitive theory of 
embodied mathematics, I will next proceed to my analysis of it.  This analysis will again first 
discuss the prominent features of embodied mathematics, followed by a discussion of the 
responses of the Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous worldview to the theory, and 
finally will end with the coding and discussion of concepts that emerge from the above 
explanation of the theory and the other three analyses of it already done. 
Prominent features of embodied mathematics. 
Possibly most importantly, it should be noted how Lakoff and Núñez’ (2000) theory of 
embodied mathematics, unlike the previously discussed philosophies of mathematics, is neither 
absolutist nor fallibilist in nature, that is it neither claims that mathematical knowledge is 
absolute, nor does it claim that it is fallible.  Instead, this theory claims that mathematics 
knowledge just is, and that it is a metaphoric construction within the human mind.  Without the 
human mind, mathematics does not exist, and because of the human mind it does.  
The theory of embodied mathematics is also neither modern nor postmodern in nature.  
Although it does focus on rational reasoning and empiricism, the way in which mathematical 
knowledge is constructed according to Lakoff and Núñez (2000) is neither measurable nor really 
reproducible.  Likewise, ambiguity, paradox, disorder, and diversity are not desirable in the 
metaphorical knowledge of embodied mathematics, rather the continual formation and 
reformation of metaphors and metaphorical networks aims to eliminate such issues as they 
appear. 
Thus, Lakoff and Núñez (2000) address what mathematical objects are as embodied 
concepts without worrying about their truth, falsehood, or indeterminateness.  Instead, what is of 
importance within their theory is that mathematical knowledge is based upon metaphors of 
understanding, and that these metaphors are themselves absolute and abstract from a particular 
context.  However, each of these metaphors is in fact influenced by all contexts in which the 
mathematics is seen, thought of, or applied.  The construction of mathematical metaphors within 
one’s mind is thus a pursuit of best fit and ultimately viability.  The metaphorical mathematical 
knowledge is thus not judged on its truth, but on how “good” it is within all contexts under 
consideration.  As more and more contexts are considered, and modifications are made to the 
network of metaphors defining the mathematical knowledge, the “goodness” of the knowledge 
increases.  
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Overall, Lakoff and Núñez’ (2000) theory of embodied mathematics not only does not 
align with absolutism, falibilism, modernism, or postmodernism – it considers mathematics from 
a very different perspective than that of the various philosophies of mathematics previously 
discussed and analyzed.  Rather than trying to define what kinds of knowledge are valued in 
mathematics and what processes that a person needs to apply to obtain mathematical knowledge, 
embodied mathematics considers what mathematical knowledge looks like within the human 
mind and in particular how the mathematical knowledge is housed therein.  With these 
understandings of the theory of embodied mathematics, I now turn to the results of 
hermeneutically (according to Gadamer’s theory) considering how the Traditional Western 
worldview would respond to it.  
Dialogue with the Traditional Western worldview. 
When viewed through the lens of the Traditional Western worldview, the theory of 
embodied mathematics is, as has been seen many times before, somewhat murky.  Although 
Lakoff and Núñez (2000) do restrict their focus to rational and abstract mathematical knowledge, 
which is strongly valued within the Traditional Western worldview, the possibility of emotional, 
spiritual, experiential, intuitional, or physical knowledge also contributing to mathematical 
knowledge cannot be discounted outright.  For example, if one considers non-mathematical 
examples that Lakoff and Núñez provide (such as the metaphors of warmth and affection) such 
other knowledges are not completely disregarded in their theorizing about the embodiment of 
mathematics.  Further, there is some valuing of experiences as informants to the construction of 
and relationships between mathematical metaphors, which would not be viewed as a reliable 
source within the Traditional Western worldview. 
In addition, Lakoff and Núñez’ (2000) embodied mathematics relies deeply upon the 
establishment of not only metaphorical relationships, but inter- and intra- metaphorical 
relationships as well.  Therefore, the mathematical knowledge becomes so interconnected that 
complete isolation and categorization, or even the establishment of hierarchies of knowledge, 
would be next to impossible.  This too would be challenged by a person grounded within the 
Traditional Western worldview. 
Thus, a person grounded within the Traditional Western Worldview is very likely to view 
the pursuit of describing mathematical knowledge as metaphors unnecessary and whimsical 
dalliances, best saved for non-mathematicians to engage with if they so desire, but not to be held 
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of importance in general terms.  With these understandings of the relationships between 
embodied mathematics and the Traditional Western worldview, the relationships between an 
Indigenous worldview and theory of embodied mathematics will be considered next. 
Dialogue with an Indigenous worldview. 
From the perspective of an Indigenous Worldview, the exclusion of a discussion of 
alternate ways of knowing in favour of rational and logic-based approaches within the embodied 
mathematics philosophy would be seen as very limiting on the knowledge that one could attain 
mathematically.  As well, the focus on creating the knowledge metaphors appears to be on the 
grounds that it can be done and not based on a need for it being done, which would also limit the 
value of it within an Indigenous Worldview.  Further, although an Indigenous worldview would 
appreciate the emphasis on the relationships described and understood between different 
metaphors and metaphor networks, the use of abstract mathematical symbols to represent the 
knowledge contained within the metaphors would likely be viewed as making the knowledge 
restrictive.  An Indigenous Worldview would, however, value the inter-relationships emphasized 
within Lakoff and Núñez’s embodied mathematics and the recognition of the possibility of 
diversity in knowledge configurations between individuals’ metaphor constructions.   
In general, a person grounded within an Indigenous Worldview may view this philosophy 
of mathematics in much the same way as that of a person grounded within the Traditional 
Western Worldview – too focused on flights of fancy, but this time this view would be the result 
of the philosophy being too restrictive in terms of the kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing 
instead of too open, with too little concern for knowledge of value.  Thus, embodied mathematics 
would be accepted as one possibility within an Indigenous worldview, but it would also be 
recognized as being knowledge that has limited value. 
Thus, Lakoff and Núñez’s (2000) theory of embodied mathematics does not have strong 
alignment with either the Traditional Western worldview or an Indigenous worldview.  With this 
understanding, I now turn to the final analysis of this theory, that of the identification of 
significant concepts emerging from the theory and its analysis so far and an explanation of how 
those concepts apply. 
Coding and explanation. 
Within Lakoff and Núñez’s (2000) embodied mathematics, there is no real emphasis 
placed upon a hierarchy of knowledge.  It is true that within the metaphorical descriptions of 
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different mathematics knowledges, metaphors may connect in a hierarchical fashion, requiring 
other metaphors in order to define a new one; however, there is no sense of one metaphor being 
perceived as having greater value than another as was prominent in both my story and many of 
the philosophies of mathematics.  Likewise, specialization is not even considered within this 
theory, other than to note that as people embody more mathematics, their conceptual metaphors 
become more specialized in their intent and purposes.   
Embodied mathematics does bring some notion to the singularity of mathematical 
knowledge, as it is through specific relationships between specific metaphors that new 
mathematical ideas emerge.  Although Lakoff and Núñez (2000) never directly say that there is a 
“right way” in which these metaphors are defined and connected within our brain, their 
presentation of only one possibility in their discussion of the metaphor networks for different 
mathematical knowledges would seem to indicate that such an assumption would not be 
incorrect. 
Categorization occurs within the theory of embodied mathematics through the grouping 
of metaphors into conceptual metaphors by Lakoff and Núñez (2000).  In their theory, the two 
researchers specifically target particular mathematical knowledge, isolated (at least at first) from 
other mathematical knowledge to be described through metaphors and the relationships between 
them.  As they progress with the construction of the conceptual metaphor, other metaphors (and 
hence mathematical knowledge) are brought in, but, only insofar as it is necessary for the 
development of the conceptual metaphor.  No attempt is made to further establish relationships 
between conceptual metaphors or to create broader categories of knowledge if not absolutely 
necessary.  In many ways, Lakoff and Núñez stick to the same categorization of mathematical 
ideas that is present within my story and through the various philosophies of mathematics. 
Relationships, on the other hand, are a major concept within the theory of embodied 
mathematics; all knowledge is created by and related to metaphors.  Thus, within embodied 
mathematics, mathematical knowledge is the result of relationships between metaphors and how 
those metaphors relate to one’s experiences.  Furthermore, the emphasis on personal experiences 
also emphasizes the importance of contexts within the creation of the mathematical metaphors.  
This connection, however, soon becomes irrelevant to the metaphor, which then stands apart 
from any specific examples.  At that point, the metaphor becomes an abstract representation of 
how the specific contexts impacted a person’s mathematical knowledge, but the contexts are no 
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longer retained. 
 The theme of authority and power is also present in Lakoff and Núñez’s (2000) embodied 
mathematics, but in a different way from the philosophies of mathematics discussed so far.  In 
embodied mathematics, authority and power is present within the individual, and not over other 
individuals or their knowledge, as each person constructs their metaphorical mathematical 
knowledge.   
Overall then, the theory of embodied mathematics yet again brings forward the same 
concepts that have been seen throughout my research so far.  Moreover, the interconnectedness 
of the various concepts, and how the presence or absence of one impacts others, is also evident, 
leading to further saturation of the individually coded concepts, while continuing to support an 
emerging axial coding of a conceptual category.  
There now remains only one more piece of data to be introduced in relation to the 
philosophies of mathematics – Bishop’s (1991) notion of mathematical enculturation.  Bishop 
describes mathematical enculturation in terms of what he believes to be the values and ideals of 
Western mathematics.  Inclusion of this data and its subsequent analysis should prove beneficial 
to broadening my (and the reader’s) understanding of the kinds of knowledge and ways of 
knowing that are valued within mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics. 
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Figure 7: Bishop’s Mathematical Enculturation 
This final section in the re-presentation of the philosophies of mathematics, is, again, not 
on a philosophy of mathematics, but is a discussion of (Western) mathematics as a cultural 
product.  This discussion comes from the work of Alan Bishop (1991) as provided in the book 
Mathematical Enculturation, in which Bishop recognizes that “mathematics is a pan-cultural 
phenomenon: i.e. it exists in all cultures” (p. 19), while also acknowledging that it recognizing 
that it could look differently amongst different cultures.  Thus, in order to differentiate Western 
(abstract) mathematics (his primary focus) from other mathematics, Bishop refers to Western 
mathematics “as ‘Mathematics’ with a capital ‘M’” (p. 19).  
Of significance to this discussion is Bishop’s (1991) presentation of the values of what he 
terms Mathematical culture.  In particular, Bishop identifies “six different sets of ideals and 
values… in complementary pairs” (p. 61) that define Mathematical culture.  These values are 
what Bishop holds to be “the principal values associated with Mathematics” (p. 62) in which 
students (and people in general) need to be enculturated.  Each of these three pairings are now 
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briefly discussed.  
Rationalism and Objectism 
The first of the pairings are the values of rationalism and objectism, both of which 
constitute the ideology of the Mathematics culture.  Bishop (1991) defines rationalizing as “to 
seek to forge a logical connection between two ideas which may hitherto have been either 
unconnected or connected by incongruity” (pp. 63-64), and that it is only Mathematical 
explanations and arguments, not the world or people, which are rational.  Within the rationalism 
of Mathematics, Bishop notes that although science and Mathematics were at one time concerned 
with explaining, Mathematics has moved away from empirical validation and is “concerned with 
‘internal’ criteria of logic, completeness, and consistency” (p. 62).  As a result, Mathematics is 
dependent upon deductive reasoning as the only means for “achieving explanations and 
conclusions” (p. 62).   
When discussing rationalism, Bishop argues that it “has guaranteed the power and 
authority of Mathematics (and the ideal of Mathematicians)” (p. 62).  Along with the ideological 
value of rationalism, Bishop also highlights its aesthetic nature “where the ‘loose ends are tied 
up’, where ‘fuzziness’ and imprecision are replaced by clarity and certainty, where greyness and 
shadowy half-truths are illuminated by the bright light of reason” (p. 64).  For Bishop, 
“explanations are about abstractions, and these are the life-blood of Mathematics, as in proof, the 
pure form of Mathematical explanation” (64) making rationalism the heart of Mathematics.  As a 
result, Bishop concludes: “Without understanding [rationalism], the language and symbols of 
Mathematics will be as meaningless to our children as are those of an alien culture” (p. 65). 
The second value in this pairing Bishop (1991) calls objectism “in [an attempt] to 
characterize a world-view dominated by images of material objects” (p. 65).  Like the value of 
rationalism, objectism is also bound to abstraction and removal of the personal being “based on 
inanimate objects and not on animate phenomena… Mathematics favours an objective, rather 
than a subjective, view of reality” (p. 66).  Despite the efforts of rationalism to divorce 
Mathematics from the world and remain within the realm of ideas, those ideas themselves 
“originate in our interaction with the environment … it is material objects which provide the 
intuitive and imaginative bases for these ideas” (p. 66).  Mathematics is, and relates to an, 
“objectivised reality” (p. 66).  Thus, “the logical nature of Mathematics is complemented by its 
analogical side – its imagery – which is clearly rooted in society’s world-view and in 
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environmental interaction.  The imagery is object-oriented and materialistic, and can be a force 
for good or for evil in society, depending on one’s view.  Given the significance of objectism in 
Mathematics, in relation to Mathematics education, Bishop argues that “as well as encouraging 
children to develop their ability to abstract [rationalism], we need also to encourage them in 
ways of concretising and objectivising abstract ideas” (p. 67).   
Control and Progress. 
Bishop’s (1991) second pair of complementary values for Mathematics is control and 
progress, and are concerned with feelings and attitudes, or the sentimental component of 
Mathematical culture.  The value of control is seen in the “quest for knowledge, and explanations 
of natural phenomena,… a desire to predict” (p. 70), and the ability to predict is a powerful tool 
in maintaining control.  Such control gives humans “a sort of security within our ever-changing 
world” (p. 70).  As materialism became a driving force in the eighteenth century, there was 
development in “the understanding that Mathematics can explain any aspect of the natural or 
man-made environment, but there was also the growing desire to do this” (p. 70).  Bishop 
continues:  
it is interesting to see how we are not attempting to explain and control our 
(unknowable?) social environment through the development of social science.  The 
procedure is to try to understand human and social phenomena in Mathematical terms, 
in order to find rationally acceptable explanations of those phenomena and to help us 
end social ‘problems’.  (p. 70) 
Thus, through the sciences, Mathematics attempts to control the situations and objects in our 
lives.  Bishop also discusses how the “’facts’ and algorithms of familiar Mathematics can offer 
feelings of security and control which are hard to resist” (p. 71), and how the solving of a 
complicated problem using those facts and algorithms can “kindle a glow of satisfaction and 
aesthetic pleasure” (p. 71).  The feeling of control through Mathematics soon spreads to the rest 
of society as it informs technological developments and other progress.  Bishop even argues: “As 
one progresses in Mathematics, the objects, the symbols, the rules become so familiar that they 
take on a certain kind of friendliness” (p. 71).  
Complementary to the value of control within Mathematical culture, is the value of 
progress.  “Progress represents a more dynamic feeling than [control]” (Bishop, 1991, p. 72).  
Bishop describes the value of progress as having “the feelings of growth, of development, of 
progress, and of change, and the first point of importance about this value is that the unknown 
  
 217 
can be known” (p. 72).  Growth in knowledge is an aim of Mathematics, and thus it supports the 
value of progress Bishop proposes.  Because such growth has been continuously achieved, it “is 
therefore felt to be continually achievable” (p. 72), which also results in a greater sense of 
control.  
Bishop (1991) also explains how, when control is disrupted, such as when students 
encounter fractions or integers, and past knowledge (e.g., adding increases the quantity) is 
challenged, progress can then occur as the students learn that “because this is Mathematics, all 
this seeming chaos will be organized, structured, and thus explained, in such a way that the 
knowledge will once again offer security” (pp. 72-73).  Bishop calls such an example one of 
personal progress.  
Bishop (1991) then relates that progress can also be collective, such as when geometries 
other than Euclidean were proposed and validated.  In this way, progress in Mathematical culture 
is about “alternativism – the recognition and valuing of alternatives” (p. 73).  Bishop argues that 
today the embracing of alternativism is  
very strong – definitions, procedures, algorithms, axioms, proofs, are all capable of rich 
variation, and the exploration of alternatives is a powerful source of new research.  In 
‘Western’ society generally the spirit of alternativism seems to be alive and well, with 
alternate economies developing, alternative religions being studied and alternative 
lifestyles being pursued. (p. 73) 
Desiring to emphasize that Mathematics is not value-free, Bishop also provides examples of how 
progress can in fact be detrimental if left unchecked: dissatisfaction with the amount of control 
one has over what is done in the environment, creation of unneeded technologies which results in 
the creation of an artificial need for them, and the creation of greater problems as a result of 
progress in the solution of a different problem.  In this regard, Bishop ponders: “I wonder 
whether these values still have the emotional power to offer us an appropriate balance” (p. 75) – 
it is a problem that he leaves for education and educators to contend with. 
 
 
Openness and Mystery 
The final pair of values, openness and mystery, that Bishop (1991) discusses represent 
the sociological values of Mathematical culture.  By openness, Bishop is referring to “the fact 
that Mathematical truths, propositions and ideas generally, are open to examination by all” (p. 
  
 218 
75).  In this way, “Mathematical principles, then are truths, as we like to think of them, namely 
open and secure knowledge.  They don’t go out of date, they don’t depend on one’s political 
party, they don’t vary from country to country, they are universal and they are ‘pure; knowledge” 
(p. 75).  As a warning however, Bishop comments that “it is important for this ‘purity’ that 
Mathematics is not about concrete, tangible objects… It is about abstractions which concern 
those tangible objects” (p. 75).  Mathematics is thus depersonalized and in writing about their 
Mathematical findings, Mathematicians “conceal any sin that the author or the intended reader is 
a human being” (p. 75).   
Mathematical openness also refers to Mathematical knowledge being available for 
“anybody to ‘own’” (Bishop, 1991, p. 75).  Moreover, Bishop argues: “you can convince 
yourself that any Mathematical principle is true, nobody has to persuade you – ‘the facts speak 
for themselves’.  Provided that you perform the correct procedures, and keep to the rules, logic 
will do the rest” (p. 76).  This openness, Bishop contends, “reinforces and stimulates feelings of 
democracy and liberation within our societies and our social institutions” (p. 76) as within 
Mathematical knowledge:  
one is not a prisoner to tyrannical control, not forever at the mercy of gods who must be 
appeased, nor is one bound to certain people in authority.  With rationalism as an 
ideology and progress as the goal, individuals are liberated to question, to create 
alternatives and to seek rational solutions to their life’s problems. (p. 76) 
Thus, Mathematical knowledge is not only open within itself, but also can open the outside 
reality of individuals by providing them freedom and security. 
Reflecting upon Mathematical culture, Bishop (1991) notes: “one of the paradoxes of 
Mathematics is that even though Mathematical culture brings with it the values of ‘openness’ and 
accessibility, people still feel very mystified about just what Mathematics is” (p. 78).  For this 
reason, mystery is the last of the values of Mathematical culture that Bishop presents.  This sense 
of mystery is not only felt by “the people-in-the-street” (p. 78), but by Mathematicians as well.  
In fact, Bishop claims that the mystery of Mathematics also includes a sense of mystery about 
Mathematicians, noting that often “we actually know some of their Mathematical products and 
‘objects’ better” (p. 78) than we know the people who created them.  This side of the mystery 
value within Mathematical culture is a natural consequence of the dehumanizing nature of both 
values of rationalism and openness.   
Reflecting upon the history of Mathematics, Bishop (1991) notes that starting with the 
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early Greeks, “‘Abstraction’ was necessary for the cultivation of Mathematics and … it also 
served to keep the Mathematicians abstract, remote, and exclusive”, (p. 79).  Further, the abstract 
objects of mathematics have no meaning for most people, although “professional 
Mathematicians who work with completely abstract phenomena as if they were objects will 
argue that these objects do have plenty of meaning for them” (p. 81).  In relation to mystery as a 
value of mathematics then, Bishop contends: “‘What is real?’ … is destined to remain forever a 
mystery” (p. 81). 
Analysis of Bishop’s Mathematical Enculturation 
Based on the above understandings of Bishop’s (1991) value pairs related to 
Mathematical enculturation, I will next proceed to my analysis of it.  This analysis will again 
first discuss the prominent features of the value pairs, followed by a discussion of the responses 
of the Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous worldview to them, and then will end 
with the coding and discussion of concepts that emerge from the above explanation of Bishop’s 
Mathematical enculturation and the other three analyses of it already done. 
Prominent features of mathematical enculturation. 
As in the postmodern-like philosophies of mathematics (humanism, quasi-empiricism, 
social constructivism, and radical constructivism), Bishop (1991) views mathematics as a human, 
even cultural, product and endeavor.  Further, Bishop recognizes the potential for different 
mathematics and mathematical representations to exist within different cultural settings, and so 
to emphasize the mathematics he is focusing on in his discussions (and which he is most familiar 
with), Bishop chooses to refer to this mathematics (the mathematics of the Western society) with 
a capital M (Mathematics).  
Bishop (1991) then delineates what he describes as the three pairs of values that 
determine what the nature of Mathematics is and how people engaging in Mathematics should 
understand it: rationalism and objectism (forming the ideology of Mathematics culture), control 
and progress (forming the sentimentality of Mathematics culture), and openness and mystery 
(forming the sociology of Mathematics culture).  Each pairing of values represents a 
dichotomizing, yet intertwined perspective of aspects of Mathematics from Bishop’s perspective.  
When speaking of rationalism, Bishop (1991) is referring to the attempt within 
Mathematics to make logical connections between ideas, which focuses on the internal nature of 
Mathematical understanding.  The objectisim of Mathematics is conversely the externalization of 
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the knowledge into abstract constructs and representations.  These two values, as is true within 
all the pairings, both need to exist in Mathematics, each supporting each other as they alternate in 
positioning themselves on centre stage. 
Control and progress, take on a different perspective towards Mathematics, that being 
that they are concerned with feelings and attitudes in relation to Mathematics.  Bishop (1991) 
uses the term “control” to explain how Mathematics is used to try to control the world around us, 
to explain and predict phenomena in order to be able to control them.  Progress, on the other 
hand, is found in the dynamics of Mathematics, and Bishop uses the term to describe how one 
should seek to grow and change one’s Mathematical knowledge.  By engaging in Mathematical 
progress, more Mathematical control can be sought and maintained, and progress emerges when 
control is interrupted.  Bishop also argues that progress is grounded within the recognition and 
valuing of alternative strategies and knowledges. 
The final of Bishop’s (1991) three value pairings foundational to Mathematics cultural is 
that of openness and mystery.  Bishop uses openness to describe how Mathematical knowledge 
is open to anyone who wishes to pursue it.  In addition, openness also refers to the security of 
Mathematical knowledge, that is, the consistency and dependability of the Mathematical 
knowledge.  The mystery of Mathematical knowledge, on the other hand, is something which 
Bishop states is not sensed by everyone; however, non-Mathematicians do hold a sense of 
mystery in relation to Mathematicians, with Mathematicians rarely being associated in the 
general public with the Mathematics they have created and work with.  Mathematicians, on the 
other hand, sense an additional kind of mystery in relation to Mathematics, that of what 
Mathematics might yet be created and how.  Mathematical objects are often a source of mystery 
for both Mathematicians and non-Mathematicians alike.  
Bishop (1991) introduced these valuing pairs in order to describe what people should 
know and understand about Mathematics as a discipline and subject area.  In all instances, 
Bishop argues for balancing of emphasis within each of the pairings, rather than the disconnect 
and imbalance that he has often noticed during his time spent in engaging with others in 
Mathematics and discussions of Mathematics.  With these understandings of Bishop’s three pairs 
of values of Mathematics, and the roles they play in the creation, use and, learning of 
Mathematics, I now turn to the results of hermeneutically considering how the Traditional 
Western worldview would respond to Bishop’s thoughts. 
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Dialogue with the Traditional Western worldview.  
From the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview, although perhaps not 
Bishop’s (1991) message, the identification and focus upon Western mathematics, and further 
the labeling of such mathematics as Mathematics, would be seen as valuable and desirable.  Such 
a focus and granting of privilege to Western mathematics, which is already treated with respect 
and authority, aligns perfectly with the Traditional Western worldview’s identification and 
valuing of the “right” knowledge. 
In terms of Bishop’s (1991) pairing of rationalism and objectism as the ideological values 
of mathematics, the Traditional Western worldview would question the need to build 
connections between Mathematical ideas in order to focus on the internal nature of Mathematics; 
since, the isolation of knowledge and not relationships between knowledges is an emphasis 
within this worldview.  The Traditional Western worldview, however, would respond positively 
to Bishop’s proposed objectism value because it focuses on the abstraction of Mathematical 
knowledge, a major goal within the worldview. 
In the case of the pairing of control and progress, however, a person grounded within the 
Traditional Western worldview would commend both values.  Control, as Bishop (1991) defines 
it, is about the authority and power of Mathematical knowledge, which aligns well with the 
Traditional Western worldview.  Alternatively, Bishop’s referral to progress aligns with the 
Traditional Western worldview’s seeking of knowledge for the purpose of the knowledge itself.  
If that knowledge then leads to further control, a person grounded within the Traditional Western 
worldview would find even more reason to support these two values.  Interestingly, however, the 
association of this pair of values with the sentimentality of Mathematics would not be well 
received from the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview, as it would imply that 
consideration should be given to an emotional, possibly even spiritual, nature of Mathematics.  
This is a nature that a person grounded within the Traditional Western worldview would, at best, 
choose to ignore because it would be seen as being of no value. 
Finally, from the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview, Bishop’s (1991) final 
values pair, that of openness and mystery, would be viewed as simultaneously appealing and 
objectionable.  The security that Bishop’s value of openness affords Mathematical knowledge 
would be seen to ensure the maintaining of the singularity and absolute truth that the Traditional 
Western worldview seeks.  Moreover, the mystery that Bishop identifies as being afforded to 
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Mathematicians and their work would also appeal to a person grounded within the Traditional 
Western worldview since it emphasizes the notion of Mathematical knowledge being 
hierarchical in nature, with increasing levels of complexity, and thus resulting in a hierarchy of 
specialization and specialists as well.  Some people can become those specialists, while others 
cannot.   
Conversely, a person grounded within the Traditional Western worldview would reject 
the notion that because of value of openness anyone can do Mathematics, for if this was true, 
then there would be no need to value specialization and specialists.  In addition, such a person 
would also not accept that parts of Mathematics are a mystery in that no one knows how to create 
them, or even recognizes that they are possible.  While it is true that the Traditional Western 
worldview seeks knowledge for the sake of knowledge, it also assumes that it is possible to 
create or obtain all rational knowledge – none of it can, or would, remain hidden forever. 
Thus, as seen in so many other analyses done thus far in my research from the 
perspective of the Traditional Western worldview, Bishop’s (1991) values of Mathematical 
enculturation have both points of alignment and disagreement.  With this in mind, I next discuss 
how Bishop’s values of Mathematical enculturation would be (hermeneutically) supported or 
questioned within an Indigenous worldview. 
Dialogue with an Indigenous worldview. 
Probably the aspect of most importance with respect to how Bishop’s (1991) ideas about 
Mathematical enculturation from the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, is how, by 
renaming Western mathematics, the mathematics that Bishop is focusing upon, as Mathematics, 
he is giving power and authority to that Mathematics over any other mathematics.  This is done 
through the process of capitalization of the name, which changes it from noun to proper noun.  
From the perspective of an Indigenous worldview this is perhaps the first time that it could not 
accept, with or without reservations, any of the ideas about mathematics and the teaching and 
learning of mathematics that have been discussed this far.  In so renaming mathematics, Bishop 
has in fact replaced everything that may have been considered mathematics (from any 
perspective) by a definitive subset of it, usurping all else in favour of itself.  The only possible 
way for a person grounded within an Indigenous worldview to be able to accept this re-
designation of Western mathematics to Mathematics would be to create a new category of 
knowledge that can accommodate all that Mathematics does not, but in creating a category of 
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knowledge, this person would also be challenging their own worldview. 
Moving beyond this label and onto the values of rationalism and objectism, a person 
grounded within an Indigenous worldview would find merit in attempting to find relationships 
between ideas, however, the insistence upon seeking logical connections only, would be viewed 
as very limiting of what is possible.  Further seeking to externalize and abstract Mathematical 
knowledge would de-emphasize the importance of context and relationships, which are 
significant within an Indigenous worldview. 
In terms of the values of control and progress, the divide between Bishop’s (1991) values 
and an Indigenous worldview again widens, as an Indigenous worldview seeks to work in 
relationships with the world, not to exert power and authority over it.  Moreover, an Indigenous 
worldview does not seek knowledge just to move knowledge forward, but because the 
knowledge being pursued is for the purpose of doing good for others as well as oneself, for 
contributing to community, family, and the cosmos.  Thus, although it would not reject 
knowledge that is focused on control or progress only, an Indigenous worldview would find very 
little value in having only these goals for knowledge creation and sharing.   
Finally, when Bishop’s (1991) values of openness and mystery are considered through 
the lens of an Indigenous worldview, slightly more alignment appears.  First, an Indigenous 
worldview values knowledge that is to be open to, and hopefully useful, for everyone regardless 
of who they are.  As well, an Indigenous worldview would appreciate the acceptance of mystery, 
a kind of spirituality, within Mathematical knowledge.  Further, this mystery might also relate to 
other ways of knowing, such as emotionally, physically, culturally, and intuitionally.  In fact, the 
only real concern that a person grounded within an Indigenous worldview might have regarding 
these two values is that Bishop’s notion of mystery could easily be tied to specialization and 
hierarchical viewing of Mathematical knowledge, both of which do not strongly align with an 
Indigenous worldview.  
Thus, like so many times before with the philosophies of mathematics, Bishop’s (1991) 
values of Mathematical enculturation do not overall strongly align with either the Traditional 
Western worldview or an Indigenous worldview.  And so, I now turn to the final part of this 
analysis, that of the identification of significant concepts emerging from Bishop’s values of 
Mathematical enculturation and the analysis of them so far, as well as providing an explanation 
of how those concepts apply to the ideas that Bishop has revealed. 
  
 224 
Coding and explanation. 
Yet again, the same concepts as previously identified and explained apply to Bishop’s 
(1991) values of Mathematical enculturation.  The only exception to this claim is that of 
context/story which could be assumed to play various roles within the value pairings, but which 
need not necessarily be present in order for Bishop’s work to remain clearly defined. 
The concept of hierarchy can be seen within Bishop’s openness and mystery values.  The 
first of these values, openness, challenges the notion of hierarchical knowledge by saying that 
Mathematical knowledge is available to everyone, while mystery acknowledges the hierarchical 
nature of Mathematical knowledge and the hierarchy of specialization between Mathematicians 
and non-Mathematicians, as well as between Mathematicians themselves. 
The concept of the singularity of mathematical knowledge first emerges when Bishop 
claims the name Mathematics for Western mathematics alone.  In so doing, he is, intentionally or 
not, moving Western mathematics to the top of a mathematical hierarchy, and is thus making 
Mathematical knowledge “the right”, and therefore singular, knowledge.  Singularity is also 
reinforced through the value pairs simply through the absence of the valuing of alternative 
approaches and the assigning of authority to those who have the specialized Mathematical 
knowledge.  
Categorization and isolation are not as easily identified within Bishop’s (1991) values of 
Mathematical enculturation, but are both present when Bishop shifts the view of his values from 
all of mathematics to specifically Mathematics.  Each of the value pairs also define different 
categories of Mathematical knowledge: connected and abstracted (rationalism and objectism 
respectively), authoritative and dynamic (control and progress respectively), and accessible and 
restricted (openness and mystery respectively).  
Relationship as a concept is actually a main foundation of Bishop’s (1991) values of 
Mathematical enculturation, as he argues for a balanced relationship within each pairing in terms 
of how people view mathematics and how students learn about mathematics.  Each of the pairs 
of values are also at once dichotomized and in relationship with each other, bringing a sense of 
complexity to the concept of relationship.  
Abstraction is also present within Bishop’s discussions of the values that he attributes to 
Mathematical enculturation.  Most directly, abstraction is central to the value of objectism, but it 
is also through abstraction that both control and progress are obtained.  Moreover, it is the 
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abstraction of knowledge that Bishop argues makes Mathematical knowledge most accessible to 
everyone, and that often results in the mystery of mathematics as well.  Like the concept of 
relationship then, abstraction as a concept is also being presented as a complex entity. 
Finally, power and authority as a concept appears throughout Bishop’s (1991) values of 
Mathematical enculturation.  The capitalization of mathematics to represent Western 
mathematics clearly designates a power and authority to Western mathematics that is not 
attributed to other forms of mathematics.  Further, the pairs of control and progress are 
inherently based upon the power and authority that Mathematical knowledge can exert on our 
lives.  Even the values of openness and mystery link to the concept of power and authority, as 
openness is the value of Mathematical enculturation that gives everyone access to the power and 
authority of Mathematical knowledge; while mystery stands in the way of many individuals 
having access to the power and authority that Mathematical knowledge can afford to them.  
Within Bishop’s (1991) description of Mathematical enculturation, almost all of the 
previously identified concepts are again present, and even the absence of context (story) within 
this particular set of data does not eliminate it as a concept of importance within my research, 
rather it suggests that context may be an even more significant concept because of its overt 
inclusion and then exclusion from different data sets.  Furthermore, there are again instances in 
which relationships between the various concepts suggest the formation of a broader conceptual 
category through which to reflect upon the data and to inform potential theory related to my 
research question. 
Final Reflections On the Philosophies of Mathematics, Embodied Mathematics, and 
Mathematical Enculturation 
Overall, my (Gadamerian) hermeneutic consideration and analysis of data related to the 
philosophies of mathematics and the related notions of embodied mathematics (Lakoff and 
Núñez, 2000) and Mathematical enculturation (Bishop, 1991) have produced similar results as 
did the analysis of my story.  Throughout this section of my research, the philosophies of 
mathematics, as well as embodied mathematics and Mathematical enculturation, have produced 
various relationships with the Traditional Western worldview.  At times, strong ties have been 
made with this worldview; however, more frequently the Traditional Western worldview has 
rejected foundational aspects of these ways of thinking about mathematics and mathematical 
knowledge.  On the other hand, while not outright rejecting what is being proposed about 
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mathematical knowledge and the teaching and learning of mathematics, an Indigenous 
worldview has been found to frequently devalue what is being proposed because it restricts the 
kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing to an extreme.  
With respect to the grounded theory analysis of the philosophies of mathematics, 
embodied mathematics, and Mathematical enculturation, there has been a continuation and 
expansion of the understandings of the concepts that were identified in my initial analyses of my 
story.  On a few occasions, particular concepts did not appear within a particular part of the 
analysis of this second data set; however, there was no consistency in terms of which concepts 
were not present.  Moreover, when the concepts did not appear, it most often spoke to a 
broadening of the horizon of understanding of the concept that has been emerging throughout the 
course of all of the analyses.  Overall, the continued repetition of both the concepts and 
continuing confirmation of their meaning is pointing towards their saturation.  
In addition, as mentioned throughout most of the coding and explaining of the concepts, 
the individual concepts regularly inform the understanding and even existence of other concepts.  
Through these mergings and influences, the explanations of the concepts have been suggesting 
the emergence of a single conceptual category that speaks to and about what mathematics and 
the teaching of learning mathematics are, involve, and could be.   
With the conclusion of my presentation and analysis of data related to how people view 
and think about what mathematics is (the philosophies of mathematics), I now return to the next 
area of interest that arose for me out of my telling and analysis of my story – how it is believed 
that mathematics should be taught and learned.  In particular, I next visit the math wars, through 
which the dichotomized views of mathematics teaching and learning are realized.  
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The Math Wars 
Having explored in depth the notion of what people think mathematics is, I am now going 
to consider the second area of interest that, through grounded theory, emerged as important to me 
through my analysis of the story.  This time, I am focusing on what people believe about the 
teaching and learning of mathematics – how it should be taught and why.  For decades now, 
North America (and elsewhere) have been officially embroiled in the so-called “math wars,” 
which are the consequence of different thinking about the teaching and learning of mathematics. 
Thus, I present as my next set of data (to be analyzed after) an examination of where the math 
wars originated and how they relate to the teaching and learning of mathematics.  
The great variety of philosophies of mathematics previously discussed (as well as 
embodied mathematics and Mathematical enculturation), each valuing different kinds of 
mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing, clearly indicate that mathematics has never been 
a singular or universal entity in society (or between societies), although aspects of it have been 
proclaimed to be so.  There have always been disagreements about what mathematics is, why we 
have mathematics, and how mathematics should be done and taught, and periodically different 
factions of thinking about these ideas would set forth their arguments against what others said 
and believed.  
Although there was likely banter, back and forth, between the two (or more) parties 
involved, everyone was basically able to continue with their own work and thinking. Then, in the 
1980s, all of that changed when two disparate, yet ultimately inter-influential events occurred: 
the release of the Second International Mathematics Study: Summary Report for the United 
States (Crosswhite, 1985), hereafter referred to as SIMS, and the National Council of Teachers 
of Mathematics’ (NCTM) publication of An Agenda for Action (NCTM, 1980) and Curriculum 
and Evaluation Standards for School Mathematics (NCTM, 1989).  Despite the best intentions of 
the new curricula implemented post-Sputnik, the report on U.S. student performance on the 
SIMS was dismal.  Meanwhile, the NCTMs two documents in that same decade proposed a 
major change in how mathematics should be learned and taught, rather than proposing new 
content.  What the NCTM recommended was that teaching and learning be “grounded in 
assumptions about learning being an active process rather than one of memorization and 
practice” (Schoenfeld, 2004, p. 266).  Such a proposal was shocking to many, having been fully 
immersed in an educational system modeled upon the ideals of the industrial revolution and the 
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assembly line, where mathematical content had been broken down into small, isolated chunks, 
the teaching of which emphasized facts and procedures. 
In seeking to radically improve student performance on SIMS, and thereby help to 
prevent another rendition of Sputnik-like embarrassment, the California Department of 
Education used the NCTMs documents as a foundation for their 1992 renewal of the 
mathematics curricula: the Mathematics Framework for California Public Schools, 
Kindergarten through Grade 12.  As one of the three states with a large enough student 
population to attract the attention of mainstream publishers in the U.S., California’s new 
framework resulted in the publication of a number of (radically) new textbooks for mathematics 
classrooms, and the reform approach (emphasizing active learning of mathematics) to the 
teaching and learning of mathematics was officially launched.  It would not be until the late 
1990s that there would be students from California who had experienced the reform curricula 
throughout all of kindergarten to Grade 8 (and later for up to grade 12 and into post-secondary 
institutions).  Consequently, no large-scale data collection or analysis regarding the success or 
failure of the reforms that were implemented would be available until at least the start of the 21st 
century.  However, by 1996, public outcries, websites devoted to a return to the pre-Sputnik 
“back to the basics” approach to mathematics teaching and learning, and the support of 
conservative politicians, had led to the formation of a committee to write a new framework.  
Further, an assembly bill was also passed that made it law for the State Board of Education “to 
ensure that the basic instruction materials it adopts for reading and mathematics in grades 1 to 
8, inclusive, are based on the fundamental skills required by these subjects” (Schoenfeld, 2004, 
pp. 273–274).  Thus, there was a call for a new framework and a new set of resources in K-12 
mathematics in California.  
When the new Framework was given to the State Board of Education, it was determined 
that the document did not meet the new legal criteria, and the task of yet again re-writing the 
Framework, for a third time in the decade, was given to four Stanford University mathematics 
professors who completed their task in four weeks.  This version of the Framework was 
approved by the State Board of Education of California in December, 1997.  
This time, the critiquing of what a group believed about mathematics, and more 
specifically the teaching and learning of mathematics, was not a critique – it was a judgment.  
This time, the criticisms were not directed at the other party, leaving the criticized to deal with 
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them as they would, rather they were made in a very public and political way.  This time, one 
group had denied the second party the right to practice and think about mathematics as they 
chose fit.  Of course, it could be argued that the first curricular changes were also critiques; 
however, the third rewrite of the Framework was far more than a critique.  It was a 
condemnation of what had been implemented before it had even had a chance to be tried out, and 
a denial, without evidence, of the prior research.  It was this assumption of authority of one 
group over the other, without consultation or consideration that ultimately became the starting 
point of the math wars, with its battles and casualties being documented and reflected upon as 
the decades inched forward (for example, see Becker & Jacob, 1998; Davison & Mitchell, 2008; 
O’Brien, 1999; Restivo & Sloan, 2007; Schoenfeld, 2004; Stemhagen, 2007).  Although 
mathematics and mathematics teaching and learning had never been a domain of total agreement, 
with different philosophical and social stances leading to different ideals (Davison & Mitchell, 
2008; Schoenfeld, 2004; Stemhagen, 2007), the math wars have been driven by overt political 
manipulation and the overabundance of negative campaigning within public media (Schoenfeld, 
2004), more than ever seen before in history.  
Boaler (2015) documents one of the most egregious examples of the misinformation, 
misrepresentation, and misunderstandings that riddle and perpetuate the math wars. It is the case 
of a teacher that Boaler calls Emily Moskam (a pseudonym introduced by Boaler), who had won 
awards for her mathematics teaching, had impressed even professors of mathematics with what 
here students were doing mathematically in her classroom, and whose students loved and 
excelled at mathematics because of how it was being taught to them.  At a parents only meeting, 
a small group of mothers provided “data that had been fed to them, telling them that if their 
children continued with the new math program, then they would not be eligible to go to college, 
and that test scores would fall” (The Night of Nonsense section, para. 4).  Test score declines 
was shown through the misrepresentation of data, and the eligibility for entry into different 
colleges was based upon the institutions answers to the question: “‘Would you accept a student 
who had not taken any math in high school but had just talked about math’”  (The Night of 
Nonsense section, para. 4)?  Boaler also notes that  
These tactics may sound incredible, but the people involved felt justified in trying to 
promote their position, using any method that they could, as they believed that they 
were involved in a ‘great educational war’ and that any tactics, no matter how 
underhanded, are admissible when at war. (The Night of Nonsense section, para. 4) 
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Despite another group of parents in-depth seeking of clarification, and the confirmation that 
“facts” they had been presented had been misinformed by the interests of outside parties, “the 
damage had already been done” (The Night of Nonsense section, para. 6).  Emily’s school 
decided that all of its teachers would go back to teaching in a traditional manner, and Emily left 
the field of teaching completely. 
As the math wars continue to have major impacts upon the teaching and learning of 
mathematics, it seems appropriate to better define the two major parties and their stances 
involved.  The traditional camp, as the name suggests, is fighting for a permanent return to the 
status quo for the teaching and learning of mathematics, that is, a focus on traditional content, 
facts, procedures, algorithms, and steps. They endorse pedagogical practices that include rote 
practice, rote memorization of rules, teaching by telling, and relying on an outside authority 
such as the teacher, textbook, or answer key (Schoenfeld, 2004).  For traditionalists, learning 
mathematics is only about obtaining the content, and that content is precise and deliberate.  
Efficiency (in the form of speed) in doing mathematics is of the upmost importance and thus 
students need to only learn the best way to get the correct answer. 
On the other side, the reform camp, building off the NCTM’s (1989) standards 
document’s descriptions of what mathematics teaching and learning should be like, is more 
focused, at first, on the processes of thinking, doing, and learning mathematics, rather than on any 
particular content to be learned.  Thus, the reformists believe that mathematics should be 
learned through student investigation of, or inquiry into, substantial problems.  Moreover, 
they argue: 
the classroom teacher should act as a stimulant, sounding board, and guide in student 
problem solving; that students should be encouraged to discuss mathematical ideas 
and discoveries with classmates and with the teacher; that the classroom activity should 
include frequent challenges to students to develop justifications for their ideas and 
discoveries; and that students should be encouraged to use calculators and computers 
in their mathematical expressions. (Schoen, Fox, Hirsch, & Cox, 1999, p. 446) 
Reasoning and problem solving are the most highly valued aspects of mathematics teaching and 
learning within the reform camp. 
As noted earlier, there are more than just the fighting factions involved.  It is also of 
great importance to acknowledge and consider the plight of the students, teachers, and parents 
(such as Emily, her students, and their parents) who are caught in the middle of this dichotomy 
of thinking about mathematics teaching and learning.  They have little to no influence on what is 
  
 231 
being done, yet have to persevere it being done, regardless of the impacts and consequences.  
In this regard, a number of researchers, scholars, and authors have suggested the need to find a 
middle ground, and in some cases have hypothesized about how to attain it (Loewenberg Ball, 
Ferrini-Mundy, Kilpatrick, Migram, Schmid, & Scharr, 2005; Reys, 2001; Wallis, 2006).  These 
common grounds often involve specific attention to learning algorithms through pedagogical 
strategies intended to develop the students’ understanding of the algorithms.  To date, there is no 
substantial evidence (or even acceptance of the little evidence that does exist) of either the 
effective implementation of such a common ground or the implications of such on student 
learning.   
And so, mathematics teaching and learning remains stuck in the battlefield of the math 
wars, often simmering in the background, occasionally brought to the forefront of everyone’s 
thinking through blasts of often less than professional claims. Arguments related to educators 
not knowing enough about mathematics are countered with arguments about mathematicians 
not knowing enough about education; parents are caught (with their children) bouncing back 
and forth between mathematics texts that they can recognize and others that they can not.  
Most recently, Western Canada has become the newest front line to emerge as curricula renewal 
has brought to the forefront these same controversies within the teaching and learning of 
mathematics (for example, see CBCNEWS, April 5, 2007; Murphy, April 15, 2012; 
http://wisemath.org/).  Twenty years on, resolution remains as elusive as ever, suggesting that a 
new approach, a new way of understanding the problem, needs to be sought. 
Analysis of the Math Wars 
Based on the above understandings of the math wars, I will next proceed to my analysis 
of them.  This analysis will again first discuss the prominent features of the math wars, followed 
by a discussion of the responses of the Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous 
worldview to the wars, and then will end with the coding and discussion of concepts that emerge 
from the above explanation and analyses of the math wars. 
Prominent features in the math wars. 
It was a double spark that ignited the math wars: failure of the post-Sputnik curriculum 
reforms to result in the desired improvement in students within mathematics, and the NCTMs 
arguments for mathematics learning being a dynamic rather than passive enterprise.  With the 
failure of the most previous curriculum reforms, these two factors ultimately divided people’s 
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thinking about the teaching and learning of mathematics into those who wanted to return to the 
status quo of the pre-Sputnik era, and those who wanted to embrace the calls for active learning 
from the NCTM.  
Since that time, the math wars have continued to bounce (almost always without consent 
or agreement) students, teachers, parents, and administrators between the two opposing camps of 
those supporting the traditional (pre-Sputnik) and the reform (NCTM based) approaches.  The 
wars have over time flooded media with information and misinformation, and they have often 
been politically and popularly (through mathematical “celebrities”) supported and rebuked.  
In most general terms, the traditional approach to the teaching and learning of 
mathematics as argued for within the math wars emphasizes rote practice, rule memorization, 
practice of teacher-demonstrated skills, and reliance upon a source of authority (the teacher, 
textbook, or answer key) through which mathematical knowledge must be obtained. Within the 
traditional approach, individual aspects of mathematical knowledge are presented directly to 
students who then memorize and practice using that knowledge in familiar contexts to build up 
efficiency, particularly in the form of speed. 
Alternatively, the reform approach embraces pedagogical practices that emphasize the 
construction of knowledge that is understood as well as known.  These approaches, such as 
inquiry and problem-centered learning, aim to engage students in creating mathematical 
knowledge that they can use to solve problems and answer questions that have piqued their 
interest.  Thus, the reform camp within the math wars seeks to engage students in mathematical 
thinking and doing in order for them to learn particular mathematical content.  Reform-based 
classrooms encourage dialogue, debate, conjecture, and experimentation.  
The math wars are thus in many ways a dichotomized view of the teaching and learning 
of mathematics, the traditional approach sitting at one end of the spectrum, while the reform 
approaches sit at another.  The dichotomy is not absolute however, because both camps desire 
for students to learn particular mathematical knowledge.  It is only in how each camp envisions 
students achieving this goal that not only distinguishes them, but also puts them in conflict with 
one another. With these understandings of the math wars and its two factions, I now turn to the 
results of hermeneutically considering how the Traditional Western worldview would respond to 
the prominent features of the math wars. 
Dialogue with the Traditional Western worldview. 
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As is central to its worldview positioning, the Traditional Western worldview would look 
for the “right” way to teach and learn mathematics within the positioning of the two sides within 
the math wars. Another significant feature of the Traditional Western worldview when reflecting 
on the math wars from that perspective is its emphasis on knowledge of value being known by, 
and shared through, reliable sources with a specialized background.  Based upon these two 
points, the post-Sputnik curriculum reform failure would be viewed as a failure to call upon the 
correct specialists and specialized knowledge related to mathematics and the teaching and 
learning of mathematics, which consequently resulted in the “right” way of teaching and learning 
not having been incorporated.  However, a person grounded within the Traditional Western 
worldview would believe that such specialists can be called upon, and that it is most likely that 
the past “right” way (that is, pre post-Sputnik) had been wrongfully dismissed as is held by the 
traditionalist camp. 
The argument of the reform camp that mathematics should be actively learned through 
the initiatives and understandings of students would be unequivocally rejected within the 
Traditional Western worldview.  Students are not specialists, therefore it would be the view of a 
person grounded within the Traditional Western worldview that students could not be expected 
to develop mathematics themselves. 
The fact that the math wars continue to rage on, and that teachers, students, parents, and 
administrators often are the victims of these wars, would also be squarely placed on the failure to 
make the “right” choice and to return to mathematics teaching and learning which is authority 
and specialist centered rather than student and understanding centered.  Further, a person 
grounded within the Traditional Western worldview would view political and popular arguments 
for a return to the traditional approaches to the teaching and learning of mathematics as rational 
and sound. 
For all of the above reasons then, a person grounded within the Traditional Western 
worldview would find themselves in support of the traditional camp within the math wars, 
praising the authority, rational basis, and emphasis on specialization and compartmentalization 
of the knowledge that it seeks and incorporates.  Alternatively, the same person would reject the 
reform camp’s position on the basis of its incorrect assumption that students would be able to 
create significant, specialized and compartmentalized mathematics by engaging in problem 
solving and inquiry.  Instead, they would argue that problem solving and inquiry, if absolutely 
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desired, would necessarily have to follow students first being taught the “right” mathematics and 
doing of mathematics by a knowledgeable person or authoritative text. 
Overall then, the Traditional Western worldview would not find any valid reason for the 
continuation of the math wars.  For a person grounded within this worldview, there is a 
universally correct side to these battles, that of the traditional camp.  With this understanding 
from the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview, I next turn to a discussion of how a 
person grounded within an Indigenous worldview would respond to the math wars. 
Dialogue with an Indigenous worldview. 
As has become a common occurrence, the math wars appear very different from the 
perspective of an Indigenous worldview than they do through the lens of the Traditional Western 
worldview.  For example, a person grounded within an Indigenous worldview would find value 
in both of the triggers for the math wars; however, they would also find that the isolation of these 
two factors, and the failure to consider other issues, such as the struggles of many students 
(including Indigenous) with mathematics in general, a limited mindset to have when considering 
the teaching and learning of mathematics.  
Further, from the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, the flip-flopping between the 
two camps would seem unnecessary and therefore irresponsible, as would the political and 
popular media activities that promote these abrupt responses and changes.  From the perspective 
of an Indigenous worldview, depending upon the context in which the knowledge being sought is 
needed, both approaches to the teaching and learning of mathematics could be appropriate.  
Instead, the exclusion of consideration of the context driving the two different approaches would 
be seen to be the real cause for the disagreements.  Thus, a person grounded within an 
Indigenous worldview would not accept the necessity of dichotomizing the two approaches, 
rather they would find a place for both approaches, while keeping other space open for 
combinations of both and for approaches not yet even considered.  
Thus, although a person grounded within an Indigenous worldview would be pleased to 
see the openness in terms of the ways of knowing valued within the reform approaches versus 
that of the traditional approach, this would not be enough for that person to be situated within the 
reform camp.  Neither would the traditional camp offer a suitable place for that person’s views 
on the teaching and learning of mathematics to reside.  Instead, a person grounded within an 
Indigenous worldview would move through, between, and even beyond the two camps, choosing 
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where to locate based upon the context in which they are seeking to gain or share mathematical 
knowledge.  
With these understandings of how the math wars relate (or do not relate) to the 
Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous worldview, I can now turn to the final part of 
the analysis of the math wars.  Returning to grounded theory, I now present and discuss the 
concepts that I have coded as being found within the data and the analysis of it so far. 
Coding and explanation. 
More so than any of the previous data that I have coded for concepts, in many ways the 
math wars emphasize a dichotomization of each of the concepts.  Just as the two camps tend to 
be positioned as a dichotomous pair, through the two approaches to the teaching and learning of 
mathematics, the concepts previously identified tend to diverge in their explanations through the 
lenses of the traditional and reform camps. 
The first of the concepts to consider is that of hierarchy.  The traditional approach to the 
teaching and learning of mathematics emphasizes a hierarchy of knowledge by controlling the 
order in which the mathematics content is taught, and by delegating the teaching of mathematics 
to specialists and authoritative textbooks.  The reform camp, on the other hand, encourages 
teaching and learning of mathematics where the content learned is dependent upon the problem 
solved or the inquiry carried out, both of which may come from the students rather than the 
teachers.  This means that although the teacher may do some “fancy footwork” to ensure the 
inclusion of a particular piece of mathematical content, the content that is learned is most often 
the result of the motivations and interests of the students.  Consequently, the hierarchy of 
knowledge, if it can be considered a hierarchy, is based upon the knowledge that students 
construct through their solving of problems and engaging in inquiries. 
Specialization as a concept is also very different within the two camps of the math wars.  
For those favouring the traditional approaches to the teaching and learning of mathematics, the 
teacher must be a specialist in mathematical knowledge, or have access to resources, which 
contain the specialized mathematical knowledge to be learned.  Conversely, the reform 
approaches to the teaching and learning of mathematics seek ways for students to develop their 
own specialized knowledge and ways of knowing of mathematics. 
In relation to the singularity of mathematical knowledge, the traditional approaches 
emphasize both the “right” way of knowing and learning mathematics and the singular pieces of 
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mathematical knowledge.  The reform camp instead focuses on students finding “their own 
right” ways to do and know mathematics, and the mathematical knowledge that is to be gained 
by the students through such approaches is to be comprised of integrated pieces of mathematics 
that are contextually grounded.  
The categorization and isolation of mathematical knowledge is likewise dichotomized 
between the two camps.  The traditionalists hold that mathematical knowledge should be taught 
in rote pieces of knowledge, including facts and skills, which are categorized and kept isolated 
from other mathematical knowledge so that they will not be confused.  The reformists, on the 
other hand, have students engage with the learning of mathematics in ways that integrate and 
relate various mathematical ideas and skills within particular contexts and investigations.  
Thus, the two camps also have alternative views to relationship and context.  In 
particular, the traditional approach to the teaching and learning of mathematics avoids the 
presentation of relationships or contexts, unless absolutely required for the students to acquire 
the mathematical knowledge being presented.  Relationship and context, are dissimilarly the 
foundations upon which mathematical knowledge is to be constructed within the reform 
approaches to the teaching and learning of mathematics.  
As referenced earlier, power and authority within the traditional approaches to the 
teaching and learning of mathematics are afforded to the teachers and textbooks, in the hopes 
that the students will ultimately gain the knowledge necessary to give them the more power and 
authority.  Contrarily, within the reform approaches to the teaching and learning of mathematics, 
students are afforded the authority and power to create mathematics, which they can use with 
authority in relevant situations.  
It is only in light of the concept of abstraction that the dichotomy between the two 
approaches to the teaching and learning of mathematics ceases to exist.  This is because, 
ultimately, both the traditionalists and the reformists seek for students to gain abstract 
mathematical knowledge.  One assumes that it must be given directly and specifically to the 
students (the traditional approach), while the other assumes that students can come to know the 
abstract mathematics through constructing it for themselves within meaningful contexts (the 
reform approach).  
Not only are all of the previously identified concepts again present within the math wars 
data, but also, regular interactions and inter-relationships between the concepts are again present.  
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Thus, the saturation of the concepts, and a broader conceptual category continue to emerge 
through the analysis of the math wars. 
With this conclusion to the analysis of how people think about the teaching and learning 
of mathematics, I once again return to the areas of interest that emerged from the analysis of my 
story for the source of my next set of data.  In this case, I now turn to how mathematics relates to 
culture and individuals, and more specifically to Indigenous students’ mathematics struggles and 
ethnomathematics. 
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Indigenous Students in Relation to Mathematics and Ethnomathematics 
Although likely the most publicized, the math wars are not the only context in which 
mathematics educators are concerned about what is happening to student learning of 
mathematics.  In 2003, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported: 
As a group, Native American students are not afforded educational opportunities equal 
to other American students.  They routinely face deteriorating school facilities, 
underpaid teachers, weak curricula, discriminatory treatment, and outdated learning 
tools.  In addition, the cultural histories and practices of Native students are rarely 
incorporated in the learning environment.  As a result, achievement gaps persist with 
Native American students scoring lower than any other racial/ethnic group in basic 
levels of reading, math, and history.  Native American students are also less likely to 
graduate from high school and more likely to drop out in earlier grades. (p. xi) 
However, this is not just a U.S. issue.  A decade later, there is evidence that Saskatchewan’s First 
Nations and Métis students (the fastest growing population set in the province) are continuing to 
fall well behind their non-Aboriginal counterparts in mathematics (Saskatchewan Ministry of 
Education 2008, 2009b, 2010).  
For example, in 2006, 43.1% of the Aboriginal population who were of an age to have 
been expected to complete grade 12 had not graduated from high school compared to 15.1% for 
the same age range in the non-Aboriginal population (Saskatchewan Education, 2008).  Further, 
there is consistentaly a documented 20% difference in marks in Grade 11 mathematics (the last 
grade in which mathematics is compulsory for graduation) between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal students in the province (Saskatchewan Ministry of Education 2008, 2009b, 2010).  
Moreover, this is not a phenomenon of just Saskatchewan and the U.S. – it has been noted 
throughout all of North America (Aitken and Bruised Head 2008; Cheek 1984; Graham 1988; 
Mather 1997; Scott 1983; Trent and Gilman 1985), Australia (Howard & Perry 2005), and 
around the world (Greer, Mukhopadbyay, Powell, & Nelson-Barber, 2009; Powell & 
Frankenstein 1997b). 
Within these different reports however, there is also evidence that the world’s Indigenous 
peoples are more than capable of complex mathematics, often produced and used in ways foreign 
to Western academic mathematics.  For greater understanding of this reality, one must turn to the 
field of ethnomathematics, which focuses on the relationships between mathematics and culture, 
and provides evidence of how the Mathematics (to borrow the capitalization of Bishop) taught in 
schools today is culturally biased.  Ethnomathematicians challenge beliefs in the authority of 
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Western, abstract mathematics, such as in the downplaying of the Egyptian way of determining 
surface areas of cylinders that was overlooked in favour of the Greek formulas (Powell & 
Frankenstein, 1997a).  Further examples of this kind of hierarchical authority structuring are 
found in the way solutions to non-standard problems by Africans were dismissed as “flukes” 
(Lumpkin, 1997), and how the knitting of socks was classified as women’s work rather than 
mathematics, despite both involving the solving of the same mathematical problem (Harris, 
1997).  
Ethnomathematical research has not only brought to light this assumed hierarchy in kinds 
of mathematical knowledge.  It also provides evidence of overt misunderstanding and 
assumptions about ways of mathematical thinking and knowing.  For example, Ascher and 
Ascher (1997) share an often-recounted story of researchers who offered to buy a sheep from an 
Indigenous sheepherder.  When informed that the price would be two sticks of tobacco, the 
researchers left to get the payment.  Upon their return, the researchers offered the sheepherder 
four sticks of tobacco in payment for the original sheep and one other.  The researchers reported 
that: “the herder agrees to accept two sticks of tobacco for one sheep but [became] confused 
when given four sticks of tobacco after a second sheep is selected” (p. 29).  From the 
researcher’s perspective this was conclusive evidence that “that the herder cannot comprehend 
the simple arithmetic fact that 2 + 2 (or 2 x 2) = 4” (p. 29).  Ascher and Ascher point out that it 
was not that the sheepherder was not able to think mathematically that this misunderstanding 
occurred; rather, it was because the researchers had failed to take into account the context, that 
“Sheep are not a standardized unit” (p. 29).  
Similar to the previous sheepherder example, another frequently situation discussed 
within ethnomathematical papers and conversations is that of research done in another 
Indigenous community designed to gauge the level of mathematical knowledge within the 
community using a task modeled off of one of Piaget’s sorting activity.  In the task, twenty 
different objects that could be classified as being food, clothing, tools, or cooking utensils, were 
placed in front of the research participants.  Each participant was then asked to sort the objects. 
The researchers were dismayed to note that not only were the participants not constructing the 
obvious categories, but rather putting of objects together (such as an orange with a knife), but 
they often did so with the explanation, “‘that a wise man would do things in the way this was 
done’” (Powell & Frankenstein, 1997c, p. 197).  Frustrated, one of the researchers eventually 
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questioned a participants “‘how would a fool do it?’” (Powell & Frankenstein, 1997c, p. 197), to 
which the participant responded by sorting the objects into the five categories that the researchers 
had been expecting.  In both the case of the sheepherder and the sorting task, the researchers had 
different ideas about how a given problem might be solved than the research participants had, 
and as a result, at least by the researchers and for a period of time after, the participants were 
deemed to have been inferior in their mathematical thinking. 
These examples serve to demonstrate that it might not be being able to do mathematics 
that eludes Indigenous students; rather, it may be what schools assume that doing mathematics 
looks like is the issue.  Regardless of the reason, the failure of many Indigenous students to 
succeed in the learning of mathematics is of grave concern, for as Graham (1988) notes, “without 
Western mathematics, Aboriginal children are denied access to further education and to the 
knowledge and power inherent in the social institutions which, even today, influence the way 
Aboriginal people live their lives” (p. 120).  In other words, the continuation of this negative 
relationship between Indigenous students and the learning of mathematics is contributing to the 
continuation of oppression, hegemony, and colonization. 
The combination of ethnomathematical research and the documented academic struggles 
of many Indigenous students with mathematics, since at least the 1990s, has resulted in 
researchers, educators, and curriculum developers struggling with the question of how to make 
mathematics more accessible and meaningful for Indigenous students.  Around the world, 
various strategies for improving the academic achievement of Indigenous students in Western 
mathematics have been (and continue to be) developed, implemented, and researched.   
In New Zealand (Barton, Fairhall, & Trinick, 1998; Barton 2009), researchers and 
Indigenous peoples have been working on the creation of a mathematics register (which we 
define as the language, both vocabulary and grammar, used within Western mathematics) within 
the Mäori language.  Barton et. al. (1998) note that this work has resulted in “The creation of a 
Mäori mathematical discourse [that] has moved  the  language  towards  English  modes  and  
conversations” (p. 7) .  Unintentionally, these endeavours to bring school mathematics into the 
Indigenous languages have also resulted in further losses to the languages and culture. 
Some researchers have also sought to find other ways to connect Indigenous students to 
their own mathematics and culture.  For example, Lunney Borden and Wagner (2007), have 
invited Indigenous students to bring into their school mathematics classrooms the mathematics 
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from their homes and community.  Others, such as Neel and Fettes (2010) have incorporated 
Aboriginal images, art, artifacts, and symbols into their school study of mathematics.  
Alternatively, researchers such as Sternberg and McDonnell (2010) have worked on ways 
to embrace traditional Aboriginal teaching and learning strategies, such as an emphasis on 
learning from place, in order to engage Aboriginal students in the learning of Western 
mathematics.  In terms of these approaches to connecting with Indigenous students, researchers 
and mathematics educators need to proceed with caution. It is important that when trying to help 
Indigenous students connect with school mathematics that the cultural contexts, ideas, artifacts, 
and places do not become merely objects of mathematical thinking and knowledge, abstracted 
from their culture and contexts (three Saskatchewan Cree Elders, Personal Communication, 
2006). 
Regardless of the approaches taken, the achievement gap for Indigenous students in 
school mathematics continues for many Indigenous, and non-Indigenous students.  What is also 
important to note is both ethnomathematics and the struggles of many Indigenous students with 
learning mathematics may very well be related to each other, and that “different cultures can 
produce different mathematics, and the mathematics for one culture can change over time, 
reflecting changes in the culture” (Powell, & Frankenstein, 1997a, p. 6). 
Analysis of Indigenous Students in Relation to Mathematics and Ethnomathematics 
Based upon the above understandings of Indigenous students in relation to mathematics 
and ethnomathematics, I will next proceed to my analysis of these two interrelated sets of data.  
This analysis will again first discuss the prominent features of the relationships between 
Indigenous students and mathematics as well as of ethnomathematics, followed by a discussion 
of how the Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous worldview would respond to these 
two fields of knowledge, and then will end with the coding and discussion of concepts that 
emerge from the above explanation and the analyses that follow. 
Prominent features of Indigenous students in relation to mathematics and mathematics. 
The above discussion of what is said in the literature regarding how (many) Indigenous 
students struggle with the learning of mathematics demonstrates that these struggles are not just 
confined to within the boarders of Saskatchewan or even Canada, but can be found within 
Indigenous populations around the world.  Despite their struggles in school mathematics, 
however, ethnomathematical research has demonstrated repetitively that all people, including 
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Indigenous peoples, are capable of complex mathematical thinking and doing.  
Ethnomathematics also reveals how undervalued and misunderstood Indigenous 
mathematics (and all mathematics that was not made part of the Western mathematical 
knowledge system) is.  In some cases, Indigenous mathematics was usurped by Western 
mathematics, being given abstract symbolic representation, and then claimed as being Western in 
origin.  In other cases, Western ignoring of context lead to incorrect conclusions about the 
mathematical ability of Indigenous peoples.   
Likewise, equivalent mathematical thinking that was represented and carried out in ways 
different from the formulaic processes of Western mathematics was not even considered 
mathematics. Further, assumptions about the purpose and hierarchy of different types of 
knowledge led many mathematical and anthropological researchers to believe that different 
Indigenous groups were mathematically incompetent, while it was merely the valuing of 
different assumptions and kinds of knowledge resulted in disparity between the mathematics of 
the researcher and the mathematics of the researched.  
In general, ethnomathematics research sheds light upon differences between cultural 
perceptions, representations, and uses of mathematics, particularly between Western 
mathematics and Indigenous mathematics.  The great importance and value placed on 
mathematical knowledge within Western society thus raises concerns about how Western 
mathematics presents mathematical thinking and mathematical knowledge, and what ways of 
knowing and doing mathematics that it values or disadvantages.  
Consequently, many mathematics education researchers have engaged in various 
approaches to finding ways to connect Indigenous students to mathematics and mathematics to 
the Indigenous students.  Some of these attempts have resulted in more positive attitudes of 
Indigenous students to the teaching and learning of mathematics, while others have caused 
unwanted changes to Indigenous languages.  Even with the variety of attempts made to change 
the teaching and learning of mathematics for struggling Indigenous students, and despite 
indications of some improvement in their academic progress, the achievement gap in 
mathematics continues for many Indigenous students. 
Thus, it is important to recognize that there is a potential for a strong relationship 
between knowledge and understandings emerging from ethnomathematical research, the 
struggles of many Indigenous students to have success in school mathematics, and the various 
  
 243 
approaches taken by researchers to try to bridge Indigenous students’ knowledge and Western 
mathematical knowledge.  With these understandings of these three areas and their relationships, 
I now turn to the results of hermeneutically considering how the Traditional worldview would 
respond to the data just presented. 
Dialogue with the Traditional Western worldview. 
From the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview, the worldwide struggle of 
many Indigenous students in regards to the learning of Western mathematics would necessarily 
be seen as being related to issues of the students, and not of the mathematics or how it is being 
taught and learned.  This response would be deemed appropriate within the Traditional Western 
worldview because it would be argued that no other culture has this nearly en masse issue with 
achieving in mathematics (a statement that could be countered by considering current 
achievement levels of different nations on international mathematics testing, but will not be 
pursued further within this dissertation); therefore, what is being taught and how it is being 
taught must be the “right” mathematics and the “right” way of teaching it.   In the same vein, the 
Traditional Western worldview would not accept the alternative forms of mathematical 
knowledge that the ethnomathematical research highlights since there must be only one “right” 
way of knowing and doing mathematics.  Everything else must necessarily be classified 
differently or assumed false. 
For these reasons, mathematics education researchers seeking alternative teaching and 
learning approaches for Indigenous students would be deemed to be engaging in unnecessary 
research from the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview.  Moreover, engagement of 
Indigenous students, as well as possibly non-Indigenous students in such learning pursuits would 
be viewed as impractical, and a waste of time.  A person grounded within the Traditional 
Western worldview would substantiate such claims by pointing to the unintentional damage that 
some of these approaches have had on Indigenous languages, and the failure of these approaches 
to completely (or even significantly) influence the achievement gap. 
Overall then, from the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview, the seeking of 
reasons for the struggles of the Indigenous students within mathematics and the teaching and 
learning of mathematics would be viewed as an inconsequential and insignificant pursuit.  
Likewise, focusing on particular, context-based examples of ethnomathematical thinking that do 
not fit within the parameters of Western mathematics would also be of little value to a person 
  
 244 
grounded within the Traditional Western worldview.  With these understandings of how the 
Traditional Western worldview aligns (or in this case, does not align) with the data under 
consideration, I now discuss how a person grounded within an Indigenous worldview would 
respond to this same information. 
Dialogue with an Indigenous worldview. 
From the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, the achievement gap in mathematics 
for many Indigenous students around the world would be viewed as a context for concern, not 
because the students are Indigenous, but because an Indigenous worldview would view the 
situation as problematic for the good of all.  Likewise, a person grounded within an Indigenous 
worldview would want to know about the downplaying and misunderstanding of any 
knowledges, as this worldview seeks and values, rather than denying, diversity in both kinds of 
knowledge and ways of knowing.  Further, a person grounded within an Indigenous worldview, 
while questioning what good comes from the appropriation of the knowledge of others, would be 
greatly concerned with the insistence of Western mathematics to take contextualized knowledge 
and abstractly represent and categorize it. 
An Indigenous worldview would also insist upon the valuing of all mathematical 
knowledge, whether its representation or use conformed to the norms of Western mathematics 
(abstract and rational), and regardless of how the knowledge has come to be known.  Culturally 
centered and derived mathematical knowledge outside of Western mathematics would be viewed 
as being as valuable as that within Western mathematics.  These stances upon what knowledge 
and ways of knowing should be valued in mathematics, and the teaching and learning of 
mathematics would be further fortified within an Indigenous worldview when the role that 
mathematics knowledge plays within Western society is added to the picture.  Thus, the attempts 
to find different ways to approach the teaching and learning of mathematics by researchers 
would be applauded by a person grounded within an Indigenous worldview. Such research would 
be viewed as research that is being done for good reasons as it is the seeking of knowledge that is 
for the good of all.  Even with the mistakes made, and the limitations on progress observed, such 
attempts would be celebrated and future attempts would be supported.  
With these understandings of how the relationships between many Indigenous students 
(and cultures) and mathematics, through both ethnomathematics research and the work of 
mathematics education researchers, I can now turn to the final part of the analysis of this section 
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of data.  Returning to grounded theory, I now present and discuss the concepts that I have coded 
as being related to the data shared and the analysis of it so far. 
Coding and explanations. 
As has become the norm, this section of my data and its analysis again brings to light the 
same concepts that have been previously noted.  In particular, much of the coding of the concepts 
comes from the worldview responses to the struggles of many Indigenous students with 
mathematics, ethnomathematics, and the approaches that have been developed and tried by 
mathematics education researchers. 
As noted previously, hierarchy and specialization are again present within the response of 
the Traditional Western worldview through its justification of the devaluing of non-Western 
mathematics.  Hierarchy and specialization are apparent in thinking that the cause of many 
Indigenous students struggles with mathematics and the learning of mathematics must be the 
result of their failure to do mathematics the “right” way, rather than it being a consequence of 
how mathematics has been presented and taught.  Hierarchy and specialization also play a role in 
the ethnomathematical examples that were shared.  Ethnomathematical knowledge that was 
contextually based, or that considered a different interpretation of what kinds of knowledge were 
of value was deemed by prior researchers to be indications of mathematical inadequacy rather 
than representational difference.  In this way, the people who demonstrated different kinds of 
mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing from the researchers (who assumed they were 
specialists at a high level within the hierarchy of knowledge) were deemed inferior and lacking 
in knowledge of value. 
The failure of prior researchers to acknowledge the diverse ways of knowing and kinds of 
knowledge that are present in their recounting of their research also highlights their emphasis on 
singularity and abstraction of mathematical knowledge.  Conversely, the mathematical 
knowledge that they rejected challenges the assumption that singularity and abstraction is 
necessary in order for knowledge to be valuable mathematical knowledge.  
Emphasis on the categorization and isolation, as well as the abstraction of mathematical 
knowledge, can be seen in the manner in which the mathematical knowledge and ways of 
knowing were researched prior to (and unfortunately at times still) the emergence of 
ethnomathematics.  The researchers went in with specific mathematical knowledges that they 
were wanting to research (such as sorting of objects) and with very specific responses to their 
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research questions being expected (such as by type rather than by relationships).  Contextual 
factors were ignored in their analysis of the data that was collected (in order to provide 
objectivity).  The consequence was that in many such cases of research, the categorization of 
mathematical knowledge held by the researcher did not align with that of the researched, and the 
researchers attempts to isolate and abstract the mathematical knowledge away from the context 
created a greater divide between the Indigenous knowledge and the researcher’s interpretation of 
it.  
As was just noted, context played a huge role in the differences between how the 
Indigenous people were working with and thinking about mathematics; while the original 
researchers ignored the context.  Ethnomathematical researchers revisited this original research, 
highlighting the significance and role of context.  Context also plays an important role within the 
various approaches to teaching mathematics to Indigenous (and other) students that have recently 
been, and continue to be, researched.  
A dichotomy in perceptions regarding the relationship between knowledge and knower is 
thus challenged through this section of my data.  Whereas the original researchers assumed that 
knowledge and knower are separate from each other, ethnomathematics and the new approaches 
to the teaching and learning of mathematics seek to identify, accommodate, and encourage 
relationships between the knowledge and the knower.  They do so through the ways of knowing 
allowed and through the contexts within which the knowledge is presented, gained, and housed.  
Finally, the concept of power and authority is also present within the discussion of the 
struggles of many Indigenous students with mathematics as well as within ethnomathematics 
(and the research findings that it questions), as well as approaches to the teaching and learning of 
mathematics.  Currently, mathematical achievement is exerting tremendous power and authority 
over many Indigenous (and other) students, denying their ability to pursue many options within 
their futures.  Ethnomathematics, on the other hand, is challenging the assumed power and 
authority of Western mathematics and Western mathematical ways of thinking by bringing to 
light misinterpretations and otherwise ignored mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing.  
Further, to this challenge of the power and authority of Western mathematics, the new 
approaches to the teaching and learning of mathematics for Indigenous (and other) students 
likewise confront the restrictive practices of mathematics teaching that denied students to engage 
with mathematics in meaningful, relational, and contextual ways.  
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As can be seen within the above discussion of the conceptual codes, the concepts again 
are becoming more saturated, with only more clarity about the horizon of understanding of the 
particular codes emerging.  Likewise, the merging and inter-relating of these concepts continues 
to suggest a broader conceptual category is developing. 
With this conclusion to the analysis of the data speaking to the relationship between 
cultures (and individuals) and mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing, I once again 
return to the areas of interest that emerged from the analysis of my story for the source of my 
next set of data.  In this case, I now consider how curriculum represents mathematics content 
with an eye to emerging mathematics content.  In particular, I have chosen to consider the newly 
emerging mathematical content area of risk, risk analysis, risk-based decision-making, and risk 
management. 
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Risk and Risk Education  
The final area of interest that emerged from the grounded theory analysis of my first data 
set, my story, relates to how mathematics knowledge and ways of knowing are present and 
represented within curriculum.  As this is a very broad topic, I have chosen to focus on one 
particular area of mathematics content that has only recently begun to appear within mathematics 
curricula documents, that of risk education.  This choice was deliberate on my part, as I am 
hoping that by presenting and analyzing a mathematics topic that is in its curricular infancy, my 
analysis may be able to better identify different possibilities for curricular implementation of risk 
topics and knowledges. 
Risk, risk analysis, risk management, and risk-based decision-making are ubiquitous 
ideas and terms in the modern world; however, what is meant by risk and how one can analyze, 
manage, or make decisions based upon risk remains if not contested, then inconclusive. 
Borovcnik and Kapadia (2011), define risk as “a situation with inherent uncertainty about the 
(future) outcomes, which are related to impact (cost, damage, benefit)” (p. 5503).  Within much 
of risk research, there is general agreement that “there are two levels of criteria for making 
decisions: personally preferred ones and rationally bound ones” (p. 5503).  There even is 
agreement as to the origins of the knowledge held in relation to each of the criteria 
(affective/emotional responses and scientific methods, respectively); however, the perceived 
worth of each of these criteria by researchers is not so clear cut.  Further, as with other emerging 
and prominent features of the modern world, like technology, there is a proclaimed need for the 
study of risk to be part of students’ educational experiences.  Hence, there is a need to consider 
risk education –what should it look like, and how can it happen, and educational researchers 
have begun to investigate these questions. 
Risk Education 
Since risk impacts our lives in so many ways, it is not surprising that many educational 
systems and researchers are looking for ways to embed risk assessment and management and 
risk-based decision-making into the K-12 school system.  As an example of how and the extent 
to which risk education is being incorporated into school curricula, an examination of examples 
from Saskatchewan’s mathematics curricula are now presented.  
Risk education in k-12 Saskatchewan mathematics curricula in its infancy. 
The first example is an outcome in the Grade 12 Workplace and Apprenticeship 
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Mathematics curriculum (Saskatchewan Ministry of Education, 2013b): “Analyze and interpret 
problems that involve probability”, and more specifically, indicator 1.6 for this outcome: 
“Explain, using examples, how decisions may be based on a combination of theoretical 
probability calculations, experimental results and subjective judgments” (p. 26).  Such decisions 
may well, in fact often likely would, be in relation to situations involving risk.  A similar 
outcome in the course Grade 12 Foundations of Mathematics (Saskatchewan Ministry of 
Education, 2013a), “ Interpret and assess the validity of odds and probability statements” has the 
indicator “1.5 Explain, using examples, how decisions may be based on probability or odds and 
on subjective judgement” (p. 71), which is also easily connected to risk assessment and 
management, as well as risk-based decision-making.  Thus, within these two courses, students 
should be engaging in risk analysis and risk-based decision-making through the consideration of 
both objective and subjective knowledge.  The two indicators give some direction towards what 
students might learn with respect to thinking about risk, namely probability, odds, and subjective 
judgments in decision-making; however, what kinds of subjective knowledge to be considered 
and are to be valued in these outcomes remains undefined.  
Risk education research. 
Beyond what the limited references to risk, risk analysis, risk-based decision making, and 
risk education can be found within curriculum documents, there have been two major studies 
done to investigate how to best teach students about risk.  The first of these studies is Martignon 
and Krauss’ (2009) research, which aimed to develop within students thinking a “chain of 
competencies that make up good decision making for informed consent in basic domains of 
modern life like those of medical and investment decisions (P. 229).  Working with grade four 
students, used hands-on activities and tools designed to strengthen student learning of these 
competencies and looked for ways to incorporate these strategies into pedagogical design. In the 
activities, the students moved from investigating how to make logical inferences within the 
context of if-then statements, to investigating the inclusion of conditional probabilities, to the 
comparing of proportions.  Martignon and Krauss explain that “[students] need to understand 
conditional probabilities for determining the validities of features and they need to make 
comparisons between different validities of features for establishing rankings among features… 
These competencies are at the core of risk assessment” (p. 231), and “the comparison of 
proportions is essential in comparing feature validities and for assessing risks” (p. 232).  Overall, 
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the researchers describe the ordering of their activities as being based upon a “a ‘historic 
trajectory… from logic to probability” (p. 238), giving the students a historically accelerated 
experiential learning of decision-making and reasoning with risk.   
The second major study into how to teach about risk is that of Kapadia, Kent, Levison, 
Pratt, and Yogui, explain that “going beyond the idea of risk in statistical theory, we are trying to 
understand how personal values and models influence thinking about risk and the process of 
decision-making, and the implications of this for classroom practice” (Kent, Pratt, Levinson, 
Yogui, Kapadia, 2010, p. 1).  Thus, different from Martignon and Krauss’ (2009) rational focus 
on the historical trajectory from logic to probability, this second group of researchers were 
instead focusing on how affective (emotional) knowledge impacted risk analysis and decision-
making, thereby assuming “that decision-making involves the coordination of different kinds of 
information, based on quantitative models and personal value systems and judgements” (p. 1). 
This study was also different from the first in that the research participants were mathematics 
and sciences teachers who worked in pairs (one from each specialty).  This decision was based 
upon a second assumption – that science teachers would be more familiar with the socio-
scientific aspects (including affective ones) of understanding and working with risk, while the 
mathematics teachers would be more familiar with the stochastic aspects of understanding and 
working with risk.  Overall, the researchers hoped that through such groupings the participants 
would come to a better understanding of risk and decision-making processes.   
The choice by these researchers to involve teachers, rather than students, was made in the 
hopes that the dynamic software tool (Deborah’s Dilemma) that the teachers would engage with 
might later inform their teaching decisions, or even be incorporated into their classrooms.  This 
program asked the participants to make decisions on Deborah’s behalf regarding undergoing 
surgery for a chronic medical condition.  The participants were provided a variety of statistical 
and affective information regarding Deborah’s case upon which to reach their decision.  It is 
important to note that the information provided was often lacking pertinent information, and in 
the case of the affective data there was no pre-assigned measure of importance to Deborah or the 
decision.  After recognizing that the participants were initially treating the two sets of data as 
disconnected information.  To help the participants consider alternate possibilities for the 
relationship between the data sets, the researchers added a component to the software called the 
‘Risk Mapping’ Tool.  In explaining the tool, Kent et.al. (2010) explained that,  
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Whilst the mapping tool does enforce the association of impact and likelihood with each 
hazard, we did not enforce any model for how these relate to ‘level of risk’.  It was 
exactly at this point where we hoped users would express their personal models for the 
situation, providing us with a window on their thinking about risk, (Kent, et. al., 2010, 
p. 4) 
once again assuring the possibility for both rational and affective reasoning to emerge.  With this 
third tool, the participants were found to be able to better coordinate their thinking about the 
hazards and about the impact – that is the rational statistics and the affective impingements. 
Since what risk education might, let alone should, include is still an open discussion, it is 
beneficial to next provide two examples related to risk analysis and risk-based decision making 
that are based upon neither rational statistical evidence, nor affective or emotional impacts.  Both 
of these examples demonstrate another way of knowing about risk and making decisions and are 
based within and around Indigenous communities and their traditional knowledges.  
Navajo Plague, 1993 
In the spring of 1993, a healthy, newly engaged Navajo woman of 24 became sick with 
“a stuffy nose, a dry cough, aches, and little else.  It looked like an ordinary case of the flu” 
(Arviso, & Cohen, 1999, p. 117). The following day, the woman “showed up in Crownpoint in 
severe respiratory distress and hypoxic ... She’d died a few hours later” (p. 118).  On the day of 
her funeral, her 19 year old fiancé became similarly ill, was “brought to the GIMC emergency 
room in full respiratory and cardiac arrest and died shortly thereafter” (p. 120).  These were the 
first two patients of a soon to be epidemic that was spreading through the Four Corners – the 
name given to a region within Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, and Utah – in which a number 
of Navajo reservations are located.  Although the as yet unidentified disease was seemingly 
targeting only Navajo people (hence the name ‘Navajo Plague’), restaurants and businesses in 
communities adjoining the reservations began refusing to serve anyone who appeared to be 
Navajo in descent, people began cancelling vacation reservations in the south, and “the national 
media jumped to the conclusion that it was because they were Navajo that these individuals had 
contracted” (pp. 121-122) this acute respiratory distress syndrome.   
Local doctors and health care workers were dumbfounded as to the underlying cause for 
the disease, and so the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) was called in to solve the mystery.  The 
CDC carried out a series of laboratory tests that “failed to identify any of the deaths as caused by 
a known disease such as bubonic plague”  (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012). 
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As additional testing continued, physicians and researchers repeatedly found that “The particular 
mixture of symptoms and clinical findings pointed… away from possible causes, such as 
exposure to a herbicide or a new type of influenza, and toward some type of virus”.  Tissue 
samples were analyzed by virologists at the CDC, ultimately leading to the identification of a 
previously undocumented type of hantavirus.  The species of mouse (the deer mouse) known to 
carry and transmit this virus through its fecal matter and urine is not considered endemic to the 
Four Corners environment, and for this reason, hantavirus had not been considered in the original 
testing.  Had hantavirus been included within the possible underlying diseases that were 
originally tested for, many of the deaths may have been prevented.  
However, at least one of the healers in the affected Navajo reservations knew that a 
change in climate could result in the deer mouse being, at least temporarily, endemic to the Four 
Corners.  In fact, early on in the investigation, a worker from the CDC , who was of Navajo 
descent, had gone to see one of the Navajo healers to ask about the disease.  The healer replied 
by showing the CDC worker a photograph of a sand painting with a mouse in it, and he also told 
the worker that “many years ago such a sickness had occurred and that the sand painting had 
been used to treat it” (Arviso, & Cohen, 1999, p. 122).  In reality, the sand painting did more 
than identify the particular breed of mouse responsible for the illness.  It also explained why the 
population size of the deer mouse would increase: three or more years of excessive rain leads to 
increased production of the seeds of the dwarf pine trees in the area, and those seeds are one of 
the best food sources for the deer mouse.  When finishing his sharing of the story of the sand 
painting, the healer told the worker to share this knowledge with the CDC, and more specifically, 
to “‘Look to the mouse’” (p. 122).  
Sadly, in all of the documented knowledge about this outbreak, there is no mention of 
anyone else (not even the Navajos living on the reservations) approaching the healer for 
information.  Like the scientists, most Navajo people believed that this outbreak must be 
something new, beyond and foreign to their traditional knowledge.  Upon receipt of the 
information from the Navajo healer, the CDC dismissed it because the deer mouse is not 
endemic to the four corners – they chose to ignore the context, namely the story of why the mice 
would come into the region.   
The CDC has officially acknowledged that: “Navajo Indians… recognize a similar 
disease in their medical traditions, and actually associate its occurrence with mice.  As strikingly, 
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Navajo medical beliefs concur with public health recommendations for preventing the disease” 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012).  Perhaps, if the traditional Navajo 
knowledge and ways of knowing had been valued by the scientific practitioners and, 
dishearteningly, by the Navajo people themselves, the hantavirus diagnosis would have occurred 
sooner, and fewer young and promising lives would have been lost.  And, perhaps research into 
risk education would benefit from acknowledging the value of asking to learn and listening to 
traditional knowledges such as that of the Navajo healer  -- knowledge which is neither rational 
(in the Western sense), abstract, or affective in origin.  
Tsunami, 2004 
On Dec. 26, 2004, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake, centered near the west coast of Sumatra 
and under the Indian Ocean, occurred.  The energy released by this earthquake has been 
estimated to be equivalent to 23 000 atomic bombs equal to those used on Hiroshima.  The 
resulting tsunami a few hours later had waves that moved at the speed of a jet  (National 
Geographic News, January 5, 2005).  Pictures and videos of homes, people, animals, and all 
kinds of belongings being swept into the ocean flooded the media.  More than 150 000 people 
were instantly dead (or missing and presumed dead), with some estimates being placed at       
250 000 and higher, and millions lost everything they had.  Despite all of the technology and 
scientific models available to predict and communicate risks of earthquakes and tsunamis, 
scientists were unable to provide adequate warning for the event.   
Yet, a number of Indigenous groups, frequently ignored or seen as inferior to other 
human inhabitants in the region, survived en masse.  Unfortunately, the same was not true for the 
non-Indigenous people inhabiting the same islands and communities.  It was a “survival 
determined by their in-depth knowledge of the environment” (Mercer, Dominey-Howes, 
Kelman, & Lloyd, 2007, p. 251).  As an example, the Moken (or sea gypsies), an Indigenous 
group from Thailand who live on the Indian islands of Andaman and Nicobar “managed to 
anticipate the tsunami danger.  Their knowledge of wind, tides, and the animals, which had been 
passed down from generation to generation, prepared them to deal with the natural disaster” 
(Perez, n. d., p. 1).  Part of this knowledge included the silence of the cicadas, which was 
understood to tell the people to run for higher ground, and they did.  
Similar examples from onslaught of the tsunami can be found throughout the region’s 
Indigenous peoples, including those who live on Nias Island where, not only did the Indigenous 
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people survive, but so too did their homes that were nearly 100 years old while the new modern 
homes on the island were destroyed.  Neither is it emotional knowledge.   It is the traditional 
knowledge of the people, the knowledge that has been preserved and carried forward through 
generations of oral traditions.  It is spiritual knowledge, intuitional knowledge, physical 
knowledge, and probably even experiential knowledge.  No known testing, isolation, 
compartmentalization, or abstraction of the knowledge was, or had been previously, done.  
Analysis of Risk Education, Risk Analysis, and Risk-Based Decision-Making; Navajo 
Plague, 1993; and Tsunami, 2004 
Based on the above understandings of risk education, analysis, and decision-making, 
along with the knowledge of the Navajo Plague and the 2004 tsunami, I will next proceed to my 
analysis of these risk-related topics.  This analysis will again start with the discussion of the 
prominent features of these topics, followed by a discussion of the responses of the Traditional 
Western worldview and an Indigenous worldview to them, and then will end with the coding and 
explanation of concepts that have emerged. 
Prominent features of risk. 
Highlighted in the above discussion of risk and its positioning within mathematics 
curricula, I have chosen to focus in particular upon risk analysis, risk management, and risk-
based decision-making.  Risk management has become a feature of every day life, and thus 
decision-making in relation to risk has moved to the foreground of important content for students 
to learn.  To date, within Saskatchewan, however, an analysis of the mathematics curricula 
reveals that risk is not explicitly included, and it is only as an indirect consequence of engaging 
with (objective and subjective) probabilistic knowledge that risk analysis and risk-based decision 
making might enter into a Saskatchewan student’s education.  
The assessment of risk is generally associated with two different ways of knowing about 
risk: personally defined and rationally derived; however there is great variance in terms of how 
individuals balance (or do not balance) the two.  For example, Martignon and Krauss (2009) 
emphasize only the rationally derived ways of knowing and thinking about risk.  In their work, 
the two researchers lay out a specific trajectory through which students learn how to rationally 
come to think about and assess risk. 
Kent et. al. (2010), on the other hand, are researching the valuing of both personally 
determined interpretations of risk and rationally originating assessments of risk.  In addition, 
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they are investigating how to help individuals blend the two different ways of knowing about 
risk (personally and rationally) to make better-informed decisions. 
 The two specific risk-related examples (the Navajo Plague and the tsunami of 2004) 
provide a less theoretical look at how risk can be assessed and managed.  In the case of the 
Navajo Plague, the traditional Navajo healer had knowledge related to the risk that was 
devastating his community, but others, were not valuing it such as many of the CDC researchers 
and the community members, because it was not rationally derived knowledge.  However, the 
healer’s knowledge was also not personally defined risk knowledge, as the healer himself had no 
previous personal experience with the disease that was over-running his community.  Instead, the 
healer’s knowledge was traditional cultural knowledge, based upon experiences and the 
knowledges of past healers and past down to him through the use of sand paintings.  Because this 
way of knowing about the risk that faced his community was not valued within his community 
(or even sought) or by most of the CDC researchers, many people likely needlessly died from the 
onslaught of the hantavirus. 
The example of the 2004 tsunami also highlights the existence of traditional cultural 
knowledge that is neither personally nor rationally derived.  In this case, the Indigenous people 
chose to heed their traditional cultural knowledge resulting in their escaping from certain death.  
Other people in the same locations did not have, nor did they inquire about this traditional 
cultural knowledge, and consequently did not know about the preeminence of the tsunami.  Most 
of them died as a result.  
Thus, within the researching of the teaching and learning about risk analysis, risk 
management, and risk-based decision making, two ways of knowing are being considered as 
potentially valuable: personal response based upon one’s own experiences and inferences, and 
rationally derived calculations of risk.  From the two examples provided, however, a third way of 
knowing related to risk also emerges, namely through traditional cultural knowledges.  With this 
understanding of how risk can be analyzed and understood, as well as an understanding of how 
risk is currently addressed within Saskatchewan’s mathematics curricula, I now turn to the 
results of hermeneutically considering how the Traditional Western worldview would respond to 
these prominent features related to risk. 
Dialogue with the Traditional Western worldview. 
From the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview, the consideration of risk as a 
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topic of learning for students would be considered beneficial from the perspective that the 
inclusion of risk within mathematics curricula would serve to further promote probabilistic 
thinking within the hierarchies of knowledges of value.  Thus, knowing about risk through 
rational analysis involving probability would also be considered valuable.   
Further, a person grounded within the Traditional Western worldview would value the 
research of Martignon and Krauss (2009) for its focus on discrete mathematical processes that 
provide rational knowledge pertaining to risk.  However, considering personal impressions and 
inferences, such as what is emphasized in Kent et. al.’s (2010) research, would be seen as 
unnecessary and even muddying of the truth that rational analysis secures.  
The final way of knowing about risk, which is introduced through the examples of the 
two risk-bound situations would be an even further step away from the ways of knowing that are 
valued within the Traditional Western worldview.  The traditional cultural knowledge that 
provides information that is pertinent to understanding the risk in each situation is not rationally 
bound as is expected of the Traditional Western worldview.  Instead, this knowledge would 
likely be perceived by a person grounded within the Traditional Western worldview as emotional 
or even spiritual knowledge, neither of which is considered of any value within this worldview.  
Overall then, the Traditional Western worldview would only value risk being part of 
students’ learning about probability, and in so doing, all of the emphasis would be upon 
objective (rational) knowledge versus knowledge based upon personal experience or 
“unverified” traditional cultural knowledge.  With this understanding from risk and risk 
education from the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview, I next turn to a discussion 
of how a person grounded with an Indigenous worldview would respond to the same information 
about risk education. 
Dialogue with an Indigenous worldview. 
From the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, all three ways of knowing about risk 
(rational, personal, and traditional cultural) would be viewed as valuable as they would allow for 
diverse understanding of risk and risk-based decision-making.  Further, the notion that in a given 
context, one or two of these ways of knowing might play a more important role in assessing and 
understanding the risk that is present than the other(s) would be equally acceptable.   
Thus, from an Indigenous worldview perspective, in the cases of the Navajo plague and 
the 2004 tsunami, choosing to respond to the situation solely on the basis of traditional cultural 
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knowledge would not have been questioned.  Likewise, using any combination of the three ways 
of knowing discovered so far to make decisions and respond to the risks in those same questions 
would also be acceptable.  Thus, a person grounded within an Indigenous worldview would 
accept the knowledge gained through Martignon and Krauss’ (2009) research; however, the same 
person would see greater value in the work of Kent et. al. (2010) because of its emphasis on 
more than one way of knowing.   
From the perspective of an Indigenous worldview, the incorporation of risk education 
into student learning would also be viewed as highly valuable.  Since risk analysis, risk 
management, and risk-based decision-making are now a regular part of our daily lives, a person 
grounded within an Indigenous worldview would see such knowledge, if open to different ways 
of knowing, as knowledge of significant value because it would be contributing to the greater 
good. 
With these understandings of how risk education and risk-based decision-making would 
be received by each of the two worldviews (the Traditional Western worldview and an 
Indigenous worldview), I can now turn to the final part of the analysis of these two areas.  
Returning to grounded theory, I now present and discuss the concepts that have emerged from 
both the data and my analysis of it so far.  
Coding and explanation.  
The discussion and analysis of risk education and risk-based decision making once again 
highlights the same concepts as previously mentioned.  Moreover, the coding of these concepts 
against the data again supports the saturation of these concepts.  A detailed description of how 
and where each of the concepts relates to risk education and risk-based decision making follows. 
The concept of hierarchy between different kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing can 
be seen in the different approaches taken to researching risk education.  Martignon and Krauss 
(2009) focus solely on students’ familiarity and use of rational probability-related knowledge 
when considering questions of risk, placing it at the top of the hierarchy of ways of knowing.  
Kent, et. al. (2010), on the other hand, choose to value both rational knowledge and personal 
knowledge within their research.  Further, they encourage the participants to determine for 
themselves the balance that they feel is appropriate between the two ways of knowing.  In this 
way, Kent et. al. are challenging the notion of a hierarchy of ways of knowing, instead letting 
context and individuals define which, if either, of the two ways of knowing are more important.  
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The examples of the Navajo plague and the 2004 tsunami actually parallel these same 
approaches to hierarchy.  In the case of the Navajo plague, no one challenges the supremacy of 
the rational approaches taken by the CDC researchers.  Instead, the CDC officials dismiss the 
healer’s traditional cultural knowledge because it does not align with their rational knowledge, 
and therefore conclude that the healer’s knowledge is incorrect (only later to realize their error).  
The case of the 2004 tsunami, however, demonstrates how the Indigenous people’s choice to 
trust their traditional cultural knowledge over the non-existent rational knowledge of others 
living in the same other, was in the end the best choice that could have been made.  In one case, 
the hierarchy of knowledge denied consideration of alternate ways of knowing, while in the other 
case, there was no hierarchy of knowledge in play for some of the people (the Indigenous), while 
there may have been a hierarchy of knowledge of value for the non-Indigenous people. 
Specialization is also common throughout the entire discussion of risk education and risk-
based decision making.  Within the research of Martignon and Krauss (2009), emphasis is placed 
upon students learning specialized probabilistic processes and knowledges in order to guide their 
decision-making in risk-related situations.  The research of Kent et. al. (2010), on the other hand, 
seeks diversity in approaches to risk versus specialization.  Notably, the two examples (the 
Navajo plague and the 2004 tsunami) return to specialized knowledge in the form of traditional 
cultural knowledge.  In one case (the plague) the specialized (yet contextualized) knowledge is 
discredited and ignored, while in the other (the tsunami) the specialized (yet contextualized) 
knowledge is embraced by some.  The result of these different responses to the specialized 
traditional cultural knowledges is ultimately one of life and death. 
The singularity of knowledge is most clearly emphasized through the research of 
Martignon and Krauss (2009), although it can also be related to the tsunami of 2004.  In the case 
of Martignon and Krauss’ research, the approach that they take towards risk education 
emphasizes the singular importance (even dominance) of rational understandings of probability 
upon risk analysis and risk-based decision-making.  Probability is presented the “right” way to 
analyze and make decisions related to risk.  In the case of the tsunami of 2004, there is also a 
singularity of knowledge (specifically traditional cultural knowledge) presented; however, this 
may be more the result of the availability of data with respect to the event than a reflection of the 
kinds of knowledge that were available for use at the time. 
Categorization and isolation of knowledge is also present within both Martignon and 
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Krauss’ (2009) research and the research of Kent et. al (2010).  In the first case, Martignon and 
Krauss isolate various pieces of mathematical knowledge to build towards (in a hierarchical 
fashion) students’ singular understanding of risk.  On the other hand, although they do categorize 
the ways of knowing risk into personal and rational, do not seek to have their participants keep 
these two ways of knowing isolated, rather they encourage the participants to find ways to 
integrate and bridge the personal and rational ways of knowing about risk.  Even in my own 
analysis of the two situations (the Navajo plague and the 2004 tsunami), I have insisted on the 
categorization of the way of knowing being presented in order to differentiate it from the 
personal and the rational, which is emphasized in other research in the field.  
Within Martignon and Krauss’s (2009) research, relationship and context are only present 
to serve as tools for engaging the students in the desired probabilistic learnings.  For Kent et. al. 
(2010), however, the context of Deborah’s dilemma is deliberately chosen for how the 
participants may be able to relate to and personalize Deborah’s situation.  Further, the concepts 
of relationship and context play an even larger role within the two examples of risk-based 
situations (the Navajo plague and the 2004 tsunami) because the traditional cultural knowledge is 
contextual bound and it focuses on relationships between humans, animals, and the world that 
they live in. 
The concept of power and authority emerges from this data and its analysis in two 
different ways.  First, in Martignon and Krauss’ (2009) research, the selection of a particular 
trajectory (and the accompanying justification for that specific trajectory) is clearly grounded 
with an assumption of both a hierarchy of probabilistic notions and knowledges as consequently 
within the authority and power attributed to each part of the trajectory.  In the research of Kent 
et. al. (2010), rather than the power and authority being attributed by the researchers to a 
particular kind of knowledge, or a specific way of combining two different ways of knowing, the 
power and authority for making such decisions is turned over to the participants.  In so saying, it 
must be noted that the researchers do nudge the participants into considering deeply where and 
how they will assign the power and authority of either or both ways of knowing and their 
resulting knowledges; however, they do not tell the participants any “right” way of assigning that 
power and authority.  Finally, the two stories once again demonstrate both sides of the concept of 
power and authority.  In the case of the Navajo plague, power and authority is assigned by (and 
to) the CDC officials (and by almost everyone else involved) specifically to scientific 
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experimentation and analysis; whereas, in the case of the tsunami of 2004, power and authority 
was assigned to the traditional cultural knowledge, not by some outside specialist, but rather by 
the individuals who are directly in relation to the risk at hand.  
Finally, the concept of abstraction is also a site of a dual interpretation within this section 
of the data.  Whereas the research of Martignon and Krauss (2009) is focused on helping 
students obtain abstract understandings of a series of probability-related knowledges, Kent et. al. 
(2010) seek to find ways for their participants to find value within and grapple with their 
personal thinking about risk and risk-based decision-making.  
At this point within my overall analyses, the concepts of hierarchy, specialization, 
singularity, categorization and isolation, relationship, power and authority, abstraction, and 
context (story) have consistently reappeared, and, I contend, the explanations of how these 
concepts related to the particular parts of data has resulted in a complete saturation of each of 
these concepts.  Further, as each concept has been repetitively explored and explained through 
the contexts of the data being analyzed, all of the concepts have been crossing the artificial 
boundaries that the initial coding placed between them.  A discussion of hierarchy, whether it is 
in support of the concept or in opposition, is naturally connected to specialization, singularity, 
and so one.  In fact, all of the initial concepts that were coded and reported on by the end of my 
story’s reflections upon my days as an undergraduate student have now also become saturated 
within a single conceptual category that I have labeled as  “attributes of mathematics and the 
teaching and learning of mathematics”.  
As will be discussed shortly, this broad conceptual category next leads me to a new 
theory pertaining to my research question, “What ways of knowing and kinds of knowledge are, 
and possibly could be, valued within mathematics and the teaching and learning of 
mathematics?”  Before I propose this new theory, however, I want to first return to the 
theoretical framework (of the Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous worldview, 
which has played such a prominent (and hermeneutical) role within the analysis of my data.  I do 
so to further justify the inclusion of this framework within my research and its use in the analysis 
by discussing how this framework might further be used within mathematics education research.  
I have chosen to place this discussion at this point within my dissertation, because I now believe 
that the reader has significant understanding of the two worldviews that will allow them to better 
understand how the framework might be used within research.  Moreover, I have chosen this 
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location, prior to the introduction of the theory that has emerged from the data and analysis, to 
further reinforce the readers appreciation for how the framework has contributed to the coding 
and saturation of the concepts and the conceptual category that emerged. 
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Research Possibilities for my Theoretical Framework 
As the theoretical framework that I presented at the end of my story has been 
foundational to the analysis of my research data, some final words in relation to the potential of 
the framework in relation to the researching of the teaching and learning of mathematics seem 
appropriate.  Thus, in this section, I briefly describe how I see the framework of the Traditional 
Western worldview and an Indigenous worldview might be applied within future research.    
First, I must acknowledge the obvious, which is that all of the analysis in my dissertation 
relating to the two worldviews has been a demonstration of one way that the framework can be 
used within the researching of mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics.  In 
particular, I have been using the two worldview lenses to look into different aspects of 
mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics in order to identify the kinds of 
knowledge and ways of knowing that are being valued within different situations and 
presentations.  I also propose that the worldview framework can be used to theorize about how 
the boundaries of the topic being researched would appear when grounded within each of the two 
worldviews or some mix of the two.  In addition, my theoretical framework can also be used as a 
catalyst for change and the analysis of those changes.   
In the following sections, I further elaborate upon each of these types of uses for the 
framework within research, providing examples for each coming from the results of a research 
project funded by the Dr. Stirling McDowell Foundation for Research into Teaching that was 
intended to investigate one question, but ended upon revealing and suggesting answers to very 
different questions (see Russell & Chernoff, 2013).  I begin by considering the use of the two 
worldviews as lenses for looking in. 
Looking Inwards: Worldview Analysis of Mathematics and the Teaching and Learning of 
Mathematics 
As previously noted, much of the analysis done so far in this dissertation falls into this 
particular way of using the theoretical framework in research.  When using the worldviews to 
look inwards, the purpose is to look for connections and divergences between the subject matter 
(in this case, mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics) and each of the 
worldviews.  The conclusions of such research could reveal not only a sense of alignment 
between the subject matter and the particular worldviews, but also a clear picture of what ways 
of knowing and kinds of knowledge are being valued and which are not.  Such research is of 
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value as it can be used to inform and give further research questions (as this very work 
demonstrates) by providing insights into the subject of the research that might not otherwise be 
obvious or even considered important regarding attitudes, beliefs, and processes.  
As an example of this type of use of my theoretical framework (taken from the research 
project mentioned above) although the original research question was “what impacts does the 
grounding of the teaching and learning of mathematics within an Indigenous worldview have 
upon students’ (1) affective response to mathematics and mathematics learning, and (2) 
academic achievement in learning mathematics,” much of the data collected provided insights 
into the kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing that the teachers themselves were valuing in 
their teaching.  Although the aim of the research project was to have the teaching and learning of 
mathematics grounded within an Indigenous Worldview, there were numerous incidents in which 
the values held and communicated by the teachers could be more directly correlated to the values 
of the Traditional Western Worldview than to those of an Indigenous Worldview.  Reflections 
upon these conclusions has led me to consider the determining of one’s positioning with respect 
to the two worldviews prior to trying to incorporate any or all aspects of either or both is 
important for understanding what happens when changes are attempted. 
Examining and Challenging the Boundaries 
The second way in which the theoretical worldview framework can be used within 
research related to mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics is by first 
identifying and then challenging the boundaries placed upon the kinds of knowledge and the 
ways of knowing that are being valued.  The analyses done in previous sections of this 
dissertation also demonstrate the first part of this use of the framework in that they not was what 
was being valued identified, but also what was not.  By identifying limitations that can be 
observed through the two worldview lenses, the impacts of those limitations can then be 
researched. 
Within the aforementioned research project (see Russell, & Chernoff, 2013), this type of 
use of my theoretical framework bore out when incidents were noted and analyzed where the 
teachers moved away from their attempt to be grounded within an Indigenous Worldview and 
back into the Traditional Western Worldview.  As an example, when confronted by her students 
being unable to complete a task involving the hundred chart, one of the teachers (Sharon) told 
myself (the researcher), and the other teachers in our working group that her only recourse was 
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to reteach her students about the hundred chart despite her own misgivings about how the chart 
was constructed.  At that moment, Sharon’s openness to valuing diverse ways of knowing and 
kinds of knowledge was shut down by the event that had happened, and she was planning upon 
returning to the Traditional Western Worldview reasoning of their being one “right” way of 
obtaining and representing knowledge.  Without this framework being front and centre within the 
research, this incident may very well have gone unnoticed or not critiqued; however, Sharon’s 
statement immediately initiated a conversation, primarily amongst the teachers, about whether 
the hundred chart had to be given that particular layout, or if others were not only possible, but 
actually preferable.   
Consequently, this discussion shifted Sharon’s thinking out of the boundaries defined by 
the Traditional Western Worldview and back into thinking that was more aligned with an 
Indigenous Worldview.  This is but one of many such examples of how shifts in the boundaries 
of the teachers thinking about the kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing that are of value 
were easily identified and ultimately challenged through the use of the worldview framework. 
A Catalyst for Change 
The final way in which the framework based upon the Traditional Western Worldview 
and an Indigenous Worldview can be used within research is as a catalyst for change.  The two 
worldviews provide a schema for thinking about what ways of knowing and knowledge can, 
might, or even should be valued within mathematics and the teaching and learning of 
mathematics.  Either worldview, or any portion thereof, can thus be used as a catalyst for desired 
change, the effectiveness of which can then be analyzed and reported on.  Examples of how the 
worldview framework can be used in this capacity come in the after stories discussed by Russell 
and Chernoff (2013).  In each of these after stories, the impact on the teachers and students of the 
teachers responses to incidents of intrusion by the Traditional Western Worldview into their 
teaching of mathematics are presented and discussed.  In each instance, the teachers’ awareness 
of what worldview they were grounding themselves in and why ultimately led to desired 
outcomes in the students learning.  To this point in my dissertation, I have not applied my 
theoretical framework to my research in this final way; however, it will come to take a leading 
role in the theory that has emerged from the data and its analysis.  I now move onto the 
presentation and discussion of that theory.  
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The Emergence of a Theory 
Through the saturation of the concepts coded and reported upon (namely, hierarchy, 
specialization, singularity, categorization and isolation, relationship, power and authority, 
abstraction, and context) within the analyses of the data, as well as the combining of these 
concepts into a saturated conceptual category (“attributes of mathematics and the teaching and 
learning of mathematics”), the emergence of a theory is now immanent.  This theory is also 
directly tied to the claim that the theoretical framework used within all of the analyses may in 
fact hold a key to some different forms of resolution to the crises, difference, conflict, and 
confusion that has emerged within the data on mathematics and the teaching and learning of 
mathematics. 
 I have named the theory that I am about to describe the Transreform Approach to 
Mathematics and the Teaching and Learning of Mathematics (hereafter called the Transreform 
Approach).  Stated plainly, the Transreform Approach is achieved by grounding oneself within 
an Indigenous Worldview.  This explicitly means that the kinds of mathematical knowledge and 
ways of knowing that are valued (including how mathematics is taught and learned) align with 
the Indigenous Worldview.  I have selected the term “transreform” with great purpose, in that the 
Transreform approach embodies all aspects of the prefix of “trans,” referring not only to the 
joining of the traditional approach and the reform approaches to the teaching and learning of 
mathematics, but also to the notion of providing a means of transit between and beyond both of 
these assumed realities.   
At first glance one might think this proposal illogical and detrimental, a proverbial 
swapping of the baby out for the bath water.  Contrarily, I argue that by grounding ourselves 
within an Indigenous worldview, we would be ensuring that nothing related to mathematical 
knowledge and ways of knowing would be lost; rather, more (hopefully all) would be 
acknowledged and valued for how they contribute, particularly within specific contexts.  This 
would be the case because, in abstract mathematical terms, the Traditional Western Worldview 
can be contained within an Indigenous Worldview.  That is to say, because an Indigenous 
Worldview considers what knowledge and ways of knowing are of value based upon context, 
then the knowledge and ways of knowing valued within the Traditional Western Worldview, 
which have contexts in which they are not just needed, but mandatory, would have places in an 
Indigenous Worldview where they would be most valued.  Conversely, the Traditional Western 
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Worldview would not be able to always house the values of an Indigenous Worldview.  
It is also important to note that the Transreform Approach is not a defining of a middle 
ground within a dichotomized situation, such as seen in the math wars.  Instead, the Transreform 
Approach removes the instances of dichotomy by allowing the two ends of any spectrum to 
become just two options within a far more extensive playing field of possibilities, options that 
will be more or less valued depending upon the place, time, and person (people) involved.  In 
some cases, the context or place will dictate what kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing are 
most valued (for instance, in a scientific journal, abstract and isolated mathematics would be of 
most value), in other instances, the place in which it is occurring as well as the time available 
may decide what is most valuable.  On other occasions it may be the person, who arbitrarily or 
with great purpose, decides what is of value.  
Potential of the Theory 
 The Transreform Approach has many potential impacts (related specifically to the 
data presented within this dissertation), which I now state as a list of numbered hypotheses (with 
defense) below: 
1. The Transreform Approach can help Indigenous students, in fact all students, find 
ways to relate to and “find themselves” within the mathematics they learn and 
use.  By grounding teaching and learning within an Indigenous Worldview, 
opportunities for students to bring their ways of knowing and knowledge about 
mathematics forward will naturally occur, giving all students entry points into the 
learning, regardless of whether the ultimate mathematics to be learned is to be 
abstracted and categorized, or not.  It will allow the students to bring to the table 
their stories, their emotions, their intuitions, their physical understandings, their 
spiritual understandings, and so on, in order to address the questions posed, and 
by doing so, personalize the mathematics for the individual students.  This I 
believe is what was missing for the student that told me that he now “knew what 
mathematics wanted from [him].”  That student had been looking for a way to 
build a relationship with mathematics, and by grounding the teaching and learning 
within an Indigenous Worldview, the creation and maintaining of such 
relationships can be possible in ways most meaningful to the individual students. 
2. The Transreform Approach does not negate existing boundaries on mathematics 
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and the teaching and learning of mathematics; rather, it will clarify those 
boundaries with respect to their context, while extending and even creating new 
boundaries for mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing that are suited to 
alternative contexts and needs.  Thus, the Transreform Approach does not throw 
out the Traditional Western worldview; rather, it recognizes it as part of a larger 
set of values.  In this way, this theory is not a middle ground, nor is it a total 
remake, such as changing from traditional to reform approaches might appear, it 
is a broadening of perspective to make room for not only the traditional and the 
reform, but also for those ways of knowing and kinds of knowledge which have 
never been valued within Western mathematics.  The Transreform Approach 
would also result in the reclaiming and re-envisioning of Bishop’s term 
‘Mathematics’, where absolute power and authority would not be given over to 
Western mathematics, but instead, the name would now stand for all of 
Mathematics – Western, enthnomathematical, and whatever else may come to 
pass.  Western society only owns the word mathematics because it assumed the 
authority to claim it and the power of using it.  The Transreform Approach gives 
us the opportunity to redefine mathematics (or Mathematics) and make it word 
associated with all mathematical ways of knowing and kinds of knowledge. 
3. The Transreform Approach can expand and strengthen mathematical 
understanding and ability.  By opening mathematics up to alternative ways of 
knowing and kinds of knowledge, such as the traditional knowledges foundational 
to the examples of the hantavirus outbreak and the tsunami, mathematics itself 
will have ways to grow previously denied to it, and all people (mathematicians 
and non-mathematicians, Indigenous and non-Indigenous) will benefit from the 
changes and expansion in knowledge and thinking. 
4. The Transreform Approach can eliminate the need for the math wars.  In some 
respects, how this would be achieved is similar to that proposed by those seeking 
the middle ground; however, the Transreform Approach would not require a 
singular resolution.  That is to say, the Transreform Approach would not relegate 
one approach to be the servant of the other, such as reform methods serving the 
role of solidifying traditional Western mathematical knowledge. Within the 
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Transreform Approach, the traditional approach and the reform approach could 
interact in any number of ways, or even completely alternative approaches could 
enter into the processes of teaching and learning.  For example, neither the 
traditionalists nor the reformists propose approaches that would be easily 
amenable to the inclusion of the traditional knowledge found in data.  
Consequently, the Transreform Approach could help guide curricular reform to be 
more meaningful and responsive to all students and their particular learning styles 
and needs.  
5. The Transreform Approach would be supportive and receptive to the use of my 
theoretical worldview framework.  The use of this framework has shown to 
provide unique, meaningful, and useful insights into mathematics and the teaching 
and learning of mathematics.  In fact, without this theoretical framework, the 
theory I propose would not have come into existence. 
6. The Transreform Approach broadens what Bishop (1991) defines as the 
“openness of mathematics” or what other philosophies and claims call the 
“universality of mathematics” so that mathematics communication and 
understanding becomes truly open.  Within the Transreform Approach, there is 
not one way of communicating about mathematics because there is not one way 
of representing it.  Thus, not only people who are Western mathematicians can 
communicate with each other, regardless of where they are from; anyone can 
communicate mathematically and meaningfully with anyone else.  
7. Finally, while removing all of the points of contention and sources of tension 
from my story and the data presented, the Transreform Approach does require the 
conceptualization of a philosophy of mathematics that supports and substantiates 
the theory.  I will now briefly outline such a philosophy. 
 
 
Philosophy of the Transreform Approach 
Since none of the existing philosophies of mathematics aligned with either the Traditional 
Western or an Indigenous worldview, then it is safe to assume that none of those same 
philosophies can embrace the knowledge and ways of knowing valued by the Transreform 
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Approach.  And, if none of the existing philosophies are capable of embracing the Transreform 
Approach, then a new philosophy is needed (to use a Western “if-thenism”).  It seems only 
fitting that this philosophy would acknowledge the circumstances under which it is created, and 
thus it should include the term “transreform” to represent how this philosophy must be broad 
enough, and open enough, to allow traditional and reform mathematics teaching and learning to 
be seen as valuable.  Further, the term transreform, as associated previously with grounding of 
the teaching and learning of mathematics within an Indigenous worldview, communicates the 
valuing of all kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing mathematically (for the contexts in 
which they are most relevant), regardless of whether they can be housed within either camp from 
the math wars or neither of them. 
Next, this philosophy has to be radical, but more than that, it needs to be radically 
humanistic.  Scholarly research tells us that humanism, and recognition of the “human face of 
things” (such as mathematics, in this case), can in itself be a slippery slope towards oppression 
and subjugation.  In particular, Smith (1999) explains how humanistic research methods actually 
gave permission to researchers to apply very specific definitions of who is human and who is not 
within their research, strengthening the impact of the hegemony and oppression that continues to 
grow as a result of colonization and slavery.  The humanistic feature of this proposed philosophy 
must not allow for this kind of segregation and devaluing of certain people and ideas – it must be 
radically different, a radical humanism that equitably values all people, all of their knowledges, 
and all of their ways of knowing. 
Marrying this understanding of radical humanism with the transreform grounding of 
mathematics results in a new philosophy of mathematics, which has room for both Bishops’ 
Mathematics, and for all of the mathematics that has been disregarded by that Mathematics and 
its practitioners.  It is the conscious grounding of what mathematics is in an Indigenous 
worldview; where dichotomies cease to exist and viability truly determines worth (and possibly 
truth); a contextual and time-defined variable whose measurement is solely the responsibility of 
those who are using it in a particular time and within a particular context.  This is the 
transreform radical humanistic philosophy of mathematics. 
Within this philosophy of mathematics, those who stand outside a particular context and 
time may only reflect, but not pass judgment on how others have proceeded; recognizing how the 
mathematics might have been different for them if they had been in that time and place, without 
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condemning the mathematics that actually is or was.  Truth belongs to the mathematician(s) at 
work; it can inform other mathematicians in their work – it can contradict, complement, or just 
expand the work of others, but it can never be presumed to be the truth of others.   
School mathematics, then, becomes mathematics in which students contemplate the truths 
of mathematical questions and activities, understanding other’s truths and relating them to one’s 
own, but ultimately developing the mathematical tools necessary for the students to succeed in 
their mathematical futures, whatever form and in whatever context they might be encountered.  
Western mathematics belongs in school mathematics, as it does elsewhere; however, it 
must necessarily relinquish absolute authority when confronted by someone else’s viable 
alternatives.  If mathematics can come to live as transreform radical humanistic mathematics, 
there is promise for great strides being made in reversing, and even eliminating, the oppressing 
and privileging of people and their thinking, as well as strengthening everyone’s mathematical 
understandings and abilities.  There is also the promise of mathematics itself growing as a result. 
The philosophy of transreform radical humanistic mathematics proposes moving away from 
saying “it may be possible for other mathematics to exist” to saying “let’s celebrate, and benefit 
from the diversity of what we know and can come to know as mathematics.” 
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Reflections on my Choice of Data Sources and Methodologies 
At times, as I worked through the sharing and analysis of my data, I questioned whether 
my choices in terms of data sources, methodologies, and methods were ultimately being 
influenced by where my worldview positioning was located, and of course it was.  Worldview 
influences all of our decisions, as that is its role.  However, I also came to realize that by 
assuming the role of speaking with both the Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous 
worldview, I was also allowing myself, and my research to be open to alternative perspectives 
that would not have been present, or even considered, without the use of this theoretical 
framework. 
So, at this point, I provide, in a style grounded within the Traditional Western worldview 
(because of its categorization and isolation of features of my research, without consideration of 
relationships or story), my analysis of my data sources and methodologies choices: 
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Table  2:  Data  Source/Methodology  Worldview  Alignments  
 Traditional Western 
worldview alignment 
Indigenous worldview 
alignment 
Data Sources   
My story 
 
• Too much context  
• Very little valid 
knowledge 
• Justification of future data 
sources not necessary 
• Foundational  
• Establishing relationships 
Philosophy of mathematics 
Math Wars  
Indigenous Students and 
Ethnomathematics,  
Risk Education 
Use in Research 
• Factual data 
• Too much consideration of 
story and relationships 
• Relationship to story 
• Contextualization 
• Diversity of knowledge 
Methodologies   
Auto/ethnography  • Too much focus on self – 
distancing needed 
• Self in relation to context 
and others is of value 
Gadamerian hermeneutics • Traditional Western 
worldview dialogue 
establishes what is 
important 
• Indigenous worldview 
dialogue is impractical 
• Traditional Western 
worldview dialogue is 
limiting 
• Indigenous Worldview 
dialogue is 
accommodating 
• Two dialogues together 
are respecting of dialogue 
Grounded Theory • Initial coding – detailed 
and categorized 
• Axial coding – too much 
broadening of the 
categories 
• Theory generation – not 
measurable nor are all data 
sources reproducible  
• Initial coding – fairly 
narrow coding; however, 
diversity in codes 
• Axial coding – 
establishment of 
relationships and 
contextualizing 
• Theory generation – 
recognizing of valuable 
relationships and 
contributions of both 
worldviews 
 
 
What I hope that this table demonstrates is not an equality in alignment (Traditional Western 
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worldview) nor an equitable alignment (Indigenous worldview); rather, I hope it shows that 
neither worldview was wholly denied within my research.  For each worldview, there were sites 
of value; moreover, those sites of value all contributed to my overall analyses, coding, and 
theory.  In recognizing this, although I still feel the pull towards more equality or equity at times, 
I am comfortable in my choices of data sources and methodologies, and the conclusions that they 
ultimately afforded me.  Perhaps, the above table even embodies my own worldview in relation 
to mathematical knowledge and ways of knowing that are of value – a “Gadamerian-esque” 
dialogue between the two worldviews. 
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Reflections 
When reflecting upon the knowledge that the Indigenous people had and used to avoid 
the ravages of the tsunami, Mercer, Dominey-Howes, Kelman, and Lloyd (2007) stated that 
these kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing are “increasingly recognized in the international 
arena, yet [are] frequently overlooked in practice” (p. 247), often with great cost to human lives 
and wellbeing. It is time to stop just seeing the other possibilities but not valuing them, and the 
Transreform Approach provides a theoretical basis for how this can be done.  
Mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics are rife with conflicts and 
crises – some well documented (such as the math wars and the struggles of Indigenous students) 
and others less well known (such as the variety of and clashing between the philosophies of 
mathematics).  I propose, not without evidence, that my theoretical framework and the resulting 
Transreform Approach theory could be important pieces in the work to eliminate these problems 
as well as to expand what mathematics is and what should be valued within it.   
The Transreform approach requires one’s examination and reflection upon their own 
views about mathematics and the teaching and learning of mathematics, as well as the kinds of 
knowledge and ways of knowing that they do and do not value.  The Transreform Approach 
gives a route for attaining the equity in mathematical thinking and doing that ethnomathematics 
demonstrates is sorely missing, and it is an avenue through which students and teachers can 
engage in culturally sensitive mathematics education. 
The Transreform Approach provides the opportunity to change how “instutionalized 
Eurocentric curricula constantly reinforce the racial and sexual inferiority complexes among 
people of color and women” (Anderson, 1997, p.293), by acknowledging and valuing the 
knowledge and ways of knowing of everyone.  As Barta (2001) so eloquently wrote, “Our 
classrooms must become places where children learn to value differences and respect variety. 
For hope to be alive, we must teach our children that as human beings, we do many of the same 
things, yet because of our individual and collective cultures, we do those things differently.  The 
problem is not the differences but rather our learned responses to them. …. In our mathematics 
classrooms, we can help our students learn that we all count” (p. 305), and this can happen 
through the Transreform Approach.  
Finally, the Transreform Approach challenges Van Eijick and Roth’s (2007) claim that 
the Traditional Western worldview and an Indigenous worldview “are incommensurable with 
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each other” (p. 935) by proposing that, instead of trying to force an Indigenous worldview into 
the authoritative stance of the Traditional Western worldview, one can instead invite the 
Traditional Western worldview into its own special and abstract location within an Indigenous 
worldview.  From that positioning, the Traditional Western worldview can maintain its authority 
and power (within context), while an Indigenous worldview can continue to seek and value 
diversity in the kinds of knowledge and ways of knowing that it has. 
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Moving Forward with the Transreform Approach 
With the proposal of a new theory, the inevitable question of “so what?” arises – what 
can be done with the theory now that it’s been proposed?  Clearly, just issuing a mandate to all 
teachers, students, administrators, and parents, as well as the society as a whole, is not going to 
work, just as proposals to change how mathematics has been traditionally taught to approaches 
that actively engage the students in knowledge creation and understanding have not been widely 
(or in many cases, successfully) implemented and maintained.  So, where to go from here? 
First, it must be recognized that the assumption that mathematics is, almost en masse, 
being taught from the perspective of the Traditional Western worldview is not advisable, even 
though much of the data and it’s analysis presented throughout this document may give that 
impression.  To do so would be to make assumptions about the teachers and their worldviews.  
Even to assume that all teachers of Western origins are grounded within the Traditional Western 
worldview (see the general discussions of worldviews).  Thus, it would seem the best place to 
start would be to investigate how the teaching and learning of mathematics in different 
classrooms aligns and or misaligns with each of the two worldviews.  By determining what kinds 
of knowledge and ways of knowing are being valued within classrooms, wiser, and more 
respectful, decisions about how to implement the Transreform Approach can be made. 
It will also be important to engage teachers (as well as students, parents, administration, 
the public) in discussion and reflections upon what the grounding of the teaching and learning of 
mathematics within an Indigenous worldview could look like.  It will be important to remember 
that the Transreform Approach may require fundamental belief (worldview) changes for many 
people, and such changes take lots of experiences, time, and support. 
Only once these first two endeavours are in place, can one actually start to research, in 
earnest, the Transreform Approach in action.  Moreover, such research will require patience and 
time, as teachers, students, parents, administrators, and the public, in general, come to both 
understand, and ultimately implement this new theory.  However, having said that, it should also 
be noted that the time is rife with events and situations that will help with the acceptance of an 
Indigenous worldview.  As scientists turn to Indigenous knowledges seeking ideas for how to 
deal with climate change, as reconciliation for the damage (including genocide) done by 
Canada’s residential schools upon our Indigenous peoples is being called for and supported, and 
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as the Métis and all First Nations peoples are being extended the rights previously only given to 
status Indians, Canadians (and thus Saskatchewanians) are starting to consider additional ways of 
thinking and knowing different from those that they were taught and valued.  The Transreform 
Approach could thus be part of thus societal shift, but it needs to be done with respect for 
everyone, and all worldviews involved.  
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